IR 05000261/2015004
| ML16028A004 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Robinson  |
| Issue date: | 01/27/2016 |
| From: | Hopper G NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB4 |
| To: | Glover R Duke Energy Corp |
| References | |
| IR 2015004 | |
| Download: ML16028A004 (22) | |
Text
UNITED STATES uary 27, 2016
SUBJECT:
H.B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000261/2015004
Dear Mr. Glover:
On December 31, 2015, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit 2. On January 20, 2016, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff.
Inspectors documented the results of this inspection in the enclosed inspection report.
No NRC-identified or self-revealing findings were identified during this inspection.
In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding, of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRCs Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRCs Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
George T. Hopper, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects Docket No.: 50-261 License No.: DPR-23
Enclosure:
IR 05000261/2015004 w/Attachment: Supplementary Information
REGION II==
Docket No: 50-261 License No: DPR-23 Report No: 005000261/2015004 Licensee: Duke Energy Progress, Inc.
Facility: H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit 2 Location: 3581 West Entrance Road Hartsville, SC 29550 Dates:
October 1, 2015 through December 31, 2015 Inspectors:
K. Ellis, Senior Resident Inspector C. Scott, Senior Resident Inspector (Acting)
J. Parent, Resident Inspector (Acting)
A. Butcavage, Reactor Inspector, 1R07 M. Bates, Sr. Operations Engineer, 1R11 Approved by: George T. Hopper, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure
SUMMARY
IR 05000261/2015004, October 1, 2015, through December 31, 2015; Duke Energy Progress,
Inc., H.B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit 2, Integrated Inspection Report.
The report covered a three-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and regional inspectors. No findings were identified during this inspection period. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operations of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 5.
REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status
The unit began the inspection period at 100 percent rated thermal power (RTP). The unit was shutdown for a planned maintenance outage on November 16, 2015, to replace four turbine blades. The unit returned to 100 percent RTP on November 29, 2015, and remained there for the remainder of the inspection period.
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity
1R01 Adverse Weather Protection
a. Inspection Scope
.1 Impending Adverse Weather Conditions
The inspectors reviewed the licensees preparations to protect risk-significant systems from heavy rainfall on October 1-2, 2015. The inspectors evaluated the licensees implementation of adverse weather preparation procedures and compensatory measures, including operator staffing, before the onset of the adverse weather conditions. The inspectors reviewed the licensees plans to address the ramifications of potentially lasting effects that may result from heavy rainfall. The inspectors verified that operator actions specified in the licensees adverse weather procedure maintain readiness of essential systems. The inspectors verified that required surveillances were current, or were scheduled and completed, if practical, before the onset of anticipated adverse weather conditions. The inspectors also verified that the licensee implemented periodic equipment walkdowns or other measures to ensure that the condition of plant equipment met operability requirements. Documents reviewed are listed in the
.
.2 Seasonal Extreme Weather Conditions
The inspectors conducted a detailed review of the stations adverse weather procedures written for extreme low temperatures. The inspectors verified that weather-related equipment deficiencies identified during the previous year had been placed into the work control process and/or corrected before the onset of seasonal extremes. The inspectors evaluated the licensees implementation of adverse weather preparation procedures and compensatory measures before the onset of and during seasonal extreme weather conditions. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. The inspectors evaluated the following risk-significant systems:
- service water system
- fuel oil system
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R04 Equipment Alignment
a. Inspection Scope
Partial Walkdown The inspectors verified that critical portions of the selected systems were correctly aligned by performing partial walkdowns. The inspectors selected systems for assessment because they were a redundant or backup system or train, were important for mitigating risk for the current plant conditions, had been recently realigned, or were a single-train system. The inspectors determined the correct system lineup by reviewing plant procedures and drawings. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
The inspectors selected the following systems or trains to inspect:
- A residual heat removal pump (RHR) in-service for shutdown cooling
- motor-driven auxiliary feedwater system (MDAFW) when used for decay heat removal option
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R05 Fire Protection
a. Inspection Scope
Quarterly Inspection The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of selected fire plans by comparing the fire plans to the defined hazards and defense-in-depth features specified in the fire protection program. In evaluating the fire plans, the inspectors assessed the following items:
- control of transient combustibles and ignition sources
- fire detection systems
- water-based fire suppression systems
- gaseous fire suppression systems
- manual firefighting equipment and capability
- passive fire protection features
- compensatory measures and fire watches
- issues related to fire protection contained in the licensees corrective action program The inspectors toured the following fire areas to assess material condition and operational status of fire protection equipment. Documents reviewed are listed in the
.
- HVAC Equipment Room for Control Room, fire zone 17
- 4KV Switchgear Room, fire zone 25E
- Service Water Pump/Intake Area, fire zone 29
- Auxiliary Feedwater Room, fire zone 6
- [Dedicated Shutdown] D.S. Diesel Enclosure, fire zone 25D
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R07 Heat Sink Performance
a. Inspection Scope
Triennial Review of Heat Sink Performance The inspectors reviewed operability determinations, completed surveillances, vendor manual information, associated calculations, and inspection results associated with the A component cooling water (CCW) heat exchanger, and the B CCW heat exchanger.
These heat exchangers were chosen based on their risk significance in the licensees probabilistic safety analysis and their important safety-related mitigating system support functions.
For the CCW heat exchangers, the inspectors reviewed the methods and results of heat exchanger inspections. The inspectors evaluated whether the methods used to inspect and clean heat exchangers were consistent with as-found conditions identified and expected degradation trends and industry standards; the licensees inspection and cleaning activities had established acceptance criteria consistent with industry standards; and the as-found results were recorded, evaluated, and appropriately dispositioned so that the as-left condition was acceptable.
In addition, the inspectors determined whether the condition and operation of the CCW heat exchangers were consistent with design assumptions in heat transfer calculations, and as described in selected calculations. This included determining whether the number of plugged tubes reported during inspection of the heat exchangers in the field was within pre-established limits, based on established tube plugging criteria contained in selected calculations. The inspectors determined whether the licensee evaluated the potential for water hammer and established adequate controls and operational limits, to prevent heat exchanger degradation due to excessive flow-induced vibration during operation. In addition, work orders (WOs) associated with visual inspection records were reviewed to determine the integrity of the heat exchanger.
The inspectors also reviewed the licensees approach to maintaining smaller heat exchangers such as the lube oil coolers associated with the steam-driven auxiliary feedwater pump, and MDAFW pump lube oil coolers. The inspectors reviewed selected WOs to determine whether the methods used to inspect and clean heat exchangers were consistent with as-found conditions identified and expected degradation trends and industry standards; the licensees inspection and cleaning activities had established acceptance criteria consistent with industry standards; and the as-found results were recorded, evaluated, and appropriately dispositioned so that the as-left condition was acceptable.
For the ultimate heat sink (UHS) dam, the inspectors determined whether the performance of UHS, and their subcomponents such as piping, intake screens, pumps, valves, etc., was appropriately evaluated by tests or other equivalent methods, to ensure availability and accessibility to the in-plant cooling water systems. The inspectors determined whether the licensees inspection of the UHS was thorough and of sufficient depth to identify degradation of the shoreline protection, or loss of structural integrity.
This included determination whether vegetation present along the slopes was trimmed, maintained, and was not adversely impacting the embankment.
In addition, the inspectors discussed with the system engineer whether the licensee ensured sufficient reservoir capacity by trending and removing debris, or sediment buildup in the UHS. This sample included a walkdown of the dam structure, and discussions with the system engineer on recent upgrades to one of the dam level control Tainter gates. Discussions were also held regarding the seepage in the vicinity of the toe of the dam, as documented by the licensee in Long Term Asset Management (LTAM) RNP-14-0047.
The inspector also performed a walkdown of the accessible portions of the service water intake structure, to determine whether the licensees assessment on structural integrity and component functionality was adequate, and that the licensee ensured proper functioning of traveling screens and strainers, and structural integrity of component mounts. In addition, the inspectors discussed with the system engineer whether service water pump bay silt accumulation was monitored, trended, and maintained at an acceptable level by the licensee, and that water level instruments were functional and routinely monitored. The inspectors also determined whether the licensees ability to ensure functionality during adverse weather conditions was adequate. Inspectors completed sample observations of in-progress work on outdoor piping heat trace elements and insulation in the vicinity of the intake structure. The inspectors also performed a walkdown inspection of accessible portions of the UHS buried supply pipe routing from the intake structure to the plant structure, to look for possible telltale signs of settlement or leakage conditions that may be indicative of loss of pipe leak-tight integrity or piping structural discontinuities.
The inspectors reviewed a sample of the licensee procedures for flow testing of the service water pumps to determine if pump testing and valve stroke criteria is consistent with industry standards established by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Operation and Maintenance Code, and plant-specific design requirements.
In addition, the inspectors reviewed system health reports and condition reports (CRs)related to the heat exchangers and heat sink performance issues, to determine whether the licensee had an appropriate threshold for identifying issues, and to evaluate the effectiveness of the corrective actions. The documents that were reviewed are included in the Attachment to this report, including the system health reports that include discussion of corrective measures completed or planned for the identified concerns.
At the request of the resident inspector, the inspectors determined whether the licensees inspection of the forced draft cooling system enclosure structure, used in conjunction with the dedicated shutdown diesel generator cooler, was maintained in accordance with the system design intent.
An additional sample of the plants response to operating experience (OE) concerning the RHR system heat exchanger maintenance was also conducted. Discussions with system engineers concerning the RHR system heat exchanger testing were conducted, and included a review of the proposed solution of the CR related to LTAM RNP-15-0062 concerning OE on a similar plant that did not establish a test plan to demonstrate RHR heat exchanger heat transfer capability. This review was conducted to determine if the proposed solution would provide reasonable assurance of the RHR heat exchanger heat transfer capabilities, and that an operability assessment was recorded. Additional RHR heat exchanger condition monitoring actions are included in the proposed solutions of LTAM RNP-15-0062 and action request 01960415.
These inspection activities constituted five heat sink inspection samples as defined in Inspection Procedure (IP) 71111.07-05. Documents reviewed are listed in the
.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
a. Inspection Scope
.1 Resident Inspector Quarterly Review of Licensed Operator Requalification
The inspectors observed two evaluated simulator scenarios administered to an operating crew conducted in accordance with the licensees accredited requalification training program. The scenario on October 28, 2015, evaluated the operators ability to respond to a tube rupture of the A steam generator (SG), failure of the steam dumps to operate and failure of the A SG power operated relief valve. The scenario on November 15, 2015, evaluated the operators ability to perform a scheduled plant shutdown to zero percent reactor power, and perform a cooldown to establish hot shutdown conditions. The inspectors assessed the following:
- licensed operator performance
- the ability of the licensee to administer the scenario and evaluate the operators
- the quality of the post-scenario critique
- simulator performance Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
.2 Resident Inspector Quarterly Review of Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual
Plant/Main Control Room The inspectors observed licensed operator performance in the main control room during the Unit 2 reactor shutdown for a planned maintenance outage on November 16, 2015.
The inspectors reviewed the operator performance and adherence to the operating procedures.
The inspectors assessed the following:
- use of plant procedures
- control board manipulations
- communications between crew members
- use and interpretation of instruments, indications, and alarms
- use of human error prevention techniques
- documentation of activities
- management and supervision Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
.3 Annual Review of Licensee Requalification Examination Results
On April 3, 2015, the licensee completed the comprehensive biennial requalification written examinations and the annual requalification operating examinations required to be administered to all licensed operators in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 55.59(a)(2), Requalification Requirements, of the NRCs Operators Licenses. The inspectors performed an in-office review of the overall pass/fail results of the individual operating examinations, written examinations, and the crew simulator operating examinations in accordance with IP 71111.11, Licensed Operator Requalification Program. These results were compared to the thresholds established in Section 3.02, Requalification Examination Results, of IP 71111.11.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors assessed the licensees treatment of the issues listed below to verify the licensee appropriately addressed equipment problems within the scope of the maintenance rule (10 CFR 50.65, Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants). The inspectors reviewed procedures and records to evaluate the licensees identification, assessment, and characterization of the problems as well as their corrective actions for returning the equipment to a satisfactory condition. The inspectors also interviewed system engineers and the maintenance rule coordinator to assess the accuracy of performance deficiencies and extent of condition.
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
- CR 1968817, C Auxiliary Feedwater Diesel Generator Trip and Alarm Locked in
- CR 1975684, Control Rods did not insert automatically
- Performance review of the main control room heating and ventilation air conditioning
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the maintenance activities listed below to verify that the licensee assessed and managed plant risk as required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)
- (4) and licensee procedures. The inspectors assessed the adequacy of the licensees risk assessments and implementation of risk management actions. The inspectors also verified that the licensee was identifying and resolving problems with assessing and managing maintenance-related risk using the corrective action program. Additionally, for maintenance resulting from unforeseen situations, the inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the licensees planning and control of emergent work activities.
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
- October 19-25, 2015, Qualitative Yellow Risk with A, B, and C main feedwater regulator valves in manual
- December 4, 2015, dedicated shutdown diesel generator out of service for 2-year preventive maintenance outage
- Reviewed the risk mitigation plan for the planned maintenance outage, from November 16-29, 2015
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R15 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
a. Inspection Scope
Operator Work-Around Review The inspectors performed a detailed review of the licensees operator work-around, operator burden, and control room deficiency lists for the station in effect on December 18, 2015, to verify that the licensee identified operator work-arounds at an appropriate threshold and entered them in the corrective action program. The inspectors verified that the licensee identified the full extent of issues, performed appropriate evaluations, and planned appropriate corrective actions. The inspectors also reviewed compensatory actions and their cumulative effects on plant operation. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors either observed post-maintenance testing or reviewed the test results for the maintenance activities listed below to verify the work performed was completed correctly and the test activities were adequate to verify system operability and functional capability.
- WO 13407992-02, OST-201-1, MDAFW System Component Test -Train A following inspection of the V2-16C, C MDAFW discharge to S/G C
- WO 20036353-05, LP-I-TURB-PRESS-CNTL, Turbine First Stage Pressure Control following replacement of NUS Modules for Rod Speed Control
- WO 13314434-02, OST-902-1, Containment Fan Coolers Component Test A Train following relay replacement for HVH-2 The inspectors evaluated these activities for the following:
- Acceptance criteria were clear and demonstrated operational readiness.
- Effects of testing on the plant were adequately addressed.
- Test instrumentation was appropriate.
- Tests were performed in accordance with approved procedures.
- Equipment was returned to its operational status following testing.
- Test documentation was properly evaluated.
Additionally, the inspectors reviewed a sample of corrective action documents to verify the licensee was identifying and correcting any deficiencies associated with post-maintenance testing. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities
a. Inspection Scope
For the Unit 2 maintenance outage to replace turbine blades, from November 16, 2015 through November 29, 2015, the inspectors evaluated the following outage activities:
- outage planning
- shutdown, cooldown, heat-up, and start-up
- reactor coolant system instrumentation and electrical power configuration
- reactivity
- decay heat removal and spent fuel pool cooling system operation The inspectors verified that the licensee:
- considered risk in developing the outage schedule
- controlled plant configuration in accordance with administrative risk reduction methodologies
- developed mitigation strategies for loss of key safety functions
- adhered to operating license and technical specification requirements Inspectors verified that safety-related and risk-significant structures, systems, and components not accessible during power operations were maintained in an operable condition. The inspectors also reviewed a sample of related corrective action documents to verify the licensee was identifying and correcting any deficiencies associated with outage activities. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the surveillance tests listed below and either observed the test or reviewed test results to verify testing adequately demonstrated equipment operability and met technical specification and licensee procedural requirements. The inspectors evaluated the test activities to assess for preconditioning of equipment, procedure adherence, and equipment alignment following completion of the surveillance.
Additionally, the inspectors reviewed a sample of related corrective action documents to verify the licensee was identifying and correcting any deficiencies associated with surveillance testing. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
Routine Surveillance Tests
- OST-201-2, MDAFW System Component Test - Train B
- OST-202, Steam Driven Auxiliary Feedwater System Component Test
- OST-751, Control Room HVAC R-1 Initiation and ERFIS Point Test (Quarterly)
- 2015 Control Room Tracer Gas In-leakage Testing RCS Leakrate
- OST-051, Reactor Coolant System Leakage Evaluation
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed a sample of the performance indicator (PI) data, submitted by the licensee, for Unit 2 PIs listed below. The inspectors reviewed plant records compiled between October 1, 2014, and September 30, 2015, to verify the accuracy and completeness of the data reported for the station. The inspectors verified that the PI data complied with guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, and licensee procedures. The inspectors verified the accuracy of reported data that were used to calculate the value of each PI.
In addition, the inspectors reviewed a sample of related corrective action documents to verify the licensee was identifying and correcting any deficiencies associated with PI data. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems
- high pressure injection system
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution
.1 Routine Review
The inspectors screened items entered into the licensees CAP to identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up. The inspectors reviewed condition reports, attended screening meetings, or accessed the licensees computerized corrective action database.
.2 Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors conducted a detailed review of CR 752914, Two Unexpected Station Blackout Sequence Actuations.
The inspectors evaluated the following attributes of the licensees actions:
- complete and accurate identification of the problem in a timely manner
- evaluation and disposition of operability and reportability issues
- consideration of extent of condition, generic implications, common cause, and previous occurrences
- classification and prioritization of the problem
- identification of any additional condition reports
- completion of corrective actions in a timely manner Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.3 Semi-Annual Trend Review
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed issues entered in the licensees corrective action program and associated documents to identify trends that could indicate the existence of a more significant safety issue. The inspectors focused their review on repetitive equipment issues and human performance trends but also considered the results of inspector daily condition report screenings, licensee trending efforts, and licensee human performance results. The review nominally considered the 6-month period of July 2015 through December 2015 although some examples extended beyond those dates when the scope of the trend warranted. The inspectors compared their results with the licensees analysis of trends. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the adequacy of corrective actions associated with a sample of the issues identified in the licensees trend reports.
The inspectors also reviewed corrective action documents that were processed by the licensee to identify potential adverse trends in the condition of structures, systems, and/or components as evidenced by acceptance of long-standing non-conforming or degraded conditions. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings and Observations
No findings were identified.
4OA3 Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion (1 sample)
(Closed) LER 2015-002-01, Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV) Limit Switches Qualified Life Exceeded Due to Miscalculation.
a. Inspection Scope
On February 18, 2015, it was determined that qualified life calculation for the NAMCO limit switches for the pressurizer PORVs was incorrect. These limit switches are used as post-accident monitoring (PAM) instrumentation to provide position indication of the PORV to the control room operators during a design basis accident (DBA), which is a requirement of TS 3.3.3. The qualified life calculation was revised on March 19, 2015, and revealed that the NAMCO limit switches were no longer qualified for their monitoring function during and following a DBA. This resulted in the function of PORV position being inoperable for a period of time greater than allowed by TS 3.3.3 PAM Instrumentation Limiting Condition for Operation. The licensee determined the cause of the miscalculated qualified life was a result of the calculation not being adequately checked by utility engineering personnel or by the person who performed the design verification. The licensee entered this issue in the corrective action program as CR 738953, implemented an interim standing instruction for alternate methods of monitoring PORV positon, and finally replaced the switches during refueling outage 29 which began May 12, 2015. Revision 1 was issued to include the event date.
b. Findings
The enforcement aspects of this LER were documented in IR 05000261/2015003 Section 4OA7, Licensee-Identified Violations. Revision 1 of the LER was reviewed. No additional findings or violations of NRC requirements were identified. This LER is closed.
4OA5 Other Activities
(Closed) Unresolved item (URI) 05000261/2015003-01: Failure of Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) Discharge Valve to Close on Demand
a. Inspection Scope
Introduction:
The inspectors continued the review of an unresolved item associated with the failure of SI-864A, Reactor Water Storage Tank discharge valve to close on demand during surveillance testing. The URI was opened to review the licensees cause evaluation and determine if a performance deficiency existed.
Description:
On May 18, 2015, with the plant in Mode 6, the A RWST discharge valve, SI-864A failed to stroke close on demand, from the control board, during engineering surveillance testing. Troubleshooting revealed that the thermal overload relay within the breaker that supplies power to the MOV actuator was tripped, which rendered the A emergency core cooling system train inoperable. Following discovery of this issue, maintenance personnel manually reset the thermal overload and cycled the valve closed. Additionally, the licensee replaced the thermal overload relay and performed post-maintenance testing. The licensee documented this issue in CR 749789 and initiated a cause evaluation. The licensees cause evaluation was unable to determine the exact time and cause of the tripped thermal overload relay for SI-864A.
The inspectors reviewed the licensees cause evaluation and the results of a vendor analysis of the failed component. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings and Observations
No findings were identified. The inspectors concluded that a performance deficiency did not exist based on the information available.
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit
On January 20, 2016, the resident inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Glover and other members of the licensees staff. The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was not retained by the inspectors or documented in this report.
ATTACHMENT:
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee personnel
- C. Caudell, Regulatory Affairs
- J. Conder, Assistant Operations Training Manager
- T. Cosgrove, Plant General Manager
- S. Connelly, Licensing
- F. Giannone, Training Manager
- M. Glover, Site Vice President
- E. Hedderman, Chemistry Manager
- R. Hightower, Licensing/Reg. Programs Supervisor
- D. Hoffman, Nuclear Oversight Manager
- K. Holbrook, Operations Manager
- M. Pastva, Jr., Nuclear Regulatory Affairs
- S. Peavyhouse, Organizational Effectiveness Director
- J. Rackley, Training Supervisor
- C. Sherman, Radiation Protection Superintendent
- C. Spencer, Welding Engineer
NRC personnel
- G. Hopper, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 4
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Closed
- 05000261/2015-002-01 LER Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV)
Limit Switches Qualified Life Exceeded Due to Miscalculation
- 05000261/2015003-01 URI Failure of Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST)
Discharge Valve to Close on Demand