IR 05000324/1987027

Insp Repts 50-324/87-27 & 50-325/87-27 on 870810-14.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Core Physics Testing & Followup on Open Items

ML20234C532
Person / Time
Site:	Brunswick
Issue date:	09/10/1987
From:	Jape F, Tingen S NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20234C507	List: IR 05000324/1987027 ML20234C503
References
50-324-87-27, 50-325-87-27, NUDOCS 8709210327
Download: ML20234C532 (5)

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UNITED STATES

.[>RRtooq* NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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1. " REGION ll f*I M j 101 MARIETTA STREET, ATLANTA, GEORGla 30323

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Report Nos.: 50-325/87-27 and 50-324/87-27 Licensee: Carolina Power and Light Company P. O. Box 1551 i Raleigh, NC 27602 Docket Nos.: 50-325 and 50-324 License Nos.: DPR-71 and DPR-62 Facility Name: Brunswick 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted: August 10-14, 1987 Inspector: Mk _h #2 , 9/9fE7 l S. Ting'en Date Signed i

Approved by: %l, f, /M /Q 9//o /f 7 F. Jape, Chief Date 51gned Test Programs Section Division of Reactor Safety SUMMARY Scope: This routine, announced inspection was in the areas of core physics testing and follow-up on open item Results: No violations or deviations were identifie s

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REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

• E. Eckstein, Manager Technical Support

• K. Enzor, Director, Regulatory Compliance

• R. Poulk, Senior Specialist, Regulatory Compliance

! M. Pastva, Specialist, Regulatory Compliance

! S. Boyce, Project Engineer, Emergency Core Cooling Systems M. Blinsen, Specialist, ISI, Leak Rate Test Director NRC Resident Inspectors W. Ruland, Senior Resident Inspector L. Garner, Resident Inspector

• Attended exit intervie . Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on August 14, 1987, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection finding No dissenting comments were received from the license The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspector during this inspectio . Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters This subject was not addressed in the inspectio . Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspectio . Core Physics Tests - Units 1 and 2 (61705, 61707) Periodic test, PT-01.9, LPRM/APRM Calibration, was reviewed by the inspector for successful performance in both units. This procedure ensures that the local power range monitor system has been properly calibrated to the local neutron flux and that the average power range monitor system has been properly calibrated to core thermal power which is required by Technical Specification (TS) to be performed once per month of equivalent full power operatio _ _

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2 Periodic Test, PT-14.3.1, In Sequence Critical Shutdown Margin Calculation, was reviewed by the inspector for successful performance in both units. The purpose of this Periodic Test is to calculate and compare to TS requirements the actual shutdown margin of the reactor core during initial startup following a refuelin No violations or deviations were identifie . Follow-up on Previously Identified Items (92700, 92701, 72703)

(Closed)LER 02-85-14: Automatic Depressurization System testing revealed that the KSA timing relays exceeded the TS tima tolerance, and setpoint drift of the KSA relays was a primary concer The relays were replaced and all subsequent test results have been satisfactory. The utility will continue to track Unit 2 future KSA relay calibrations and adjustments to

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evaluate any set point drift trend. This item is close \

(Closed) LER 02-85-08, and URI 50-324/85-33-02: During Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) fast closure testing, several Unit 2 MSIVs would not fast close. Subsequent investigation attributed this failure to disc-to-seat material problems of the respective MSIV double acting solenoid valv The disc-to-seat material was Ethylene Prophylene (EP) and failed due to a combination of hydrocarbon contamination, temperature, and internal geometry acting on the EP seating material. The MSIV double acting solenoid valves in Units 1 and 2 have been replaced with new valves utilizing vi ton disc-to-seat materia Viton is impervious to hydrocarbons but less resistant to radiation than EP, therefore the licensee is periodically replacing a sample of the viton seated valves and evaluating the removed valves for failure analysis to determine valve lif The licensee is tracking this item until a useful valve life has been determined. These items are close (Closed) LER 02-85-11 and IFI 50-324/85-35-01: A reactor scram resulted from an inadvertent MSIV closure. The MSIV closure occurred when deenergizing the MSIV Dual Solenoid Valve AC solenoid for testing purpose When the AC solenoid was deenergized the MSIV closed because the corresponding DC solenoid had unknowingly failed at a prior tim Due to this failure,the licensee checked the other Units 1 and 2 MSIV Dual Solenoid Valves for AC or DC solenoid failure, three other Unit 2 DC solenoids were discovered to be failed. Subsequent investigation revealed the probable cause of failure to be chloride corrosion of the DC solenoid coil, but the source of chloride corrosion could not be determine As corrective action, the licensee has replaced all Units 1 and 2 MSIV solenoids with an improved type and installed monitoring circuits that detects a faulty solenoi Since this corrective action has been implemented no MSIV solenoid failures have occurred. IFI 50-324/85-35-01 also addressed MSIV soleniod disc-to-seat materials problems that has been closed in the previous paragraph. These items are close _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ -

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(Closed) LER 02-86-05: Local Leak Rate Testing (LLRT) of Unit 2 primary j containment revealed a non-quantifiable leakage rate for three single j valve penetrations and one double valve penetration. The valves were repaired and the local leak rate tested satisfactorily. The inspector ;

asked the licensee if there was any program to identify LLRT valve failure j trends. Presently, there is no such program, but one is being developed 1 that will soon be implemented. This item is close [

l (Closed) IEB 86-02: This bulletin requested that licensees determine 1

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whether Series 102 or 103 differential pressure switches supplied by SOR Incorporated -are installed in electrical equipment important to safet i In response, the licensee has stated that S0R Series 102 and 103 differential pressure switches are not installed in any Unit 1 or 2 systems important to safety applications as defined in 10 CFR 50.49(b).

This item is closed for both unit ;

(Closed) IEB 80-25: Target Rock (TR) Safety Relief Valves (SRVs) failed to operate in response to manual demand and at a later unrelated time l opened spuriously during power operations at Boston Edison Company's 1 Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station. These malfunctions identified several TR SRV problems. The first was that during fabrication, the excessive use of Loc-tite would cause the solenoid plunger to stick to the bonnet, thus i preventing pneumatic pressure from entering the pneumatic operator. 'When }

this bulletin was issued the licensee was purchasing two-stage TR SRVs to replace the currently installed three-stage TR SRV Prior to installation of the new TR SRVs into Units 1 and 2 the action taken specified by this bulletin was taken to ensure that excessive Loc-tite was not present, and subsequently, Brunswick has not experienced any SRVs failing ;

to respond to manual demand until very recently. LER 01-87-20, dated i July 15, 1987, documents that several SRVs failed to open when given a manual open signal. This recent LER is being tracked by the Test Program Sectio The second deficiency identified by the Pilgrim 1 SRV malfunctions was excessive pressure in the pneumatic supply system to the ,

SRV pneumatic operator which resulted in an SRV spuriously openin Licensees with TR SRVs were required to analyze their respective l pneumatic supply to the SRVs for overpressure possibilities, install overpressure protection if required, and install high and low pneumatic supply pressure alarms in the control room. Brunswick analysis of Units 1 and 2 SRV pneumatic supplys determined that there was adequate protection to prevent overpressure and no modifications were necessary. Both units already had low pressure alarms and since SRVs were being installed that were not as sensitive to an overpressure condition in the pneumatic supply, l

the licensee determined that a high pressure alarm was not required.

l Brunswick Units 1 and 2 have not experienced any spurious SRV opening

! since installation of the two-stage TR S6Vs. This item is closed for both units.

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.5 (Closed)'IFI- 50-325,324/85-31-01: During -LLRT, the licensee. tested valves E17-F015A, E11-F0158, E21-F005A and E21-F0058 in the Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) reverse direction without. previous NRR approval.. Since-this. finding the: licensee' has changed. the applicable procedures _ to lea . rate -check these. values in the LOCA direction. The inspector verified this by reviewing the applicable procedures. These items are close (Closed) IFI 50-324/86-17 '01 and 50-325/86-16-01': Establishment of a 4 periodic test to perform and . document control - rod coupling checks prior to criticality following a refueling outag The . licensee has-issued Periodic Test, ' PT-14.1, Control Rod Coupling Check and ' Control Rod Drive (CRD) Testing, which is required to be performed prior to criticality after completing- core alterations' that could have effected CRD coupling integrity. The inspector reviewed - this procedure and

_ verified that it was performed prior to the recent Unit 1 post refueling

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initial criticalit These items are close (Closed) IEB 86-03: The inspector reviewed the licensee's response to IEB 86-03, Potential Failure of Multiple Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Pumps Due to Single Failure of Air-0perated Valve in Minimum Flow Recirculation Line. The licensee determined that the problem described by . this bulletin did not apply because of - the design of these recirculation lines at this facilit Licensee action on this bulletin is considered to be complete. This item is closed for both unit ,

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