ML20210K967

Responds to 870122 & 23 Telcons Re Documented Evaluations of Irradiations of Bromo-Phenanthrene (Powder Form) for Production of Br-82 Against Tech Spec 3.6.3 for Accidental Release of Generated Bromine Gas During Irradiation

ML20210K967
Person / Time
Site:	05000128
Issue date:	01/28/1987
From:	Feltz D TEXAS A&M UNIV., COLLEGE STATION, TX
To:	Chaney H NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
References
87-139, NUDOCS 8702120322
Download: ML20210K967 (8)

Text

(

D TEXAS ENGINEERING EXPERIM ENT STATION THE TEXAS A&M UNIVERSITY SYSTEM COLLEGE STATION, TEXAS 77843-3575 28 January 1987 M _ T -

NUCLEA 1 I:

5-7gst Mr. H. Dean Chaney Ib0 'O,bW *hl '

i Radiation Specialist i ,g U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region IV 611 Ryan Plaza Drive l Arlington, Texas 76011 ,(0 69

Dear Mr. Chaney:

The following is in response to telephone conversations with Mr. Blaine Murray and Mr. Dean Chaney on January 22 and 23, 1987 regarding documented evaluations of the l irradiations of Bromo-Phenanthrene (powder form) for the production of a:Br against Tech. Spec. 3.6.3 for an accidental release of generated bromine gas during irradiation.

1. Irradiation of Bromo-Phenanthrene (powder), as well as other samples irradiated in the NSCR, are evaluated against 3.6.3 by a process of applying engineered safeguards and making comparisons to previous evaluations of accidental releases of radioactive gases having large gross activity values (usually greater than 1 Ci). Of ten laboratory experiments are performed on smaller samples to determine production and identify physical changes to samples during irradiation. For example an experiment was conducted on Bromo-Phenanthrene which indicated approximately 30% of the total Br-82 production was in gas form. Such knowledge is applied by the technical services group, reactor supervisors, and health physicist in determining encapsulation and handling procedures and approvals for irradiation.

Engineered safeguards provide the greatest protection against accidental l releases and carry the heaviest weight in the evaluations of accidental ,

releases of radioactivity. Typical engineered safeguards used in meeting l the requirements of 3.6.3 review are:

a. Encapsulation and irradiation devices such as the long tube irradiator, as described in the attached material provides a large volume for the l

collection of gases should sample encapsulation fail. These gases are

! vented to the central exhaust system under controlled conditions for detection to determine if corrective measures are necessary before handling an irradiated sample. Such devices provide for first time irradiations of unknowns.

l b. The 108.000 gallon pool water capacity becomes a large factor in pre-I venting gaseous releases of soluble materials. '

h2Moh P

\

p. g RESEARCH ANO DEVELOPMENT FOR MANKINO 3 , l .).g i

_ ~

, .Mr. Dean Chaney Page 2

c. Shutdown of the facility exhaust and air. handling system _ :.pon reaching.

alarm levels as monitored by building exhaust detector systems prevents uncontrolled off-site releases,

d. Chemical filtering of experiments such as the chem lab hood air exhaust system reduces the possibility of large releases of radioactivity to the building exhaust system.

2. An analysis of '8Ar which is non-soluble and non-filterable (using con-ventional methods) is an excellent selection for the comparison to 8 Br which is soluble and easily filtered. As an example an evaluation of

• • Ar activity of 4.3 Ci, if accidently released to the reactor building, is provided in NSC Staff Meeting #368 which is attached. The 4.3 Ci is in comparison to 40 mci of a:Br generated in the December 2,1986 irradiation.

As seen in both the initial evaluation and the revised evaluation, the accidental release of 4.3 Ci of.

• Ar does not result in a release that ex- '

ceeds limits when averaged over 1 year as allowed in 10CFR Part 20 and as stated in 3.6.3.a.

3. The documentation of evaluations made in 1981 for the first time irradiation of Bromo-Phenanthrene material is not available. Records containing detailed procedures and evaluations made by the technical staff involved in the experi-ment dating that f ar back have not been located. However,-minutes of NSC Staff Meeting #290 (attached) documents authorization to conduct the experi-ment and provides general procedures.

The NSC staff feels that sufficient action has been taken over the past 25 years of operation to satisfy the requirements of 3.6.3, however, evaluations of sample failure during irradiation resulting in comparatively small accidental releases could be reviewed for improved documentation.- The establishment of written guidelines for making evaluations against 3.6.3 could aid documentation and decision-making regarding authorizations to perform experiments.

Sincerely, M @

Donald E. Feltz Director DEF/ym Attachment cc: Mr. Blaine Murray, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region IV Dr. J. A. Reuscher, Director, Nuclear Research Reactor Programs Mr. J. L. Krohn, Manager of Reactor Operations Mr. C. Meyer, Senior Health Physicist 3 ._. -

o-NSC Staff Meeting #290 30 September 1981 Attending: Randall, Feltz, Waldrep, Land, Deigl This meeting was called to discuss the Ar-41 production and transfer experiment for Teledyne Isotopes, Inc. The irradiation container design was reviewed and approved. The transfer apparatus was also reviewed as well as the procedures for its use. Authorization was given to begin construction of the gas transfer device and to complete the fabrication of the irradiation canister. There were several unanswered questions involving the shipment of the radioactive Ar-41 which Herb Deigl will address and report back on.

The Bromine irradiation was also discussed. These irradiations will be donc using Bromo phenanthrene powder irradiated in three 1 gram samples encased in poly vials. These vials will then be put into aluminum sausage cans and using T.I. type holder will be irradiated. The poly vials will then be removed from the aluminum cans and transferred to the chem lab using the dumb waiter. The samples will then be put into the glove box, which will be vented into the chem lab hood. The vials will be placed upright in shielding blocks and 3 cc of benzene will be injected into each using ,a syringe. The samples will then be left overnight to allow the bromine to dissolve into the benzene. After the samples has dissolved it will then be transferred to the containers provided by Teledyne again using a syringe.

The container valves will be shut, handles removed and then packaged for s hipme nt .

Respectively submitted, Car Wald 2p Reactor upervisor

" ' N Wh .*

• • • -mem% .

s.M EXPERIMENT DEVICE: Long Tube Rotisserie (Shell pipe rotisserie)

PURPOSE: Originally designed to irradiate Shell pipe. Now has evolved into a general irradiation device accommodatina several different types of exnnru.on n DESCRIPTION:

Aluminum tube 6 1/2' x 3"(2 11/16" 1.D.) . U.ght rotisseries available.

Each uses two "0-rings" to seal the cap one, size 041, and one, size 235. Each numbered tube has a similarly numbered cap. Long tube rotisseries require long extension shafts stamped "Long tube" at the top. Used on A3, A5 and A7 only.

j h '. , i

. .t %g.

.. y

. 4

, ' l ,

e g ~, 1

. y,f Q ., ,

• . c a :y 9e =

y. .

gy ,

c.. .

. Ia .

(

h ,k G

'f' -  :

. ,q. .

gu

,., .g ,

.'.! \ .

e .3 m i gh.- . ~ ,

FIG. I FIG. 2 INSTRUCTIONS: Select " coolest" rotisserie. Place in long tube rack (Figure 1). If rotisserie is empty remove the cap using the special tool shown in Figure 2. If the rotisserie contains a-sample you must first attach the vent hose (Figure 2) and coen the vent valve. Monitor the Facility Air Monitors during ventin g Close the vent valve and remove the cap.

Eitract the sample.

4 To load aluminum cans: place the cans in a long tube canister (Figure 3),

using appropriate spacers to center the sanple on the reactor, and drop the loaded canister into the long tube. (See also chapter on " Sample En-capsulation in Aluminum Cans"). The canister will fall to the bottom coming l to rest upon the cone-shaped pipe centering spacer.

To load a Shell pipe an electromagnet loading device is used (Figure 5).

The pipes come wrapped as shown in Figure 4 and should not be touched by human hands. (They should be cleaned with alcohol while wearing plastic gloves). Before using the electromagnet loading device ascertain the device has a good battery. Pick up the pipe with the electromagnet, place the pipeinto the mouth of the long tube, then lower the pipe gently with the

_.,,,,yw y-wy-9,.74.-g , . . . . _ . , _

wire rope until the pipe settles on the cone spacer at the bottom of the tube. Turn off the magnet (switch in the mid, or straight up, position).

Remove the loading device. Shavings corresponding to the pipe just loaded should be sealed in quartz and then placed in the special basket at the bottom of the positioning rod (See Figure 4). Lower positioning rod into the long' tube until the cone spacer is inserted in the pipe. An aluminum wire attached to the top of the positioning rod enables one to remove the rod at time of unloading. Replace long tube cap and tighten with tool (Figure 2), using care not to overtighten. Ensure the long tube vent valve is closed before the tube is lowered into the water.

~0ther samples may be irradiated in a long tube canister with a certain amount] '

of fabrication. Means of fabrication should be discussed with, and approved by, the SRO.

/

l ,.

m h,N . Y t .

i2,l? % b 'l, s v ,. ..

' 'N j

' . - ,1 ~ % ,

! -w.-

i

~

4?,; ? }, ,

• • j

'A '

-j ,g 9; p -

L. - m l '

y - ,

t. l

- n,.

k .

K . [-, < .

~' % -

TEr , \

'~b

.' K, t -;+ Qh ,

Fl4. 3 Ft(, 5

[*% TUBC C ANI ST E.R. , WILL FloLD 6 ELEC.TKcMi%NETic. LoADINfi DEVICE. ,

SMALL CANS CR THREE. LAR6 E cMJS.

Firs. 4 LEhD t.ous c.gr SH ELL hstTittlig ruet CAP waE share PIPC Rob SIACER.

1 1@ = 2

/

!;uclear Science Center Staff Meeting # 368 3 December 19WI Attending: Feltz, Rogers, Sandel, Head, Petench, Hartlett A staff meeting was convened to review the procedures involved in the irradiation and handling of radioactive argon and xenon gas for calibration tests. The majority of the transfer and handling of samples will occur in the late afternoon and early evening when fewer individuals are present. The crushable quartz vials used for the radioactive xenon will contain a maximum of 50 mC1. Although 4.3 Ci of argon will be activated only a maximum of 250 mci will be transferred and handleo at a time. The calibration rig is located in the chemistry lab on the lower research level where most of the sample handlind will take place.

Calculations show that should a vial of xenon be dropped and broken the activity level in the chemistry lab would be approximately 9 MPC. When diluted thtoughout the entire building it is expected that this level would be much less than 1 MPC. Although the NSC facility air monitors would be unable to detect this leakage, the end window GM detectors in the lab are very sensitive and would provide quick detection. The staff concluded that tnere would be no health hazard involved under this worse case condition for the handling of xenon. There would be no significant release to the general public (200:1 dilution factor from stack to boundary fence), and the building dilution would be such that personnel evacuation from the confinement building would be unnecessary. Individuals in the chemistry lab could conceivably stay in the lab for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> at that activity level; however, they will remain only long enough to isolate the leaka6e-Argon 41 activity calculations are attached, and as can be seen approximately 1 MPC would be released from site should the entire 4.3 Ci escape from the sample.

Based on this, the transfer will occur during reduced personnel hours, and the requirements stipulated in the attached sheet will be adhered to.

The staff approved this procedure under the limitations and procedural requirements discussed. The meeting was held in accordance with SOP's I-B-4 and I-F.

Respectfully submitted, C/ :h DaleRogersb Assistant Director

1

~

TEC R e 3 e. 5 tL344 *An'Ekme. C.e\<.ukdE 02 4.3 L M L M @-

asoi -Q w4 Cg m_ s c.asx\@ u adum O"

• k.% X lo A U/cc. E . lL X1ti Ulc.c.

as a. .m c.mue < <

6%. m Evhw d d 9AsadeNd(6N au/fM unuAl < d[mPCQ Sua f "mic' s.n xAtu ul %1y AL soee h.

(['aovj M +udgmt<6AM d1m%fc.,'

kh bR d w a m n w a h l.

3:

If S d k d b ( d )da D ew L d I M Pc) 7.% J L J C M A LL&6 14, %

3.hw(\m90Au.f E UM*'N d A.

hb.U!

~

% Lul % J

r

, y TEC Rej et blsJ s

la-3 3' AR le.e ase OAtofied cbs dk e pdsu) 4.3 L p<<a A p~ m aso-t b bNukndirf-kb /diLdd w 500o crM E 6000 C-Fvi x' aldel a,ofx(o"ce,/tl(socs I. h- u tr R,  % i t aso m t a.oy n o " u.

, 1. m & 4epvg ~ Wdea %

~ = \ lec DY$

v ec

k. 4 M OA4u o pl. qr -3 MQggh%_ a,c4Mo'tc Q. l Xlb ~ A b[tC

.i E

^ u. QOD[( h .l.0Klhrheevu

/

~ a ch mec ( Mdu) 60 eal D iotreaodu Wh )

h 9E eld [ ma Aui 4.

a6 & %a J h_xL '

g4.&a%aifc>o%  % ka met % 5 _%  :

a.% uu { b 2 1 edwaa)udl Lf C 16m Pt s h ku f b ( A % k % M J A d d 9u d

%%Ne. -