IR 05000416/1989001

Insp Rept 50-416/89-01 on 890109-13.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Design Control,Design Changes & Mods

ML20235K408
Person / Time
Site:	Grand Gulf
Issue date:	02/13/1989
From:	Jape F, Casey Smith NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20235K343	List: IR 05000416/1989001 ML20235K339
References
50-416-89-01, 50-416-89-1, NUDOCS 8902270101
Download: ML20235K408 (7)

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-[ NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION- ,

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Report No.: : 50-416/89-0'. 1 Licensee: System. Energy Resources, In (SERI)~

-Jackson, MS 39205 Docket No.: 50-416 License No.: NPF-29 Facility Name: Grand Gulf Inspection Conducted: January 9-13 198 Inspect . M m 'i'

d /3 Ddte Signed

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' Accompanying Personnel: R.' Wright

<M. Thomas S.Nin)r Approved by: [2+Lk 2

. F. Jape,- Section Chief / / Date Signed-Quality Performance'Section

' Operations Branch Division of Reactor Safety SUMMARY

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Scope This routine unannounced inspection was. conducted in the areas of design control, design changes and modification Results In the areas inspected, violations or deviations were not identifie Design change packages were prepared and installed in accordance with the-requirements of the design-engineering program, and industry codes and standard Nuclear safety evaluations performed in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59 were thorough and technically adequate. To better control plant modification changes, licensee management is reconstituting the design basis documents. This is but one aspect of a configuration management'

program with initiatives that include drawing configuration control, design basis related activities, calculations, and an as-built drawing progra ,,

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REPORT CETAILS Persons Contacte Licensee-Employees F. Bryant, Performance and System Engineer -

• D. Cupstid, Manager Plant Modification and Construction

~ * Eiff, Principal. Quality Engineer, Nuclear Plant Engineering

• C. Hutchinson, General Manager

• J. Roberts, Manager, Performance and System Engineering

• J Roberton, Plant Licensing Superintendent

• J. Summers,. Compliance Coordinator

• F.. Titus, . Director, Nuclear Plant Engineering

• G. Vining, Plant Modification and Construction Field Engineering Superintendent -

R. Wright, Mechanical Engineer, Nuclear Plant Engineering

• J. Yelverton, Manager - Plant Operations Other . licensee- employees contacted during this inspection included <

craftsmen, engineers, mechanics, and administrative personne NRC Resident Inspectors

• C.'Christensen, SRI

• J. Mathis, RI

• Attended exit interview Acronyms and initalisms used throughout this report are identified in paragraph . Modification Control Program DCP 87/4017, Standby Service Water Power Supply Modification, Revision The original design basis of the SSW system provided for cocling of plant auxiliaries that are essential to a safe reactor shutdown ~

following a DBA (LOCA). The SSW system consists of redundant cooling c water trains made up of cooling towers, pumps, pipes, valves and instruments as shown on P&ID drawing numbers M-1061A through M-1061 Cooling water for the unit is pumped from the cooling tower basins by two redundant SSW and one HPCS service water pumps to essential components through two main redundant SSW supply headers, (Loops A and B), and the HPCS supply header (Loop C). After removing heat from the plant auxiliaries, the coolant is returned to the cooling towers .where the heat is rejected through direct contact with ambient temperature air. Normal makeup for each SSW cooling tower basin is i__Z__.__________________._______________________________.__.__________________..___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ . _ . _ _ _

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.provided automatically by a connection to PSW. This system provides filtered well water during shutdown. and reactor isolation- condition The SSW cooling tower basins are sized to have sufficient water inventory to provide all plant post-LOCA cooling water 'needs .for a 30-day period with no external makeup water source On March 18, 1987, during a special design review of the SSW system, the licensee identified a design deficiency. During LOCA conditions coincident with a LOP, a single failure of either two MCCs could cause a SSW flow diversion resulting in a gradual reduction of the 30 day cooling water inventory through the PSW system. This design deficiency was reported in LER 86-29, Revision 9, and was transmitted to the NRC in SERI letter AECM-870169 dated August 8, 198 The following plant configuration and automatic control actions led

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to this problem: j Upon an LOP and LOCA, PSW supply valves QSP41F125-A and QSP41F066-A receive a signal for automatic closure and SSW supply valve:

QSP41F064-A. receives a signal to open. The motor' operators for the PSW valves are fed from MCC 15861 and are subject to a common mode failure upon loss of this MCC. Failure of MCC 15861 during transition from the PSW to the SSW system would prevent both

' valves from performing their intended safety function, isolating the PSW system. Concurrently, the motor operator for the SSW supply. valve which is fed from MCC 15B21 would automatically open because of the separate power supply. - This would align the SSW-supply to the PSW resulting in diverting some SSW flow to the PSW and reducing the 30 day VHS cooling water inventory. A similar problem was identified for Division II PSW return valves QSP41F189-B and QSP41F0748-B and SSW supply valve QSP41F064B- DCP 87/4017 was prepared and implemented to correct this design deficiency. The design change scope involved installing new power feeds for PSW supply valve QSP41F125-A and PSW return valve QSP41F189-B from MCC 15B11 and MCC 16811, respectivel Hardware changes implemented during installations of the plant modification included:

Installing new 480 V power and 120 VAC Control Cables from MCC 15B11 and 16B11 to rooms 0C202 and OC215 respectivel Disconnecting the existing cables from MCC15B61 and MCC 16B61 to the valves and control room. The cables were pulled back into the MCC cable tray rise Installing terminal boxes TB1BA32 and TBIBB19 in rooms 0C202 j and 0C215 respectivel Installing 74 Alarm Relays at both MCC 15811 and 1681 ;

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' Installation instructions. .for terminal boxes, conduit raceways and supports, and retagging and determination of power and control cables were included in the DCP. The inspectors independently. verified .that the hardware changes were consistent with the DCP scope ~by reviewing drawings included as attachments to the modification packag The inspectors reviewed the. DCP safety analysis, Attachment 15 and interviewed licensee engineering personnel to assess the technical adequacy of the 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation. Pursuant to this review, the inspectors verified that the design change resolved the MCCs single failure concern that us identified by the license Additionally,. the potential -impact of excessive voltage drop caused by increased field runs of power and . control cables ~was assessed during the design-engineering proces Additional DCP reviews were performed to verify procedural compliance with the design change program and the TS. Completed test procedure number MSTI IP41-87-001-0-S, "QSP41F125-A and F189-B Circuit Function-al Test," was reviewed by the inspectors to assess post modification testing for technical. adequacy. Based on this review the inspectors determined that the design objectives had been me The inspectors also performed 'a field walkdown of the installed DC The 'walkdown scope included visually inspecting condait and cable tray raceways, tenninal boxes, MCCs, and correct power and control cable terminations at the MCCs and the terminal boxe Within this area, no violations or deviations were identifie DCP 83/5009, Control Room HVAC System Modification, Revision This DCP involved modifying the ductwork in the A and B Trains of the Control Room HVAC System which resulted from a control room redesig This redesign resulted from findings from a Detailed Control Room Design Review performed by the licensee. The DCP also involved modifying two fire dampers. The fire dampers were taken out of service as a result of DCP 86/0094, Revision 0, which derated the fire wall where the dampers were installe The inspector reviewed DCP 83/5009, Revision 1, in detail. The DCP was reviewed to determine if the evaluation to meet 10 CFR 50.59 requirements were adequately met; to verify that the DCP was reviewed and approved in accordance with TS and applicable licensee administra-tive controls; to determine if the modification was installed in y accordance with the DCP; to assure that applicable plant operating !

documents (drawings, plant procedures, updated FSAR, TS, etc.) were {;

revised to reflect the modifications; to verify that post modifica-tions test requirements were specified and adequate testing was performe ]

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Based .on reviewing DCP 83/5009, the design process appeared to be adequat Within this area, no violations or deviations were identifie c. DCP 82/0752, Prelube Oil Modification to HPCS Diesel Generator Engines This DCP involved adding additional prelubrication system capability to the existing lube oil systems for both engines of the HPCS diesel generator (P81 system). The safety related modification (seismic category I) provided maintenance enhancement for prelubricating an inoperative engine in that this change alleviated the need for an

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external oil source to perform manual prelubrication. The P81 system ;

operation and function were not changed. This modification installed j two each 1/2-inch (ASME Class 3) check valves that can be closed and 1 opened for maintenance _ use. Two each 1/2 needle shut-off valves '

(ASME Class 3) are normally closed to prevent short _ cycling of the engine driven lube oil pump and can be opened for maintenance us The tubing modification supplied by the DCP meets all applicable design requirements and the HPCS diesel generator continues to function in its intended manner. The HPCS diesel engines are iesigned such that losing any single lube oil system component will i not cause loss of the lube oil supply to more than one engine. This modification maintains this design featur Therefore the margin of safety was not affected by this modification and a change v!as not required to the plant T ;

The inspector conducted discussions with knowledgeable NPE and plant system engineers concerning the design and functional aspects of the modification and the supporting DCP documentation. The following DCP documents were reviewed in detail to determine their adequacy: design input data; the design verification report; ALARA, environmental, fire protection, safe shutdown, and 10 CFR 50.59 evaluations; the related equipment and seismic qualification review; and objective evidence that the PSRC recommended DCP approval prior to its being released for construction, The inspector verified that plant procedures and programs had been reviewed and revised to reflect the design change, l and that retraining of personnel concerning these changes was considere Testing data reviewed (Function Test MSTI-IP81-87-001)

for the modification was satisfactory and the testing was accomplished prior to the modification being declared operable. Required revisions to the UFSAR and pertinont plant drawings concerning the change were ;

confirmed to have been properly incorporated by the license The inspector physically walked-down the installed HPCS diesel engine ,

prelube system to verify whether or not the installation matched the )

as built drawings. One discrepancy was identified in this area which !

was subsequently detarmined to have no safety significance by NP !

The bolting orientation for both seismic tubing clamp assemblies (one I

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for each eng'ine) were'found to be installed 180 degrees opposite of'

that . depicted by approved detail drawings _ FSK-I-A10938-013-G,

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Revision'A, and FSK-I-0126-027-V, Revision 1. These drawings' stat "No changes or modification to this design shall. be made without prior design group approval." NPE review of this matter concluded

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that either bolting configuration for these seismic clamp assemblies-was an acceptable installation method and the subject clamps were acceptable as.is. To avoid any possible recurrent' inquiries'into this matter,.NPE decided to add a general note to the drawings stating the bolting orientation of the clamps was an optional matter for construction convenienc Based on reviewing DCP 82/0252, the technical adequacy and the design change process appeared to be satisfactor Within this area, no violations or deviations were identifie d .' .DCP 86/4033, Replacement of Rosemount Electronic Differential . Pressure :

Transmitters, Revision 0 This DCP was prepared and implemented to replace nine GE Rosemount Model 1151 level, flow-and pressure transmitters whose qualified' life was'about to expire. These transmitters were replaced with Rosemont-Model -1153B whose qualified life is forty years. Reviewing the DCP and- related documents revealed that the 'DCP was adequately reviewed and approved by NPE personnel. The design inputs were specified in detail; -the safety evaluation analysis adequately addressed an unreviewed safety question pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59; and the leak, functional and calibration tests were performed and the results were found to be acceptable and in accordance with UFSAR and TS criteri The inspectors verified that the EQ vendor technical manual had been revised and no personnel training was require One deficiency was identified in modification work permit 87/1136 used for installing the transmitters. This modification work permit specified incorrect values 'of installed torque and mounting bolt j dimensions. ..The vendor's technical manual recommended using 5/16-inch bolts torqued to 200 inch-pounds for attaching the instrument bracket -l to a flat mounting surface. . Field installation of the model 1153B j transmitters was accomplished by using the 3/8-inch bolts previously i used with the model 1151 transmitters. Additionally, these bolts were torqued to 250 inch-pound Licensee management was informed of this installation discrepanc Immediate corrective action was initiated via MNCR 006-89 and, based on preliminary evaluation, the licensee has determined that no safety significance is associated with the present installation. However, l further engineering evaluation will be performed to assess the effect on the instrument's seismic qualificatio Pending completion of

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licensee's engineering evaluation and corrective action, this is identified as Inspector Follow-up Item, 50-416/89-01-01, Evaluation of Torque Requirements for Rosemount Transmitters (MdCR 006-89). Exit Interview The inspection scope and results were summarized on January 13, 1989, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1. The inspectors described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results. Proprietary information is not contained in this repor Dissenting comments were not received from the license The following IFI was identified during this inspection:

Item Number Status Description IFI 50-416/89-01-01 Open Evaluation of torque requirements for Rosemount Transmitters (MNCR 006-89), paragraph . Acronyms ALARA As Low as Reasonably Achievable ASME American Society of Mechnical Engineers DBA Design Basis Accident DCP Design Change Package EQ Environmental Qualification HPCS High Pressure Coolant System HVAC Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning LOCA Loss of Coolant Accident LOP Loss of Offsite Power MCC Motor Control Center MNCR Material Nonconformance Report NPE Nuclear Plant Engineering P&ID Piping and Instrumentation Diagram PSRC Plant Safety Review Committee PSW Plant Service Water SERI System Energy Rescurce In SSW Standby Service Water TS Technical Specification UFSAR Updated Final Safety Analysis Report UHS Ultimate Heat Sink V Volt VAC Volt AC i

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