IR 05000412/1987061

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Insp Rept 50-412/87-61 on 870921-25.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Startup Activities in Radiation Protection Area,Including Reviews of Previously Identified Items in post-accident Sampling & Analysis
ML20236S028
Person / Time
Site: Beaver Valley
Issue date: 11/06/1987
From: Gresickcioffi, Shanbaky M
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20236S005 List:
References
50-412-87-61, NUDOCS 8711240175
Download: ML20236S028 (9)


Text

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I  !

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Report'No. 87-61 Docket N ' License No. NPF-64 Priority -- Category C j .

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Licensee: Duquesne Light Company P. O. Box 4-Shippingport, Pennsylvania 15077

-Facility Name: Beaver Valley 2    l Inspection At: Shippingport, Pennsylvania Inspection Conducted: ' September'21-25, 1987 Inspectors: LC - bbI' ~
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 - Jec}tf A. Gresick-Cioffi, Radiationf f ' da'te '

Specialist, FRPS l

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Approved by: W, Mohamed Fr. Sfianbaky, C#ief

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     'date Facilities Radiation Protection Section Inspection Summary: Inspection conducted on September 21-25, 1987 (Inspection Report No. 50-412/87-61).

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of start-up activities in the Radiation Frotection Area, including: reviews of previously identified items in post-accident sampling and analysis, external and internal exposure controls, control of radioactive materials, facilities and equipment, and ALARA; and a review of start-up tests conducted to identify and verify radiation areas, high radiation areas, and shielding design Results: No violations were identifie dh12 PDR ADOCK Or PDR Q-  ; i

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;, a DETAILS  ;

1.0 P'ersonnel Contacted 1.1. Licensee Personnel j G. Bellamacina, Control Engineer, SWEC

 *E. Cohan, Director Rad Operations, Unit 2, DLC Rad Con
 *A.'Dulick, Chemistry Supervisor, DLC G. Franek, Test Engineer, Energy Consultants
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 *J. Godleski,TCT Engineer, DLC B. Haney, Director, Technical & Crafts Training, DLC
 *V. Linnebom, Director, Plant Chemistry, DLC
 *F. Lipchick,. Senior Licensing Supervisor, DLC

, *A. Lombardo, Nuclear Chemistry Specialist, DLC J. Niemeyer, Site Engineering Group, SWEC 1

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 *M. O'Neill, BY-2 Engineering Manager, DLC Eng J. Saunders, HP Foreman-Unit 2, DLC D. Szucs, Lead Compliance Engineer, DLC G. Wargo, Asst. Director, Quality Control, DLC
 .K. Winter, Senior Health Physics Specialist, Unit 1&2, DLC
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 *R. Wittschen, Licensing Engineer, SWEC
 *G. Zosack, Regulatory Affairs, DLC 1,2 NRC PERSONNEL J. Beall, Senior Resident Inspector, NRC F. Young. Senior Resident Inspector, NRC
  * Denotes attendance at the exit interview on September 25, 1987. ,

Other licensee and contractor personnel were contacted or interviewe .0 ' Purpos l The purpose of this routine, unannounced inspection was to review the , start-up tests conducted to identify and verify radiation areas, high I radiation' areas, and shielding designs. Previously identified concerns I in the following areas were also reviewed and evaluated: l

 - Post-Accident Sampling and Analysis   J
 - Training and Qualification of Personnel  l
 -- External Exposure Control and Personnel Dosimetry  )
 - Internal Exposure Controls   '
 - Control of Radioactive Materials and Contamination, Surveys and Monitoring
 - Facilities and Equipment   l
 - . Maintaining Occupational Exposures ALARA l

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 > Start-Up Testing     i The licensee's program for start-up testing to review and verify radiation shielding radiation for high radiation areas was reviewed with
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respect to the following criteria:

 - Beaver. Valley 2 FSAR, Chapter 14.2, " Initial Test Programs,"
 - Regulatory Guide 1.68, Revision 2, " Initial Test Programs for '

Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants,"

 - ANSI /ANS 6.3.1-1980, "American National Standard Program for Testing Radiation Shields in Light Water Reactors (LWR)."

i The licensee's performance related to the above criteria was determined by:

 - tour of plant areas;    l
 - review of the following procedures:
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Procedure IST-2.43.02, Section VII A, and B, J

  " Plant. Radiation Survey and Verification of Shielding Effectiveness;". .

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Rad Con Manual, Chapter 4, Radiological Instrumentation l Procedure (RIP) 3.15 " Ion Chamber Model R0-2, R0-2A;"

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  ' review of the test results report for testing of less than or equal f to 5%~ power;    .
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review of the test results report for testing at 45-50% power; and )

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discussions with start-up test and radiation protection personne ] Within the scope of the review, no violations or deviations from license commitments were identified. Review of the start-up test procedure, l

 . discussions with personnel, and the tour of radiologically controlled .!

areas found the surveys and techniques in conformance with the q ANSI standard. The radiation protection. procedure for instrument use l properly referenced the corrections necessary to perform radiation ( measurements-in sub-atmospheric containments. However, only the 5% and l 50% power surveys were completed. Therefore, the results of remaining '; start-up tests for the 95% to 100% power level will be reviewed in a future-inspectio .0 Post Accident Sampling and Analysis (0 pen) 87-50-01 (Inspector Follow-Up) The procedures for performance of reactor coolant and containment atmosphere sampling operations have yet to be finalized and implemented, including revisions to the sequence for collecting samples, verification of the gas dilution factor and reference to . appropriate procedures for handling high activity sample i l I I

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The' procedures for performance of reactor coolant and containment ' atmosphere sampling operations have been finalized and implemented effective. August 11, 1987. The Beaver Valley Chemistry Manual gives the proper sequence for collecting samples based on the Westinghouse , i Owner's. Group Post Accident Core Damage Assessment Methodology. The gas dilution ratio for the BVSPS-II was determined using CM 2- .(Chemistry Manual Procedure) and by substituting 100% 7N for containment' atmosphere. Each chemistry procedure contains appropriate procedures for handling high activity samples. This concern is resolve ~ ~ Document that the PASS piping and valving systems are capable of

 . functioning:as. designed at applicable reactor coolant temperatures and pressure The Post Accident Sampling System has shown that it is operable at full reactor coolant system temperature (550 F) and pressure (2300 PSIG) in accordance with Chapter 6 of the Chemistry Manual. This concern is resolve . Perform a comparison of the routine _ reactor coolant sampling system and PASS, sample analyses results when sufficient activity is present in' reactor coolan There is insufficient isotopic inventory built up in the RCS at this time to perform a comparison of results of the PASS and routine sampling system. This item of concern will remain ope . Ensure that the in-line boron analyzer and gas chromatograph are operationa f The in-line boron analyzer has not been repaired and remains out of service. The gas chromatograph problem has been identified and j resolved. This item of concern will remain open pending return to )

operational status of the in-line boron analyze . . Develop and implement a procedure for gamma isotopic detector calibratio Chapter 5 Radiochemical Procedures contains the procedure for gamma isotopic detector calibration. This concern is resolve .0 Training and Qualification of Personnel The inspector reviewed lesson plans for training Radiation Protection l technicians on the Digital Radiation Monitoring System (DRMS) and on system differences between Units 1 and 2. These training sessions were conducted as part of the Rad _ Operations Continuous Training Program in which Radiation Protection personnel participate on a quarterly basis.

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V k, .  ! Training for the DRMS consisted of one day of classroom training and one . day.of in-plant hands-on training with the equipment'in the fiel l Training on the system was conducted from January to April of 1987, to > give all. personnel in the Radiation Protection department an opportunity to receive this training. . Inspector review of training records noted i that senior plant management also took advantage of this trainin Discussions with in-plant personnel during a tour of Unit 2 facilities indicated that the training was effective and comprehensiv Unit 2 ' systems training consisted of 8 hours of walk-downs of all Unit 2 i plant systems. The instructor that conducted the training was a  ; certified. senior. reactor operator. This training was conducted in April, ;

.1987'for selected Radiation Protection technician I

No violations were identified in this revie ; i 6.0 External Occupational Exposure Control and Personnel Dosimetry ) The licensee's program for external occupational exposure control and personnel dosimetry was reviewed against criteria contained in:

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10 CFR 20, Standards for Protection Against Radiation;

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Licensee Technical Specification 6.0, Administrative Controls;

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Licensee. Final Safety Analysis Report, Section 12, Radiation Protection; and

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Regulatory' Guide 1.33, Quality Assurance Program Requirements .

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The licensee's performance relative to these criteria was determined by:

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 ' discussions with licensee radiological protection personnel;
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review of applicable licensee documentation; and

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tour of BV-2's radiologically controlled are No violations were identified in this review. The licensee had '. identified and posted potential . radiation areas and high radiation areas

'in the plant. Barricades with locks had been installe High rad key controls were grouped into three different designation High radiation area (100 mR/hr to 1000 mR/hr, keys designated RBM) are controlled by Health Physics and the Nuclear Shift Superviso Containment high radiation areas (key designations RBC) and high-high
. radiation areas (1000 mR/hr, key designations RBX) are controlled only by the Nuclear Shift Supervisor. Operations licensee personnel had appropriate administrative controls and procedures to ensure that keys were logged out and inventoried on a shift basi The licensee's Radiation Protection group maintains a list of all locked radiation and high radiation areas. These areas are checked on a shift
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basis to assure. barrier' integrity. Radcon Procedure 8.3, " Radiation l Barrier Key Control," on the Beaver Valley Power Station Radiological i

 ' Controls ~ Manual was established for both Units to maintain RBM keys and a selected-number.of RBC keys during outage A follow-up item was identified in NRC Inspection Report number-50-412/87-09, concerning a change in ECF (element correction factors)  ,

values for a batch of TLDs. The ECF change resulted in the licensee { re-evaluating ' doses for the affected TLDs to ' determine the need to modify ; 0 personnel exposures. During this inspection, the inspector reviewed the p .following licensee documentation: )

 - DLC Radiological Control. Department Memo No. ND IRSD:032 "ECF change: Burns International Security," dated February 5,1987;  t
 -- .DLC Radiation Safety Committee Report No. BVPS-RSC. 2-87, approved l
 ' March-12, 1987;
 - Panasonic ' Analysis, Investigation Report of UD-812AS2/UD-802AS2, requested by DLC;     ;
 - Letter to Mr. David Katzman, Panasonic Industrial Company, dated March 9, 1987, from DLC; The inspector determined, based upon the review of documentation, that modifying the personnel exposures from this batch of affected TLDs was not necessary, due to the insignificant change in personnel exposures. The licensee further informed the inspector that the TLDs were continuing to be evaluated for anomalies. This area will be reviewed in, future inspection .0 Internal Exposure Control and Assessment The' licensee's program for internal exposure control and assessment was reviewed against criteria contained in:

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 - 10 CFR 20.103, " Exposure of Individuals to Concentrations of  i Radioactive Materials in Air in Restricted Areas";
 - -Technical Specification 3/4 7.8, " Supplemental Leak Collection and Release System,"
 - Beaver Valley 2 FSAR, Chapter 12, Section 3.3, " Ventilation Systems," and '

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 - Beaver Valley 2 FSAR, Chapter 6.5, " Fission Product Removal and  .

Control Systems,"

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7.1 Ventilation Operability

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The inspector determined complience with the above licensee commitments by:

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review of the Balancing Report Logs;

 - review of SM/ TAB-1, Revision 2, " Procedure for the Adjusting and Balancing of Ventilation, Filtration and Air Conditioning Systems at DLC, BVII;"
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  - ' review of the non-ducted air flow test results, report numbers
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   ~46, 46A, and 46B for the Supplemental Leak Collection and Release System (SLCRS);
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review of Nonconformance and Disposition (N&D) report numbers 51521, 51512, and 51559; and

  - discussions,with pre-operational testing personne Within the scope of this review, no violations were identifie .Both trains of the.SLCRS were operating, as required by technical specifications for:the current mode of operation. Air flow discrepancies with the system's emergency modes were addressed in i the N&D. reporting system and were being tracked for resolutio l
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These air flow discrepancies were-also noted to contradict the air

  ' flow descriptions in the FSAR. Licensee representatives stated that a re-evaluation of the new flows in SLCRS emergency modes were being conducted and a change to the FSAR was being made. This item will remainunresolved.-(412/87-61-01)

J ' 7.2 Whole Body Counting . The l'icensee's performance related to the criteria contained in Section 7.0 was determined by touring the new whole body counting l facility and conducting discussions with licensee personne Within the scope of this review, no violations were_ identifie As

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a' supplement to the original whole body counting equipment, the licensee purchased and had on-site two new whole body counters. At the time of the inspection, neither of-the two new counters were in operation, nor had procedures for calibration, maintenance, and operation been written. However, the licensee stated that the screening type whole body counter would be operable prior to the next outage for Beaver Valley, scheduled in December, 1987. This ; area will continue to be reviewed in future inspection .0 Control of Radioactive Materials and Contamination, Surveys, and l Monitoring

 .The licensee's program for control of radioactive materials and contamination, surveys, and monitoring was reviewed against criteria

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 "' 10 CFR 20 Standards for Protection Against Radiation;  !
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Licensee Technical Specification 6.0, Administrative Controls; ! Licensee Final' Safety Analysis Report (BV-2), Section 12, Radiation l Protection; and

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  (0peration . Guide 1.33, Quality Assurance Program Requirements The licensee's performance related to the above criteria was determined l by:      p i

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    :- ' ' Jreview'of-selected licensee procedures,   ;

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Observations made'of the Health-Physics Control _-_ point,

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Within ,the' scope of. this~ review, no violations .were identified. The- '

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the! Digital Radiation Monitoring System-(DRMS). Procedures for.DRMS

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Lealibration,'maintenanceland operation were complete._ The licensee's

   "1 survey techniques and methods utilized Unit 1 procedure _

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LSince the last NRC occupational radiation protection inspection the-licensee had further defined items in this area as follows:

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    - The Health Physics. Control point was established with a." clean" ,
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Eside,' designated Efor writing l and reviewing RWPS, and a

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     " radiologically controlled" side established for instrument issue and surveillance of. personnel leaving the RCA;
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Three personnel; frisking. booths had been setup for personnel

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P ' exiting' the RCA.- Additionally,:a hand-held pancake GM frisker with' L RM-14 wasiset: up to frisk personal items and tools being taken out

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   ?10. Maintaining Occupational. Exposures ALARA'
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@' The. licensee's p'rogram for, maintaining occupational exposures ALARA was , 1 , reviewed'against criteria contained in:

  %  '= 10 CFR 20.1~, Purpose;
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L.* - ; Licensee' Technical Specification 6.0, Administrative Controls; Licensee' Final Safety Analysis Report (BV-2), Section 12, Radiation

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Regu'iatory hide 8.8, Information Relevant to Ensuring that

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Occupational Radiation' Exposures at Nuclear Power Stations Will Be .As Low ~As Reasonably Achievabl ,The-inspector reviewed the Beaver Valley-Unit 2 ALARA Review Report,

    . dated July, 1987. The report was thorough'and comprehensive in scop s 'The' report identified numerous areas for redesigning piping and valving to; facilitate maintenance activitie J     .The inspector discussed the resolution of the. deficiencies identified in  '
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the~ report with licensee personnel. At the time of the inspection, no

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Egroup'had officially been assigned this responsibility. Therefore, this

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