ML20235H507

Forwards Proposed Changes to Facility Fire Suppression Sys Design,Including Revised Sprinkler Hanger Design & Fire Suppression Flushing Procedures. Dynamic Testing of Flexibility Supported Fire Protection Sys..., Also Encl

ML20235H507
Person / Time
Site:	Vogtle
Issue date:	07/07/1987
From:	Bailey J GEORGIA POWER CO., SOUTHERN COMPANY SERVICES, INC.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
Shared Package
ML20235H510	List: ML20235H507 ML20235H520 ML20266J084 ML20266J087 ML20266J089
References
GN-1380, NUDOCS 8707150162
Download: ML20235H507 (19)

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~ ' Georgia Power Company o Post Office Box 282 Wayntsboro, Georgia 30830 Telephone 404 554-9961 404 724 8114 Southern Company Services, Inc.

Post Offace Box 2625 Birmingham, Alabama 35202 Telephone 205 870 6011 VOgtie Project l

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July.7' 1987 l

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission File: X4BJ01 Attn: Document Control Desk Log: GN-1380 Washington, D.C. 20555 NRC DOCKET NUMBER 50-425 CONSTRUCTION PERMIT NUMBER CPPR-109 V0GTLE: ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT - UNIT 2 FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEM CHANGES Gentlemen:

Enclosed for your review are proposed changes to certain portions of the Vogtle Unit 2 Fire Suppression System design, briefly discussed with a member of your staff. These changes . will not compromise the-ability of the fire protection systems to perform their intended functions during a fire event. These changes include:

1. Revised sprinkler hanger design based on. the results of seismic testing for qualification purposes rather than analytical means as done previously.

2. Revision to the criteria for placement of in-tray sprinkler protection to include them only in the cable spreading! rooms.

3. Revision to the fire suppression flushing procedures, which provides an alternate to flushing of sprinkler system piping.

Attachments 1, 2 andi 3 provide detailed information regarding .each of these . changes. Attachment 4_ provides - a . draft of the 'FSAR changes, which will .be incorporated into a future amendment.

8707150162 870707 PDR l F ADOCK 05000425 0

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PDR . ,;  :

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'Vogtle Electric Generating Plant ~ July 7,1987 :I '

J Fire Suppression System Changes- Page Two Fi1e:. ' X48J01 Log: GN-1380 d

Should you have any questions, please inquire. ,

Sincerely,.

.k. ,

'J. A. Bailey

Project Licensing Manager JAB:Je-

= Attachments xc: .NRC Regional Administrator NRC Resident Inspector l J.lP. O'Reilly .l R. E. Conway 'I L.'T. Gucwa l R. A. Thomas J. E. Joiner, Esquire B. W. Churchill, Esquire M. A. Miller (2) r- G. Bockhold, Jr.

l R. Goddard, Esquire l

[ D. Feig i R. W. McManus '

Vogtle Project File  ;

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ATTACHMENP 1 FIRE PRCTTECTION SPRIIELER HAtGER CHAFEES l l

FSAR subsection 9.5.1.3 currently identifies that the ccuponents of a fire protection system are analytically checked to assure they will not collapse when subjected to accelerations of the design basis earthquake.

The Unit 2 fire protection systens will be suspended with rod type hangers rather than rigid type supports which were used on Unit 1. The Unit 2 systems have been modeled and seismic testing has been performed instead of using analytical means to show they will not collapse when subjected to seismic acceleration of a design basis earthquake. This support arrangement naintains i seismic 2/1 considerations. l The Unit 2 fire protection hanger arrangement provides VEGP with the following i advantages:

o Sprinkler spray pattern blockages incurred frcm rigid type (tube steel) '

supports will be reduced.  !

o Sprinkler heads will require less frequent relocation while providing better spray coverages.

The follcwing are excerpts frczn the seismic test report. This report is attached for your review. 4 i

SEISMIC TEST INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW l The Fire Suppression Systems (FPS) installed in Unit 1 were designed and constructed to meet strict support stiffness and piping deflection criteria. In safety related areas, the FPS are classified as seismic twtM:ver-one (2/1) l i systems. Their integrity chring and after a seismic event cannot jeopardize the f l

integrity of adjacent equignent and structures which may be essential for safe j

! shutdown of the plant after a seismic event.

j l

A recent experimental effort performed by ANCO Engineer, Inc. (AICO) for Bechtel '

Western Power Corporation (BWPC) successfully derronstrated that the rod- {

suspended FPS at the South Texas Project (STP) were capable of withstanding j simulated seismic events in excess of predicted design criteria without I collapse. These ' flexible" supports were demonstrated to have a ductile capacity far in excess of their capacity predicted by linear elastic methods. j lbne of the test systems collapsed under extreme loading. 4 Based on the experience gained during the STP project, the expectation was excellent that FPS systems designed to IFPA-13 ctandards, which included sway i bracing as discussed in Section 10 of the standard, would be capable of  :

withstanding postulated seismic events at the Vogtle Unit 2. It was further j

.mvisioned that incorporating a "pinrad" connection at the top of the supports i i (anchor elevation) would eliminate potential low-cycle fatigue failures. Other l concerns evaluated were the determination of required rattle space, the loads l transferred to anc111ary structures and the affects of inpact and collision on l piping integrity.

l 1-1 4

l

'Ib address these ccncerns, verify design ecocepts, establish design argins and determine design ecostraints, three segments of actual systems (as installed in VEGP t. hit 1) were asserrbled and tested an AN00's R-4 Shake Table. The three systeme were chosen to be representative of' actual installed systerre. Eachi system ccnsistad of a feed min asprmimately forty feet in length with several i branch lines and a simlated deluge valve ccnnecticn. Each system's supports l and sway bracing were located using WPA-13 reocrrmendaticos. All supports l iri.er rgeted standard off-the-shelf hardware, including swivel connecticos to l act as pins at the tcp of the supports.

Testing took place at A!OO Engineers, Inc. test facility in Culver City, California between 24 March and 2 April 1987. 'Ihe three test systems were fitted with sensing instrumentation to detezmine response acceleraticos, displacements and loads during simlated seismic events. 'Ihe.three test systems were fitted with the support hardware intended for use at the site and subjected .

to five Operating Basis Earthquakes (CBE) and a Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) . I N3 piping separated and no supports failed during these events. Hydrostatic '

testing, as per WPA-13, Section 1.11, was performed prior to and after the first CBE test to demonstrate functionality. ' Next, the three test systems were subjected to a 1.2 x SSE event and lastly a 1.4 x.SSE event to derrmstrate survivability and to establish a design rrazvin. System fragility levels were l l determined to be in excess of shake table capacity and far in excess'of site j enveloping seismic design criteria.

1

'IEST CONCLUSIONS Based on the results of the VEGP specific test, the fire protection systerns l

2

~ designed to WPA 13 standard using red t.ype hangers and sway bracing have been derncostrated to be capable of withstanding postulated base input motions in excess of OBE and SSE requirements. The test has preven that seismic 2/1 capability is maintained.

1 1-2 M0587047/VT

ATIACHMENT 2 FIRE PROTECTION IN-TRAY SPRINCLER CHAKES FSAR Subsection 9.5.1.2.1.4 currently identifies that electric cable tray arrangements will utilize autcrnatic suppression systems located above the trays and FSAR Table 9.5.1-9 identifies that cable tray protection uses the guidance of NFPA 15 with closed head spray nozzles.

The Unit 2 sprinkler design will be based on the following: -

1) The area coverage boundaries for suppression systens will be in accordance with that identified on fire area drawings (FSAR figures 9A -

1 through 9A-46) .

2) In the cable spreading rooms, in-tray directional spray nozzles will be provided. Area protection at the ceiling will provide coverage for the first three safety-related trays in a vertical stack and in-tray protection will be provided for the remaining safety related trays starting with the 4th tray in the stack and ending with the last tray in the stack. (Typical Unit 1 design) .

3) For electrical cable chases and tunnels, sprinklers will be provided at the ceiling designed to discharge .3 gpn per square fcot over the nest renote 3000 square feet or area within the cutoff fire boundaries whichever is less.

4) For other areas containing three safety related cable trays or less in a vertical stack, sprinklers will be provided at the ceiling designed to discharge .21 gpm per square foot over the nest remote 1500 square feet or area within the cutoff fire boundary whichever is less. (Typical Unit 1 design).

5) For other areas containing more than three safety related cable trays in a vertical stack, sprinklers will be provided at the ceiling designed to discharge .3 gpn per square foot over the nest rmote 3000 square feet or area within the cutoff fire bourrlaries whichever is less.

Our insurance underwriter (Nuclear Mutual Limited) has agreed during a walkdcwn l of Unit 1 areas that because of the light to nederate cable tray fill densities, the in-tray nozzles could be eliminated if the ceiling density was increased in accordance with the criteria listed above.

The use of autanatic sprinklers at the ceiling, without in-tray nozzles, has been accepted at other nuclear plants.

The Unit 2 sprinkler design neets the guidelines of CMEB BTP 9.5.1 section C.5.e by providing an adequate level of suppression for cable tray arrangements.

I 2-1 l M0587047/VT

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q j i ATTACIDENT 3 i

Fim Suppression Systm Flushing Changes FSAR table 9.5.1-9 identifies a deviation to NFPA-13 subsection 1-11.1'.1 regarding connection of sprinkler system piping prior to ccupletion of. flushing of underground mains and lead-in connections. - The underground main and lead-in piping was flushed while connected with the sprinkler systs. After the header piping was verified clean, the sprinkler systems wem flushed in accordance with j approved flush procedures. This deviation was identified as open item 7C of the {

Safety Evaluation Report and subsequently closed in supplement 4 of the SER.

For Unit 2, to assum that foreign material does not enter the suppression system the following steps will be performed when connection is made to lead-in.

piping:-

1

1) A test blank will be installed between the system isolation valve and l preaction sprinkler. valve prior to' system installation.. I

2) 'Ihe test blanks will be visible when installed and controlled through the use of drawings, procedures,~and inspections. j 1

3) Test blanks will be removed after header piping 'is verified clean. I This alternate to NFPA 13 requirements for Unit 2 provides reasonable assurance that foreign materials have been rmoved frun the underground piping system and that sprinkler systems are free of foreign material. q 1

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3-1 M0587047/VT l

-m DRAFT FSAR CHANGES ATTACHMENT 4 SH, 4 - l

. VEGP-FSAR-9 1

l With the exception of short runs.of flexible nonmetallic  ;

conduit, wiring runs outside of cable trays are enclosed in 23  !

metallic conduit to reduce the exposure of the cable to ignition. I Several approaches are used to limit the, hazard presented by combustible cable insulation. Electrical cable. construction, as =l25 a minimum, meets the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 383-1974 flame test, except in a limited number l23 l of places, as outlined in appendix 98. Additional fire l protection for concentration of cables is provided as required. I Cable insulating materials which do not create hazardous concentrations of corrosive or toxic gas when overheated or when ,

exposed to flames are used to the extent practicable, as i detailed in appendix 9B.

Cable tray construction materials are noncombustible. Cable trays and conduit are used for cables only; miscellaneous storage is not permitted in cable trays, raceways, trenches, or-culverts. Piping for flammable or combustible liquids or gases is not permitted in areas of heavy cable concentrations. l23 Interior transformers are of the dry type.

Cable and cable tray penetrations of fire barriers (vertical l and horizontal) are sealed (fire stops)' to give protection at j least equivalent to that required for the fire barriers. '

3 Fire protection for areas containing cable trays is achieved in i the design of the plant through a combination of the following i (detailed in appendix 9A): )

A. For early warning of fire conditions in the cables, smoke detectors are provided for all safe shutdown cable tray runs throughout the plant. Line-type detectors are provided in safety-related cable trays inside containment and those cable. trays containing 23 25 pressurizer heater cables inside containment.

B. For control and minimization of fire effects, either in case of significant cable fire loading within the same safety train or for congested runs of cable trays, automatic suppression systems located above the trays and manual backup capabilities are provided.

je"- 23 25 INSERT A ,

Amend. 23 4/86 9.5.1-11 Amend. 25 9/86

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4- 2 l

VEGP-FSAR-9 system heads open upon a rise of ambient temperature to the melting point of fusible links on sealed sprinkler heads; thus, fire extinguishing flow through the spray heads is established.

Once initiated, system operation is terminated by manually ,

23 shutting a local valve at the preaction valve.

Inadvertent manual or automatic operation of the preaction valve, due to release failure, is detectedLby a system actuated alarm, The impact of inadvertent operation of suppression systems is minimized through the following design features: 23 e All suppression systems in safety related areas are l either Halon or pre-action sprinkler systems j

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2EEi3iHi? dei--C WSERT B '

e Redundant safe shutdown equipi$ent is located in separate l23 fire areas to the extent practical I e Sprinkler heads are passive components, and only one l23 l head is expected to fail at any one time. I 15

e Drip-proof motors are installed on safety-related l23 pumps.

I 3

e Safety-related electrical cable design allows water spray on cables in tray without electrical cable 25 faulting.

1 Where the safe shutdown analysis takes credit for distance j separation between redundant safe shutdown components in the i same fire area, the existence and orientation of intervening 23-structural components are reviewed in consideration of the possibility for damage during manual fire fighting activities (i.e., fire hose stream damage).

l Failure of one detector to sense fire results in no adverse l25 effect, since, in general, alternate detector (s) remain functional to sense the fire and release the system. In the event of a pipe break, no adverse effect results, since the system is dry within.

9.5.1.2.2.10 Water Sprav Deluce. Water spray system operation -

is initiated by an electric fire detection device. This sensor .

detects a fire and releases a tripping. device to open the deluge valve, thus supplying water under pressure to the open spray heads. Actuation of the fire detection device also initiates a local alarm and registers the alarm condition en an Amend. 15 3/85 Amend. 23 4/86 9.5.1-17 Amend. 25 9/86

SH,4-3 VEGP-FSAR-9 nw Insulation with UL ratings of 25 or less for flame spread, fuel contributed and smoke generated, is l28 provided for ductwork above the ceiling of the control '

room. "*

D. Fire suppression or extinguishing agents which result in corrosive products upon pyrolysis are not employed i to protect essential circuitry. '

Redundant engineered safety features (EST) components are physically remote and are separated by fire l barriers.

l In the unlikely event that the fire protection system does not function, fire barriers prevent the spread of fire to other areas. Safe shutdown is attained and maintained, during or after such an improbable fire in i an ESF area, by the use of the redundant components of  !

the necessary safe shutdown-related systems. Thus, fire in an ESF area will not prevent a safe shutdown.

'E . The components (and supporting structures) of the fire protection system, the collapse of which could result

'_ in loss of a required function of plant structures, systems, or components important to safety are analytice.lly checked to determine that they will not l15 E

collapse when subjected to seismic accelerations of the .

l desicm b? s earthquake.

4'~ INSERT' l F. Wet pipe sprinkler systems are not installed in ESF j rooms so that inadvertent operation or failure would '

not impair safety systems. Preaction sprinkler systems are installed to mitigate these failures.

The fire 'ighting f water piping running from the source serving the preaction sprinkler systems is filled and pressurized with water up to a shut control valve, located outside the room to be protected. The pipe is dry between the shut control valve and the spray or sprinkler heads. Thus, flooding within the area to be protected due to piping failure inducted by seismic events, explosions, pressure, or missiles is precluded. Moreover, additional protection is realized in that the fire protection piping is analytically checked, as discussed above, and is protected from missile and explosion debris by the barriers that protect equipment within the area from missile damage. Inadvertent manual operation of a preaction sprinkler valve is detected by a system trouble alarm. No adverse effects result since there is no flow as the sprinkler heads remain sealed.

9.5.1-24 Amend. 15 3/85 Amend. 28 11/86 -

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,SH,4.4 VEGP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.5.1-9 (SHEET 2 OF 16)

2. Volume verification will be performed using^available < '

tank level measuring equipment instead of weighing:the tank. This method provides an accurate indication of tank volume and meets the intent of section 1-11.1.6 which requires a check of agent " quantity."

NFPA 13-1983, STANDARD FOR INSTALLATION OF-SPRINKLER SYSTEMS l23 General: Due to the complexity.of the plant, the determination of compliance with NFPA 13 is based.in part

~

28 upon the professional judgment of qualified fire protection engineers.

Subsections C-11.1: The underground main and lead-in piping will not be flushed before connection is made to the j

sprinkler piping. The underground main and lead-in piping will be flushed, in accordance with approved VEGP flush procedures, while connected with the sprinkler system.

Measures will be taken and controlled via the flush- 23 procedure to prohibit the introduction of foreign material i into the sprinkler piping during main and lead-in i flushing. The sprinkler systems will then be flushed in 1 accordance with the flush procedure after the header piping ,

is varif4ad cleaned.

FI NSERT DJ

' Subsection 1-11-2.5: Test blanks will not be painted or-numbered, however, they will be strictly controlled by procedure which requires removal verification.

Subsection 2-2.1.2.4 The water allowance for outside hose is not added to the sprinkler and inside hose requirements for all buildings, since some buildings are not accessible for outside hose usage, i.e., Auxiliary Control Fuel ,

Handling and Containment buildings. However, the design at  !

Plant Vogtle is such that no given system plus hose stream will exceed the requirements of CMEB 9.5-1 section C.6.b.

Subsection 2-4: This' subsection is not applicable because 28 gravity tanks are not used at VEOP.

Amend. 20 12/85.

Amend. 23 4/86 Amend. 28 11/86-s

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stlculI m.

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,i ci s t e a ai: s e .

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s t

ce gl i st oasisgee uro sup s

al epsR t s S t e

t pt rt r e s s oat u iet l:

t

_ n r aei aanhken erys y a a soso s cnsl e h a e rrhgts eiI i lio cogysgn c ceyl e i en a 't m uot ntrrr rLi n rseri i ibs'd yd s l t os o s g r s I

e h eeno rau t t efe ne d d

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u

, setovs smk penect g ce. snc ie t

q esa euIeeens D dl oa u e dt h o peifds .

pd t c eraf ovoindo soesdem r ronuee n u l det e oouo)dia sier nit sa ; s t n o o h u qd a s o r ,e s

nu:

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ashc(ti ott u carrgra e e vyc t rvn . t -t nb t

- n ti aI t nhl e et v a a t 1

- rertdl l ayagcr rep t dn eedpa i it eeri o o b. t es s eao ns hpoiht peI n al oa r p ssS.

s

_ ocasneohtl i ni n poo hoo t ti t i omst mc em

_ $. tI eiarcti plif l a t (l 's t 9 n na r t eC ma r rbpsor e ea nnpn erg )

_ B ) l

_ E $ t t peo po po l

_ M ( l l ahisui mr (

_ C A Actti st I P

d. e.

- 1 I C C.

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I Insert A to FSAR subsecticn 9.5.1.2.1.4 Item B

'Ihe autanatic sprinkler systems consist of ceiling sprinklers supplemented by i cable tray protection utilizing the guidance of WPA-15. '

)

For Unit 2, with the excepticn of the cable spreading rocms, the autct:stic .l sprinkler systens ccosist of ceiling sprinklers. 'Ihe automatic sprinklers in the cable spzsading zozns ccasist of ceiling sprinklers supplerrented by cable tray protection utilizing the guidance of WPA-15. i 1

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l 1

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4 l

J l

I 1

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l 4-8 o-_______________________________-.-------------.. - - - - _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ . - _ _ _ _ _ _ _

i I

1 Insert B to FSAR subsection 9.5.1.2.2.9 )

l i

1 The header piping ard supports up to and including sprinkler system isolation i valves and all sprinkler system piping supports in proximity of safety related equignent are designed for SSE loads. .

f 1

1 i

l d

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l l

l l

{

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l l

l 4-9

Insert C to FSAR subsection 9.5.1.3 (E)

Portions of the Unit 2 fire protection systems are mcdeled and subjected to seismic testing rather than checked analytically to shcw they will not collapse when subjected to seismic accelerations of the design basis earthquake. Where testing methods are saployed on the Unit 2 fire protection systems, . they will utilize NFPA-13 hanger and sway bracing designs. This hanger arrangement ccuplies with the seismic Category 2 over 1 requirements of FSAR subsection 3.7.B.

4 1

4-10

{1l l

l LM D to FSAR table 9.5.1-9 (sheet 2 of 16) l

}

For Unit 2 an alternate to flushing sprinkler systerns will be incremented to  !

ensure foreign sterial does not enter the suppression system by installing a test blank at the system isolatica valve at tine of sprinkler piping installation. This will prohibit foreign naterial frun entering the sprinkler system piping should the isolation valve be accidentally opened. Af ter the flushing of lead-in ccrinacticms is ccupleted, the test blanks will be raroved in accordance with approved VEGP procedures.

1 l \

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1 1

l l

l e

et 4-11 o____________---______________. _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Insert E to FSAR Appendix 9B section C.1.b The header piping and supports up to and ircluding sprinkler system isolation valves and all sprinkler system piping supports in proxhnity of safety related equirrnent are designed for SSE Icads.

4-12 l

M0587047/VT

~

Insert F to FSAR Appendix 9B section C.1.C.4 1

1b withstand a natural phencanena, the indoor fire protection header piping i systen up to and including sprinkler system isolation valves and the sprinkler l system piping in proximity to safety related equigamnt is designed for SSE 1 loads, and wind forces have been implemented into the outdoor design features.

The hanger criteria used meet or exceed the requirements of WPA in all seismic category 1 structures.

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l I

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1 1

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4-13 M0587047/VT

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