IR 05000346/1986015

Insp Rept 50-346/86-15 on 860512-0716.Violation,open Items & Unresolved Items Noted:Design Deficiency in Emergency Diesel Generator Sys (EDG) & Min Loading of EDG Not Satisfied

ML20212B677
Person / Time
Site:	Davis Besse
Issue date:	07/31/1986
From:	Ring M, Rich Smith, Valenti L, Vandenburgh C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20212B667	List: IR 05000346/1986015 ML20212B663
References
50-346-86-15, NUDOCS 8608070192
Download: ML20212B677 (13)

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Report No. 50-346/86015(DRS)

Docket No. 50-346 License No. NPF-3 Licensee: Toledo Edison Company Edison Plaza, 300 Madison Avenue Toledo, OH 43652 Facility Name: Davis-Besse 1 Inspection At: Oak Harbor, Ohio Inspection Conducted. May 12, 1986, through July 16, 1986

Inspectors: C. VanDenburgh Obe\ ^ 1#A'N

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R. Smith -

1 Adb Date f

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'b 7-M M L. Valenti /

Nate Approved By: M. A. Ring, Chief Test Programs Section S) _

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Inspection Summary

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Inspection on May 12; 1986 through July 16,1986 (Rep' ort No. 50-346/86015(DRSJ1-Areas Inspected: 7pecnT'aiiriolinced inspectTon by regii5nalTheadquarters a and contractor inspectors to review licensee action on previous inspection findings; followup on Licensee Event Reports; review the SRTP System Review Reports; perform SRTP test procedure review; perform SRTP test procedure witnessing; and perform SRTP test results revie Results: Of the six areas inspected, one violation was identified in section 3.c of the report. In addition, five open items and two unresolved items are documented in the body of the report which will require action by the licensee i and the NRC to resolv PDR ADOCK 05000346 G PDR

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DETAILS 1. Persons Contacted Toledo Edison

• W. O' Conner, Assistant Plant Manager, Operations

• L. Ramsett, Quality Assurance Director

• J. Ligenfelter, Operations Engineering Manager R. Peters, Nuclear Licensing Manager J. Wood, Nuclear Plant Systems Director

• T. Bloom, Senior Licensing Specialist R. Flood, Technical Support Manager R. Cook, Senior Licensing Specialist

• S. Jain, Nuclear Engineer P. Hildebrandt, Nuclear Engineering Group Director

• S. Piccolo, Assistant Restart Manager NRC E VanDenburgh, RIII Reactor Inspector

• P. Byron, Senior Resident Inspector D. Kosloff, Resident Inspector R. Smith, Inspection and Enforcement L. Valenti, EG&G

• Denotes those personnel attending the July 17, 1986 exit meetin The inspectors also interviewed other licensee employees, including members of the technical, operations, maintenance, I&C, training, health physics and nuclear materials management department staf . Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Open Item (346/85036-04): This item concerned SRTP-003 in that many Required for Restart (RR) and Not Required for Restart (NRR) problem reports had been deleted from the System Review Report (SRR) or had their classification changed from RR to NRR without documenting the reason in the SRR. The first portion of this concern was closed in Inspection Report 50-346/86009 and the second portion remained open pending the inspectors' review of a licensee audit to ensure that adequate written documentation exists for changing the classification of problem reports. This review has been completed and the inspector has no further concerns in this are (Closed) Open Item (346/85036-06): This item concerned an inspector observation that inadequate system walkdowns were being performed prior to system testing as evidenced by various construction tags and debris remaining on system piping which potentially effected the satisfactory performance of the test procedure. The inspector has verified by observation that this problem has been corrected and has no further concerns in this are .

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c. (0 pen)OpenItem(346/85039-07): This item concerned a comitment to revise the Updated Safety Analysis (USAR) to clarify what systems and system functions are assumed to mitigate a letdown line break discussed in USAR Section 15.4. Further evaluation by the licensee has determined that the temperature switches provide the function of letdown line isolation and as such will be required to be tested as a function important to plant safety. Accordingly, the SRR for the Makeup and Purification System will be revised and testing performed to verify this function. In addition, the USAR is required to be revised to clearly describe the function of the letdown isolation temperature switches and their basis in the Safety Analysis. This item will continue to be followed as an open ite d. (0 pen) Open Item (346/85039-09): This item concerned a comitment to revise the USAR to update the discussion in Section 15.2 concerning the Turbine Trip Analysis. The inspector was concerned that the functions of reactor runback and turbine bypass were not included in the System Review Reports (SRRs). The licensee had previously indicated that the function of reactor runback and turbine bypass had not been deleted as mitigating functions but that the Anticipatory Reactor Trip System (ARTS) would function to trip the reactor on a turbine trip before the runback and bypass could occur. The licensee has comitted to update the USAR based on this new understandin Further evaluation of Section 15.2 indicates that the Loss of Turbine Load discussion is not accurate as well. Due to an increase in the Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV) setpoint, the reactor will trip on high reactor coolant system pressure on a loss of load and will not recover from this transient as previously assumed. The licensee has comitted to revise the USAR description for the turbine trip and turbine loss of load transients and the SRR list of functions for the ARTS trip. This item will remain open pending the completion of these change (Closed) Open Item (340/85039-14): This item concerned a commitment to revise Technical Specification 4.7.9.1.1 on the fire pump suppression pool pressure. The licensee has retrieved documentation which indicates that the suppression pool pressure was submitted to NM correctly on December 12, 1977 and was subsequently incorrectly incorporated into the Technical Specifications. This item is considered to be a typographical error and will be corrected in the next revision to the Technical Specifications. The inspector has no further concerns in this are (Closed) Open Item (346/86009-04): This item concerned a SRTP-001 requirement to provide Independent Process Review Comittee meeting minutes within one week of the meeting. Meeting minutes had not been provided from November 15, 1985 until S cil 15, 1986. The missing minutes were provided and have been reviewed without comen SRTP-001 has been revised to eliminate the time requirement for publishing meeting minutes and the inspector has verified that

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subsequent minutes have been provided in a timely manner. The inspector has no further concerns in this are .

g. (0 pen) Unresolved Item (346/86009-05): This item concerned a licensee coninitment to develop and implement a chronological log for the performance of surveillance tests performed as a part of the SRTP. The licensee has issued instructions dated June 13, 1986 which require the implementation by June 16, 1986 of a mini-chronological log to detail the time and date of test entry; description of any deficiency which led to test suspension; a resolution of the deficiency; and the test completion time and date/ test reentry if after a suspension by deficiency. Implementation of these requirements should satisfy the inspector's concern that the events of the test can be evaluated after the performance to ensure that the test results are valid. The inspector remains concerned that these requirements are being inadequately implemented. By direct observation the inspector has determined that test personnel and Quality Control inspectors are not familiar with the implementation of these requirements. The licensee is investigating and this item will remain open pending further inspector tvaluatio h. (Closed) Open Item (346/86009-06): This item concerned an administrative requirement of AD 1805.00 to perform a safety evaluation to establish whether an unreviewed safety question exists during the development of station procedures. The administrative procedure had recently been revised to ensure that a safety evaluation had been performed for each of the test procedures performed in the SRTP. Based on the inspector's concern, the licensee had conducted an audit to ensure that such a review had been performed for each of the test procedures. The inspector has reviewed the results of this audit and is satisfied that all deficiencies have been satisfactorily resolve . (Closed) Open Item (346/86009-07): This item concerned the development of a safety evaluation addressing the performance of hoi,

'unctional testing with potentially cracked main coolant pump shaft The licensee has modified testing plans and has decided to replace the potentially damaged shaf ts with replacement shafts prior to entering mode 4, therefore the safety evalcation is not required and this item is close (Closed) Unresolved Item (346/86009-08): This item concernea the operability of the Component Cooling Water (CCW) system based on hydramotor actuator failures which were discovered during the performance of system testing. Based on the inspector's concern, the licensee conducted an investigation into the operability of the CCW system and the extent of the hydramotor failure problem. As a result of this investigation, the licensee has issued Licensee Event Report LER 86-019. This LER indicates that the CCW system was not inoperable, however, the Emergency Diesel Generator ventilation system was determined to be inoperable due to hydramotor actuator failures (refer to paragraph 3.b) . This will be followed as part of the LER review and closecut. The inspector has no further concerns with respect to the CCW system testin I

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There are two previous open items and one previous unresolved item discussed in this section of the report which will require further licensee action to resolve. There were no violations identified in this section of the repor . Licensee Event Reports Followup

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Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with Technical Specification (Closed) LER 86-018, Breaching a Fire / Negative Pressure Barrier by Personnel. During preparation for testing as part of the System Review and Test Program (SRTP), test personnel removed a portion of the BISCO fire barrier foam material in order to route test cables for acoustic sensors through a floor penetration. The approximately two-inch diameter hole breached both a fire and negative pressure boundary for the Emergency Ventilation System and was discovered by operations personnel about ten hours later. An hourly fire watch which was previously established for previously identified Appendix R concerns, satisfied the immediate corrective action for the violation of Fire Barrier Technical Specification (TS 3.7.10). The pressure boundary of the Emergency Ventilation System (EVS) which is required by Technical Specification 3.6.5.1 was not applicable in mode 5. The report indicates that the root cause of the incident was a lack of adequate supervision by the test leader / test program management of the contractor personnel supporting the test program. The personnel ,

involved and all applicable test personnel were counseled on the responsibility of test personnel and their interface with operation The penetration has been repaired. This penetration did not constitute a serious breach of the fire barrier and although not applicable in mode 5, would not have prevented the EVS from ,'

functioning in modes 1 through 4. The inspector has no further concerns in this are (0 pen) LER 86-019, Inoperable Ventilation System Damper Controller System testing performed as part of the SRTP, identified on February 25, 26 and March 6, 1986, that the Component Cooling Water (CCW) Pump Room Ventilation System exhaust and recirculation dampers for both trains had failed. Based on the inspector's concern on the operability of the CCW System identified in Inspection Report No. 50-346/86009 as an unresolved item (86009-08), the licensee has conducted a review and determined that the hydramotor failures did not offect the operability of the CCW system because flow modulation was not lost and the test results indicated that adequate ventilation capacity existed with the failure As part of a generic licensee concern on the degraded operability of all hydramotor actuators due to inadequate preventative maintenance and testing, the licensee has undertaken a program for investigation l

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of problems with hydramotor actuators. A Preventive Maintenance program for hydramotor actuators is presently being established and will be implemented by October 31, 1986. The quality inspection required for the receipt inspection of material from the manufacturer is currently being evaluated by Engineering. In addition, periodic testing of all safety related hydramotor actuators will be implemented by July 31, 198 As a result of these actions, preventative maintenance determined that recirculation damper, HV 53298, for Emergency Diesel Generator 1-1 ventilation system had failed in the open position. As a result, the ventilation system was incapable of supplying the full ventilation capacity as described in USAR Section 9.4.2.1.2. In addition, based on the investigation conducted to date, the licensee has identified leakage of hydraulic fluid from two of the thirteen hydramotor actuators that have been tested. This leakage could result in making the hydramotor inoperable. Further action is necessary to determine the extent of the problem. The report indicates that the cause of the ventilation damper failures is due to lack of testing and preventative maintenance. These actions and evaluations will be followed as an unresolved item pending completion andimplementation(346/86015-01).

c. (0 pen) LER 86-023, Lack of SFAS Stroke Testing of DH Pump Suction Valves. During a review of the periodic testing requirements of the 4 Decay Heat Removal / Low Pressure Injection System (DHR/LPI) as part of the SRTP, it w". deFrmined that current testing does not confirm that DHR pumps se e n valves DH 2733 and DH 2734 receive a ccnfirmatory open signal from the Safety Features Actuation System (SFAS) as required by Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 4.5.2.e.l. Technical Specification 3.5.2 requires that two Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) subsystems be operabl Surveillance Requirement 4.0.2.e.1 requires a verification at least cnce every 18 months while shutdown that each automatic valve in the flowpath actuate to its correct position on a safety injection test signal. Surveillance Test (ST) 5031.07, " Integrated SFAS Test,"

currently strokes these valves with the control room handswitches only. Although the SFAS logic is tested in ST 5031.07 and ST 5031.01,

"SFAS Monthly," the valves do not receive a periodic test signal frem the SFAS logic directl The root cause of this occurrence is an inadequate technical review of the procedures used to implement the surveillance requirement This LER will remain open pending the verification of the licensee's actions to modify the surveillance procedures. This condition has existed since the plant entered mode 3 on July 24, 1977, and was identified during the conduct of the SRTP on April 23, 198 This is the second occurrence identified by the licensee in which SFAS signals have not been used to verify actuation of ECCS flowpath valves. The first occurrence was identified by LER 86-004, "SFAS Testing of High Pressure Injection Valves," and documented in

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Inspection. Report 50-346/85039 as a violation (85039-04). Failure to comply with Technical Specification 3.5.2 due to inadequate surveillance procedures .for the DHR/LPI System is a further example

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of the previous violation. Since the corrective. actions for the first violation can be reasonably expected to encompass this further example of a violation, this violation will be followed as a part of violation 85039-04 documented in Inspection Report 50-346/8503 One violation and one unresolved item were identified in this section of

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the report which will require further licensee action to resolv . SRTP Sy_s_ tem Review Reports The inspectors reviewc. ne following System Review Reports (SRRs) and

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associated Appendix A, Test Review Reports, which document the results of the system reviews, the corrective action plans, the implementation

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schedule of corrective actions, the list of system functions and the

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The review verified that the implementation schedule for the corrective action plans was consistent with the guidance of SRTP-004, and that

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sufficient testing was identified to demonstrate the functional capabilities of the system in the anticipated modes of operatio !

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High Pressure Injection

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480 Volt Distribution Emergency Diesel Generators With respect to the review of the High Pressure Injection system SRR,

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the inspector noted that problem report HPI-RR-6 identified that l

varying amounts of water from unidentified sources have been detected 1 in the auxiliary building in Emergency Core' Cooling System (ECCS)

Room'#2, Motor Control Center (MCC) E21A. The problem report indicates that a drain line had been installed in the electrical

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conduit from MCC E2 to MCC E21A to prevent inleakage to MCC E21A which was causing-a starter circuit to short out and eventually the entire MCC to be lost. Toledo Edison civil engineering evaluated the source of the leakage and indicated in letter No. A85-08971D, that it was not feasible to uncover the conduit and find the leak and 1 that no further action is necessary. The inspector is concerned that i this resolution may not be adequate and safe.- The licensee has been

requested to investigate this resolution and provide a more detailed

response. This item will be followed as an unresolved item (345/86015-02).

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4 With resnect to the review of the Emergency Diesel Generator system SRR, the inspector noted a potential problem which could effect the a'uility of the system to perform its intended function. Region II has identified a deficiency at the Watts Barr Nuclear Power Plant in Potentially Generic Issue Data Sheet, RII:DRP-86-03, dated June 11, 1986, which may be applicable to the Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) in use at Davis-Besse. The cause of this deficiency is a

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design error by the manufacturer, Morrison-Knudson,' Power Systems Division, Rocky Mount, North Carolina. During the normal shutdown cycle of the Watts Barr EDGs, a 10 minute idle period at j approximately 450 rpm is initiated prior to bringing the engine to a 4 full stop. If, during the 10 minute idle period, an emergency start

] signal is received by the EDG system controls, the EDG will accelerate to 900 rpm, but the generator field will not be flashed.

The generator field flash reset circuit is interlocked with a relay, contact which closes at approximately 200 rpm when engine speed is decreasing. Since this is below the 450 rpm idle speed, the field flash circuitry would not be reset. Since this prohibits the EDG from accepting load, the EDG design does not meet the requirements of the design basis. The licensee.has been informed of this potential design deficiency and is in the process of investigating its

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applicability to the Davis-Besse design. This item will be followed as an open item (346/86015-03).

One open and one unresolved item were identified in this section of the report which will require further licensee action to resolv . SRTP Test Procedure Review The inspectors reviewed the following Technical Specification required surveillance testing, periodic testing and one time performance testing

~ which were utilized to verify the functional operability of the system This review verified that the test procedures adequately demonstrated the conditions to the maximum extent practicable; were reviewed and approved by the appropriate management personnel; and. contained appropriate acceptance criteria.

TP 850.05,-" Component Cooling Water Flow Verification for SFAS Level 3" TP 850.08, 45tation Air Compressor Sequencer Checkout" TP 850.34, " Containment Air Cooler Performance Test" TP 850.43, "AFW Logic Verification" TP 859.45, " Auxiliary Feed Pump Turbine Admission Valve Testing on Auxiliary Steam"

-TP 850.49, " Auxiliary Feed System Refueling Test" TP 850.52, " Auxiliary Feed Pump Monthly Test" TP 850.53, "A.uxiliary Feed Pump Instrumentation Calibration" TP 850.61, " Main Feed Pump and Turbine Control Oil Test" TP 850.68, "SFRCS Cabinet Cooling Test" TP 850.79, " Auxiliary Feed Pump Turbine Steam Generator Level Control" TP 850.80, " Auxiliary Feedwater Pressure and. Valve Control Test" TP 850.91, " Operational Test of Portable Diesel Air" TP 850.92, " Service Water Veritilation Operational Test" TP 851.16, "High Pressure Injection Suction Check Valve Reverse Flow Test" TP 851.18, " Atmospheric Vent Valve Air Volume Tank Pressure Drop Test"

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TP 851.21, "DH 9A(B) Open Operational Check" TP 851.29, " Component Cooling Water Check Valve Test" TP 851.30, " Reverse Flow Test" TP 851.32, "Feedwater Control Valve Response" TP 851.37, "High Pressure Injection Pressure Isolation Test" TP 851.40, "4160 V Bus C2/D2 Protection Relay Functional Test" PT 5126.02, " Emergency Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Transfer System" ST 5011.02, " Boric Injection Flowpath Verification" ST 5031.11 " Loss of Reactor Coolant System Input to SFRCS and Reactor Coolant Pumps" ST 5032.02, " Radiation Monitoring System Channel Calibration" ST 5051.06, " TSP Chemical Tank" ST 5063.01, " Containment Air Cooler Monthly Test" ST 5074.01, " Component Cooling Water System Monthly Surveillance Test" ST 5074.02, " Component Cooling Water System Refueling Test" ST 5081.01, " Emergency Diesel Generator Monthly Test" ST 5081.03, " Diesel Generator Fuel Oil 92 Day Sample" ST 5083.02, "0C Bus Trains Lined Up and Available'

The inspector has no unresolved questions or concerns and no violations or deviations were identified in this section of the repor . SRTP Test Procedure Witnessing The inspectors observed the following Technical Specification required surveillance testing. periodic testing and one time performance testing which were utilized to verify the functional operability of the system This review verified that the testing was performed in accordance with approved procedures; limiting conditions for operations were met; and that deficiencies encountered during the performance of the procedure were adequately documented and resolved prior to proceedin TP 850.05, " Component Cooling Water Flow Verification for SFAS Level 3" TP 850.08, " Station Air Compressor Sequencer Checkout" TP 850.34, " Containment Air Cooler Performance Test" TP 850.43, "AFW Logic Verification" TP 859.45, " Auxiliary Feed Pump Turbine Admission Valve Testing on Auxiliary Steam" TP 850.49, " Auxiliary Feed System Refueling Test" TP 850.52, " Auxiliary Feed Pump Monthly Test" TP 850.53, " Auxiliary Feed Pump Instrun.entation Calibration" TP 850.61, " Main Feed Pump and Turbine Control Oil Test" TP 850.68, "SFRCS Cabinet Cooling Test" TP 850.79, " Auxiliary Feed Pump Turbine Steam Generator Level Control" TP 850.80, " Auxiliary Feedwater Pressure and Valve Control Test"

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TP 850.92, " Service Water Ventilation Operational Test" TP 851.18, " Atmospheric Vent Valve Air Volume Tank Pressure Drop Test" TP 851.21, "DH 9A(B) Open Operational Check TP 851.29, " Component Cooling Water Check Valve Test" TP 851.30, " Reverse Flow Test" TP 851.32, "Feedwater Control Valve Response" TP 851.37, "High Pressure Injection Pressure Isolation Test" TP 851.40, "4160 V Bus C2/D2 Protection Relay Functional Test" PT 5126.02, " Emergency Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Transfer System" ST 5011.02, " Boron Injection Flowpath Valve Verification" ST 5031.11. " Loss of Reactor Coolant System Input to SFRCS and Reactor Coolant Pumps" ST 5032.02, " Radiation Monitoring System Channel Calibration" ST 5051.06, " TSP Chemical Tank" ST 5063.01, " Containment Air Cooler Monthly Test" ST 5074.01, " Component Cooling Water System Monthly Surveillance Test" ST 5074.02, " Component Cooling Water System Pefueling Test" ST 5081.01, " Emergency Diesel Generator Montnly Test" ST 5081.03, " Diesel Generator Fuel Oil 92 Day Sample" ST 5083.02, "DC Bus Trains Lined Up and Available" a. With respect to the performance of TP 850.45, the inspector noted that Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (AFWP) 1-2 exhibited visible fluctuations at the governor arm and on the chbrt recorder when the governor was assuming speed control. These fluctuations were not noted during the performance of the testing on AFWP 1-1 on May 9, 1986. The test leader indicated that the difference in fluctuations was due to the use of opposing spring force on AFPT 1-2 and not on AFFT 1-1 and that Engineering was evaluating this discrepancy. This concern will be evaluated in the review of the test results package and will be followed as an open item (346/86015-04).

b. With respect to the performance of TP 850.92, the inspector noted that the Service Water (SW) ventilation fans C99-1, C99-2, C99-3 and C99-4 failed to start within the required setpoint range. Further engineering evaluation of the Field Change Request (FCR)

implen.entation and temperature switch calibration and reperformance of the test sections 7.2 and 7.4 is required. This item will be reviewed as part cf the test results evaluatio c. With respect to the perfcrmance of TP 851.18, the inspector noted that the test procedure failed when initially tested because valve V2 was installed backward allowing pressure to bleed off the Air Volume Tank. Valve V2 has been repaired and the test reperformed satisfactorily. Additional test deficiencies were identified and will be reviewed in the results evaluation. The inspector has no further concern .

. With respect to the performance of ST 5081.01 for Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 1-1, the inspector noted that the minimum loading of the EDG was not satisfied. The procedure requires that the EDG be loaded between 2100 and 2600 kilowatts and acceptance criteria requires that the minimum value be 1000 kilowatts. Step 6.1.7.2 was performed on June 19, 1986 at 1542 hours0.0178 days <br />0.428 hours <br />0.00255 weeks <br />5.86731e-4 months <br /> and a value of 803 kilowatts was recorded. Subsequent to the completion of the test, the licensee determir.ed that the data for step 6.1.7.2 was incorrectly recorde EDG operating logs indicate that EDG 1-1 was actually loaded to between 2100 and 2600 kilowatt Further review is necessary to determine the method of identification and correction of this discrepancy. This item will be followed as an open item (346/86015-05), With respect to the perfonnance of ST 5081.01 for Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 1-2, the inspector noted that the first attempt was stopped shortly after starting the EDG because the frequency meter stuck at 65 Hertz which prevented verification of the maximum EDG start time. During the second attempt the frequency meter had to be tapped to break the meter free. This problem has been identified with a maintenance tag on the meter face dated October 1985. This item will be followed as an open item pending correction (346/86015-06).

There were three open items identified in this section of the report which will require further action by the licensee to resolv . SRTP Test Results Revie The inspectors reviewed the results of the following Technical Specification required surveillance testing, periodic testing and one time performance testing which were utilized to verify the functional operability of the systems. This review verified that the licensee is perfonning an adequate evaluation of test results; that all test data is either within previously established acceptance criteria or that deviations are properly documented and evaluated; and that test results are reviewed, evaluated and approved by the appropriate management personne TP 850.01, " Reactor Protection System Response Time Calculation" TP 850.02, " Emergency Diesel Generator Full Load Rejection" TP 850.04, " Emergency Diesel Generator Governor Electrical Noise Test" TP 850.06, " Anticipatory Reactor Protection System Lamp Test Circuitry Check" TP 850.07, " Functional Test of Station Air / Instrument Air Control Valves" TP 850.09, " Clean Waste Receiving Tank Low Level Alarm Furctional Test" TP 850.10. " Detergent Waste Tank Low Level Alarm Functional Test"

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.TP 850.11, " Miscellaneous Waste Tank Low Level Alarm Functional Test" TP 850.16, "CAS Relocation Fire Protection" TP 850.36, " Emergency Diesel Generator Room Temperature Alarms" TP 850.37, " Emergency Diesel Generator Air Start Test" TP 850.38, " Emergency Diesel Generator Refueling Surveillance Test" TP 850.77, " Motor Driven Feed Pump Motor Run-In" TP 850.83, " ARTS Logic Verification and Pressure Switch Calibration TP 850.90, " Condenser Vacuum Discharge Radiation Monitor Interlock on Low Flow Alarms Functional Testd TP 850.91, " Operational Test of Portable Diesel Air Compressor" TP 850.93, " Emergency Diesel Generator Governor Control Test" TP 851.01, " Decay Heat Valve Pit Level Alarm Test" TP 851.16, "High Pressure Injection Suction Check Valve Reverse Flow Test" With respect to the performance of TP 850.90, the inspector noted tnat one purpose of the test was to verify that high flow in the operating Condenser Vacuum Discharge Radiation Monitor will actuate the annunciator. The acceptance criteria specifically required that high flow in either monitor will actuate the annunciator alarm. The test procedure actually verified that high flow in either monitor will actuate the annunciator if the other monitor is shutdown. As had been previously identified and discussed in Inspection Report No. 50-346/86009 (Section 6), the licensee has taken administrative action to ensure that both radiation monitors are not operated simultaneously. The inspector has no further concern With respect to the performance of TP 851.01, the inspector noted that the Purpose Section of the test indicated that the valve pit cover would be leak tested after completion of TP 851.01 in accordance with FCR 85-303 Supplement #1. The inspector is concerned that the identified purpose of the test procedure has not been satisfied by the test results and that a method to ensure compliance with this purpose is not identified, such as with a deficiency. This item will be followed as an open item (346/86015-07). With respect to the performance of TP 851.16, the inspector noted that the chronological log entries for valve DH 132 operations are inaccurate and/or incomplete in that it cannot be determined if DH 132 was in the correct position for the tes If DH 132 was closed, as could be inferred from a review of the log entries, then the test results are invalidated. The licensee has determined that the chronological log is in error and that DH 132 was opened during the test procedure based on the actual leakage measured downstream of the valve. This additional information has been documented in a letter which will be attached to the test results package. The inspector has no further concerns with this tes There was one open item identified in this section of the report which will require further action by the licensee to resolv . . . . Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance, or deviations. Unresolved items disclosed during the inspection are discussed in sections 3.b and . Open Items Open items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee, which will be reviewed further by the inspectors, and which involve some action on the part of flRC or licensee or both. Open items disclosed during the inspection are discussed in sections 4.b, 6.a. 6.d, 6.e and . Exit Interview_

The inspector met ..ith licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)

throughout the month and at the conclusion of the inspection and sunmarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities. The licensee acknowledged the findings. After discussions with the licensee, the inspectors have determined there is no proprietary data contained in this inspection report.

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