Text

Augmented Insp Repts 50-321/86-41 & 50-366/86-41 on 861204-07.Violations Noted & Will Be Issued Under Separate Cover.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Response During 861203 Release of Radioactive Water Into Environ
	ML20207P208
Person / Time
Site:	Hatch
Issue date:	01/06/1987
From:	Cantrell F, Gloersen W, Holmesray P, Nejfelt G; NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20207P201	List: ML20207P200; ML20207P208;
References
	50-321-86-41, 50-366-86-41, IEB-84-03, IEB-84-3, IEIN-84-93, TAC-64455, TAC-64456, NUDOCS 8701150234
	Download: ML20207P208 (16)
	v • d • e

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UNITE 3 STATES

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j 101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.

t ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323

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Report Nos.: 50-321/86-41 and 366/86-41

Licensee: Georgia Power Company

P. O. Box 4545

Atlanta, GA 30302

Docket Nos.: 50-321 and 50-366 License Nos.: DPR-57 and NPF-5

Inspection Conducted- December 4-7, 1986

Inspectors: (fh /77- / ~

b9

P. Holmes-Ray Date Signed

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V. B. Glaersen '"

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/eq<~ l} &l8 -7

'Datd Signed

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G. M. Nejfelt

> $(2. ll5 8]

Da'te' Signed

Approved by: .

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D

Floyd S. Cantrell, dry,' Team Leader Date Signed

Division of Reactor Projects

SUMMARY

Scope: This special, announced augmented inspection was conducted to monitor

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'the licensee's response during the release of radioactive water from the Plant

Hatch refueling floor into the environment discovered on December 3,1986. The

areas inspected for this event included: root cause determination, equipment

failure, the sequence of events, environmental impact, single mode failures

(e.g., risk of draining fuel pools and loss of secondary containment), and

, licensee's knowledge of precursors (e.g., plant parameters, IE Bulletins and

Notices,etc.).

Results: Apparent violations were identified involving design and procedures.

The violations are being evaluated and will be forwarded under a separate cover.

8701150234 870108

PDit ADOCK 05000321

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REPORT DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

J. T. Beckham, Jr. , Vice President, Pl. tnt Hatch

H. C. Nix, Pla1t Manager

D. Read, Plant Support Manager

R. D. Baker, N'aclear Licensing Manager, Hatch, Corporate

H. L. Sumner, Operations Manager

B. McLeod, Maintenance Manager

T. R. Powers, L1gineering Manager

R. W. Zavadoski, Health Physics (HP) and Chemistry Manager

C. H. Coggin, General Support Manager

M. Geoge, Outages and Planning Manager

0. M. Fraser, Site Quality Assurance (QA) Manager (Acting)

C. T. Moore, Training Manager .

C. C. Eckert, Nuclear Safety and Engineering Manager, Corporate

S. C. Ewald, Radiological Safety Manager

S. B. Tipps, Regulatory Compliance Superintendent

G. A. Goode, Plant Engineering Superintendent

S. B. Bethay, Regulatory Compliance Supervisor

M. Squires, Radiation Protection Foreman

M. Link, HP Supervisor

H. Davis, Consultant, GPC

D. Smith, HP Supervisor

Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators,

mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.

State Personnel

J. Hardiman, State of Georgia

NRC Personnel

R. D. Walker, Director, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP)

L. A. Reyes, Deputy Director, DRP

F. S. Cantrell, Jr. , Section Chief, DRP

P. Holmes-Ray, Senior Resident Inspector - Hatch

W. B. Gloersen, Regional Radiation Specialist

G. M. Nejfelt, Resident Inspector - Hatch

Attended exit interview

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2. Exit Interview (.30703)

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on December 6, 1986, with

those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The inspectors described the

areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings.

The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material provided to

or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.

The licensee acknowledged the findings and took no exception.

3. Overview

a. Description of Event

On December 2,1986, a Plant Equipment Operator (PEO), in the process

of restoring a clearance on air drop station valves, noticed an air

valve in a not fully shut position (mid position). Operations

Departnent letter, LR-0PS-002-0286 of February 3,1986, requires that

all in use hose station valves be tagged open on a clearance. The PE0

closed this partially open, not tagged, air valve. The valve closed by

the PE0 isolated the single air supply to the transfer canal's six

inflatable seals. The inflatable seals, not being entirely leak tight,

slowly deflated (over the period from air isolation on December 2, 1986,

at 10:00 p.m., until the pressure was restored on December 3,1986,

at 10:30 p.m.) creating a leak path from the refueling pool into the

gap between the two reactor buildings and from there to the environment

and to areas of Unit 1 & 2 reactor buildings, Unit 1 & 2 turbine

buildings, the centrol building, the hot machine shop and the nitrogen

storage area. The fuel pool level dropped about 5.5 fect (141,000

gal .) below the normal level before the seals were re-inflated.

Re pressurization of the inflatable seals stopped the loss of water

from the fuel pool. (See paragraph - 4 for a more detailed time line.)

b. Contributing Causes for the Event:

(1) Neither a Deviation Report or a maintenance work order was written

when the air regulator supplying air to the transfer canal seals

was found defective at an unknown date and a valve in the same

line was throttled to control air to the seals.

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(2) The air valve to the transfer canal seals was not tagged open on

a clearance in accordance with Operations letter LR-0PS-002-0286

dated February 3rd [ Sic],1986. This letter also implies that all

non-tagged hose station valves should be closed.

(3) The pressure to the transfer canal seals was not required to be

monitored on a regular basis even though the pressure to other

inflatable seals on the refueling floor was monitored.

(4) The design of the transfer canal seals lends itself to redundancy

of air supplies to the inner and outer seals. As built, only a

single air source supplied all six seals. This was the air source

which was isolated, initiating the event.

(5) The leak detection system designed to detect leakage past the

transfer canal seals was inoperable due to improper valve position

(i.e., the drain valve was open) but, due to its design, was

probably incapable of performing its alarm function upon loss of

all air pressure to the seals even with the drain valve closed.

(6) The design of the seal leak detection system was also subject to a

common mode failure of the single air supply to all seals. Due to

the design of the leak collectors, leakage will only be directed

to the leakage detection system if the seals in the gap between

the two buildings are leak tight. This seal is not leak tight as

shown by this event. Sufficient water must accumulate in the

building gap above the inflated seal to reach the horizontal

drain from this area to the leakage collection system,

c. Efforts to Control the Radiological Release:

Once the source of the leak was determined, the air pressure was

restored to the inflatable seals and the flow from the fuel pool was

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stopped.

During the night of December 3 and the morning of December 4, 1986, the

licensee took positive and effective action to determine the extent of

and to limit the spread of contamination. .', series of water samples

were collected to determine which outfalls contained contaminated water

(See Paragri.ph 9). Additionally, a series of dikes (dams) were constructed

to minimize the spread of the contamination. The licensee promptly

performed radiation surveys of the affected buildings and the outfall

area of the swamp to determine the extent of the release. It was

estimated that 141,500 gallons of water were released from the Fuel

Pool. The licensee estimated that the total volume of water was

partitioned in the following manner: (1) 17,500 gallons were processed

through the radwaste system; (2) 80,000 gallons were released to the

swamp; and (3) 44,000 gallons were between the reactor buildings. The

maximum amount of radioactive material that could have been released

was approximately 0.373 curies (based on a volume of 124,000 gallons).

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During the afternoon of December 4,1986, direct radiation readir.g>

along the outfall which led to the swamp ranged from 1-2 mrem /hr.

Direct radiation readings along the shoreline of the swamp ranged from

150-250 uR/hr (normal readings were typically 8-10 uR/hr). Water

sample results at the location identified as a potential pathway to

the river (location "B" figure 1) indicated no detectable activity. The

water from behind the dikes and at the entrance to the swamp pool was

pumped back to tanker trucks, filtered through demineralizers, and then

discharged through the plant radwaste system with all normal discharge

precautions in place.

The fuel pool to transfer canal gates were installed on December 4,

1986, and by December 5,1986, the air supplies were configured such

that the transfer canal gate seals were fed from both units such that

the inner seals were supplied from one unit and the outer seals were

supplied from the other unit, thus redundancy was achieved. Also by

December 6,1986, the transfer canal seals were pressurized from each

unit such that a single loss of air supply would not cause the seals to

deflate.

The organization, manning, controls and coordination of the recovery

effort was rapid and effective. The Technical Support Center (TSC)

functioned well as the recovery center. The manning of the recovery

center was adequate, with all needed disciplines represented. The

personnel at the spill area in the swamp were well managed and

effective in containing the extent of the contamination within the site

boundaries and in minimizing the area of the swamp which was

contaminated.

4. Sequence of Events:

The following detailed chronology of the event was obtained from licensee's

logs and interviews.

Approprimate

Date Time (EST) Comment

Unknown Unknown Transfer canal inflatable seal

pressure regulator failed. Its

supply isolation valve was throttled

almost closed to control seal

pressure.

10-10-86 4:44 p.m. Transfer canal leak detection alarm

calibration, 57CP-CAL-094-2,

completed. Drain valve that was

left open defeated or reduced the

ability to detect a leak.

12-02-86 10:00 p.m. Plant Equipment Operator (PEO)

closed the service air hose station

valve found cracked open, while

restoring unrelated clearances.

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12-03-86 8:30 a.m. Unit-1 fuel pool skimmer surge tank

low level alarm (222') received.

Operators added water to fuel pool

from condensate storage tank (CST).

No further action deemed necessary.

12-03-86 11:30 a.m. Second Unit-1 fuel pool skimmer

surge tank low level alarm received.

Closed dump valve to main condenser

hotwell from fuel pool cooling (FPC)

system. Water added from CST to

fuel pool.

12-03-86 2:00 p.m. Leak discovered at Unit-2 reactor

building penetration, 2T43-H012A, on

112' elesation.

12-03-86 2:30 p.m. Third Unit-1 fuel pool skimmer surge

tank low level alarm received. FPC

system valve alignment was checked.

No discrepancies were identified.

Various FPC valves were closed in an

unsuccessful attempt to find the

leak. The evening shift continued

search.

12-03-86 3:00 p.m. Leak discovered at reactor building

penetration 112ft. elevation

12-03-86 4:15 p.m. Water added to fuel pool to clear

low level alarm.

12-03-86 6:15 p.m. Water added to fuel pool to clear

low level alarm.

12-03-86 8:00 p.m. Water added to fuel pool to clear

low level alarm. Leak location

determination continued.

12-03-86 9:37 p.m. FPC pumps tripped on low, low fuel

pool surge tank level (215.8').

Water level was found by operator to

be l' below fuel pool skimmer

suctions.

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12-03-86 10:00 p.m. Water found entering: Unit-2

turbine building 112' elevation;

Unit-1 and Unit-2 East cable ways on

130' elevation; and nitrogen storage

tank area. Water pressure prevented

opening door to nitrogen storage

tank room.

12-03-86 10:05 p.m. Fuel Pool Water Level About 11s-2

Feet Low. While checking air

pressure to all fuel pool inflatable

seals, air pressure on the transfer

canal inflatable seals was observed

to be 0 psig. The closed air

isolation valve was opened and then

throttled to re-establish normal

seal pressure (25 +/- 5 psig).

LEAKAGE FROM FUEL POOLS STOPPED.

12-03-86 10:30 p.m. Fuel pool level estimated to be 4'

below normal (222.3').

Note: Estimate was later revised to

be 5.5' below normal level at

1:00 p.m. on 12-04-86, based on

measuring the reference level

observed.

Shift Supervisor forced open

nitrogen storage tank doors

revealing 2' to 3' of water. The

water was released to the hot

machine shop area. Also, water

was observed draining outside the

plant via the storm drain in the

nitrogen storage tank area.

12-03-86 10:45 p.m. Manager of Plant Operations notified

and responded to site.

12-03-86 10:55 p.m. Fuel pool level returned to normal

(226.3').

12-03-86 11:15 p.m. Vice President of Plant Hatch

arrived on site.

12-03-86 11:30 p.m. Manager of Health Physics and

Chemistry notified and responded to

site.

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12-03-86 12:00 p.m. HP began taking samples and surveys.

Fuel Pool Cooling and cleanup

returned to service,

12-04-86 1:28 a.m. NRC notified of fuel pool transfer

canal seal leak by red phone.

12-04-84 2:00 a.m. GPC emergency center in Atlanta, GA,

staffed including the President of

GPC.

12-04-86 4:00 a.m. NRC provided additional information

by red phone.

12-04-86 4:30-6:30 a.m. Telephone discussions to assess

significance by RII management and

resident inspectors.

12-04-86 7:00 a.m. Meeting in NRC Region II Offices.

12-04-86 8:00 a.m. Hatch resident inspectors dispatched

to site. (From resident inspector

meeting in progress.)

GPC staffed site technical support

center (TSC) to coordinate recovery.

Region II made decision to send

,

augmented inspection team (AIT) to

site.

'12-04-84 9:00 a.m. AIT departed Region II Offices.

12-04-86 10:00 a.m. Started installation of transfer

canal to fuel pool gates. At

2:00 p.m. gates were in place and at

6:00 p.m. the gates were completely

installed with the seals inflated.

12-04-86 12:00 a.m. Resident inspectors arrived at Plant

Hatch. Initial inspection objectives l

were communicated from Region II.

12-04-86 3:00 p.m. AIT arrived on site. Team briefed ,

by licensee management in TSC. Tour

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conducted of outfall swamp and of

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actions to contain radiologically

contaminated water. Extent of

spread of contamination in swamp was >

defined. No radiological releases

directly entered the Altamaha River.

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12-04-86 5:00 p.m. Clean water from plant drains

diverted from entering swamp to

reduce migration of contamination

and reduce volume of water to be

recovered in order to prevent

release to river.

12-05-86 8:00 a.m. Licensee notified NRC of revised

calculation showing that approxi-

mately 141,000 gallons of water was

lost from fuel pool. Note:

previous estimate was approximately

50,000 gallons.

12-05-86 5:00 p.m. After concerns were raised about

environmental damage to the swamp if

dikes were constructed and after

consultation with State and NRC

representatives, the decision was

made by the licensee not to dike the

swamp for containment purposes.

12-07-87 12:30 p.m. AIT concludes site activities.

5. Event Root Causes

Prior to December 2, 1986, the air regulator (100/20 psi) supplying the

inflatable seals on the seal assembly, which seals the gap between Unit-1

and Unit-2 reactor buildings, failed and the lever valve upstream of the

regulator was placed in a throttle position to compensate. This throttle

position was almost shut. On December 2, 1986, at approximately 10:00 p.m.

(EST), this throttled valve was closed when a Plant Equipment Operator

(PEO), who was restoring clearances on the air system noticed that the valve

was almost shut, assumed it to be slightly out of position in the open

direction and placed the valve in the closed position. This action secured

the pressurization air to all six inflatable seals on the transfer canal

seal assembly. At this time a slow depressurization of the seals commenced.

The root causes of the event were:

a. Plant personnel did not adequately adhere to the requirement of 10 CFR 50

Appendix B, Criterion V and Georgia Power Company's (GPC) accepted

QA Program (HNP-2 FSAR-17 Section 17.2.5) that requires that activities

affecting quality be prescribed by documented procedures of a type

appropriate to the circumstances and be accomplished in accordance with

these procedures as indicated by the following examples:

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A Deficiency Report (OR) was not written as required by procedure

10AC-MGR-004, when a defective regulator was suspected and a valve

in the same line was throttled. (Preparation of the maintenance

work order (MWO) would also have initiated corrective action.)

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Corrective action is being tracked under a previous violation

(50-321,366/86-22-06) in that GPC's response to the violation

dated November 17, 1986, stated that corrective steps which will

be taken to prevent recurrence will be completed by December 26,

1986. These steps included revising the procedure to make it

easier to understand, and completing training on the revised

procedure.

The valve in the air line with the regulator was throttled (at

some unknown time) without a procedure and was subsequently closed

on December 2, 1986, without an adequate procedure and without

knowing or determining the consequence. This open valve was not

tagged in accordance with Operation Letter LR-0PS-002-0286 dated

2/3/86. This letter implies that untagged valves should be

closed.

The transfer canal seal leak detection system was calibrated on

10/10/86 using generic procedure 57CP-CAL-094-2, Robertshaw Level

Switch Calibration, even though this procedure did not provide

instruction for removal or return to service and could not be used

verbatim because of differences in the pipe and valve arrangement

to the leak detection system.

The Plant Equipment Operators', Daily Inside Rounds Procedure

34G0-0PS-030-1S did not require checking air pressure on the

transfer canal seals even though the procedure specified checking

the air pressure on the spent fuel pool gate's seals when a gate

is installed.

b. Design measures were not established to ensure that the seals in the

transfer canal were capable of preventing a significant loss of water

from the fuel pool or to assure appropriate containment of any water

lost from the fuel pool as specified by criterion 61 of 10 CFR 50,

Appendix A. The description of the transfer canal seal in the FSAR or

other plant documents did not adequately describe the trarsfer canal

seal or its safety function even though the transfer canal seals,

gates, fuel pool structure, and part of leak detection system are

classified as safety related.

c. The seal arrangement in Figure 9.1-6 of the FSAR indicates an intent to

not rely on one set of seals; however, the failure to provide separate

air supplies defeated the redundant design upon loss of the single air

supply. The failure to provide an alarm on loss of air to the seals

means that by design the alarm can only function af ter the seals fail

and due to the design of the leak collection system may not function

for a catastrophic seal failure,

d. The spent fuel pool low level alarms were not documented in either the

control room operation logbook or the supervisor's logbook. This

contributed to the delay in identifying that water was being added to

the spent fuel pool more than once per shift to compensate for leakage

and evaporation. It was reported that two low level alarms were

recofved on the night shif t 12/3/86, and information was passed on at

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shift turnover. Three alarms were received on the day shift, but this

information was not passed on to the evening snift and may have not

been passed on to the supervisor. When the second alarm was received

on the evening shift additional effort was initiated to find leaks.

The on shift operating supervisor stated that he remembered a previous

spent fuel pool reactor cavity gate seal leak that caused the fuel pool

cooling pumps to trip on low surge tank level. Based on the previous

event, he headed for the refueling floor with a plant operator at

9:37 p.m. At that time, he estimated the pool level to be about one

and one half to two feet low. They were checking gate seal air pressure

when they found no air pressure on the transfer canal seal. Air

pressure was reestablished, the seals were reinflated and the leakage

was stopped about 10:00 p.m. The pool level was estimated to be about

four feet low. The referenes guide was later measured and determined

to be about five and one half feet low.

Subsequent to this event, instructions have been issued to each shift

to document, in the control operator logbook, how much water is added

to the spent fuel pool and when.

6. Cause of the Seal Leak Alarm Failure

On October 10, 1986, procedure 57CP-CAL-094-2, the safety related procedure

<

for calibration of the transfer canal leak detection level switch 2G41-N019,

was performed incorrectly. Also the procedure is inadequate in that no

instructions for removal from service are included for this level switch.

To use this procedure in its current form for calibration of 2G41-N019 also

violates the principle of verbatim compliance with procedures since the

principle of verbatim compliance includes correcting procedures prior to use

if they do not work.

7. The Potential Risk of Draining Both Fuel Pools

Based on calculation by the licensee, with the transfer canal gates out and

the transfer canal seal failed and no operator action, the water level would

drop to the bottom of the transfer canal which would leave 1.5 feet of water

over the active fuel. If fill water were supplied to the pool thrnugh the

normal fill path at maximum flow rate using two pumps (1000 GPM), the pool

Invel would stabilize at approximately 7.75 feet above the active fuel. The

licensce's calculations also show that it took approximately 18 minutes for

the water level to drop 5.5 feet. This is adequate time to move the

refueling bridge from the center of the transfer canal to either storage

pool and lower a fuel bundle into a storage location.

8. Review of IEB 84-03, Refueling Cavity Water Seal and IEN 84-93, Potential

Loss of Water From the Refueling Cavity

Licensee's response to IEB 84-03 was by letter NED-84-500 dated

September 27, 1984. This response states in part, "The expansion joint has

redundant pneumatic seals on both Unit 1 and Unit 2 sides. In addition,

there is another pneumatic seal in the expansion joint itself." This

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response does not address the air supplies to the pneumatic seals nor that

if a single air supply were provided that the designed redundancy of seals

would be no longer functional. The response concludes, " Based on the above,

it is not considered credible to have a seal failure at Plant Hatch similar

to that which occurred at Haddam Neck." In response to NRC questioning, the

licensee reviewed this response and submitted a supplemental response on

December 23, 1986.

The Plant Hatch review of IEN 84-93 recognized the potential for seal

failure and water loss but stated that leakage alarms were installed for

detection of a leak and that procedures were in place to provide for water

restoration. This review by Plant Hatch concluded that no action need be

taken based on IEN 84-93.

Based on the events covered in this report, the licensee's evaluation of

both the IEB and the IEN were inadequate.

9. Recovery and Cleanup Operations

The licensee's cleanup and recovery organization consisted of representa-

tives from plant management, maintenance, health physics and chemistry,

emergency planning, rumor control, and engineering. Although the Technical

Support Center (TSC) was not officially activated, the licensee utilized the

TSC for planning and directing the cleanup and recovery activities. The TSC

was manned for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> per day with two shifts. The inspectors noted that

the licensee's staff was well organized and utilized the various applicable

status boards as well as onsite and offsite maps for ease of information

flow.

The inspectors examined the cleanup activities in the swamp area located

near the cooling towers on the East side of the plant. Personnel working at

the cleanup site were receiving directions from the TSC. Controlled access

to the swamp area was established by health physics personnel to limit

spread of contamination to previously established " clean" areas. A

frisking station was established at the entry point.

In order to contain as much of the contaminated water leaving the storm

drain system as feasibly possible, the licensee built a series of earthen

dams along the creek bed which led into the swamp. The water that was

contained in the ponds as a result of constructing the dams was pumped into

7000 gallon (approximately) capacity tanker trucks for subsequent disposal.

The licensee was planning to dispose of the water in the liquid radwaste '

treatment system, provided that the treatment system could handle the

additional volume of water. The contingency plan was as follows: if the

contaminated water could not be treated by the liquid radwaste treatment

system, then the option would be: (1) to take representative samples from

the tankers to determine curie concentration (typical concentrations were

approximately 140 9C1/7000 gallons) and (2) to release the content of the

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tanker into the plant's discharge canal, obtaining additional samples at the

beginning, midway, and end of the release. This release would be regarded

as a batch release with the creation of required discharge permits. The

licensee was aware that the conditions and Action Statement of Technical

Specification 3.15.1.3 would apply.

Additionally, the licensee had established several sampling stations along

the release stream, swamp area, and at an area (Sample "B") where seepage

from the swamp into the river was noted (See Figure 1). Sampling stations

were also established at two other outfall pipes to ensure that the water

flowing out was not contaminated. It should be noted that no detectable

activity was measured, as of December 6,1986, at sample location "B". The

licensee's sampling program involved the collection of one liter water

samples at each sample location once per hour. The inspectors accompanied

licensee representatives and a state representative and observed the

collection of seven water samples. The samples were analyzed in the Plant

Hatch counting laboratory using a one liter Marinelli beaker geometry, which

was normally used for liquid radwaste analysis. Four liquid samples were

split between the NRC, State of Georgia, and the licensee at sample

locations 3, 4, A and B. The comparison between the licensee and NRC can be

seen on Table 1.

The data indicate that all licensee measurements were higher than the NRC

measured values. This difference could be partially explained by the

relatively shorter counting times used by the licensee (600 seconds vs. 5000

seconds used by NRC/RII) and the resulting higher uncertainties associated

with the licensee's measurements. Additionally, it would have been more

appropriate to count these relatively low level samples in a low background

environmental counting laboratory. However, for qualitative analyses the

licensee's methods appeared to be appropriate to accomplish the task at

hand. It should be noted, that it may not be appropriate to use these data

quantitatively where accurate measurements would be needed to perform, for

example, dose calculations.

The licensee's corporate environmental affairs staff was involved with the

on going sampling program and estabitshing an augmented environmental

monitoring program to identify any significant migration of radioactive

material in excess of permissible levels. The plans established by the

corporate environmental affaire personnel for an augmented sampling program

included taking over the swamp water sampling efforts from Plant Hatch;

obtaining sediment samples to characterize the swamp sediment; increasing

the frequency of surface water, vegetation, and sediment samples offsite;

and adding a composite sampler downstream of the swamp outfall. The

frequency of the swamp water sampling was going to be reduced from the

present hourly rate to weekly sanples. Details of the augmented sampling

program were still being formulated at the time of this inspection. The

licensee stated that the augmented environmental sampling program would be

implemented by December 15, 1986.

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In plant cleanup activities were ongoing, while the swamp sampling and

cleanup were progressing. In plant cleanup activities were directed in the

following four main areas: (a). nitrogen storage tank area; (b). hot

machine shop; (c). asphalt area outside the hot machine shop; and (d).

portions of the East cable way at the 130' elevation of the Unit-1 and Unit-2

reactor buildings. A temporary roof was put on the nitrogen storage tank

building until the contaminated portions of the asphalt area outside the hot

machine shop area were temporarily covered with Herculite (trademark) until

the surface can be removed and repaved. The licensee plans to replace the

damaged cable tray insulation on the East cable ways and to initiate

extensive cleanup activities in the hot machine shop. Additionally,

engineering personnel were performing an evaluation to determine the amount

of water contained along the walls of the Unit-1 and Unit-2 reactors

buildings, turbine buildings, control building, and radwaste buildings. The

engineering staff was determining how to remove the water from between the

buildings so that it could be processed through the radwaste treatment

system.

10. Operators' Response to the Event

The operators response to the event once the spill had occurred was

commendable. The operators alertness to changing fill rates of the fuel

pool was lacking. Had each refill of the fuel pool been logged in either

the Plant Operator's log or the Shift Supervisors log the increased

frequency might have been noticed and corrective action taken prior to

complete depressurization of the seals.

11. Plant Response

Unit I was at full power and Unit 2 was in cold shutdown following refueling

when the spill occurred. No transient took place effecting plant operating

parameters.

4

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,

TABLE 1

.

Swamp Sample Results of Gamma Spectroscopy

Measurements at Plant Hatch, December 6s 1986

i Sample Location i Nuclide l Concentration (uCi/ml) l

l(Licensee geometry = l l Licensee * [ NRC** 1

I one liter marinelli)l 1 (Value i one sigma) (Value one sigma I

I i l I

I #3 I Cs-134 l 1.22 0.21 E-6 I 8.57 0.28 E-7 I

I I Cs-137 1 1.34 1 0.20 E-6 [ 1.30 t 0.03 E-6 [

I I I I I >

I #4 i Cs-134 I 7.96 1.58 E-7 l 2.83 1 0.17 E-7 I

I I Cs-137 I 7.53 1 1.48 E-7 1 4.42 1 0.19 E-7 [_

l I I I I

I A I Cs-134 1 6.50 1 1.54 E-7 [ 4.68 1 0.23 E-7 I

I l Cs-137 l 9.56 1 1.63 E-7 1 6.50 1 0.26 E-7 I

I I I I I

I B I I No nuclides detected [ No nuclides detectedl

l I I I I

I I I I I

I i 1 l I

I I I I I

i 1. I I I

I I I I .I

.

i

All-licensee analyses were performed at Plant Hatch, each measurements was

based on a counting time of 600 seconds.

- All NRC analyses were performed in the Region II counting laboratory, each

measurement was based on a counting time of 5000 seconds,

s .

e

ML20207P208

Text

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