IR 05000341/1998010
| ML20236F727 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fermi  |
| Issue date: | 06/29/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20236F718 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-341-98-10, NUDOCS 9807020306 | |
| Download: ML20236F727 (10) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGIONlil Docket No:
50-341 License No:
NPF-43 Report No:
50-341/98010(DRS)
Licensee:
Detroit Edison Company (DECO)
Facility:
Enrico Fermi, Unit 2 Location:
6400 N. Dixie Hwy.
Newport, MI 48166 Dates:
June 8-12,1998 Inspectors:
R. Jickling, Emergency Preparedness Analyst W. Sartor, Senior Emergency Preparedness Specialist R. Glinski, Radiation Specialist D. Nissen, Radiation Specialist G. Harris, Senior Resident inspector N. O'Keefe, Resident inspector Approved by:
James R. Creed, Chief, Plant Support Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety 9807020306 900629 I
PDR ADOCK 05000341 G
PDR l
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EXF.CUTIVE SUMMARY -
Fermi 2 Nuclear Generating Station
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NRC Inspection Report 50-341/98010 i
l This inspection consisted of evaluation of the licensee's performance during the station's biennial exercise of the Emergency Plan. It was conducted by NRC Region lli emergency preparedness inspectors, resident inspectors, and a senior emergency preparedness specialist from the NRC Region 11 office. ~No violations of NRC requirements were identified.
Elant Sucoort Overall performance during the 1998 Emergency Preparedness exercise demonstrated e
that emergency plan implementation activities met regulatory requirements. (Section P4.1.c)
Overall performance in the Control Room Simulator was effective and professional.
e Plant emergency announcements were very informative. Good communications and teamwork were evident. (Section P4.1.c)
The Technical Support Center staff's performance was effective. Briefings were
concise. The emergency action level, protective action recommendation, and emergency operating procedure flowcharts were proactively reviewed. Priorities were properly established and revised as plant conditions changed. (Section P4.1.c)
The Operational Support Center's staff performed well in coordinating activities and e
maintaining control of the inplant teams. Priorities were clearly communicated. Facility and inplant team briefings were efficient and detailed. (Section P4.1.c)
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Performance of Emergency Operations Facility staff efficiently assembled to perform their auties. Status boards were well maintained and legible. Communications to onsite emergency response facilities and offsite agencies were frequent. Notifications to the State and local agencies contained appropriate protective action recommendations.
(Section P4.1.c)
Self-critiques following termination of the exercise were thorough, self-critical, and e
included inputs from exercise participants as well as controllers. (Section P4.1.c)
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Bagod Cetails l
IV. Plant Support P3 Emergency Preparedness Procedures and Documentation P3.1 Bayiew of Exercise Obiectives and Scenario (82302)
The inspectors reviewed the 1998 exercise objectives and scenario and determined that l
they would provide for the demonstration of major elements of the licensee's onsite emergency plan. The scenario provided a challenging framework to support demonstration of the licensee's capabilities to implement its emergency plan. The scenario included a radiological release and several equipment failures.
P4 Staff Knowledge and Performance in Emergency Preparedness
' P4.1 1998 Evaluated Biennial Emeroency Preparedness Exercise a.
Insoection Scone (82301)
On June 9,1998, the licensee conducted a biennial exercise involving full participation by the State of Michigan and the counties of Monroe and Wayne. The Province of Ontario participated in a limited role. This exercise was conducted to test major portions of the licensce's onsite and offsite emergency response capabilities. Onsite and offsite emergency response organizations and emergency response facilities were activated.
The inspectors evaluated performance in the following emergency response facilities:
o Control Room Simulator (CRS)
Technical Support Center (TSC)
i Operational Support Center (OSC)
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Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
The inspectors assessed the licensee's recognition of abnormal plant conditions, classification of emergency conditions, notification of offsite agencies, development of protective action recommendations, command and control, transfer of emergency responsibilities between facilities, communications, and overallimplementation of the emergency plan. In addition, the inspectors attended the post-exercise critiques in each of the above facilities to evaluate the licensee's initial self-assessment of exercise performance.
b.
Emeroency Resoonse Facility Observations and Findinas b.1 Control Room Simulator (CRS)
Overall control room crew performance was effective and professional. The Emergency Director's command and control of the CRS crew was sound. Briefings were informative
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- and appropriately timed so as not to adversely impact response to the changing plant conditions. ' Changing plant conditions and emergency response status were included in
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the briefings. Good big picture awareness was demonstrated by the Emergency l
. Director, i
Plant announcements from the CRS were very informative. The announcements were clear and timely. Communications by the CRS crew were accurate. Repeat backs and acknowledgments were used extensively.
CRS operators entered ' appropriate abnormal and emergency procedures in response to the simulated conditions. Immediate and subsequent actions were proficiently implemented.. Operators correctly evaluated and diagnosed malfunctions during the scenario. Emergency Action Levels (EAL) were promptly recognized and
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communicated to the rest of the organization. The emergency classifications for the l
Alert and Site Area Emergency were correct and made in a timely manner. In addition, checklists were used to ensure proper actions for each classification were implemented.
Good teamwork and coordination was evident. Technical Specifications were referenced. Applicable limiting conditions for operations were entered and implemented.
Communications with other emergency response facilities were frequent and detailed.
The Nuclear Shift Supervisor (NSS) was effective in keeping TSC and OSC counterparts informed of changing plant conditions and actions taken by the CRS crew.
Reactor operators were aggressive in monitoring and reporting plant status. The NSS and Nuclear Assistant Shift Supervisor were properly informed of actions taken prior to execution. Notifications to the State, counties, and NRC were made within the required times.
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b.2 Technical Sunoort Center (TSC)
The TSC stars overall performance was effective. Activation of the facility was rapid and efficient. Minimum staffing was achieved within ten minutes of the Alert declaration.
The TSC's Emergency Director accepted command and control of accident response within twenty-seven minutes of the Alert declaration.
The initial briefing was defined plant status and provided guidance to the TSC staff.
Subsequent, periodic briefings were concise and informed the staff of current status, priorities, and issues. Significant changes in plant conditions were promptly announced as they occurred instead of waiting for the next briefing. During the Emergency i
Director's briefings, phone and group discussions continued, which caused additional distraction in the facility that resulted in a few repeated announcements.
Status boards were detailed and well maintained throughout the exercise. The Team Task status board clearly displayed inplant response teams, tasks, and team status.
The inspectors noted that the priority column on the Team Task status boards in the OSC and TSC did not indicate the teams' priorities. However, their priorities were
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appropriately established for plant activities and adjusted as scenario conditions changed. Priorities were properly established and rapidly communicated to the CRS and OSC as plant conditions changed.
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Communicators effectively tracked offsite agencies' notification times and the times required for followup notifications using a status board. This status board clearly indicated the status of past and current notifications.
Colored overlays were used on the ten-mile emergency planning zone (EPZ) maps in the TSC and EOF. The overlays represented the protective action orders from the State to the counties by predefined geopolitical areas. The overlays effectively enhanced the visual clarity of the protective action decisions by the offsite agencies.
The EALs, Protective Action Recommendation (PAR), and Emergency Operating Procedure flowcharts were frequently reviewed to ensure that the current decisions were acceptable. Potential conditions which could lead to changes were proactively noted on the chart and discussed.
Effective teamwork was demonstrated by the TSC advisors, radiation protection group, engineering group, Technical Advisor, Nuclear Safety Officer, and the Emergency Director. Examples of good discussions included the potential emergency classification upgrade for emergency depressurization and loss of two fission product barriers with the potential loss of the third, and the discussion on what the positive and negative results of initiating the hydrogen recombiners in containment.
The transfer command and control of emergency responsibilities from the TSC to the EOF was smooth. The Emergency Director retained control of emergency classifications after other emergency responsibilities were transferred to his EOF counterpart.
b.3 Operational Sunoort Center (OSC)
The OSC staff performed well. OSC management effectively coordinated activities and
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maintained contrril of inplant teams. After the Alert declaration, the OSC was staffed in a timely manner. The OSC Coordinator and assistant coordinators competently ensured facility staffing was adequate. The Radiological Emergency Team (RET)
Leader properly initiated the OSC habitability surveys, which included monitoring for dose rates and airt>ome radioactivity. Later surveys also included smears to detect contamination.
Communications with the CRS, EOF, and the TSC were effective. The exchange of information facilitated the assembly, briefing, and dispatch of the inplant teams. The j
Personnel Status and the Team Status boards were well maintained. The Communicator / Chronological logs were kept current. OSC advisors efficiently assembled and briefed teams on their missions and related radiological conditions. The OSC staff appropriately used the procedural attachments to log, brief, and debrief the inplant response teams.
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l OSC management rapidly dispatched a team to collect a containment atmosphere l
sample using the post accident sampling station (PASS) after a request from the TSC.
The OSC supervisors had anticipated the potential for the PASS sample request, identified the area radiological conditions, and had the laboratory instruments prepared for analysis. The RET leader provided a detailed briefing for the team. Collection and analysis processes were conducted properly. The radiation protection staff's support for this mission was effective. Proper controls for the sample collection and transport were i
established. The PASS results were reported well within the required three hour time limit.
b.4 Emegency Ooerations Facility (EOF)
The EOF was efficiently staffed and functional within 41 minutes of the Site Area Emergency classification. Security personnel established access control to the facility in I
accordance with procedures. The Emergency Officer (EO) frequently communicated
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with the Emergency Director in the TSC and provided status updates to his staff when appropriate. The EO provided effective command and control of the EOF and documented significant emergency information in a well maintained electronic Emergency Officer Narrative log.
EOF staff functioned smoothly in performing assigned tasks. The inspectors observed effective communications of changing conditions between EOF personnel, particularly by the Nuclear Operations Advisor. The EOF Administrator competently coordinated the preparation of offsite notifications with minimal impact on EOF operations.
Notifications were completed to the offsite agencies by a communicator in a timely manner.
The EOF staff was proactive in reviewing the EAL flowchart and potential scenarios that
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could lead to an emergency classification upgrade or changes to the offsite PARS.
Dose assessors provided the EO with periodic dose projections. These dose projections were incorporated in the offsite notifications. Appropriate PARS were clearly provided to the State and local agencies. Protective actions ordered by the State were indicated on an EPZ map.
Status boards were well maintained, easy to read and quite informative. The General Information status board concisely indicated current and past emergency conditions and
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status.
b.5 Licensee Self-Critiaues The inspectors attended the licensee's self-critiques in the TSC, OSC, CRS, and EOF which occurred after the exercise. Exercise controllers solicited participants' inputs besides providing the controllers' initial assessments of participants' performances. The inspectors concluded that these initial critiques were thorough and self-critical. The participants' and controllers' comments were in close agreement with the inspectors'
observations.
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b.6 Scenario and Exercise Control The inspectors made observations during the exercise to assess the challenge and realism of the scenario and to evaluate the control of the exercise. The scenario was
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challenging and exercised the majority of the licensee's emergency response capabilities. ' Emergency classifications were made according to scenario plant conditions. The inspectors determined that the scenario was appropriate to test basic
. emergency capabilities and demonstrate the exercise objectives.
Overall control of the exercise was appropriate. No significant instances of controller prompting or major exercise control problems were identified.
c.
Overall Conclusions The exercise was an effective demonstration of the licensee's capabilities to implement its emergency plans and procedures, Overall performance during the 1998 Emergency Preparedness exercise was e
j effective and demonstrated that emergency plan implementation met regulatory j
requirements. (Section P4.1.b)
j Overall, performance in the CRS was effective and professional. Plant e
emergency announcements were very informative. Good communications and teamwork were evident. (Section P4.1.b.1)
The TSC ste*f's performance was effective. Briefings were concise. EAL, PAR, e
and emergency operating procedure flowchards were proactively reviewed.
Priorities were properly established and revised as plant conditions changed.
(Section P4.1.b.2)
The OSC's staff performed well coordinating activities and maintaining control e
and status of the inplant teams. Priorities were clearly communicated. Facility
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and inplant team briefings were efficient and detailed. (Section P4.1.b.3)
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Performance of EOF staff was effective. Personnel efficiently assembled to e
perform their duties. Status boards were well maintained and clearly legible, i
Communications to onsite emergency response facilities and offsite agencies j
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was frequent. Notifications to the State and local agencies contained appropriate PARS. (Section P4.1.b.4)
. Self-critiques following termination of the exercise were thorough, self-critical, e
and included inputs from exercise participants as well as controllers. (Section i
P4.1.b.5)
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Emergency classifications were made according to scenario plant conditions.
e The inspectors determined that the scenario was appropriate to test basic l
emergency capabilities and demonstrate onsite exercise objectives. (Section
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P4.1.b.6)
P8 Miscellaneous EP issues (Closed insoection Followuo item 50-341/96006-09:. During the 1996 exercise, TSC staff failed to staff the Health Physics Network (HPN) phone line when requested by the
' NRC. The licensee assigned the responsibility to ensure the HPN line was manned i
l upon request from the NRC to the Radiation Protection Advisor. During the 1998
. exercise, the HPN line was staffed upon request by the NRC and communications were observed. This item is closed.
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(Closed Insoection Followuo item 50-341/96006-11: During the 1996 exercise, certain status boards in the EOF were inadequately maintained. All the status boards in.the EOF were reviewed and selected status boards were modified. During the 1998 exercise, the EOF's status boards were well maintained and clearly legible. This item is closed.
V. Management Meetings X.1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on June 11,1998. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee D. Gipson, Senior Vice President Nuclear Generation P. Fessler, Nuclear Operations Assistant Vice President B. O'Connor, Nuclear Assessment Assistant Vice President J. Baum, Emergency Preparedness Specialist S. Bartman, General Supervisor Chemistry and Radiation Protection S. Beckner, Maintenance Superintendent S. Cashell, Compliance Engineer J. Conen, Licensing J. Davis, Nuclear Training Director i
S. Farrel, Assistant Shift Supervisor G. Garber, Emergency Preparedness Specialist R. Gaston, Compliance Supervisor K. Harsley, Licensing Engineer K. Howard, Plant Support Superintendent J. Kauffman, Emergency Response Specialist A. Mann, Nuclear Shift Supervisor K. Morris, RERP Supervisor M. Paul, Nuclear Supervising Operator N. Peterson, Nuclear Licensing Director J. Plona, Engineering Manager S. Stasek, ISEG Supervisor NBC G. Harris, Senior Resident inspector N. O'Keefe, Resident inspector INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 82301 Evaluation of Exercises for Power Reactors IP 82302 Review of Exercise Objectives and Scenarios for Power Reactors ITEMS CLOSED Closed 50-341/96006-09 IFl Failure to staff the TSC's HPN at the NRC's request.
50-341/96006-11 IFl Plant parameter trending, TSC priorities, and offsite protective action status information status board inadequacies.
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LIST OF ACRONYMS USED CFR Code of Federal Regulations CRS Control Room Simulator DRP Division of Reactor Projects DRS Division of Reactor Safety EAL Emergency Action Level EO Emergency Officer EOF Emergency Operations Facility ENS Emergency Notification System EPZ Emergency Planning Zone HPN Health Physics Network IFl inspection Followup Item IP Inspection Procedure s
NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission NRR Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation NSS Nuclear Shift Supervisor OSC Operational Support Center PAR Protective Action Recommendation PASS Post Accident Sampiling Station PDR NRC Public Document Room RET Radiological Emergency Team RP Radiation Protection RPT Radiation Protection Technician TSC Technical Support Center i
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