IR 05000341/1989005
| ML20235N078 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fermi  |
| Issue date: | 02/16/1989 |
| From: | Harrison J, Neisler J, Westberg R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20235N076 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-341-89-05-EC, 50-341-89-5-EC, IEIN-87-012, IEIN-87-12, NUDOCS 8903010024 | |
| Download: ML20235N078 (31) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l
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REGION III
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'ReportNo.,50-341/89005(DRS)
. Docket:No. 50-341 License No.-NPF-43-
--Licensee: The Detroit Edison Company 6400 North Dixie Highway Newport, MI 48166 Facility Name:
Fermi 2. Nuclear Power Station
. Meeting At: l Region III; 0ffice, Glen Ellyn, Illinois Meeting Conducted:
February 8,:1989 Type of Meeting:
Enforcement Conference
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Inspectors:.
U OfS!M
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Rolf AKJdestberg
Date 1.h A L ~ L 2h/v John H. N isler Date
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Approved By:
J. J. Harrison, Chief Date
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' Engineering Branch l
Inspection Summary Meeting on February 8,1989 (Report No. 50-341/89005(DRS))-
Matters Discussed: Apparent violations of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B
- were identified by the NRC and information pertinent to the cause, extent, treatment and corrective action to prevent recurrence of the problems were
. presented'by the licensee. The analysis and disposition of the apparent violations will be presented in subsequent communications. The licensee also gave a presentation relative to compliance with 10 CFR 50.62, the ATWS Rule.
8903010024 890217 PDR ADOCK 05000341 Q
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DETAILS l
1.
Persons Contacted a.
Detroit Edison Company (DECO)
B. R. Sylvia, Senior Vice President
- W. S. Orser, Vice President, Nuclear Operations
- S. G. Catola, Vice President, Nuclear Engineering and Service
- R. J. Ballis, Supervisor, Nuclear Engineering
- G. Cranston, General Director, Nuclear Engineering C. R. Gelletly, Supervisor, Special Projects, Nuclear A. P. Marquardt, General Attorney
- T. L. Riley, Supervisor, Compliance R. B. Stafford, Director, Nuclear Quality Assurance and Plant Safety b.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
A. B. Davis, Regional Administrator, Region III
- R. W. Cooper, Section Chief, Region III
- J. J. Harrison, Chief, Engineering Branch, Region III
- R. C. Knop, Projects Branch Chief, Region III
- H.
J. Miller, Director, Division of Reactor Safety, Region III
- W. D. Shafer, Acting Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Safety, Region III
- P. R. Pelke, Project Inspector, Region III
- J. F. Stang, Project Manager, NRR
- H. Li, ICSB Reviewer, NRR
- J. H. Neisler, Reactor Inspector, Electrical
- R. A. Westberg, Reactor Inspector, Electrical i
- R. N. Gardner, Chief, Plant Systems Section
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F. J. Jablonski, Chief, Maintenance and Outages Section H. A. Walker, Reactor Inspector B. W. Stapleton, Enforcement Specialist The preceding persons attended the Enforcement Conference on February 8, 1989.
- Indicates those attending the technical meeting on February 8, 1989.
2.
Enforcement Conference As a result of apparent violations of NRC requirements, an Enforcement Conference was held in the Region III office on february 8, 1989. The preliminary findings which were the bases for these apparent violations of NRC requirements were documented in NRC Inspection Report No. 50-341/89003(DRS) and were transmitted to the licensee by letter dated February 1, 1989.
The attendees of this Conference are noted in Paragraph 1 of this report.
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The purposes of the conference were to:
(1) discuss the findings identified during the special safety inspection conducted January 5-6, I
13-14, and 25, 1989, (2) determine whether there were any mitigating circumstances, (3) obtain other information which would help determine the appropriate enforcement action, and (4) determine what corrective actions had been taken by the licensee and what actions would be taken in the future.
In opening the conference, the hRC representatives identified the following apparent violations of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B:
Criterion XVI - Corrective Action:
Failure to implement corrective action relative to SIL No 448 and Information Notice 87-12 in a timely manner.
Failure of corrective actions taken for previously identified deficiencies to envelope the A train breaker.
Criterion V - Instructions, Drawings, and Procedures:
Failure to lubricate the B train breaker in accordance with the procedure.
Failure to perform an adequate engineering justification for deferring preventive maintenance on the A train breaker in accordance with the procedure.
The licensee presented a summary of the January 4, 1989 event, the results of the background review, the root cause analysis, and corrective actions taken. The licensee also presented specific and general corrective actions to prevent recurrence relative to personnel and DECO quality programs.
(See Attachment 1)
The evaluation and disposition of the apparent violations will be documented in subsequent communications.
3.
ATWS Technical Meeting On February 8, 1989, a meeting was conducted in the Region III Office between members of the Region III Staff, DECO Engineering Personnel, and NRR technical review and project management personnel. The subject of the meeting was compliance with 10 CFR 50.62, the ATWS Rule.
The meeting was chaired by the NRR project manager for the Fermi plant who opened with some general remarks.
The licensee gave a presentation consisting of the following:
a.
Background of the Fermi 2 ATWS design.
b.
Final Rule 10 CFR 50.62 Requirements.
c.
A plant specific review showing how the required ATWS systems meet the rule.
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Implementation schedule.
The staff understood the implementation schedule to be a commitment
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by the licensee as documented in Attachment 2 to this report.
Implementation of the licensee's compliance with the rule will be assessed in a future inspection.
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ATTACHMENT I EVENT SUMMARY o
NOR. MAL ORDERLY PLANT SHUTDOWN - 01/03/89 o
REACTOR MANUALLY TRIPPED o
"B" RECIRCULATION PUMP MG SET TURNED OFF - 01/04/89 o
FIELD BREARER INDICATION SHOWED NOT TRIPPED I
o DISPATCHED AUXILIARY OPERATOR o
FIRE IN ELECTRICAL PANEL o
DE-ENERGIZED CONTROL POWER TO BREAKER o
EQUIPMENT QUARANTINED s
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.c ROOT CAUSE DETERMINATION PROCESS BACKGROUND AREAS REVIEWED o
FAILURE CIRCUMSTANCES
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o DESIGN AND MODIFICATION HISTORY o
OPERATING HISTORY o
SURVEILLANCE HISTORY o
CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE HISTORY
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o PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE HISTORY
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DETAILED TROUBLESB00 TING ACTION PLAN l
EXTERNAL RESOURCES
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BACEGROUND REVIEW RESULifS o
MODIFICATION & CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE ELIMINATED AS POTENTIAL CAUSAL FACTORS
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o SATISFACTORY OPERATING & SURVEILLANCE RESULTS o
UNLIKELY THAT JOURNETMAN LUBED BREAKER DURING MARCH PM
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ROOT CAUSE DETERMINATION-I
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ON-SITE INSPECTION:
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MISALIGNMENT OF CENTER CONTACT
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LACK OF LUBRICANT
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o GE FAILURE ANALTSIS:
MISALIGNMENT (EITRA SHIM)
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LACK OF LUBRICART
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o ROOT CAUSE - PROCEDURAL NON-COMPLIANCE (FAILURE TO LUBE BREAKER IN MARCH 1988)
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CORRECTIVE ACTIONS o
DE-ENERGIZED CONTROL POWER o
BREAKER REPLACEMENT (IN-KIND)
REFURBISHED
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UPGRADED
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CREATE AN "OJT" FOR THESE BREAKERS
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o REVISE PM EVENTS TO COINCIDE WITH 12 MONTH INSPECTION INTERVAL I
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CGtRICFIVE X:TIGIS 'ID PRIMMP HICURREK2 PERSONNEL Soecific Accountctility Meeting On-the-Job Training.
Iessons Learne3 Training General STEPS
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Tech Staff & Managers Training AWP's Incentive Plan Supervisory Training Initiate Quality Circles in Maintenance PROGPAMS Specific Preventive Maintenance Improvement Program Operating Experience Report Enhancement Plan General DER System l
System Engineers
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e ATTACHMENT II-
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AENDA
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BACKGROUND OF FERMI 2 ATWS DESIGN FINAL RULE 10CFR50.62 REQUIREMENTS SYSTEM EVALUATION o STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL SYSTEM (SLCS)
o ALTERNATE ROD INSERTION (ARI)
o RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP (RPT)
IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE (1)
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BACKGROUND OF FERMI 2 ATWS DESIGN Original RPT Design In J
1972
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o MG Set Drive Motor Trip I
o NEDO 10349 i
NUREG 0460 Issued 1978
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o ATWS Mitigation Systems G. E. Assessment of NUREG 0460, Alt. 3 1979
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o RPT/ARI/2.pp SLCS o Limiting ATWS Transients Utility Group on ATWS 1981
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o Deco Participant DECO Position on HPT/ARI 1981
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o Decision to Implement RPT/ARI Fermi 2 SER (NUREG 0798)
............................. July 1981 o Accepts RPT - Monticello
RPT/ARI Implementation
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1982/83 o GE Design i
1984 Pre. Operational Tests
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o ARI Timing / Function o RPT Function Final Rule Effective
................................. July 1984 o 10CFR50.62 l
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l BACKGROUND OF FERMI 2 ATUS DESIGN
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Fermi 2 Fuel Load
................................... March 1985 Fermi 2 SER Supplement 5............................. March 1985 o Schedule for 10CFR50.62 Compliance
............................... April 1985 l
l Fermi 2 Implementation Schedule
................... October 1985 I
o 2nd Refueling BWROG Response to ATWS Rule........................ January 1986 o FEDE 31096-P NRC Acceptance of BWROG Response.................... October 1986 o SER I
o NEDE 31096-P-A (February 1987)
NRC Requests Fermi 2 Compliance Schedule
......... December 1986 o Information for Review o Schedule Within 60 Days
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Fermi 2 Provides Info / Schedule
................... February 1987 o FSAR References o 2nd Refueling NRC Requests Further Information
.................... March 1988 o 15 Questions Fermi 2 Responds to 15 Questions
.................... April 1988 Region III Inspection............................. November 1988 I
o compares Other RIII Plants (3)
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10CR50.62 (C.3)
ARI o DIVERSE o REDUNDANT o RELIABLE-o INDEPENDENT (C.4)
SLCS o 86 GPM/13% WT o RELIABLE (C.5)
RPT o AUTOMATIC o RELIABLE (C.6)
IMPLEMENTATION o 2ND REFUELING
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ALTERNATE ROD INSERTION (ARI)
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l FERMI 2 ARI DESIGN i
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CHECKLIST FOR PLANT SPECIFIC REVIEW
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t OF ALTERNATE ROD INJECTION SYSTEM (ARI)
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FERMI 2 CONFORMANCE WITH ARI SER 1.
ARI SYSTEM FUNCTION TIME o ROD INJECTION MOTION WILL BEGIN WITHIN 15 YES SECONDS AND BE COMPLETED WITHIN 25 SECONDS FROM ARI INITIATION DISCUSSION:
ROD MOTION WILL START 15 SECONDS AFTER DETECTION OF AN ATWS EVENT AND ROD MOTION WILL BE COMPLETE AFTER AN ADDITIONAL 7 SECOND. THIS WAS DEMONSTRATED DURING PRE-OPERATIONAL TESTING ON A DIVISIONAL BASIS.
2.
SAFETY REQUIREMENTS (A) CLASS 1E ISOLATORS ARE USED TO INTERFACE N/A_
WITH SAFETY-RELATED SYSTEMS
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(B) CLASS 1E ISOLATORS ARE POWERED FROM A N/A CLASS 1E SOURCE (C) ISOLATOR QUALIFICATION DOCUMENTS ARE N/A AVAILkBLE FOR STAFF AUDIT DISCUSSION:
THE ARI SYSTEM IS DESIGNED AND INSTALLED AS SAFETY RELATED.
IT UTILIZES SAFETY-RELATED POWER AND CABLING, LOGIC COMPONENTS, INSTRUMENTS, AND SOLENOID VALVES. THE ONLY NON SAFETY-RELATED INTERFACES ARE ACCOMPLISHED WITH CLASS 1E RELAYS WITH THE PLANT ANNUNCIATOR. NO ISOLATORS ARE
NEEDED TO INTERFACE WITH OTHER SAFETY-RELATED SYSTEMS.
(A-1)
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CHECKLIST FOR PLANT' SPECIFIC REVIEN OF ALTERNATE ROD INJECTION SYSTEM (ARI)
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~FEMMI 2 f
REDUNDANCY o' THE ARI SYSTEM PERFORMS A FUNCTION' REDUNDANT YES TO THE BACKUP SCRAM SYSTEM AND HAS REDUNDANT VALVES, BUT THE ARI SYSTEM IS NOT REQUIRED TO BE REDUNDANT.
-DISCUSSION:
THERE ARE A TOTAL OF THREE ARI VALVES PER DIVISION INSTALLED ON THE SCRAM AIR HEADER. ANOTHER ARI VALVE IN EACH DPfISION CONTROLS THE SCRAM DISCHARGE VOLUME VENT AND DRAIN LINES INDEPENDENTLY FROM THE RPS. EITHER DIVISION IS CAPABLE OF MEETING THE DESIGN BASIS ROD INSERTION TIME.
4.
DIVERSITY FROM EXISTING RTS (A) ARI SYSTEM IS ENERGIZE-TO-FUNCTION YES (B) ARI SYSTEM USES DC POWERED VALVES YES (C) INSTRUMENT. CHANNEL COMPONENTS (EXCLUDING SEE DISCUSSION SENSORS BUT INCLUDING ALL SIGNAL CONDITIONING AND ISOLATION DEVICES) ARE DIVERSE FROM THE EXISTING RTS COMPONENTS.
DISCUSSION:
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THE ARI SYSTEM IS DC POWERED, ENERGIZE-TO-FUNCTION, i
AND UTILIZES SEPARATE SENSORS AND TRIP UNITS FROM RPS. THIS ACHIEVES THE LEVEL OF DIVERSITY ENDORSED BY THE BWROG. WITH RESPECT TO THE STAFF'S
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l DETERMINATION THAT MANUFACTURING DIVERSITY SHOULD BE UTILIZED FOR TRIP UNITS, FERMI ENDORSES THE BWROG POSITION. IF MANUFACTURING DIVERSITY IS REQUIRED FOR TRIP UNITS, IT WILL BE PROVIDED BY 2ND REFUELING.
(A-2)
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CHECKLIST FOR PLANT SPECIFIC REVIEW OF ALTERNATE ROD INJECTION SYSTEM (ARI)-
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WITH ARI SER-
ELECTRICAL INDEPENDENCE FROM THE EXISTING RTS-(A) ARI ACTUATION LOGIC SEPARATE FROM RTS LOGIC YES (B) ARI CIRCUITS ARE ISOLATED FROM SAFETY N/A RELATED CILCUITS DISCUSSION:
THE ARI AND RPT ARE INDEPENDENT FROM RPS POWER FROM THE MOTIVE POWER SELECTION TO THE FINAL ACTUATOR. ARI AND RPT CIRCUITS ARE DIVISIONALLY POWERED AND THE CIRCUITRY IS RUN IN THE RESPECTIVE DIVISIONAL TRAY / CONDUIT SYSTEM WHICH IS SEPARATE AND INDEPENDENT FROM THE RPS TRAY / CONDUIT SYSTEM.
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PHYSICAL SEPARATION FROM THE EXISTING RTS
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o ARI SYSTEM IS PHYSICALLY SEPARATED FROM RTS YES DISCUSSION:
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Tile ARI AND RPT SYSTEMS ARE INSTALLED DIVISIONALLY AS ECCS DIVISIONAL DESIGNS TYPICAL OF A BWR.
AS A RESULT, THE ARI/RPT SYSTEM IS PHYSICALLY INDEPENDENT OF THE RPS SYSTEM FROM INSTRUMENT RACK l
OUTPUT TO FINAL ACTUATOR. THE ATWS RULE GUIDANCE STATES-l THAT IMPLEMENTATION OF ARI MOST NOT COMPROMISE THE l
SEPARATION CRITERIA APPLIED TO EXISTING RTS. SINCE THE ARI AND RPT SYSTEMS ARE ASSIGNED TO THE ECCS NETWORK, THEY ARE INHERENTLY SEPARATED FROM THE RTS (ret.CTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM) TO THE DEGREE REQUIRED BY PLANT SEPARATION CRITERIA.
(A-3)
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CHECKLIST FOR PLANT SPECIFIC REVIEW OF ALTERNATE ROD INJECTION SYSTEM (ARI)
FERMI 2 CONFORMANCE WITH ARI SER
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION o
ARI EQUIPMENTS ARE QUALIFIED TO CONDITIONS YES DURING AN ATWS EVENT UP TO THE TIME THE ARI FUNCTION IS COMPLETED.
DISCUSSION:
,m ARI COMPONENTS ARE QUALIFIED TO IEEE 323-1974 TO A DEGREE THAT MEETS OR EXCEEDS THE REQUIREMENT.
THAT IS, THE ARI SENSORS AND SOLENOIDS ARE LOCATED IN A HARSH ENVIRONMENT AND ARE QUALIFIED TO WITHSTAND THE ENVIRONMENT CREATED BY LOCA AND HELE EVENTS ALTHOUGH THEY ARE NOT REQUIRED TO CONTRIBUTE TO THEIR MITIGATION. THE ARI COMPONENTS ARE QUALIFIED SIESMICALLY TO IEEE 344-1975 ALTHOUGH THE RULE DOES NOT REQUIRE IT.
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QUALITY ASSURANCE o COMPLY WITH GENERIC LETTER 85-06 YES DISCUSSION:
ALL OF THE HARDWARE INCLUDED IN THE ARI DESIGN FROM SENSORS TO FINAL ACTUATORS (SOLENOID VALVES) HAVE BEEN PURCHASED AS QA1 EQUIPMENT. THE DESIGN IS IN COMPLIANCE WITH GENERIC LETTER 85-06.
(A-4)
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CHECKLIST FOR PLANT SPECIFIC REVIEW OF ALTERNATE ROD INJECTION SYSTEM (ARI)
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FERMI 2
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CONFORMANCE WITH ARI fiER j
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SAFETY-RELATED POWER SUPPLY i
l (A) ARI SYSTEM POWER INDEPENDENT FROM RTS YES (B) ARI SYSTEM CAN PERFORM ITS FUNCTION DURING YES ANY LOSS-OF-OFFSITE POWER EVENT DISCUSSION:
MOTIVE AND LOGIC POWER FOR THE ARI AND RPT SYSTEMS IS OBTAINED FROM THE CLASS IE DIVISIONAL BATTERIES. THESE BATTERIES ARE PROPERLY SIZED TO PROVIDE POWER FOR ALL REQUIRED DESIGN FUNCTIONS,
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INCLUDING LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER. THE RPS IS AN.AC POWERED SYSTEM WHICH IS INDEPENDENT FROM THE CLASS IE DIVISIONAL BATTERIES.
10.
TESTABILITY AT POWER (A) ARI TESTABLE AT POWER SEE DISCUSSION (B) BYPASS FEATURES CONFORM TO BYPASS YES CRITERIA USED IN RTS DISCUSSION:
ARI AND RPT LOGIC UTILIZE A REDUNDANT 2 OUT-OF-2 ARRANGEMENT IN ORDER TO PROVIDE TESTING CALIBRATION, OR REPAIR CAPABILITY AT POWER WITHOUT EMPLOYING BYPASSES. HOWEVER, THE PRESENT DESIGN
CONFIGURATION DOES NOT PERMIT EXERCISING ONE RELAY j
IN EACH DIVISION AT POWER WITHOUT LIFTING A LEAD TO BYPASS THE TRIP. BECAUSE OF THIS AND THE INCUMBANT RISK OF A SPURIOUS TRIP, PRESENT
]
SURVEILLANCE PROCEDURES DO NOT EXERCISE ALL OF THIS LOGIC AT POWER (BUT DO AT SHUTDOWN).
THEREFORE, TO ENHANCE THE TESTABILITY AT POWER CAPABILITY, A CIRCUIT MODIFICATION WILL BE MADE AT FIRST REFUELING TO PERMIT MAINTENANCE REPAIR, TEST OR CALIBRATION OF ALL DEVICES IN THE TRAIN UP TO BUT NOT INCLUDING THE FINAL TRIP DEVICES (ARI SOLENOIDS AND RPT BREAKERS).
(A-5)
-_
_ _ _ _ _ _ _
,
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _
_
'
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,
CHECKLIST FOR PLANT SPECIFIC REVIEW OF ALTERNATE ROD INJECTION SYSTEM (ARI)
FERMI 2 CONFORMANCE WITH ARI SER 11.
INADVERTENT ACTUATION (A) ARI ACTUATION SETPOINTS WILL NOT CHALLENGE YES SCRAM (B) COINCIDENT LOGIC IS UTILIZED IN ARI DESIGN YES DISCUSSION:
BOTH ARI AND INITIATION EVENTS, LOW REACTOR WATER LEVEL AND HIGH REACTOR PRESSURE, WILL CCCUR AFTER THE RPS SETPOINTS ARE REACHED.
COINCIDENT 2-0UT-OF-2 LOGIC IS USED TO REDUCE THE THREAT OF SPURIOUS TRIPS.
12.
MANUAL INITIATION (A) MANUAL INITIATION CAPABILITY IS PROVIDED SEE DISCUSSION DISCUSSION:
THE FERMI 2 ARI DESIGN WAS IMPLEMENTED IN 1984, PRIOR TO THE FINAL ATWS RULE FORMULATION AND PRIOR TO THE BWROG SER ISSUANCE. MANUAL INITIATION CONTROL IS NOT PRESENTLY INSTALLED IN THE ARI DESIGN, BUT WILL BE BY THE END OF FIRST l
REFUELING. A TECH SPEC CHANGE WILL BE SUBMITTED TO THE NRC TO DELETE THE BACK-UP MANUAL SCRAM FEATURE IN FAVOR OF MANUALLY INITIATED ARI.
l (A-6)
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_ _ _ _ _ _ _
- - _ - - _ _ _.
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l-CHECKLIST FOR PLANT SPECIFIC REVIEW j
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I 0F ALTERNATE ROD INJECTION SYSTEM (ARI)
l FERMI 2 f
l CONFORMANCE i
INFORMATION READOUT (A) INFORMATION READOUT IS PROVIDED IN MAIN YES
'
CONTROL ROOM DISCUSSION:
THE REACTOR LOW LEVEL AND HIGH PRESSURE CHANNEL TRIPS ARE ALARMED IN THE MAIN CONTROL ROOM ANNUNCIATOR AS WELL AS THE ARI LOGIC INITIATION.
ARI VALVE POSITION (OPEN/CLOSE) LAMPS ARE ON THE MAIN CONTROL ROOM PANEL H11-P603 ill.
COMPLETION OF PROTECTIVE ACTION ONCE IT IS SEE DISCUSSION INITIATED DISCUSSION:
THE ARI SYSTEM IS SEALED IN UPON INITIATION AND WILL REMAIN IN OPERATION UNTIL IT IS RESET.
HOWEVER, TO ENFORCE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES THAT PREVENT THE OPERATOR FROM RESETTING THE INITIATION PRIOR TO PROTECTIVE ACTION COMPLETION, A HARDWARE DESIGN CHANGE WILL BE IMPLEMENTED PRIOR TO THE END OF FIRST REFUELING. THIS DESIGN CHANGE WILL ADD A TIME DELAY TO EACH DIVISION'S LOGIC THAT PREVENTS RESETTING UNTIL A PREDETERMINED TIME AFTER EITHER AUTOMATIC OR MANUAL INITIATION.
(A-7)
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.
,
,
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RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP (RPT)
SYSTEM EVALUATION
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FERMI 2 RPT DESIGN
,SIMILAR TO THE "MONTICELLO" DESIGN
-. - _ _.
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.
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RPT EVALUATION FERMI 2 CONFORMANCE WITH BWROG GUIDANCE l
1.
SAFETY-RELATED
.o NOT REQUIRED, BUT IMPLEMENTATION MUST NOT YES PREVENT EXISTING RTS FROM MEETING ALL APPLICABLE SAFETY CRITERIA.
DISCUSSION:
SENSORS, LOGIC, AND CABLING ARE ALL SAFETY-RELATED. FINAL CONTROL ELEMENTS, THE GENERATOR FIELD BREAKERS AND TRIP COILS ARE NOT.
2.
REDUNDANCY SEE DISCUSSION o NOT REQUIRED DISCUSSION:
SENSORS AND LOGIC ARE DIVISIONAL AND REDUNDANT.
PRESENTLY A SINGLE FINAL ACTUATION DEVICE PER FUNCTION IS PROVIDED (I.E., GEN. FIELD BREAKER).
TO ACHIEVE GREATER ASSURANCE OF ACHIEVING A SUCCESSFUL RPT, THE MG SET DRIVE MOTOR TRIP FUNCTION WILL BE IMPLEMENTED. IT WILL BE IMPLEMENTED IN A MANNER THAT SATISFIES ALL APPROPRIATE CRITERIA.
IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE TO BE PRIORTIZED IN THE 5 YEAR PLAN.
l (R-1)
_ _ _ _ _
. _ _ _. _
_ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _
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'
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RPT EVALUATION FERMI 2 CONFORMANCE WITH BWROG GUIDANCE
DIVERSITY FROM RTS o REASONABLE AND PRACTICABLE DIVERSITY IS
_YES REQUIRED NOT INCLUDING SENSORS AND FINAL CONTROL DEVICES.
DISCUSSION:
THE SAME DEGREE OF DIVERSITX AS DESCRIBED FOR ARI IS PROVIDED. AFTER THE MG SET DRIVE MOTOR TRIP IS INSTALLED, ADDITIONAL DIVERSITY WILL BE ACQUIRED IN THE FINAL CONTROL ELEMENTS.
4.
ELECTRICAL INDEPENDENCE FROM RTS YES o REQUIRED FROM SENSOR OUTPUT TO THE FINAL ACTUATION DEVICE DISCUSSION:
5.
PHYSICAL SEPARATION FROM RTS o NOT REQUIRED IF EXISTING RTS REDUNDANT YES DIVISIONS AND CHANNELS ARE SEPARATED.
DISCUSSION:
SAME AS ARI, AND ADD CONDUIT TO FIELD BREAKERS BY RFI.
.
A (R-2)
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
- _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
.
.,. -
,
!
l RPT EVALUATION.
!
FERMI 2 CONFORMANCE i
WITH BWROG l
GUIDANCE l
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6.
EQ o REQUIRED FOR OPERATIONAL OCCURRENCES YES _
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DISCUSSION:
i SAME AS ARI EXCEPT FINAL ACTUATION DEVICES ARE I
NOT ENVIRONMENTALLY QUALIFIED. THEY ARE DESIGNED, SPECIFIED AND MAINTAINED TO MEET THE
,
REQUIREMENT.
]
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SEISMIC QUALIFICATION YES
<
o NOT REQUIRED DISCUSSION:
ALL COMPONENTS EXCEPT THE CIRCUIT BREAKERS ARE SEISMICALLY QUALIFIED.
8.
QA o NRC GENERIC LETTER 85-05 YES DISCUSSION:
SAME AS ARI, EXCEPT THAT THE CIRCUIT BREAKERS WERE NOT PROCURED OR INSTALLED AS QAI.
SAFETY-RELATED POWER SUPPLY o SAME AS ARI YES
l l
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'
,
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1 (R-3)
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. - _.. _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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.
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l RPT EVALUATION
.
FERMI 2 CONFORMANCE WITH BWROG GUIDANCE 10.
TESTABILITY AT POWER o REQUIRED YES DISCUSSION:
11.
INADVERTENT ACTUATION YES o SAME AS ARI
DISCUSSION:
l l
.
(R-4)
. _ _ _ - _.
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SUlttARY OF IMPLEBENTATIOII SCHEDULE SLCS
!
o Technical' Specification Change Submittal 3/89
..................
o Enrichment Increase RFI
.......................................
.........................................
o Tech Spec Change Submittal (Delete BUMS)
..................
o Testability Enhancement RFI
...................................
o Reset Time Delay RFI
..........................................
,
RPT o Testability Enhancement RFI
...................................
o Field Breaker Flex Conduit RFI
................................
L
'
o Drive Motor Trip TBS
..........................................
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