IR 05000348/1993029
| ML20059G024 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 01/05/1994 |
| From: | Barr K, Wright F NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20059G023 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-348-93-29, 50-364-93-29, NUDOCS 9401210072 | |
| Download: ML20059G024 (40) | |
Text
~.
, ,
l UNITED STATES ,
I
/ps erog**k NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION y -
" ;;* " REGloN 11 101 MAR 1ETTA STREET, N.W., SUITE 2900
% j ATLANTA, GEORGIA 33323-0199
% g
*,,.,,**~ .K 01 %.
Report Nos.: 50-348/93-29 and 50-364/93-29 Licensee: Alabama Power Company P. O. Box 1295 Birmingham, AL 35201 Docket Nos.: 50-348 and 50-364 License Nos.: NPF-2 and NPF-8 Facility Name: Farley Nuclear Plant Inspection Conducted: December 6-10, 1993 Inspector: & }][ A_ , {$ / f74 F. N. Tright, Team'Lhader J '
V Dat'e Sibned Team Members: A. Gooden J. O'Brien N. McNgti Approved by: /. k44 / ff K. P. Barr, Chief Ddte' Signed Emergency Preparedness Section Radiological Protection and Emergency Preparedness Branch Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards -
l l
SUMMARY Scope:
This routine, announced inspection involved the observation and evaluation of the annual emergency preparedness exercise. Emergency organization activation and response were selectively observed in the licensee's Emergency Response
-
Facilities including: the Control Room; Technical Support Center; Operations -
Support Center and Emergency Operations Facility. The inspection also-included a review of the exercise scenario and observation'of the licensee's post exercise critique. The-exercise was a full participation exercise with the State of Alabama, Houston County, State of Georgia, and Early County. The exercise was conducted on December 8, 1993, between the hours of 7:00 a.m. and 1:00 PDR ADOCK0500g8 G
-.s . u -
. . _ - - - . .
.
Results:
In the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified. One ,
exercise weaknesses was identified for failure to follow Emergency Implementing Procedures concerning the radiological monitoring and protection actions for Emergency Response Organization personnel (Paragraph 11). Two Inspector Followup Items were identified: 1) To review the adequacy of the licensee's OSC's facilities, equipment, and procedures to effectively ;
implement the licensee's Emergency Plan (Paragraph 9.c); and 2) To review the ,
licensee's controls for the review and approval of Emergency Notification messages (Paragraph 7). Overall, the licensee demonstrated the capability to implement the Emergency Plan in the event of a radiological emergency, i
.
l j
i
!
l
!
i
!
!
-1
i
!
\
!
l l
,
. . _ _ _ _ _ _ _
. .
REPORT DETAILS-l Persons Contacted Licensec employees j H. Floyd, Senior Health Physics Technician l
- R. Henley, Plant Instructor
- R. Hill, General Manager
- Lee, Emergency Preparedness Coordinator (Corporate) ,
- R. Livingston, Environmental Supervisor 1 J. McGriff, Emergency Preparedness Technician 4
- Mitchell, Health Physics Superintendent i A. Morrow, Shift Radiological Chemist ,
- C. Nesbitt, Operations Manager
- J. Osterholtz, Plant Support Assistant General Manager l
- J. Powell, Unit Operations Superintendent
- L. Stinson, Operations Assistant General Manager D. Teat, Instrumentation and Control Foreman, Computer Services
- J. Thomas, Maintenance Manager
- B. Vanderbye, Site Emergency Preparedness Coordinator W. Ware, Dose Assessment Director-
- Warren, Technical Training Supervisor
- L. Williams, Training and Emergency Preparedness Manager Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included engineers, operators, mechanics, security force members, technicians, and administrative personne Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- M. Morgan, Resident Inspector
- T. Ross, Senior Resident Inspector
- Attended exit interview Abbreviations used throughout this report are defined'in the last paragrap . Review of Exercise Objectives and Scenarios For Power Reactors (82302)
The scenario for the emergency exercise was reviewed to determine that provisions had been made to test the integrated capability and a major portion of the basic elements existing within the licensee's Emergency Plan and organization as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.F,-and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I The scenario was reviewed in advance of the scheduled exercise date and was discussed with licensee representatives. The scenario was adequate to exercise the onsite and offsite emergency organizations of the-licensee. The submitted exercise scenario was organized exceptionally
- _ . - -
- ,
.
.
well with the various sections clearly identified and each page l numbered. The scenario's organization facilitated inspectio- team review and group discussions of scenario event The pre-exercise instructions to drill controllers on implementing specific scenario actions could have been clearer in some instances. In the initial plant conditions for Unit 1, the CR operators were provided the following information:
" Unit 1 main containment air lock is inoperable due to a failed seal on the inner door," and q
" Maintenance crew going to Unit 1 main air lock to repair seal on the inner door." j The conditions reported indicated that containment integrity had been lost and the plant would have to start plant shutdown within one hour if i containment integrity could not be restored. Failure to restore
,
containment integrity within that hour would require the SS to declare
'
an NOVE. The SS promptly attempted to contact the workers at the air lock to determine the status af test and repairs and was unsuccessful on ;
several attempts because the controller had not assembled the players at j the airlock when the exercise began. In another example, a controller ;
responsible for reporting the RHR system was back in service did not ;
make the report at the time planned by the scenario director because the controller had not been given sufficient instruction on when to make the '
call to the CR staff. The problems-did not significantly impact scenario play but did indicate the need for the licensee to review the pre-exercise controller instruction process. Controllers should have a clear understanding of how and when they are expected implement their specific scenario assignment The inspector noted that_ players worked well as a team and hard throughout the exercise to implement the Emergency Plan and it's implementing procedure No violations or deviations were identifie . Assignment of Responsibility, Evaluation of Exercises For Power Reactors (82301)
The area of assignment of responsibility was observed to determine whether primary responsibilities for emergency response by the licensee had been specifically established and that adequate staff was available to respond to an emergency as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(1), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.A, and specified criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I During pre-exercise reviews of the licensee's Emergency Plan and-implementing procedures, the inspector concluded that the onsite and offsite emergency organizations were adequately described, the emergency responsibilities of the various supporting organizations had been
. - -_ . .
- . - -- - , . . .
. .
specifically established, and key emergency response organization positions were clearly defined in approved plans and implementing procedures. The inspector observed that adequate personnel were available to respond to the simulated emergenc No violations or deviations were identifie ; Onsite Emergency Organization (82301)
Implementation of the licensee's onsite emergency organization was observed to determine whether the responsibilities for emergency response were unambiguously defined, that adequate staffing was provided to insure initial facility accident response in key functional areas at all times, and that the interfaces were specified as required by ,
10 CFR 50.47(b)(2), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.A, and specific !
criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I The inspector observed that the initial onsite emergency organization was adequately defined; the responsibility and authority for directing actions necessary to respond to the emergency were clear; that staf I were available to fill key functional positions within the organization; and that onsite and offsite interactions and responsibilities were clearly define Licensee procedures required activation of the TSC, OSC, and EOF emergency facilities upon declaration of a General Emergency classification. The procedures recommended the activation of the onsite ERFs for SAE declarations and permitted the ED to activate any facility that was determined appropriate to support emergency response activities having an emergency classification below SA At about 7:18 a.m. the SS received a report that there was a loss of l containment integrity associated with a containment air lock that would i require a plant shutdown and the declaration of a NOVE if the air lock could not be replaced within one hour. In anticipation of th'e probable need to declare a NOUE the SS requested partial activation of the TSC at about 7:53 a.m. The partial activation was requested to have certain emergency support personnel available to prepare and transmit an Emergency Notification message reporting the anticipated NOVE. ERO personnel onsite were ' contacted and directed to report to the TSC for !
instructions. At about 8:00 a.m. the air lock integrity had been restored within one hour and there was no need to shutdown the reactor or to declare a NOUE; however, numerous TSC personnel .had already J reported to the TS At about 8:03 a.m. a high sump ' alarm for a RHR room was received and at 8:12 a.m. there'was a report of a ruptured pipe on the remaining '
operable B-RHR system. , The loss of B-RHR with A-RHR unavailabl !
resulted in the declaration of an Alert classification at 8:18 a.m. due !
to a loss of both trains of RHR. The SS assigned to the exercise-assumed the duties of ED promptly upon initiation of the simulated ,
emergency, and directed the emergency response in the CR until formally l I
l
_ _ _ . . . __,
-- . ._ - -
.
relieved by the designated ED. The ED requested activation of the ER0 and staffing of the TSC, 0SC, and E0F. A PA announcement that an Alert emergency classification had been declared'and that the ERO was to implement the Emergency Plan and report to their emergency facilities was made at about 8:20 a.m. The ERO pagers were also activated through the licensee's CAN system at about 8:23 a.m. The inspector observed the activation, staffing, and operation of the TSC and EOF. Due to the method in which the TSC was partially activated, before an emergency declaration was made, the inspector could not determine the licensee's response time in staffing the TSC. The TSC was operational at about
-
9:00 a.m. The inspector determined that the required staffing and assignment of responsibility were consistent with the liceasee's approved procedure Following the turnover, the designated ED assumed the responsibilities of the ED at about 8:30 a.m. and directed all emergency operations until relieved of some duties by the E0F's Recovery Manage Because of the scenario scope and conditions, long term or continuous staffing of the etergency response organization was not require The licensee had recently revised the Emergency Plan and EIPs such that the TSC and E0F would be staffed by plant personnel within approximately 75 minutes after the declaration of an emergency warranting ERF activation. The change that reduced the time for staffing the EOF from four hours to 75 minutes was a significant program improvemen The licensee adequately demonstrated the ability to alert, notify, and mobilize r.mergency response personne No violations or deviations were identified.
5. Emergency Response Support and Resources (82301)
This area was observed to determine that arrangements for requesting and effectively using assistance resources have been made, that arrangements to accommodate State and local staff at the licensee's onsite E0F have been made, and that other organizations capable of augmenting the planned response have been identified as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3),
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.A and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I The inspector determined that State and local staffs could be accommodated at the EOF and arrangements for requesting offsite assistance resources were'in place, but not utilized during the exercis No violations or deviations were identifie . .
6. Emergency Classification System (82301)
The emergency classification system was observed to determine that a standard emergency classification and action level scheme was in use by the licensee as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.C, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I FNP-0-EIP-9.0, " Emergency Classification And Actions, " Rev. 35, dated October 1,1993, provided for off-normal events to be classified into one of the four emergency classification categories. The procedure described the conditions or EALs which could be utilized for each of the emergency classification categories in Guidelines 1-4. The licensee's staff made the following emergency classifications during the exercise:
-
The SS in the CR recognized the conditions for declaring an Alert were met at about 8:13 a.m., when the remaining operable train of RHR was shutdown due to a ruptured 12 inch pipe on the RHR syste The SS properly classified the event in accordance with Guideline 3 " Alert" of EIP-9.0 and declared the Alert at 8:18 a.m. The applicable EAL was Item 5.0, EQUIPMENT STRUCTURE FAILURE, " Loss of (b) Both trains of RHR (All modes)."
a The conditions for declaring a SAE began at about 9:45 a.m. due to LOCA inside containment. At about 9:56 a.m., the ED in the TSC learned that the remaining criteria for declaring a SAE, containment monitors reaching alarm setpoints, had been met. The ED declared the SAE approximately six minutes later at 10:02 a.m.,
based on Guideline 2 " Site Area Emergency" of EIP-9.0. The applicable EAL was Item 1.0 RCS FAULT, "A major loss of primary coolant as indicated by: (b) Near normal steam pressure in'all steam generators accompanied by, (1) Containment pressure reaching 27 psig, AND (2) High containment radiation (R-2, R-11, and R-12 reaching their alarm setpoint), AND (3) High containment sump (recirculation) level, AND (4) High containment humidity."
-
The remaining condition for declaring a General Emergency was met at about 10:45 a.m. due to a containment isolation failure. The ED in the TSC declared the General Emergency about 10 minutes later at 10:55 p.m., based on Guideline 1 " General Emergency" of EIP-9.0. The applicable EAL was Item 2.0 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIERS, " Loss of two of three fission product barriers with a potential loss of the third. The following describe indication of loss of these boundaries... (b) Loss of primary coolant boundary... and (c) Loss of containment integrity..."
In general, the SS in the CR and the ED in the TSC effectively evaluated existing conditions and declared appropriate emergency classifications in accordance with approved procedures in a timely manner. However, the inspector identified a concern with the licensee's emergency classification and emergency notification implementing procedures which
_ _ - _
.
could result in delays in implementing the Emergency Plan and inaccurate documentation of emergency preparedness response. As documented above, the licensee did not declare the emergency classifications as soon as the conditions for an emergency classification were recognize EIP 9.0 required the Emergency Notification message approval time be documented as the emergency classification and declaration time. EIP 9.0 included the licensee's instructions for classification and notification. Figure 6, " Emergency Notification" form, of EIP 9.0, was utilized by the licensee to make emergency notifications to the States and local agencies. Figure 6, the Emergency Notification form, in part, contained the following information:
Item TRANSMITTAL TIME /DATE: (time) (date)
Item Emergency Declaration At: (time) (date)
Item 1 APPROVED BY: (name) (title) TIME /DATE:.(time) (date)
Guidelines 2-4 of EIP-9.0 each contained a statement to the similar to following statement from Guideline 1:
"The approval time and date (line 16, figure 6) and the declaration time and date (line 6, figure 6) should always be the same time. That time is after the Emergency Director has approved the emergency classification and protective action recommendations."
During the exercise, the licensee had Emergency Notification messages that were partially completed when the ED recognized that the remaining conditions for making a particular classification had been met. Rather than declare the emergency classifications when the conditions were known, the ED delayed the declaration until the Emergency Notification message form was completed. The procedure was utilized for all three emergency declarations. The classification declaration times and the approval of the emergency notification message for each classification were the same time.
The time intervals between the time emergency classification conditions were recognized and the time of event declaration by the ED were small.
However, the emergency declarations were unnecessarily delayed a few minutes for what appeared to be an effort to ensure the requirement to notify offsite agencies within 15 minutes was never exceeded. During the exercise, notifications to offsite agencies were initiated within three, one, and two minutes of the declarations for the Alert, Site Area, and General Emergency classifications respectively. The inspector discussed the inappropriateness of the procedures and their use during the exercise with representatives of the licensee's Emergency Preparedness staff. The inspector pointed out that the classifications should be made as soon as conditions warranting a particular declaration are observed or confirmed. The inspector stated that the delay of an
-
]
- -.. . . . _--- .. . . -.-
. . ,
l emergency classification declaration until an Emergency Notification j message was complete could lead to unnecessary delays in onsite and l offsite emergency response and protective actions and did not appear to serve any emergency preparedness objectiv No violations or deviations were identifie j 7. Notification Methods and Procedures (82301) .
'
The Notification Methods and Procedures area was observed to assure that procedures were established for notification of State and local response organizations and emergency personnel by the licensee, and that the .
content of initial and follow-up messages to response organizations was !
established. This area was further observed to assure that means to t provide early notification to the population within the plume exposure pathway were established pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5), Paragraph I ;
'
of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.E of NUREG-065 The inspector observed that notification methods and procedures were used to provide information concerning the simulated emergency conditions to Federal, State and local response organizations and to alert the licensee's augmented emergency response organization. The inspector noted that notifications, to the States of Alabama and Georgia and to local offsite agencies, were promptly transmitted following thef r completion and approval. The licensee also provided periodic update notifications to offsite agencies. A review of completed notification messages to the agencies was madesto determine that completed notification forms contained the following information: emergency conditions, emergency classifications, radioactivity release status, potentially affected population, projected population doses, recommended
.
protective actions, and any changes to these conditions. In general, the contents of the emergency notifications completed during the exercise were adequate, with minor problems experienced. However, one message did have a error associated with reporting one of the PARS that warranted management attention. A sector was omitted from a followup message and another incorrectly adde FNP-0-EIP-9.0, required Figure.6 " Emergency Notification" to be complete In addition, procedure FNP-0-EIP-27.0 " EOF Setup and Activation", Rev. 23, dated October 1, 1993, required the Dose Assessment Director to review Emergency Notification followup messages for accurac Emergency Notification message number 7, transmitted at 11:37 a.m. from-the E0F incorrectly listed EPZs E-10 and F-10 as zones for recommended sheltering; when the correct zones for sheltering were E-10 and D-10 as reported in Emergency Notification number 6. (The previous and initial notification message for the General Emergency declaration having PARS.)
.. _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ .
_ _ _ - _ - . _ __
>
,
The error was identified about five minutes later by the Dose Assessment Director and the correct sectors for sheltering were then imediately ,
reported to the State of Alabama representative in the EOF' and the State !
FE0C. The error was corrected in Emergency Notification message number S issued at about 11:55 a.m. The inspector stated that the licensee's procedures and the obrervation of review and approval _ activities for Emergency Notifications during a future drill or exercise would be an j IF <
IFI 50-348, 364/93-29-01: Review licensee procedures and controls for the review and approval Emergency Notification messages in a !
future exercise or dril !
10 CFR 50 Appendix E, " Emergency Planning and Preparedness For i Production and Utilization Facilities,"Section IV, " Content of l Emergency Plans," Section D, " Notification Procedures," Paragraph 3, states, in part, "A licensee shall have the capability to notify responsible State and local governmental agencies within 15 minutes l after declaring an emergency." During the 1993 exercise, licensee j personnel issued timely initial and follow-up notifications. A related j problem concerning the timeliness of Emergency Notifications and emergency classifications was discussed in Paragraph ,
Following the transmittal of each Emergency Notification message reporting a new emergency classification: licensee personnel called each-agency to ensure the message had been transmitted properly. The licensee's practice of following up on initial notification messages issued by the TSC demonstrated good initiativ I A phone in the E0F utilized to make contact with the ENN failed during the exercise, however, a backup phone was promptly connected to the EN and exercise communications were not significantly impacte No violations or deviations were identified.
8. Emergency Communications (82301)
The Emergency Communications area was observed to determine whether l provisions existed for prompt communications among principal response l organizations and emergency personnel as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(6),
10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG- .
0654,Section I l The licensee demonstrated the adequacy, operability, and effective use of emergency communications equipment. The inspector noted that radio communications between the Field Monitoring Teams and E0F were adequate to dispatch and direct field team activitie In general, the inspector observed that adequate communications existed ;
among the licensee's emergency organizations, and between the licensee's emergency response organization and offsite authoritie l
I l u.a... . a u - - - - - , _, .
. .
i
L 9 Licensee's use of the PA system to periodically inform and update the plant staff of accident conditions throughout the exercise. The ;
frequency and message content were very goo No violations or deviations were identified.
l- l
!
9. Emergency Facilities and Equipment (82301) l The Emergency Facilities and Equipment area was observed to determine l whether adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support an i eme,gency response were provided and maintained as required by ,
10 CFR 50.47(b)(8), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.E, and specific l
'
criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I Following the Alert declaration, the on-shift emergency organization was augmented through mobilization of the ER0 and activations of the TSC, j OSC, and E0 The inspector observed licensee emergency response activities at the onsite emergency facilities including the TSC, OSC, and E0F. Licensee response activities at offsite facilities including the Corporate Headquarters Emergency Operations Center and the News Media Center were not observed during the exercis ] Control Room
The SS demonstrated good command and control throughout the exercis Classifications and notifications were adequately accomplishe The SS correctly classified the emergency and the States and local agencies were promptly notified. The SS and the reactor operators demonstrated good use of the EIPs throughout the l
exercise. The SS referred to the classification procedure often,
'
when conditions changed, to datermine the possibility of reclassification. The SS demonstrated a good understanding of the-emergency procedure Operations personnel maintained good communications with the ERFs and kept management well informed of changing plant condition Communication between the CR and the TSC was quickly established and constantly maintained. In general, the exchange of information was performed accurately, concisely and in a professional manne No violations or deviations were identified.
l l Technical Support Center The inspector observed the initial activation and personnel response in the staffing of the TSC and as discussed above an assessment of the licensee's response in staffing the TSC could j not be determined due to the manner in which it was activated and staffed. Additionally, the inspector reviewing TSC activities
[ entered the TSC prior to the start of the exercise and found one L of the players (Maintenance Manager) in the TSC at his emergency l
_
.
-
?
1:
!
l 10 response station prior to the request for partial activatio The ED also never formally announced that the TSC had been activated, although it was obvious the TSC responsibilities were being performed by 9:00 a.m. Therefore, the license was unable to demonstrate a true test of TSC activation responsiveness.
L The designated ED was in the CR when the decision to declare an l
Alert emergency classification was made. The transfer of ED l responsibility to the designated ED was accomplished efficiently.
l An adequate turnover of information was performed at the time of the transfer and the time used to perform the transfer was kept.to
,
a minimum. Once turnover was completed, the designated ED assumed the role of ED at 8:30 a.m. and departed the CR to the TSC. The ED appeared knowledgeable of his duties and responsibilities and assumed the responsibility in a professional and organized manne Adequate command and control was displayed by the ED in the TS The licensee's TSC facilities and equipment were adequate to deal with the conditions described by the scenari However, the
, inspectt r noted that some emergency information was not posted in the TSC which could have assisted the staff in the performance of their duties. These included: listing TSC priorities and ranking of task, listing out of service equipment, and status of emergency i repair teams (Re-Entry Teams). The inspector reported the l information could prove useful in improving communications and i accident assessment response in the TSC. Prioritization of repair team efforts and resources were closely coordinated.by the ED, Maintenance Manager, and the Health Physics Manager in _ the TS However, these agreed priorities were not recorded or posted on a status board or other display medium for common knowledge or tracking purposes. In view of the specific scenario exercise conditions, a large number of repair priorities did not exist and no consequences resulted from this concept of operations. Had significant number of priorities existed requiring periodic adjustments or re-sequencing, the observed methods of communicating priorities could have resulted in confusion and or omission of a timely follow-u The inspector noted that.the control of repair teams out of the TSC caused a significant amount of personnel traffic, congestion, and noise inside the TSC as various Re-entry personnel conducted their business within the TSC.
l No violations or deviations were identifie c. Operational Support Center l
The licensee's OSC during the exercise was primarily an assembly area where representatives from various disciplines (Health Physics, Chemistry, and Operations) could be assembled for
. -
. .
J i 11 specific emergency response assignments. Maintenance ~ personnel )
were located in other assembly areas on site and transferred to ;
the OSC facility outside the TSC as neede J
'The OSC area outside the TSC was fairly spacious, provided .;
protection from the weather, and contained some emergency. supplies j including personnel anti-contamination clothing and respirator '
However, the area was noisy and.poorly lighte .
,
l The inspector noted that the licensee's OSC did not have a specific organization that could independently process the formation, control, and dispatch of re-entry teams as directed by i the Emergercy Director in the TSC. All of the controls for re-
! entry teams were administered from the TSC by the TSC staf .
j During the exercise there did not appear to be any one individual in charge of the OSC facility and activities there'were at times-chaotic. The inspector concluded that the assembly, briefing,-and dispatch of the re-entry teams dispatched from the facility :
,
appeared to be very inefficient. The licensee was able to !
l dispatch five re-entry teams from the facility during the- I exercise, in a period of about four hours. The last team (PASS Sample Team) was dispatched just prior to the exercise termination. The inspector noted that the licensee's system worked when there were only a few demands placed on it and that the licensee was able to dispatch the teams needed for the
, observed exercise scenario. However, the facility organization was so inefficient that the inspector could not conclude that the D facility would properly function for a larger number of re-entry teams that could be required with a significant even Additionally, the existing system for dispatching the re-entry !
teams appeared to take up too many of the TSC resources. The
'
i l' Maintenance Manager and the Health Physics Manager in the TSC appeared to spend a significant portion of their time and resources supporting re-entry functions which could have been performed outside the TSC. The Maintenance and Health Physics q Manager's re-entry team responsibilities limited their time an attention to their other TSC duties. The inspector stated that a review of the licensee's OSC activities (including: facilities, equipment, staffing, procedural guidance and controls) for dispatching and controlling re-entry teams and its impact on the j resources of the TSC would be reviewed in a future drill or exercise and be tracked as an IF IFI 50-348, 364/93-29-02: Review the licensee's OSC activities (including: . facilities, equipment, staffing, procedural guidance and controls) for dispatching and controlling re-entry teams and its impact on the resources of the TSC in a future drill or exercis As discussed above, the inspector observed the formation and dispatch of teams, assigned various plant mitigation tasks, from the OSC. While the licensee's OSC and controls for re-entry teams l
L
.-_-_ _ .
..
I
-
.l
may not have been very efficient, the inspector noted that the teams were adequately briefed on their task prior to leaving the OS The teams were provided dosimetry and RP personnel accompanied the team RP personnel discussed the potential radiological conditions and protective measures for the access route and work areas with the team members prior to their departure. An inspector accompanied a team taking a PASS sample and noted that the activities in support of that task were appropriately controlled and that the sampling team members effectively performed their task in accordance with their procedures and were able to complete the sampling and analysis in 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> and 35 minute No violations or deviations were identifie Emergency Operations Facility The inspector observed and evaluated the activation, staffing,-and operation of the E0F, which was located in the site training building. The activation of the facility proceeded in an expeditious and orderly fashion. E0F personnel referred to their activation procedures and checklist The EOF Recovery Manager demonstrated adequate command and control characteristics, and consulted frequently with his key staff. The Recovery Manager, along with his key staff, periodically briefed the facility staff. The frequency and content of these announcements appeared to keep the E0F organization adequately informed of plant status. Under the licensee's concept of operation, the TSC maintained the responsibilities for developing and making PARS and issuing initial Emergency Notifications following a change in emergency classification. The Recovery Manager in the E0F was responsible for making periodic Emergency-Notification follow-up messages, directing the activities of offsite radiological monitoring teams, and providing an interface with offsite agency representatives assigned to the E0 The E0F was a adequate facility which allowed the staff to pursue and accomplish assigned tasks in an efficient manne No violations or deviations were identifie . Accident Assessment (82301)
The Accident Assessment area was observed to determine whether adequate methods, systems, and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency condition were in use as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.B, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I a i,
.
13 The accident assessment program included both an engineering assessment of plant status and an assessment of radiological hazards to both onsite and offsite personnel resulting from the simulated accident. During the exercise, the ERO analyzed the plant status so as to make :
recommendations to the ED concerning mitigating actions to reduce damage to plant equipment and to terminate the emergency condition. The ,
accident assessment personnel analyzed plant conditions and developed appropriate strategies for combating equipment failure The staff adequately demonstrated the ability to estimate offsite doses resulting from the scenario conditions provided. Onsite and offsite radiological monitoring teams were dispatched to determine the level of radioactivity in those areas within the influence of the simulated plume. The teams effectively demonstrated their capability to collect those data points and relay those data to the emergency response facilitie No violations or deviations were identifie . Protective Responses (82301) ,
The Protective Responses area was observed to determine that guidelines for protective actions during the emergency, consistent with Federal guidance, were developed and in place, and protective actions for emergency workers, including evacuation of nonessential personnel, were implemented promptly as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10), and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I The inspect verified that the licensee had and used emergency procedures e formulating PARS for offsite populations within the 10 mile EPZ. ine declaration of a General Emergency occurred at 10:55 Using licensee procedures, the ED and his key staff determined the most appropriate PAR and notified the States and local agencies to recommend the following protective actions for the public:
Evacuate and Control Access in Down Wind Zones A, E5, and D5; and Shelter and Control Access in Down Wind Zones E10 and D1 The licensee made an error in reporting PARS in a followup Emergency notification message that was promptly corrected (Paragraph 7).
Protective actions were initiated for onsite personnel following the SAE declaration by conducting a personnel accountability of those personnel inside the protected area. The SS in the CR requested the assembly and accountability of site personnel with a PA announcement at about 10:06 a.m. which was followed by the sounding of the Plant Emergency Alarm for site assembly. The ED actions were performed in accordance with licensee procedure FNP-0-EIP-10.0, " Evacuation and Personnel Accountability," Rev. 25, dated October 1, 1993. The accountability was reported to the ED at about 10:25 a.m. with 10 identified personnel missing. All missing personnel were accounted for by 10:39 ,
Procedure FNP-0-EIP-4.0, " Health Physics Support to the Emergency Plan,"
Rev. 24 delineates the responsibilities of the Health Physics Manager located'in the TSC, including steps: '
-
3.5 - Monitoring of personnel in the EOF and Assembly area,
-
3.2.1 Monitoring changes in radiological conditions _and recommending actions to the Emergency Director; and
-
3.213 - Relocation of Security Pos Procedure FNP-0-EIP-27, " EOF Setup and Activation," Rev. 23, delineates the responsibilities of Dose Assessment Director located in the EOF, including:
Ensuring HP coverage of the EOF as required,
-
Having EOF ventilation shifted to the Isolate Mode if radiological conditions warrant, and
-
Issuing dosimetry if radiological conditions warran During the exercise, a radiological release began at about 10:45 causing measurable radiation exposures at the site boundary. The general direction of the release was west and traveling at about three miles per hour. The release continued throughout the exercise which was-terminated at about 1:00 p.m. During that time no radiological surveys were performed in or outside the licensee's E0F located approximately southwest of the release point. A security post also in the west entrance to the site was not evacuated or relocated during the exercis The EOF and the Security Post were close to the release point and in the general direction of the radioactive plume. The inspector reported that it was appropriate to provide radiological monitoring of the EOF and'
prepare for relocation of the security post should the plume move into those work areas. The inspector determined that the Health Physics Manager should have assessed radiological conditions at the security post and the E0F and have taken appropriate actions to protect personnel at those locations. Additionally, the Dose Assessment Director should-have requested HP coverage at the E0F and should have taken action to protect EOF personne The inspector stated that failure to take appropriate protective actions for ERO personnel as required by the licensee's EIP would be identified as an E EW 50-348, 364/93-29-03: Failure to follow EIPs concerning the radiological monitoring and protection actions for ERO personne No violations or deviations were identified.
l l~
_
l _ . - _ __
,
'
_12. Exercise Critique (82301)
The licensee's critique of the emergency exercise was observed _to 'I determine whether shortcomings in the performance of the exercise were brought to the attention of management and documented for corrective action pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, .
'
Paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I The licensee conducted critiques with exercise players following the exercise termination. Licensee controllers and observers conducted additional critiques prior to the formal critique to management on December 10, 1993. Issues identified by the licensee's staff during the exercise were discussed by licensee representatives during the formal exercise critique to licensee management. The licensee's critique addressed both substantive deficiencies and improvement area The licensee's critique process with exercise monitors was open, critical, and identified significant issues. The exercise director and monitors provided management with a written list of exercise deficiencies that !
were to be placed on the Emergency Planning Punchlist for resolution and a list of exercise monitor's comments and observations (117) at the :
formal exercise critique to licensee managemen .
No violations or deviations were identifie . Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701) ,
(Closed) IFI 50-348, 364/92-22-01: Conduct an unannounced exercise during calendar year 199 The inspector. determined that the licensee had conducted an unannounced exercise on November 8, 1993, which met the requirements for unannounced drill. The drill was observed by the Resident Inspector and the licensee was able to successfully staff and activate the ERO in accordance with the Emergency Plan requirements. The inspector stated that the item would be close ,
14. Exit Interview ;
The inspection scope and results were summarized on December 10, 1993, I with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1. The inspector described >
the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results listed below. Propriety information was not reviewed during the inspection. Dissenting comments were not received from the license Licensee management was informed that an open item (listed in _
Paragraph 13) was reviewed and considered close I i
i
. . - _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _
l I
l-I
+
Item Number Status Description and Reference 50-348,364/93-29-01 Open IFI - Review licensee procedures and l controls for~ the review and approval Emergency. Notification messages in a i future exercise or drill i (Paragraph 7). ;
e 50-348, 364/93-29-02 Open IFI - Review the licensee's OSC activities (including: facilities,. ;
equipment, staffing, procedural guidance and controls) for dispatching and controlling re-entry teams and its impact on the .
'
resources of the TSC in a future drill or exercise (Paragraph 9.c).
50-348,364/93-29-03 Open EW - Failure to follow EIPs concerning the radiological ,
monitoring and protection actions for ERO personnel (Paragraph 11).
50-348,364/92-22-01 Closed IFI - Conduct an unannounced exercise during= calendar year 1993 (Paragraph 12).
1 Index of Abbreviations Used in this Report CFR Code of Federal Regulations CR Control Room EAL Emergency Action Level [
ED Emergency Director EIP Emergency Implementing Procedure ENN Emergency Notification Network -;
E0F Emergency Operations Center EP Emergency Preparedness EPZ Emergency Planning Zone ERF Emergency Response Facility ERO Emergency Response Organization EW Exercise Weakness FEOC Forward Emergency Operations Center FNP Farley Nuclear Plant GE General Emergency IFI Inspector-Follow-up Item LOCA Loss Of Coolant Acciden NOUE Notification of Unusual Event ;
NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission OSC Operations Support Center '
PA Public Address PAR Protective Action Recommendation PASS Post Accident Sampling System q
l
_ ,-. .
-. . - . . . ..
,
!
, . .
4'
'I-17 l i'
RE Revision RHR Residual Heat Removal System RP . Radiation Protection-SAE Site Area. Emergency :
SS Shift Supervisor i TSC Technical Support Center ,
Attachments:
Exercise Objectives, Scenario '
Abstract and Scenario Timeline i
f h
!
L f
l l
t
_. . . ~ . . . - - ,
F l
'
l OBJECTIVES l
O
- -
._. .- . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .
1993 FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY EXERCISE OBJECTIVES December 8, 1993
'
( I. Participating Organizations Full Participation: Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC),
Alabama Power Company, State of Alabama, Houston County, State of Georgia and Early Count .
II. Purpose To meet the requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix E, and NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Re To conduct a small-scale exercise that will include the mobilization of SNC, Alabama Power Company, state and local personnel and resources adequate to verify the capability of_ participating organizations to respond to an accident scenario requiring respons Ill. Southern Nuclear Operating Company and Alabama Power Company Objectives On-site Demonstrate that control room staff can assess the event, classify the event, take corrective measures to control the event and activate emergency response procedure q h Demonstrate that plant staff can activate and staff the Technical Support Center (TSC) and perform accident response i
'
activities including: Dose Assessment j Off-site notification and protective action recommendations ' Reclassification of emergency status I Personnel Accountability for all personnel on-site Radiation Monitoring Team (RMT) Dispatch and Control (if required) Site access control and admittance of essential personnel Dispatch and control of re-entry teams Demonstrate the capability to turn over E0F functions to the E0F staff when the EOF is activated and staffe ! Demonstrate that plant staff can activate and staff the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) and perform accident response activities !
including: j Assuming the dose assessment function and the RMT direction and control function from the TSC staf Coordinating logistics, engineering functions, licensing ,
functions and manpower with the TSC and E0 Preparing and coordinating news releases and activating the
/]
O NM L
i :
! Demonstrate the capability to augment E0F staff with non-
_'\ essential plant personne (J Demonstrate the adequacy of the plant's communication system including:
a. Communication links to Corporate Emergency Operations Center (E0C)
b. News Media Center (NMC)
c. Interplant communications d. Communication links to state and local authorities Demonstrate the capability to perform radiological monitorin Off-Site Demonstrate that the corporate staff can be activated and staff the E0C in a timely fashio . Demonstrate that Corporate Headquarters Emergency Operations Center (E0C) staff can provide support for: Activation of facilities Logistics Engineering and Licensing Support organization notification g Briefing of company management Q News release preparation Demonstrate that the Public Information Organization can respond to media and public inquiries, establish a rumor control center, and issue and coordinate news release IV. State and Local Objectives
- See Attachment 1 (Any state or local objective that cannot be demonstrated due to conditions inconsistent with the scenario will be demonstrated in a separate drill.)
V. Joint Objectives (SNC, Alabama Power Company, State of Alabama, State of Georgia, Houston County and Early County) Demonstrate that all parties can coordinate news releases and conduct a joint news conferenc Demonstrate that adequate technical information can be exchanged among involved agencie VI. Exercise Limits The plume exposure exercise will begin prior to 8 A.M. CST and conclude by 2:30 P.M. CST.
, a
s
- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .
-.
.
ATTACHMENT I STATE AND LOCAL OBJECTIVES State Houston State Early (~ of AL. County of GA. County-
' MOBILIZATION OF EMERGENCY PERSONNEL. Demonstrate the capability to alert and fully mobilize personnel for both emergency facilities X X X X and field operations. Demonstrate the capability to activate and staff emergency facilities for emergency operation . FACILITIES-EQUIPMENT, DISPLAYS, AND WORK ENVIRONMEN Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equipment, X X X X displays, and other materials to support emergency operation . DIRECTION AND CONTRO Demonstrate the capability to direct and control X X X X emergency operation . COMMUNICATION Demonstrcte the capability to communicate with all appropriate emergency X X X -X personnel at facilities and in the fiel . EMERGENCY WORKER EXPOSURE CONTRO Demonstrate the capability to continuously monitor and
'
X control radiation' exposure to emergency workers, l FIELD RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING - AMBIENT RADIATIO Demonstrate the appropriate use of equipment and X N/A determining field radiation measurement ; PLUME DOSE PROJECTIO Demonstrate the capability to develop dose projections and X N/A X N/A protective action recommendations regarding evacuation and shelterin . FIELD RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING - AIRBORNE RADIOI0 DINE AND PARTICULATE ACTIVITY MONITORIN Demonstrate the appropriate use of equipment and procedures for the measurement of airborne X N/A
'
radioiodine concentrations as low as 10-7 (0.0000001)
microcuries per cubic centimeter in the presence of noble gases and obtain samples of particulate activity in the airborne plum . PLUME PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION MAKIN Demonstrate the capability to make timely X X X X and appropriate protective action decisions (PAD).
5 C . . . . _
'
State Houston State Early of AL. County :of.GA. County 1 ALERT AND NOTIFICATION. Demonstrate the ( N.: capability to promptly alert and notify the X X X X 3 public within the 10-mile plume pathway emergency planning zone (EPZ) and disseminate instructional messages to the public on the basis of decisions by appropriate State or local official . PUBLIC INSTRUCTIONS AND EMERGENCY INFORMATIO Demonstrate the capability to coordinate the formulation and dissemination of accurate X X X X information and instructions to the publi . EMERGENCY INFORMATION - MEDIA. Demonstrate the capability to coordinate the development X X X X and dissemination of clear, accurate, and timely information to the news medi . EMERGENCY INFORMATION - RUMOR CONTRO Demonstrate the capability to establish and operate rumor X N/A X N/A control in a coordinated and timely manne !
1 IMPLEMENTATION OF PROTECTIVE ACTIONS. USE OF KI FOR EMERGENCY WORKERS, INSTITUTIONALIZED ;
INDIVIDUALS, AND THE GENERAL PUBLIC. Demonstrate !
O the capability and resources to implement potassium iodide (KI) protective actions for emergency workers, institutionalized individuals, i
'
and, if the State plan specifies, the general i publi .j 1 IMPLEMENTATION OF PROTECTIVE ACTIONS - SPECIAL l POPULATIONS. Demonstrate the capability and N/A N/A X l resources necessary to implement appropriate l protective actions for special population . IMPLEMENTATION OF PROTECTIVE ACTIONS - SCHOOL Demonstrate the capability and resources i necessary to implement protective actions for school N/A N/A N/A I children within the plume pathway emergency '
planning zone (EPZ).
17. TRAFFIC AND ACCESS CONTROL. Demonstrate the organizational capability and resources necessary to control evacuation traffic flow and to control access to evacuated and sheltered N/A X N/A area i 18. RECEPTION CENTER - MONITORING, DECONTAMINATION, l AND REGISTRATION. Demonstrate the adequacy of i O~ procedures, facilities, equipment, and personnel N/A N/A for the radiological monitoring, decontamination, and registration of evacuee !
'
G
_ . _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ __ - _ _ _
. .
State Houston State Early of AL. County of GA. County 19. CONGREGATE CARE. -Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equipment, supplies, O personnel, and procedures for congregate care of evacuee N/A N/A 20. MEDICAL SERVICES - TRANSPORTATIO Demonstrate the adequacy of vehicles, equipment, procedures, and personnel for transporting contaminated, X*
injured, or exposed individual . MEDICAL SERVICES - FACILITIES. Demonstrate the adequacy of the equipment, procedures, and supplies, and personnel of medical X*
facilities responsible for treatment of contaminated, injured, or exposed individual . EMERGENCY WORKERS, EQUIPMENT, AND VEHICLES -
MONITORING AND DECONTAMINATION. Demonstrate the adequacy of procedures for the monitoring and decontamination of emergency workers, equipment, and vehicle .
SUPPLEMENTARY ASSISTANCE (FEDERAL /0THER).
O Demonstrate the capability to identify the need for external assistance and to request such assistance from Federal or other support X N/A X N/A
_
organization . POST-EMERGENCY SAMPLING. Demonstrate the use of equipment and procedures for the collection and transportation of samples from areas that received deposition from the airborne pl um . LABORATORY OPERATIONS. Demonstrate laboratory l operations and procedures for measuring and X l analyzing sample )
l 2 INGESTION EXPOSURE PATHWAY - DOSE PROJECTION AND PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION MAKING. Demonstrate the capability to project dose to the public for the ingestion pathway and to recommend protective measure INGESTION EXPOSURE PATHWAY - PROTECTIVE ACTION O 27.
-
IMPLEMENTATIO Demonstrate the capability to implement protective actions for ingestion exposure pathwa * To be tested in a separate drill the day before the exercis . . _ . . -
.
,
State Houston State Early of A County of GA.- Count . RELOCATION, RE-ENTRY, AND RETURN - DECISION MAKIN *
Demonstrate the capability to develop decisions on
,O.'
J relocation, re-entry, and retur . RELOCATION, RE-ENTRY, AND RETURN - IMPLEMENTATION Demonstrate the capability to implement
-
relocation, re-entry and retur . CONTINU0US, 24-HOUR STAFFIN Demonstrate the capability to maintain staffing on a continuous, 24-hour basis through an actual shift chang '
31. OFFSITE SUPPORT FOR THE EVACUATION OF ONSITE PERSONNE Demonstrate the capability to provide offsite support for the evacuation of onsite :
personne . UNANNOUNCED EXERCISE OR DRIL Demonstrate the capability to carry out emergency response functions in an unannounced exercise drill, ([ EPA PAGs and other relevant factor . OFF-HOURS EXERCISE OR DRIL Demonstrate the capability to carry out emergency response functions during an off-hours exercise dril . LICENSEE OFFSITE RESPONSE ORGANIZATION Demonstrate the capability of ,
licensee offsite response organization
[ licensee (0R0)] personnel to interface with non-participating organizations and accomplish coordination essential for emergency respons O e ,
L
-
.
O O O 1993 FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY EXERCISE SCENARIO TIMEUNE
"OTENTIAL (CONFIDENTIAL) CONTROLLER NOTES:
J N E NMC TO PAGE DIAL 6866 AS DECLARED A ATION l CONTROL ROOM-ERPS TSC4191
\ ACTNATED EOF-5627/6211 NMC-2044 POTENTIAL .
FOR NOUE DECLARATION ALERT SITE AREA GENERAL
!
0700 0800 0900 1000 1100 1200 1300 to I I l l 1 l J RHR SYSTEM 2 MW/ MIN RVUS LEAKING CL TERMINATE LEAK IN RAMPDOWN INDIC, TES PENETRATION RECIRC B TRAIN RHR BEGINS CORE RESULTS IN R R 1 BECOM W lO W G M TRIPS OUTER MEDIUM N LEAKING P'AIN SIZE LOCA \ PENETRATION AIRLOCK RESULTS IN \ LOCATED &
. DOOR CTMT PRESSURE 1 A RHR REPA!RS INITIAL CONDITIONS REPA: RED >27 PSIG PUMP BREAKER INITIATED REPAIRS UNIT 1 IS ACCIDENT UNfT (CTMT INTEGRITY RESTORED) (RELEASE WILL 18 CTMT SPRAY PUMP OOC BOTH UNIT 1 NOT BE STOPPED) 1D CTMT COOLER OOC l-UMP STARTED MAIN AIRLOCK 1B RHR SYSTEM ON RECIRC SEALS LEAKING AIRLOCK INNER SEAL OOC (LOSS OF CTMT INTEGRTTY) 1A AUX BLDG EXH FAN OOC 1 A MDAFW PUMP OOC
_ . _ _ _ _ _ _-__.:_-___-______-__-.-__-_._____-.__ _ - - _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ - - . - _ _ , - . - . - - - - . . - - - .
(~\ SCENARIO SUMMARY 2a92 ;
Initial Plant Conditions 11 Equipment and System Status Maintenance Items Narrative Summary 16 -
Sequence of Events 18 Power History and Misc Data 23 l
l l
!
i
!
l O
10 b
1993 ANNUAL DRILL U,, INITIAL CONDITIONS UNIT 1 STATUS 100% steady state (reached 100% 3 days ago following a shutdown for repairs to the main generator hydrogen cooler).
1B containment spray pump red tagged out of service for the last 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> due to damaged seal (repairs -are waiting on parts, expect repairs will be completed in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.).
1B RHR system running on recirculation for a required ST A Train RHR was just run prior to starting B train to ensure-operability Unit 1 main containment air lock is inoperable due to a failed seal on the inner doo Maintenance crew going to unit 1 main airlock to repair the seal on the inner doo D containment fan cooler red tagged out of service due to a service water leak that grounded the motor .
MOL / 1500 MWD /MTU Boron concentration 810 pp Unit 1D train PRF in operation for an ST lA MDAFW pump red tagged out of service for bearing replacemen It has been inoperable for 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, expect repairs to be complete in the next 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> A train is the on-service train B train CCW (1A pump) is running to support running of B train RH lA Aux Building Exhaust fan is out of service because of an abnormal noise coming from the fa INITIAL CONDL : .
11 Il
- _ - .
- - -- - .
P s:
UNIT 2 STATUS 100% steady state BOL.<500 MWD /MTU Boron concentration 1190 ppm A train is the on' service train :
2B Charging pump inoperable and tagged out of service due to an overheated bearing and loud noise coming from the pump 2C condensate pump caution tagged for emergency use only due ,
to overheating during long term operation. The decision has been made to continue operation at 100%.
i
'
RE15B Steam Jet Air Ejector radiation monitor detector replacement is in progres FNP-2-STP-33 1B is in progress on B Train Solid State Protection Syste Fire Detection system 2A-22 is in alarm due to a faulty
'
detecto O A fire watch has been establishe .
'
.
INITIAL CONDITIONS PAGE 2 .
)1
. _ _ _ _ __ -
. - .
UNIT 1 LCOS ls\
\ 1B Containment Spray pump MANDATORY Technical Specification 3.6.2.1 in effect since yesterday'at 070 B RHR. ADMINISTRATIVE Technical Specification 3.5.2 in ef fect since 0630 this morning while running the 1B RHR pum The B train _RHR System is operationa Main Containment airlock 3.ner door MANDATORY Technical Specification 3.6.1.3 in ef.ect since 0640 this mornin D Containment Fan cooler ADMINISTRATIVE Technical Specification 3.6.2.3 in effect since 1245 on last Sunda ,
1A MDAFW pump MANDATORY Technical specification 3.7.1.2 in effect since 1900 last nigh UNIT 2 LCOS 2B Charging Pump Administrative Technical Specification 3.1.2.4 and 3.5.2 since 2 days ago at 190 RE15B SJAE Radiation Monitor Mandatory Technical Specification 3.3.3.1 since 3 days ago. Alternate sampling methods are in effec ,
'
B Train Solid State Protection System Voluntary Technical specification 3.3.1 in effect since 0630 for testin Containment Smoke Detection System Mandatory Technical Specification 3.3.3.9 since last night at 233 j l
O'~ INITIAL CONDITIONS PAGE 3 13 l2 -j
. . . . - . - -
.,-- .
UNIT 1 MAINTENANCE ITEMS
1B Containment Spray pump waiting on repair parts for seal replacemen Air lock door maintenance team is already on the way to the air lock with all of the parts that they need to effect repair D Fan Cot er scheduled for repairs during the next outag A auxiliary building f an MWR has just been written and has been sent to plannin The tagging order has just been complete The 1A MDAFW pump is in the process of being torn down to replace the bearing UNIT 2 MAINTENANCE ITEMS 2B Charging Pump MWR has been planned and repairs are i scheduled to start at 1600 today The 2C condensate pump MWR has been planned and work is >
scheduled in three weeks when a rampdown is-scheduled for other reasons.
.' R15B detector replacement is in progress, expect repairs to be complete in 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> Fire Detection System 2A-22 MWR is in planning at the current j tim l I
INITIAL CONDITIONS PAGE 4 14 ,.r
. .
.
- -
Meteorlogical Conditions
[\-['l Wind speed:
,
3.6 mph at 150 feet 3.0 mph at 35 feet Wind direction from:
102 degrees-at 150 feet 99 degrees at 35 feet Delta T
.8 degrees channel 1
.8 degrees channel 2
,
.
,
O
i O INITIAL CONDITIONS PAGE 5
'
t<
15 i
,
l l
l l
1993 ANNUAL DRILL I r]
C NARRATIVE SUl\BIARY The drill starts at 0700 when the Control Room staff is informed that both the inner and outer airlock doors on the main airlock of Unit One containment are leakin The Technical Specifications require that a plant shutdown and cooldown be initiated in an hour .
if the airlock cannot be repaired. A Notification of Unusual Event i (NOUE) declaration must be made if a plant shutdown is required by Technical Specification The control room staff may declare a precautionary NOUE prior to the start of the shutdown. Plant staff will start repair activitie At 0715 the control room staff receives a report that the 1A RHR pump is inoperable due to a breaker proble The control room staff will apply the appropriate Technical Specifications and have repair activities starte At 0755 the outer containment airlock door has been repaire Plans to shutdown the plant are canceled. If a NOUE was declared a down grade and closecut may be considere Between 0800 and 0815 the control room staff will discover a leak in the operating train of RHR, B trai This leak will require declaring the second train of RHR inoperabl The Technical 3 Specifications require that a plant shutdown and cooldown be V initiated in an hour if at least one train of RHR is not returned to service within an hou Due to both trains of RHR being inoperable an ALERT emergency classification must be declare Plant staff will start taking actions for an alert and the TSC and EOF staffs will be called i One hour later neither RHR pump has been able to be repaired and a plant shutdown is commence Within 75 minutes of the Alert declaration the TSC and potentially the EOF should have minimum staff in place and start turning over to perform designated functions. The EOC in Birmingham will also have staff available to support plant operations At 0945 a medium sized LOCA occurs causing containment pressure to )
rise above 27 psi A Site Area Emergency must be declared, i
Several pieces of containment cooling and ECCS equipment fail l causing only one spray pump, cne fan cooler, and one MDAFW to be running and no RHR pumps to be operatin The core becomes uncovered and containment radiation levels rise indicating that core damage has occurre When samples can be drawn, sample analysis will confirm that core damage has occurre ,
l 16
-- . ._ .- _
-
.
-
At 1000 one RHR pump can be restarted _ allcwing the core to be recovere *
'
At 1045 a failure of the containment isolation occurs causing a release -into the penetration room and subsequently to the Environment through the plant vent stac A General Emergency should be declared at this tim !
It is anticipated that the leaking containment penetration can be repaired by the plant staf !
The EOF staff will continue the efforts to track the plume and provide environmental monitoring and dose assessmen The EOF staff will be further challenged with licensing questions, public information, engineering and logistics support activitie ,
i The News Media Center (NMC) will be activated and staffed by representatives from SNC, APC, the State of Alabama, the State of Georgia, Houston County and Early Count Media and public interest will be simulated and news releases will be prepared and release The exercise will terminate once the radiation monitoring teams have tracked the plume, the EOF has been staffed and is performing )
EOF activities and the NMC has conducted a press conferenc O Termination will be coordinated with the State of Alabama and the State of Georgia if occurring prior to 1300 Central tim I
l l
O 17 q
-
_ _ -_____ _ _____. .
- _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _
O
'
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS O
O 18 /i h '
O ) O
,
1993 ANNUALDRH1 EVENTS
.
TIME EVENT ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE TIME 07:00 Control Room receives a report that the e Declare both doors inoperable -
outer door of the main airlock is e Apply motherhood Technical Specification damaged and will not provide 3. Containment integrity e Plan to commence plant shutdown by 0800 e Start repair activities e Contact Operations Manager e Contact Emergency Director
- Contact Recovery Manager e contact Emergency Support Manager
- A NOUE is required for a loss of CTMT integrity that requires shutdown. A shutdown is required in 1 hr. A Drecautionary NOUE may be declared at this tim e If NOUE is declared make appropriate to notification TIME 07:15 A System Operator reports that he heard * Declare the 1A RHR Pump inoperable and a popping noise and an insulation smell apply Technical Specification 3.5.2 for coming from the 1A RHR Pump breaker, one train of RHR and then the breaker indicating lights * Initiate repair activities. The breaker went out. There is no smoke or fir cubicle is damaged and repairs will take approximately 2 to 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> TIME 07:55 The outer containment airlock door is e Shutdown plans are canceled repaired and is operable * Consider downgrade to no emergency class If NOUE was declared TIME 08:00 A leak develops in the B Train RHR system in the heat exchanger room causing an increase in RHR Heat Exchanger room sump level and an increase in Penetration room radiation levels Page 1
___ _ __ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. ._ -__-_ ._-____---_____:____.-_----
_ _-_ _ _ _.-. . .
O D O ,
1993 ANNUALDRIIIEVENES TIME EVENT A MION/ EXPECTED RESPONSE ,
TIME 08:00 Shift crew detects RHR leak e Secure B Train RHR to 08:15 e Isolate B Train RHR ..
e Determine that two trains of RHR are now inoperable e Apply Technical Specification 3. * Start repair activities e Contact Operations Manager
- Contact Emergency Dires.or
- Contact Recovery Managc; e contact Emergency Support Manager e No rampdown is required at this time e Declare an ALERT based on loss of both trains of RHR e Make appropriate notifications e Call out the TSC and EOF staffs y TIME 09:00 Two Trains of RHR have been inoperable e Commence rampdown at 2 MW/ MIN ,
'
to 09: 15 for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> TIME 09:15 Minimum TSC and EOF staffs are on site e Activate the TSC and consider activating to 09:30 the EOF N TIME 09:45 A Medium sized LOCA occur RCS o Shift crew takes action per appropriate o pressure remains above RHR pressur Emergency Response Procedures CTMT pressure exceeds 27 psig causing e Upgrade emergency classification to SITE spray actuation AREA EMERGENC * Make appropriate notifications
- Sound Plant Emergency Alarm o Perform Accountability e Have the News Media Center activated if not previously don * Have the EOF activated if not previously done TIME 09:45 Containment Fan Coolers 1B and 1C e Consider sending a repair party to repair tripped on fault when Safety Injection fan coolers tried to start them in slow spee Page 2
.
.
O O O 1993 ANNUAL DRILL EVENTS TIME EVENT ACTION /EIPECTED RESPONSE f ,
TIME 09:45 The TDAFW pump failed to comc up to e Consider sending a repair party to repair speed during the Safety Injectio TDAFW pump ,
TIME 09:45 The following equipment was tagged out or failed to operate during the Safety Injection:
1A RHR PUMP 1B RHR PUMP 1B COIGAINMENT SPRAY 1B CONTAINMENT FAN COOLER 1C CONTAINMENT FAN COOLER 1D CONTAINMENT FAN COOLER 1A MDAFW PUMP TDAFW TIME 09:45 RVLIS indication show RX vessel upper-ro to 10:00 head and plenum voiding increasing and
~ the core becoming completely uncovered Time 10:00 CTMT radiation monitors R-27 A&B start * No specific action required. Staff may rapidly increasing indicating, in wa.nt to declare a General Emergency as a F conjunction with core uncovery that 0 precautionary measure. Controller to 50% fuel failure has occurred intervention may be required to prevent this declaratio TIME 10:00 The 1A RHR pump repairs are reported e Have the tags cleared on *he RHR pump and complete start the RHR pum TIME 10:13 The 1A RHR pump is started TIME 10:45 The following Rad monitors increase and e Upgrade emergency classification to go into alarm: GENERAL EMERGENC Penetration room R-10 * Make protective action recommendations Plant Vent Stack R-14 e Make appropriate notifications-Plant Vent Stack R-21 * Send a reentry team to locate the source Plant Vent Stack R-22 of the leak from the containment Indicating a failure of the CTMT isolation Page 3
- - _ _ _ . .-_ . - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __-_-___________.- --_-_-- - ._._-__ - - . - . - . - - - -
.
.. - .~
O US3 ANNUAI,MEL EVMIS TIME EVENT ACTION / EXPECTED' RESPONSE ,
TIME Leaking penetration is located e Send a reentry team to repair the leak ,
10:45+ ,
TIME Leaking penetration is sealed e When the plant staff takes appropriate 10:45+ actions to repair the leak we will inform the plant staff that no further efforts will be required to repair the lea However the release will continue to allow exercising the Radiation Monitoring team TIME 13:00' TERMINATE THE DRILL
$
v ('
i Page 4
-. . _ _ . _ . _ . _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ - _ - - _ _ . _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - . _ - . _ _ . . ._ __ _ ______ ___ __ _ _ _ - - _ . _ _ . - - .