IR 05000348/1993005

Ack Receipt of Informing NRC of Steps Taken to Correct Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-348/93-05 & 50-364/93-05.Requests Statement Describing Steps to Be Taken to Correct Violations C & D,Denied in Subj Response

ML20056F614
Person / Time
Site:	Farley
Issue date:	08/06/1993
From:	Stohr J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:	Hairston W SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING CO.
References
NUDOCS 9308300164
Download: ML20056F614 (8)

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Docket Nos. 50-348, 50-364 ,

License Nos. NPF-2, NPF-8 l l

Southern Nuclear Operating Company, In l ATTN: Mr. W. G. Hairston, III 1 Executive Vice President i

! Nuclear Operations i P. O. Box 1295 I Birmingham, AL 35201 I Gentlemen: ,

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i SUBJECT: NRC INSPECTION REPORT NOS. 50-348/93-05 AND 50-364/93-05 Thank you for your response of June 30, 1993, to our Notice of Violation issued on May 11, 1993, concerning activities conducted at your Farley Nuclear facility. We have examined your response and found that it meets the requirements of 10 CFR 2.201.

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In your response, you admitted violations A and B, and denied violations C and After careful consideration of the bases for your denial of violations C and D, we have concluded, for the reasons presented in the enclosure to the letter, that violations C and D occurred as stated in the Notice of Violation (Notice). Therefore, in accordance with 10 CFR 2.201(a), please submit to this office within 30 days of the date of this letter a written statement describing the steps which have been taken to correct violation C and D, the l results achieved, corrective steps which will be taken to avoid further l violations, and the date when full compliance will be achieve !

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Your corrective actions associated with the violations will be reviewed during future inspections.

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Sincerely,

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i b N l lm %az McN~

J. Philip Stohr, Director

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Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards

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l Enclosures: (See page 2) I l

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S6uthern Nuclear Operating 2 AUG 0 ~6 1993 .

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, Company, In Enclosures:  !

1. Evaluations and Conclusion i Violation C l Evaluations and Conclusion  ;

Violation D  !

I cc w/encls:

B. L. Moore

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Manager, Licensing  !

Southern Nuclear Operating  !

Company, In P. O. Box 1295  :

Birmingham, AL 35201-1295 l l

R. D. Hill, J l General Manager, Farley Plant Southern Nuclear Operating j Company, In l P. O. Box 470 i Ashford, AL 36312 '

W. R. Bayne, Supervisor i Safety Audit and Engineerit.g Review a Farley Nuclear Plant  :

P. O. Box 470 '

Ashford, AL 36312 State Health Officer Alabama Department of Public Health ,

434 Monroe Street Montgomery, AL 36130-1701 James H. Miller, III, Es Balch and. Bingham P. O. Box 306 1710 Sixth Avenue North Birmingham, AL 35201 Chairman Houston County Commission P. O. Box 6406 Dothan, AL 36302 bcc w/encls:

Timothy A. Reed, NRR-F. Cantrell, RII Document Control Desk j

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S6uthern Nuclear Operating 3 Company, In (bcc w/encls cont'd)

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EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION

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VIOLATION C On May 11, 1993, a Notice af Violation (NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-348/ l 93-05 and 50-364/93-05) was issued for a violation identified during a special NRC inspection. Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. (SNC) responded to the Notice on June 30, 1993. SNC denied the violation contending that the required level of assurance of trustworthiness and reliability was provided for the individuals described in the violation. The NRC's evaluation and !

conclusion regarding the licensee's arguments are as follows:

Restatement of Violation 10 CFR 73.56 Personnel access authorization reauirements for nuclear power plants (b) General performance objective and reauirements (1) requires t licensees to " establish and maintain an access authorization program granting -

individuals unescorted access to protected and vital areas with the objective of providing high assurance that individuals granted unescorted access are trustworthy and reliable, and do not constitute an unreasonable risk to the i health and safety of the public including a potential to commit radiological :

sabotage." j

License Amendment 20 dated August 18, 1981, to the Farley Operating license '

states (2.D), "The licensee shall fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the following Commission approved documents, including :

amendments and changes made pursuant to the authority of 10 CFR 50.54(p). )

Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant Security Plan, Revision 2 dated March 5,1981." !

Revision 22 of the Farley Security Plan, dated March 13, 1992, Paragraph 4.1.1. Access Reauirements - Background investigation states, "All personnel requiring unescorted access to the protected and vital areas are screened in accordance with a Company approved access authorization program. All elements of Regulatory Guide 5.66 (June 1991) have been implemented." {

J Regulatory Guide 5.66 (June 1991) Access Authorization Program for Nuclear i Power Plants, Paragraph A, states, This regulatory guide provides an approach i acceptable to the NRC staff by which the licensee can meet the requirements of :

10 CFR 73.56 for an access authorization program. The " Industry Guidelines 1 for Nuclear Power Plant Access Authorization Program" (NUMARC 89-01, August ,

1989, hereafter referred to as "the Guidelines") were prepared by the Nuclear Management and. Resources Council (NUMARC). The Guidelines meet the intent and !

substance of the rule except in a few areas in which the rule explicitly differs from the Guidelines. The Guidelines are provided as an Appendix to this regulatory guide."

NUMARC 89-01,(12.0), Contractor and Vendor Reauirements, states, "The utility ,

retains the ultimate responsibility for assuring that individuals granted !

unescorted access to the facility meet the requirements of the unescorted

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access authorization nrogram."

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EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION 2 VI,0LATION C Contrary to the above, on April 17, 1992, the licensee could not provide high assurance that certain contractors granted unescorted access were trustworthy and reliable, in that, the contractor's access program was declared inadequate, unacceptable, and no long2r Company approved, and yet their access was continued until April 27, 1992, when the background investigations were satisfactorily complete Summary of Licensee's Response The licensee argues that the required level of assurance of trustworthiness and reliability was provided for the individuals affected by the events described in the violation. SNC contends that an example of its intention to ensure an unreliable individual's access is discontinued was displayed when SNC learned that an individual had submitted false academic information, and his access was terminate The licensee acknowledges that Corporate Security, after being made aware of the contractor's " unsatisfactory" program, notified the contractor that no additional personnel would be accepted by Farley Nuclear Plant under the current Certificate of Reliability. They further stated that plant management had made a prompt assessment of the trustworthiness and reliability of the two remaining contractor employee The licensee indicated that they had made a

" qualitative evaluation" of the severity of the audit findings, the relevance of those findings to the subject individual's character, and SNC's satisfactory prior experience with this contracto The licensee further argues that, after the contractor had been found unsatisfactory in the area of access authorization, they had conducted a background investigation of each individual contractor employee which yielded no cause for-concern. Additionally, SNC points out that since the two contractors on site had been subject to a random drug testing and continued behavioral observation program their reliability was further enhance NRC Evaluation The NRC staff has carefully reviewed the licensee's response and has concluded that the licensee did not previde any information that was not already considered in determining the significance of the violation. Although the licensee contends that plant vanagement promptly made an assessment of the trustworthiness and reliability of the two remaining employees, the licensee did not address how its assessment failed to determine that one of the individuals in question had been granted full access from March 6 until May 2, 1992, without the completion of a FBI fingerprint record check, a requirement for granting a full access clearanc The licensee also contends that the decision to continue to grant access to Bartlett personnel was based on the SNC's satisfactory prior experience with the contractor. However, during the access authorization audit of this contractor, SNC's auditors described the contractor's program as having

" numerous deficiencies" and discovered " falsified background screening e

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EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION 3 VI.0LATION C r

records". Additionally, SNC auditors reported that one of the contractor employees had falsified education records which resulted in SNC denying his ;

acces NRC Conclusion f

While the random drug testing and behavioral observation program are important i elements of the access authorization program, they are not considered adequate to justify disregarding other NRC required elements of the access authorization progra The SNC decision to immediately terminate the contractor's program based on SNC audit findings was justified. The SNC decision to reject Certificates of Reliability from this contractor was justified. However, the SNC decision to continue to allow the unescorted access of contractors whose program was .

" unacceptable" and no longer licensee approved did not provide high assurance i of trustworthiness and reliability as require '

For the above reasons, the NRC staff concludes the violation occurred as state ,

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. EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION ,

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VIOLATION D l  !

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On Mcy 11, 1993, a Notice of Violation (NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-348/

93-05 and 50-364/93-05) was issued for a violation identified during a special '

NRC inspection. Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. (SNC) responded to the Notice on June 30, 199 SNC denied the violation contending that since i SNC denied 93-05-06; it followed that they could not be expected to make a t Safeguards Event Log. SNC further contends thi.t although they admitted NOV ;

93-05-02, SNC denies that such an admission provides a basis for a r. u rate

violation. SNC believes to do so would subject SNC to multiple violats for '

a single event. They also contend this is inappropriate within the con a . of :

this inspection and only serves to distort SNC's regulatory compliance '

histor The NRC's evaluation and conclusion regarding the licensee's  ;

arguments are as follows: ,

t Restatement of Violation 10 CFR 73.71, Reportina of safegua-ds events requires in Appendix C, II,  !

Events to be recorded within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> and submitted in auarterly lo_g, "Any other threatened, attempted, or committed act not previously defined in  !

Appendix G with the potential for reducing the effectiveness of the safeguards '

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l system below that committed to in a licensed physical security or contingency !

s on f te r c ri P1 ed ti r h 3 ragraph 4.1.1, Access Reauirements - Background Investication states, "All personnel l

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requiring unescorted access to the protected and vital areas are screened in ;

I accordance with a Company approved access authorization program. All elements !

of Regulatory Guide 5.66 (June 1991) have been implemented."  :

Contrary to the above, as of April 1,1993, the licensee failed to log in its l Safeguards Event Logs those events, described as B and C in this Notice of f Violation, which reduced the effectiveness of the Access Authorization Program

) committed to in its Physical Security Plan.

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Summary of Licensee's Response j 1 t

% lb m.e contends that since it denies NOV 93-05-06, it therefore follows !

th;.t v.c cquirement exists for an entry into the Safeguards Event Log. The

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, licensee also contends that even though it has admitted to NOV 93-05-02, it !

denies that such an admission provides an independent basis for a separate violation and that to do so would subject the licensee to multiple violations

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l for a single event. The licensee further contends that this is inappropriate :

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within the context of the inspection and only serves to distort the licensee's

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regulatory compliance history.

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i EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION 2  !

VI,0llTION D  !

i NRC EVALUATION  !

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The NRC staff has carefully reviewed the licensee's response and has concluded ;

that the licensee did not provide any pertinent information that was not !

already considered in determining the significance of the violatio l As stated in the previous NRC staff response to the licensee's denial of i violation C (NOV 93-05-06), the NRC staff concludes that the violation occurred as stated and should have been logged as addressed in violation D !

(NOV 93-05-07). Furthermore, the licensee demonstrated that it did not have

confidence that the security plan screening requirements had been accomplished ,

by it's suspension of the contractor program and it's decision to !

independently screen the individuals certified as screened by the contracto *

Therefore, the licensee knew that the discovered weakness reduced the ;

affectiveness of it's security system below that committed to in it's security ,

plan, yet the licensee made a conscious decision to allow the unescorted i accesses to continue. The decision to let the unescorted accesses continue -

without confidence that the required screening elements had been completed i should have been logged, t

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Also, the licensee's contentions regarding NOV 93-05-02 do not address the i basis the NRC staff used in citing the violation. The violation was based on ,

the licensee's failure to log its own discovery that individuals with ;

unescorted access were not advised that they were required to report any !

arrests that may impact upon their trustworthiness. The licensee discovered ,

this failure which reduced the effectiveness of its system below that !

committed to in its security plan in February 1993. The licensee implemented ;

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corrective measures, but failed to log the initial failure. As further noted in the violation, the corrective measures were also inadequate, but the violation regarding failure to log resulted from the licensee's failure to log the initial event within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of discover i NRC CONCLUSION  ;

The SNC decision to continue to allow the unescorted access of contractors, whose program was " unacceptable" and no longer licensee approved and SNC's '

initial failure to advise individuals with unescorted access that they were i required to report any arrests that may impact upon their trustworthiness were ,

program failures that reduced the effectiveness of SNC's security system below :

that committed to in its security plan, and, therefore, should have been !

logged within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of discovery. (Note: In the case of the decision to l allow the continued unescorted access of the contractors, discovery began when i that decision was made.)  ;

'i for the above reasons, the NRC staff concludes the violation occurred as ;

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