IR 05000321/1990023
| ML20058K239 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hatch  |
| Issue date: | 11/30/1990 |
| From: | Brockman K, Randy Musser, Wert L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20058K221 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-321-90-23, 50-366-90-23, NUDOCS 9012170045 | |
| Download: ML20058K239 (13) | |
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UNITEo STATES y*
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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f ATLANTA, GtORGIA MU3
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Report Nos.:
50-321/90-23 and 50-366/90-23 Licensee: Georgia Power Company P.O. Box 1295 Birmingham, AL 35201 Docket Nos.:
50-321 and 50-366 License Nos.: OPR-57 and NPF-5 Facility Name: Hatch Nuclear Plant
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Inspection Conducted: October 21 - November 17, 1990 l
Inspectors: MnJ6M MN A/190 Le'nbrd D. Werf, Jr., Sr. Resident Inspector Date Signed l
o m'A W
j//5*/fo Randall A. Musser, Resident Inspector
~Date Signed Approved by: # h f/h 1 9'/ / /$
Afd4/f'o
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l Kennetti E. Brockniarp(Projects Chief, Project Section 3B Date' Signed
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Division of Reactor
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SUMMARY
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Scope:
This routine, announced inspection involved on-site inspection in the areas of operations, surveillance testing, maintenance activities, and review of open items.
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Results: One violation was identified involving a failure to obtain TS required compensatory grab samples during inoperability of the' Unit-Two Fission Product Particulate Monitor.
(paragraph 4b.)
A weakness was noted in the area of.TS surveillance scheduling.-
-l Insufficient emphasis was being placed on completion of the surveillances without reliance on the interval grace period.
IFl 50-321,366/90-23-02, TS Surveillance Scheduling Issue, will be utilized to follow this issue.
(paragraph 3c.)
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9012170045 901130 PDR ADOCK 05000321
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REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- B. Arnold, Chemistry Laboratory Su)ervisor C. Coggin, Training and Emergency 'reparedness Manager
- D. Davis, Plant Administration Manager
- D. Edge, Nuclear Security Manager
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- P. Fornel, Maintenance Manager
- 0 Fraser, Safety Audit and Engineering Review Supervisor G. Goode, Engineering Support Manager
- M. Googe, Outages and Planning Manager J. Hammonds, Regulatory Compliance Supervisor
- J. Lewis, Operations Manager C. Moore, Assistant General Manager - Plant Support
- D Read, Assistant General Manager - Plant Operations
- D. Smith, Health Physics Superindentent H. Sumner, General Manager - Nuclear Plant
- S. Tipps, Nuclear Safety and Compliance Manager
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l R. Zavadoski, Health Physics and Chemistry Manager (
Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members and staff personnel.
NRC Resident Inspectors l
- L. Wert R. Musser l
- Attended exit interview i
Acronyms and initials used throughout this report are listed in the last paragraph, 2.
PlantOperations(71707)
a.
Plant Status Both units operated at power during the entire reporting period.
The inspectors reviewed plant operations throughout the reporting period to verify (TS), and administrative controls.conformance with regulatory r Specifications Control room logs, shift turnover records, temporary modification logs, LC0 logs, and equipment clearance records were reviewed routinely.
Discussions were conducted with plant. operations, maintenance, chemistry, health physics, instrumentation and control (180), and nuclear safety and compliance (NSAC) personnel.
Activities within the control. rooms were monitored on an almost daily basis.
Inspections were conducted on day and night shifts, during weekdays and. weekends. Observations included control room manning. access control, operator professionalism and attentiveness, i
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l and adherence to procedures.
Instrument readings, recorder traces, annunciator alarms, operability of nuclear instrumentation and reactor protection system channels, availability of power sources, and operability of the Safety Parameter Display system were monitored.
Control Room observations also included ECCS system lineups, containment integrity, reactor mode switch position, scram discharge volume valve positions, and rod movement controls.
Numerous informal discussions were conducted with the operators and their
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supervisors. Some inspections were made during shift change in order to evaluate shift turnover performance. Actions observed were conducted as required by the licensee's administrative procedures.
The complement'of licensed personnel on nach shift met or exceeded t5e requirements of TS.
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Several safety-related 09uipment clearances that were active were reviewed to confirm that.' hey were properly prepared and executed.
Applicable. circuit breakers, switches, and valves were walked down to verify that clearance tags were in place and legible and that equipment was properly positioned.
Equipment clearance program requirements are specified in licensee procedure 30AC-0PS-001-05,
" Cont'o1 of Equipment Clearances and Tags." No major discrepancios were identified.
Selected portions of the containment isolation lineup wece reviewed to confirm that the lineup was correct.
The review involved verification of proper valve positioning, verification that motor and air-operated valves were not mechanically blocked and that power was available (unless blocking or power removal was required), and inspection of piping upstream of the valves for leakage or leakage paths.
Plant tours were taken throughout the reporting period on a routine
basis. The areas toured included the following:
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Reactor Buildings Station Yard Zone within the Protected Area Turbine Building Intake Building Diesel Generator Building Fire Pump Building Recombiner Building Central and Secondary Alarm Stations Discharge Structure / Flume area l'
During the plant tours, ongoing activities, housekeeping, security, equipment status, and radiation control practices were observed ~.
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IncreasedMainSteamLineRadiationMonitorReadings(UnitOne)
- On November 7,1990 the Unit 1 MSLRM indications were observed to be increasing significantly. The radiation monitors reached a peak l
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P level of about 5000 mR/hr before decreasing after the Hydrogen Injection System was tripped by the operators.
The trip set point cf these monitors was about 6000 mR/hr.
These monitors initiate a reactor scram and a group 1 isolation function on high radiation levels in the main steam lines.
No indications of an obvious failure were observed at the hydrogen injection panel before or.-
after the system was tripped. Upon isolation of the hydrogen injection system, radiation levels. promptly decreased to about 1500 mR/hr.
Earlier, a problem involving this system had occurred on September 13, 1990 when personnel attempted to initiate hydrogen injection with the hydrogen flow monitor turned off.
This incident had also resulted in high MSLRM readings.
As a result of these two problems and some other concerns the licensee formed'a task force which included GE personnel to investigate the cause of the November 7 radiation level increase and consider other isues involving the hydrogen injection system.
Currently, Unit One has a hydrogen injection system, most of which is a temporary installation.
Installation of a similar system is in progress on Unit Two. The licensee intends to fully understand the November 7, 1990 excursion and examine in detail several potential problem areas on the Unit One system before the Unit Two system is
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completed. Additionally, hydrogen injection has not been reinit'.ated on Unit One, pending completion of the investigation-into the November 7 radiation level increase, Extensive testing on the hydrogen injection system has not indicated
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I any problems with the system which could.have caused a large increase in hydrogen flow and thus the observed high radiation level.
Sampling by the chemistry department of various sources of a potential chemical intrusion which could have caused an increase in hydrogen and the corresponding radiation levels has not revealed any conclusive results.
There have been observations of a decreased l
oxygen level in the offgas system when condensate demineralizers are removed from service. This could indicate that some type of mild l
chemical intrusion is occurring.
The most probable explanation for the increased radiation levels appears to be a mild chemical intrusion which increased hydrogen levels in the primary. Without the hi (due to the hydrogen injection system)gher hydrogen _ level present it is believed that the I
excurnion would ba of such small magnitude to be essentially l
unnoticed. A%ng a small amount of hydrogen to the already high
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levels caused a very large increase in radiation levels. The inspectors have been closely following-the progress of this
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examination of the hydrogen injection system.
The licensee is l
dedicating significant resources and effort to fully resolve the issues before restoration of hydrogen injection. The inspectors will continue to follow the licensee's actions on this matter.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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3.
SurveillanceTesting(61726)-
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Program Status'
i Surveillance tests were reviewed by the inspectors to verify
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procedural and performance adequacy.. The completed tests reviewed were examined.-for necessary test prerequisites. instructions, acceptance criteria,-technical content, authorization to begin work, data collection, independent, verification where required, handling of deficiencies noted, and-review of; completed work. The
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tests witnessed in whole or in part, were_ inspected to
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determine that approved procedures ;were available, -test equipment was calibrated, prerequisites were met, tests were
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conducted according to procedure, test results were acceptable and systems restoration was completed, j
The following surveillances were' reviewed and witnessed in whole or in part:
1, 34SV-C41-002-1S;. Standby Liquid Control Pumps Operability Test 2.
34SV-E51-002-1S; RCIC Operability Test ~
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34SV-R43-005-2S: - Diesel' Generator 1B Semiannual Test;
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During observation and review of Surveillance Procedure l
34SV-C41-002-1S, Standby Liquid Control-(SBLC) Pump Operability
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Test, the inspectors noted one area in which the procedural guidance.
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isolation valve, 1041-F001, is shut. This, along with-other valve'
manipulations during the testing, results_.in both SBLC. pumps not being able to~ perform their safety function without' local ' operator-action.
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TS 3.4.A and 3.4.B contains the operability requirements of the SBLC
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system. During the performance ~of the surveillance testing'the LC0
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for SBLC system inoperability is not entered.- Operator action'to restore the lineup is relied upon to maintain the SBLC system operable. This is acceptable since the SBLC system. is a manually -
activated system..The surveillance procedu're does not contain any
. specific requirements or precautions concerning communications with the' control room or actions required to restore the-system if it is
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needed.
The inspectors.were provided copies of internal letters dated August 19 and= September 2, 1988, which stressed the importance of operator actions and' constant communications'to' ensure.SBLC system operability. The operators involved'with the observed. testing were-aware of their responsibilities and actions required inLregards.to l
system operability.
Communications were maintained with the control room. The' inspectors concluded that the test was performed
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satisfactorily.
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The fact that the procedure does not specifically a'ddress operator responsibilities concerning SBLC system operability during-testing was discussed with operations management. ManagementLindicated that
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the procedure will be revised to include applicable: precautions.
Additionally,.that same week a-TS Clarification was issued which 4
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discussed the operators. role'in maintaining the SBLC system operable I
during surveillance, testing..
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b.
Missed TS Surveillance During Diesel Generator "2C" Inoperability
(UnitTwo)
On October.30 1990, at approximately 1800, it was. determined that the requirements'of T.S. 3.8.1.1.b had not been met.
The breaker
i alignment check. required _when:a EDG is inoperable-had.not been
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performed within the.specified 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> interval. The."2C" EDG was removed from operable' status 'at,about 0530 on October 30, 1990 for-maintenance.
34SV-SUV-013-2S:. Weekly Breaker Alignment Checks, is l'
required by TS to be completed within 1; hour'of the EDG being removed from service and at least once every 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> thereafter.
These checks were completed at 0615 on 0ctober 30, but not repeated until 1910. This,is an. interval of about 13 hours1.50463e-4 days <br />0.00361 hours <br />2.149471e-5 weeks <br />4.9465e-6 months <br /> which exceeds.the 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> requirement.
It.also exceeds the 25 percent or 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> grace
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period permitted by TS 4.0.2.
The failure to perform the surveillance as required was due to an
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oversight ;n.the part of the Unit Two Shift Supervisor. The
Supervisor forgot to initiate the-surveillance as required. The T
failure to perform the' TS required surveillance was identified by j
the licensee and prompt. corrective action.was taken.
The licensee
has initiated development of an LER addressing this issue. One of
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the corrective actions noted by the inspectors was the'. issuance of a
simple alarm clock-to each shift supervisor station to-aid in.
L tracking of required actions. 'An LER follow-up will be utilized to I
track the licensee's future' corrective actions on this issue, c.
TS Surveillance Scheiuling Issue-During this report period the inspectors observed several TS required Surveillances which were being performed on, or close to,
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their scheduled "last date." ~Since thisL"last day" includes the TS permitted surveillance interval grace period, the inspectors-examined this issue closer. The licensee promulgates schedules of a
TS surveillances which include both the "due date" and the "last i
date."
Procedure 90AC-0AP-001-0S,1 Test and Surveillance Control,
contains guidance on surveillance scheduling. The "due date"-.
L corresponds to the TS specified interval. The "last date" indicates the TS interval'with the permitted 25 percent extension included.
If a test was completed between the "due date" and the "last date".,
the next "due date" would be set based upon the regular interval from the previous scheduled date-(it would not be' shifted by adding the interval to the date accomplished).- This practice. prevented
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- exceeding the previously required 3.25X surveillance interval TS
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limit which, was recently. removed.- The inspectors noted that a-graph of TS surveillance performance dates. depicting surveillances completed from May 1989 through September 1990 indicated-the j
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The data for September, '1990 contained 247. total surveillances.
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Of these, 81'were completed during=the grace period and'51 on the'last date. Only 114 or less than.50 percent were' completed -
on or before the due date.
On the average for the 18 month period,'the fraction of
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surveillances completed on or before the due date was less than 50 percent with some periods-of only 35 percent of the surveillances completed by-the due-date.
Discussions with operations personnel indicted that the goal wa:: to complete surveillances by their late date and little concern was i
expressed about surveillances exceeding the due date.. Again, it should be noted that the licensee's practice of not rescheduling the
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next due date if surveillances were. completed past the due date restricted the maximum interval.of the surveillances to less than the maximum allowable by TS.
However,' the intent of the TS (Unit Two, Section 4.0.2 -)' is. to complete the' surveillance within the specified surveillance interval.
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The bases of TS 4.0.2 and the SER issued with the recent TS change which deleted the 3.25X. interval both stated that TS 4.0.2 permits allowable extension of the normal interval to facilitate scheduling-and for consideration of plant operating conditions.
It was not-intended for this provision to be: utilized repeatedly as a convenience to extend surveillance intervals;beyond-that specified.
The inspectors requested that-the licensee examine-this issue and respond to their concerns. The NSAC manager conducted an audit in t
this. area. Among the stated results was the fact.that-for the. month i,
of October, 80 percent-of TS surveillances had been-done by.the due date. However, it was acknowledged that the emphasis was clearly placed on accomplishing the surveillances by the11ast date and not
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the due date.-
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Plant mar' cement immediately initiated efforts to emphasize the importan-af trying to complete surveillance by their du'e date and not' utilizing the grace. period except for the reasons. stated in'the TS guidance. The manager of Outages and Planning is responsible for
the Planning and Control section which coordinates overall i
surveillance scheduling. He is actively working to shift many
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surveillances back to scheduled accomplishment by the due.date.. The
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surveillance coordinator is considering revising some methods used to schedule surveillance.to, facilitate: accomplishment by the due date. Among the actions being considered is the scheduling of regular interval testing on specified calendar days. (For example, a monthly required test would be scheduled for the 25th of each month, a weekly for each Wednesday.) Additionally more emphasis will be
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placed during planning meetings to accomplishment of surveillances j
by their due date.. Intentions are to initially' revise the ll scheduling of specific surveillances'and stress to all personnel 1the
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importance of the due.date, if necessary, changes will be-made to the test and surveillances control documentation in the future.
The practice -and philosophy _ of routinely permitting a significant.
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f.raction' of.TS surveillances to be extended past their due date-is
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considered a weakness. This issue will be tracked as-
IFl 50-321,366/90-23-02, TS Surveillance Scheduling Issue. The inspectors will continue to follow the licensee's corrective actions.
on this issue.
No-violations or deviations were identified.
4.
MaintenanceActivities(62703)'
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Program Status Maintenance activities were observed and/or reviewed during the-reporting period to ' verify that work was performed by -qualified-personnel and that approved procedures in use adequately described work _that was not within the skill of _the trade. Activities, procedures. and work requests were examined to verify: proper
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authorization to begin work; provisions.for fire,. cleanliness, and.
exposure-control; proper return of-equipment to~ service; and that limiting conditions for operation were. met.
The following maintenat a were reviewed:and_ witnessed in whole or in part:
i (1) MWO 1-90-6139; Lubrication of "1A" Standby Liquid Control Pump in accordance with 52PM-C41402-1S, (2) MW0 2-90-2942; Replacement of Service Water Valves 2P41-F338 and 2P41-F342.
(3) MWO 1-90-7476; Inspection / Repairs to the "1A EDG Jacket ' Coolant
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and Scavenging Air Heat Exchangers in:accordance with
52SP-111390-HX-1-IS and 52PM-R43-015-0S.
b.
Failure to Perform TS Required Compensatory Actions During Fission ProductParticulateMonitorInoperability'(UnitTwo)
i On November 1,1990,. the Unit 2 Fission Product Particulate Monitor (2D11-P011) was removed'from service in order for repairs to be conducted in accordance with MW0 2-90-3153. The particulate monitor paper was not advancing.
As required by TS 3.4.3.1, compensatory grab samples of' containment atmosphere were obtained and analyzed every four hours.
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On November 5, a new drive motor and dr1ve belt were installed.
The MWO states that the instrument was returned to service.
During the functional testing of the instrument ( " verify the paper advances as; l
required" was stated as the functional test on the_MWO ) it was noted that the 2011-P011 high/ low flow alarm in the CR would not clear. The functional test was signed off as satisfactory.
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'l second MWO (MWO2-90-3215).was written to address the alarm not-clearing.
I&C technicians' found that switch HS-2, located on the back of the monitor's control panel, was incorrectly in the "off" position.- This removed power to the alarm circuit.- The switch was repositioned and the MWO was' signed off on the morning of
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November 5.
On September 6. the inspectors noted a CR log entry which stEted
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that the alarm condition had been repaired by properly positioning-
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the HS-2 switch. The' inspectors questioned how a functional test could have been completed satisfactorily with the switch-in the
"off" position ~since the paper drive motor is powered through'this switch. The inspectors also' questioned the operability of the system with the HS-2 switch "offe" In response, a chemistry supervisor enmined the incident.. As a result of his' investigation-and further discussions with the inspectors, the following problems tere noted; The functional test was not completed properly. The paper
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drive was not advancing since' the switch was "off" and yet was
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signed 'off as operating satisfactorily.
The test was completed i
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HS-2 switch. -The paper does move very slowly and a long interval is required to confirm movement.
No formal written procedure was utilized to functionally test
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the paper drive motor or to. return the monitor to service.
The monitor was returned to service by checking that the valves and l
switches are.in their normal. operating position.
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Many chemistry department personnel were not aware of the HS-2
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switch position and its-role in the operability of the i
detectors. Apparently..it is not normally operated by chemirtry personnel.
The detector was inoperable with the HS-2 switch "off" since
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this powers the-drive ~ mechanism, the source check mechanism and the flow alarm pressure; switch. The last compensatory grab sample was taken at 0515 on November 5.
The HS-2 switch was positioned to."on" at 1530 on November 5.
Two grab-samples required by TS 3.4.3.1 were missedc The licensee will be submitting an LER< addressing.the missed sampling.
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Without the inspectors questioning, the role of the HS-2 switch
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in the operability of the detector would probably still not be widely understood. The fact that several required grab samples were missed would most likely not have been identified.
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l 9-The failure to fully resolve all implications of the HS-2 switch
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being mispositioned is considered a weakness.
This, along with the failure to properly l restore the system to service and functionally s
test the system resulted in a violation of TS requirements.
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1ssue will be addressed as Violation 50-366/90-23-01,' Failure to-
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Perform TS Required Compensatory Measures During FPMlInoperability.
One violation was identified.
5.
InspectionofOpen. Items'(92700)(90712)(92701)
The following items were reviewed using licensee reports, inspection, record-review, and discussions with licensee personnel, as aprropriate:
a. (Closed) IFI 50-321,366/89-01-05:
Procedure for Cleaning Fuel 011'
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Storage _ Tanks.
This item was opened during a review of the licensee's receipt, storage and handling of EDG fuel oil in occordance with TI 2515/100.
The inspector had observed that no program requirement:or procedure existed concerning cleaning of the fuel oil: storage tanks. The tanks were cleaned in November 1986, but a cleaning procedure was-still in development.
Procedure 52PM-R43-007-0S, Diesel Fuel 0il-Storage Tank Cleaning,-has been developed.
It was effective June 14, 1990. The procedure contains two major subsections.
Section 7.10, Fuel Oil Cleaning (Removal ?of. Water, Sediment, Insoluble,etc.), provides guidance and requirements for' cleaning
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of the fuel oil _ in the storage tanks whenever results:of the-sampling and analysis program indicate that'cleaningLis necessary.
Section 7.11, Fuel Oil Storage Tank C1.eaning-(10 year P.M.),
provides instructions and requirements for cleaning'of the fuel oil tanks.
In this case, the tank is pumped out and the empty tank.is cleaned. _ The required frequency is stated ~ as -at least once every 10 years. Additionally, the procedure recommends tank cleaning'when the fuel oil is replaced. The inspector reviewed Procedure-l 52PM-R43-007-0S and did not identify any problems.. The instructions l
appear to be thorough and the appropriate QA hold-steps:were-
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included. This item is closed.
L b. (Closed) IFI 50-321,366/89-01-06:
Removal of Water from Fuel 0il-Storage Tanks.
c This item was opened during the inspector review:of' EDG fuel oil
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issues as required by TI 2515/100.
As discussed in the'above-paragraph, the licensee has developed a procedure (Section 7.10 of 52PM-R43-007-OS) to remove water from the fuel oil in'the. storage-tanks whenever analysis indicates it is'necessary.
Procedure 64CH-ADM-001-0S, Chemistry Program, lists the required frequency of storage tank sampling and acceptance criteria for percent water-and
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sediment.
The inspector determined that adequate procedure guidance i
is present to ensure the fuel oil storage' tanks are sampled and if necessary, water and/or sediment removed. This item is close __ _
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c. (Closed) IFI b'l-366/89-27-04i Incorrect-Louver Setpoints In Calibration Prot 9 dure 57CP-CAL-180-2.
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This item addresseo two discrepancie'. noted between the applicable
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P&ID and the calibration procedures..Specifically, the closing /z
' opening temperature setpoints-for the diesel.-generator ' room 2A and l
2C louvers were incorrectly stated in:57CP-CAL-180-2. The-
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inspection report stated if thr. louvers w'ere set at the incorrect setpoints, their operation.wN1d not be as specified in the FSAR.
The inspector reviewed ku,ision 1 of Calibration Procedure 57CP-CAL-180-25, Penn Controls Temperature Switch Calibration
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(effective February 12, 1990.)..P&ID 12619,'and Section 9.4.5.2.'1;of the FSAR.
The procedure contained the correct setpoints. No, discrepancies were identified. This item is closed.
d.
(Closed)-LER'321/89-05:
Personnel Error Causes. Missed TS Surveillance..
This LER addressed the licensee's discovery of a failure to correctly test all relays and contacts' between the sensor and:the'
t actuated device of the Low Low' Set (LLS) system for both Hatch units. TS 4.6.H.2.6 (Unit 1) and 4.3.3;2 (Unit 2) specifically
require logic system functional-tests (LSFT) of thesetsystems.
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Corrective actions involved revising the deficient proceduresit'o j
include-testing of the one set of contacts on eight different relays in the LLS systems that had not previously been tested. The
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contacts must function to actuate the LLS system. A method was developed which tests all relays and contacts between the sensor and the actuated device. This method was then utilized.to revise the
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applicabl2 ATTS Panel Channel Funct1enal Test and calibration
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procedure to include functional testing of the relays;and contacts.
The revised functional test were performed satisfactorily in May 1989. 'The. licensee also performed engineering reviews of,other-LSFT urocedures that has been generated by the same individual :to -
l ensur! these tests complied with TS requirements. No other problems
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were Toted..This item is closed, e.
(Closed) LER 366/89-10:
Less Than Adaquate Preedure.Results in a Missed TS Surveillance.
l This LER involved a weakness in the calibration and test.ing of instrumentation which provides secondary position for the SRVs.
Specifically, procedure 57CP-CAL-162-2S, Leeds and Northrup Speedomax 165 and 250 Multipoint Recorder, did-not meet all the
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surveillance requirements of TS 4.3.6.4-1.
The procedure tested alli (
required functions except the verification of the CR' annunciator i
function which provides an alarm when the SRV tailpipe temperature l
exceeds a setpoint programmed into the recorder. On December 14, 1989, this function was satisfactorily tested. - Procedure 57SU-821-019-2S, SRV Temperature Instrument Channel Lalibration, was developed which provides instructions for performing the. testing required by TS.
It was made effective on June 8,199'J, and includes specific steps addressing the annunciator. This item is closed.
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(Closed)LER 321/89-09:. Plant Procedures Inadequately Implement TS Surveillance Rec.uirements.
This LER addressed the licensee identified failure'to perform adequate E0C-RPT response time-testing.,-This testing is required by TS Table 4.2.9 (Unit 1) and-Section.4.3.9.2.3,(Unit Two) and had been discussed in the SERs for-recent TS amendments.
Problems had been identified during a' review of TS as part of'the TS Improvement Program.
Special Test' Procedures 57SP-083989-1M-1-1S'and.57SP-082989-1M-1-2S-were developed to test the response times of the:E0C-RPT sytems on both units.1 The testing was completed-satisfactorily in August and i
September of 1989. ' During review of.-the issue several.other areas:
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were identified which required TS-changes ~ for full resolution.- TS amendments Nos~167'and 103 were issued 4 0n December 4, 1989.
The Unit:2 amendment defined E0C-RPT. response time and revised the; response time acceptance criteria; JThe Unit.1: amendment also-defined E0C-RPT system response. time and added a. response time acceptance criteria.-
The licensee examined a 5 percent sample of recent TS amendments to-ensure TS surveillance requirements had beenicorrectly incorporated into procedures.
No additional examples'of the problem were identified. A pennanent procedure; change was completed which-fully incorporated the TS E0C-RPT testing requirements. Based on these i
actions as well as other corrective actions discussed in the LER, this' item is closed.
7.
ExitInterview(30703)
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on November 19,-1990,.
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with those persons indicated in paragraphL1'above. The inspectors'
described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the~ inspection i
findings.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this-
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inspection.
l Item Number Status-Description and Reference-
50-366/90-23-01 Opened:
VIOLATION - Failure to Perform TS Requi' red Compensatory Measures During FPM Inoperability (paragraph 4b)
50-321,366/90-23-02 Opened'
IFI - TS Surveillance Scheduling Issues (paragraph 3c)
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12-8.
Acronyms and Abbreviations Control Room CR
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Design Change Request DCR
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ECCS - Emergency Core Cooling System-EDG - Emergency Diesel Generator.
EOC-RPT - End of Cycle Recirculation Pump ' Trip.
Engineered Safety Feature ESF
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FPM Fission Product Monitor
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FSAR - Final Safety Analysis Report Functional. Test-
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FT
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Instrumentation and Controls I&C
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-IFl
-- Inspector Followup Item
Limiting Condition for Operation LC0
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LG Licensee Event Report
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LLS Low Low Set MWO Maintenance Work Order mR/hr-Millirem per Hour MSLRM-Main Steam Line Radiation' Monitor NCV Non-cited Violation
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Nuclear Regulatory. Commission NRC
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NSAC - Nuclear Safety and Compl:ance -
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P&lD - Piping and Instrumentation Diagram PCIS - Primary Containment Isolation System-PM Preventive' Maintenance
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RCIC - Reactor Core Isolation Cooling SAER - Safety Audit and Engineering Review-SBLC - Standby Liquid. Control. Control
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SOS SuperintendentOnShift(Operations)
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SRV' - Safety Relief Valve TS Technical Specifications
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URI Unresolved item
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