IR 05000346/1986020

Insp Rept 50-346/86-20 on 860922-24.No Violation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Emergency Preparedness Exercise,Involving Observations of Key Functions & Locations by Four Inspectors & Three Consultants

ML20215F967
Person / Time
Site:	Davis Besse
Issue date:	10/08/1986
From:	Ploski T, Snell W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20215F952	List: IR 05000346/1986020 ML20215F950
References
50-346-86-20, NUDOCS 8610160435
Download: ML20215F967 (22)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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REGION III -

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Report'No. 50-346/86020(DRSS)

Docket No. 50-346 License No. NPF-3 Licensee: Toledo Edison Company Edison Plaza 300 Madison Avenue Toledo, OH 43652 Facility Name: Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1 Inspection At: Davis-Besse Site, Oak Harbor, Ohio Inspection Conducted: September 22-24, 1986 c'

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$ ?l Inspectors: T. Ploski Date w.SA W. Snell /o/8/34 Date Approved By: n'e ief / /a/s4 Emergency Preparedness Section Dat6 Inspection Summary Inspection on September 22-24, 1986 (Report No. 56-346/86020(DRSS))

Areas Inspected: R]utine, announced inspection of the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station emergency preparedness exercise, involving observations of key functions and-locations by four NRC inspectors and three consultant Results: No violations, deficiencies, or deviations were identifie ~

PDR ADOCK 05000346 G PDR

- DETAILS

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.. Persons Contacted

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" NRC Observers'a'nd Areas Observed T. Ploski, Control Room, Satellite Technical Support' Center (STSC),

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Technical Support Center (TSC), Emergency Control Center (ECC)

D. Kosloff, Control Room, STSC

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T. Essig, Operational Support Center (OSC), Health Physics Monitoring Room (HPMR), and Inplant Teams S. Merwin, OSC, HPMR, and Inplant Teams G. Arthur, TSC W. Snell, ECC G. Simonds, Radiological Testing Laboratory (RTL), and Radiological Monitoring Team (RMT)

Toledo Edison Company

• P. Smart, President and Chief Executive Officer

• J. Williams, Senior Vice President, Nuclear Operations

• • D. Amerine, Assistant Vice President, Nuclear Operations

• • • L. Storz, Plant Manager

• D. Shalton, ECC Controller

• • • J. Wasilk, Environmental and Emergency Preparedness Manager

• • • Peters, Nuclear Licensing Manager

• • Danielson, Lead Exercise Controller

• • Cope, Exercise Coordinator, Lead TSC Controller

• • Flood, Lead Control Room Controller

• • Kevern, Lead ECC Controller

• • W. Armstrong, Lead RTL Controller

• • J. Walter, Lead Joint Public Information Center Controlle" .

• • N. Bonnar, OSC Controller

• • R. Varley, Emergency Planning Supervisor

• • B. Geddes, Quality Assurance Auditor

• Attended only the morning exit interview on September 24, 198 ** Attended only the afternoon exit interview on September 24, 198 *** Attended both exit interview . Licensee Action on Previously Identified Items (Closed) Open Item No. 346/85019-01: During the 1985 exercise, differences between offsite geographic subareas depicted on large scale EPZ maps and those depicted in Procedure AD 1827.12 contributed to the failure to include all areas within about a two mile radius of the station in the initial offsite protective action recommendation. The inspector reviewed the plume exposure pathway Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) maps found in the licensee's implementing procedures, as well as those large scale EPZ maps located in the Emergency Control Center (ECC). These maps correctly

' depicted the EPZ's outer boundaries as well as the boundaries of inner

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geographic subarea Both types of boundaries have been revised since the July 1985 exercise. As indicated in Paragraph 5.e of this report, the initial offsite protective action recommendation was appropriate and included all land and lake areas within at least a two mile radius of the Davis-Besse Station. This item is close (Closed) Open Item No. 346/85019-02: During the 1985 exercise, the failure to consult the EALs for applicability prio to downgrading from a General Emergency and later from an Alert, plus the incorrect procedural guidance that emergencies classified as at least an Alert must be downgraded below the Unusual Event class before commencing recovery activities, together resulted in inappropriate emergency declassificatio As indicated in Paragraphs 5.d and 5.e of this report, the licensee's Technical Support Center (TSC) and ECC staffs made good use of the Station's Emergency Action Levels (EALs) during discussions regarding downgrading from a General Emergency to a Site Area Emergency during the latter stages of the 1986 exercis The downgrading was in accordance with revised procedural guidance and was appropriate, based on plant conditions in the exercise scenari This item is closed.

3. General ,

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A normal-hours exercise of the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station (DBNPS)

Emergency Plan was conducted at DBNPS on September 23, 1986, testing the integrated response of the Station's emergency organization to a

hypothetical accident scenario resulting in a simulated release of 1 radioactive material. Although this was essentially a utility-only exercise, the Ottawa County and Ohio Disaster Services Agencies participated to a limited extent. The Lucas County emergency governmental organization also conducted a tabletop drill in conjunction with the licensee's exercise. The attachments to this report contain the licensee's exercise objectives and narrative summaries of the scenario.

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4. General Observations

' _ Procedures

! This exercise was conducted in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E requirements using the DBNPS Emergency Plan and associated procedures, Coordination

The licensee's response was coordinated, orderly, and timel Had scenario events been real, actions taken by the licensee would have been sufficient to allow State and local authorities to take appropriate actions to protect public health and safet Observers Licensee observers monitored and critiqued this exercise independently of the seven NRC observer _

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Critiques The licensee held critiques following the exercise. On the morning of September 24, 1986, the inspectors presented their preliminary findings to senior licensee management, some of thom were unable to attend the afternoon critique session. The critiques consisted of presentations by the licensee's lead exercise controllers of

. their preliminary findings, followed by the NRC's presentation of the inspection team's preliminary findings. Both afternoon critiques were attended by a large audience of exercise participants and controller . Specific Observations Control Room

, .. A Shift Supervisor (SS), Shift Technical Advisor (STA), Administrative

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Assistant, and several operators made up the Control Room crew for this exercise. The SS quickly and correctly classified the Unusual Event and the Alert. The associated initial notifications to the

<- State, Ottawa County, Lucas County, and the NRC Headquarters Duty Officer were completed within about fifteen minutes of each declaration. All initial notification messages were complete, accurate, and well documented. The Administrative Assistant and the STA, who were both making these notifications, properly ensured that the SS had first reviewed and approved the completed message form Plant-wide Public Address (PA) announcements were made from the Control Room soon after all emergency declarations during the exercis The SS, Operations Superintendent, and Emergency Assistant Plant Manager (EAPM) generally made good use of plant drawings and abnormal operating procedures during the exercise. For example, they soon concluded that the fault which had caused the power loss to the onsite meteorological monitoring system would also i have affected some plant lighting. -They later determined that

! a leak inside the containment building was in a makeup

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line rather than the reactor coolant system. However, later I

in the exercise, valves for the containment air sampling lines l were not opened as soon as had been anticipated by the inspector.

l The licensee has established a policy that requir=s Control Room l staff to repeat back verbal orders issued wi. thin that facility, i

to better ensure these orders are properly understood. Although the inspector did not observe this policy was followed, no failures to properly follow orders given in the Control Room were observed during this exercis ,

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Prior to Technical Support Center (TSC) activation, the Plant Manager

and Vice-President for Nuclear Operations were kept adequately informed of plant conditions, corrective actions in progress, and

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the status of offsite notifications. Upon learning of the fuel l

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handling accident, the SS correctly ordered the evacuation of the auxiliary building and, several minutes later, the assembly of nonessential onsite personnel. About fifteen minutes prior to

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.the Emergency Control Center (ECC) becoming fully operational, l a good decision was made to transfer offsite notification responsibilities to that facility in order to relieve Control Room personnel of that burden. The Emergency Director (ED) in the ECC later relieved the SS of all his undelegatable emergency responsibilities only after receiving a final telephone briefing by the S The SS then announced to Control Room personnel that he had been relieved by the ED; however, a similar PA announcement was not made until about thirty minutes late The Administ'rative Assistant was principally responsible for maintaining the Control Room lo For some time he kept an adequately detailed record of activities on separate sheets of paper. He was later told to maintain the log in a spiral notebook and to transfer

, all previous. log entries into this notebook. During both fifteen minute periods when his efforts were devoted on completing offsite notifications for the emergency declarations, the Administrative Assistant had difficulty in maintaining the Control Room log. The inspectors later noted that the ECC was equipped with operable telephone equipment that allowed a communicator to simultaneously speak with persons in the State of Ohio, Ottawa County, and Lucas County Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs).

Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program is acceptable; however the following items should be considered for improvement:

• The log of Control Room activities during~ Emergency Plan activations should be maintained in a bound logbook having numbered page * Control Room personnel should have the equipment to allow simultaneous communications with the State of Ohio, Ottawa County, and Lucas County E0C Satellite Technical Support Center (STSC)

The STSC was located adjacent to the Control Roo The licensee j indicated that this recently created facility was within the envelope

, of the Control Room's emergency ventilation system and that plans had been made to expand the STSC into what was currently a part of the turbine deck. Thus, the STSC is essentially an interim Emergency Response Facility (ERF).

The STSC was promptly activated following the Unusual Event declaration. It was staffed by three persons: the Emergency Chen.istry and Health Physics (C & HP) Superintendent, a C & HP i

communicator /logkeeper, and the EAP However, the EAPM tended i to remain in the Control Room rather than in the STSC, unless he

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was using his telephone in the STSC. This was sometimes appropriate,.

based on the need to review drawings and to hold discussions with the SS and/or Operations. Superintendent, and the fact that the STSC

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had desk space and chairs for only three or four persons. However, the fact that the EAPM spent so much time outside the STSC occasionally had a disruptive effect on the facility's C & HP staff, who had to answer his telephone in addition to meeting their own responsibilities. While the C &'HP staff assistant maintained open communications links with persons in other ERFs and kept a very complete log of these communications, the EAPM did not have someone to provide him with similar valuable assistanc The Emergency C & HP Superintendent did a good job-of directing the radiological assessment of the fuel handling accident. It was soon determined that there were no offsite consequences associated with that event. A proper decision was later to leave the fuel assembly in its somewhat elevated position in order to concentrate on more important scenario developement The STSC was equipped with a facsimile machine to facilitate the

transmittal of Area Radiation Monitor (ARM) and other radiological information to any other ERF. However, the machine's speed was considered inadequate, as evidenced by the use of a serviceman to hand carry the radiological information updates to the Operational Support Center (OSC) and Health Physics Monitoring Room (HPMR).

This individual was instructed to remain outside the Control Room while awaiting these' updates in order to avoid introducing contamination into the Control Room and to avoid having another person in the room.

Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program is acceptable; however, the following items should be considered

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for improvement:

• The licensee should keep the NRC formally informed of the'

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completion status of the STSC and its other ERFs, as facility l modifications will impact the scheduling of an ERF Appraisal.

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I * A communicator /logkeeper should be provided for the EAPM in the STS * Facsimile equipment linking the STSC with other ERFs should be l' improved, rather than being replaced by runners or eliminated entirel c. 0)eratioral Support Center (OSC), Health Physics Monitoring Room (iPMR), and Inplant Teams Both the OSC and HPMR were activated after the Alert declaration

ar.d were soon staffed with sufficient numbers of personnel. However,

the OSC Manager never completed tb "0SC Activation and Response

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Checklist" per procedure EP-2410. The OSC. Manager and HPMR Coordinator effectively managed their personnel. Assembled staff were kept adequately informed of scenario events, through briefings o and the use of status boards. However, the HPMR's " events status board" was not mounted in a location where it was readily visible to personnel awaiting assignments. The OSC Manager demonstrated

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U good initiative with respect to posing solutions to the various-operational and equipment repair problems presented by the scenari l -The OSC Manager exhibited proper concern for the continued habitability

, of the OSC. However, while several habitability surveys of the OSC

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were performed, they were only done following a request from the OCS

Manager, and then consisted of only direct radiation measurement OSC and HPMR briefers provided good briefings to teams sent into the plant on assigned tasks and simulated radiation hazards,

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respectively. Adequate records were kept regarding personnel

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dispatched from the OSC and their exposure OSC communicators performed adequatel _

l The inspectors accompanied approximately eight inplant teams during the exercise. The teams exhibited a good attitude.towards the

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. exercise and demonstrated their capabilities to adequately perform

, . assigned maintenance and survey tasks. Some teams were equipped

with respiratory protection and associated special communications i equipment. The wearing of respiratory protection did not have an adverse effect on communications quality. The te'ams had appropriate C &.HP support.

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One scenario event involved an inplant worker who had become faint from the heat in the radwaste processing area and had supposedly

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become contaminated when a co-worker tried to assist him.' A first aid team was quickly sent to the victim's locatio A radiation j area perimeter was established around the victim. The team adequately

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demonstrated how on-scene first aid would be administered for this

si tuation. However, several items used by the first team within.the contaminated area, such as a blood pressure cuff, were later removed

'from the area.without having been surveyed at the scene-or bagged for l later survey at another location. Also, at one point in'the l demonstration about eighteen people were observing the first aid

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demonstration from outside the radiation area boundary. 'This ,

i unnecessary congestion could have hindered first aid efforts in an

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actual situation. The victim was later adequately surveyed for l contamination, decontaminated per procedures, and afforded proper

! onsite care for his medical problem. Appropriate TSC and ECC staffs l _

were kept adequately advised of the care given to the victim.

I An inspector witnessed the use of the post-accident sampling system which was made operable for this exercise. Senior licensee management later informed the inspectors that system upgrading has

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not yet been completed. The sampling team obtained a sample in accordance with current procedures. Although self-contained

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breathing apparatus was worn during key phases of~the sample collection process, only an air sampler was operated to provide some later. indication of the magnitude of any airborne contamination that may have resulted from sample collectio Based on the.above findings, this portion of the licensee's program

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.is adequate; however, the following items should be considered for

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improvement:

• ~ Facility activation checklists should be completed per procedure * OSC habitability surveys should be periodic, rather than only as requested, and should also' include air samples and swipe sample *

• Personnel involved in post accident sampling should be provided with'a real-time indication of the presence of airborne

_ contamination in the sample collection are d. ' Technical Support Center (TSC)

-With the exception of those individuals assigned to the STSC, the ,

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' remainder of the TSC staff reported directly to the main portion

of the TSC which was located on the first floor of the Davis-Besse

Administration Building (DBAB). The TSC was fully operational well

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within one' hour of the Alert declaration. The layout of.the DBAB's

TSC was improved from.that observed during the 1985 exercise with

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respect to the seating arrangement, locations of computer terminals, and placement of status board In general, TSC staff did a good. job of interfacing with. staffs in the Control Room and STSC, and with the OSC Manager when addressing the variety of equipment prblems posed by the scenario, including:

.the suspended spent' fuel assembly; the leak in a makeup line; and the relative merits of utilizing the low pressure injection system

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in lieu.of the decay heat removal system. TSC staff closely monitored

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and trended key plant parameters through the use of computerized displays and status boards. The plant's EALs were closely monitored, and the Emergency Plant Manager (EPM) and Emergency Director (ED)

were kept adequately advised of potentially relevant EALs.

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The EPM and TSC Manager kept TSC staff informed of major decisions through briefings; however, these briefings became less frequent and too concise in the latter stages of the exercise. TSC staff inputs were, however, usually solicited during these briefings. While TSC staff maintained a positive attitude throughout the exercise, their i activities were disrupted on several occasions when the ED and one F or more TSC staff members became involved in important discussions

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near the EPM's work station.

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'An adequately detailed TSC log was maintained during the exercis With one exception, TSC status boards were kept up to date with.

, accurate information. Although TSC staff were well aware when the major release had begun and had been terminated, the " environmental problems" portion of the " Plant Status Board" only contained entries regarding the earlier insignificant release from the spent fuel handling are A " Problem Analysis Board" was effectively utilized to list plant problems which the TSC staff had to address. This-

status board: identified the person assigned lead responsibility for working on.the problem, the.results of his work, and the times that the problems were-identified and resolved. However, the TSC was not equipped with an analogous'. status board for summarizing whether inplant teams had been dispatched to perform critical maintenance, post-accident. sampling, or survey tasks and what were their results or current status.- Instead, key TSC staff seemed to rely too often E on memory or personal notes when attempting to recall whether an inplant team had yet been dispatched or had reported the results of its wor Accountability of personnel within the protected area was accomplished

. within the 30 minute goal after the Site Area Emergency declaration.

l Upon receiving the accountablity report from the OSC Manager, the-EPM and his staff made'a. correct decision on the routes to be utilized

. during the subsequent simulated evacuation of nonessential personnel.

Scenario events included several circumstances which placed the ED and-EPM in the position of having to authorize emergency worke exposures in excess of regulatory limits. As allowed per procedure, the ED delegated responsibility for authorizing such exposures to the EPM. The Emergency C & HP Superintendent kept the EPM advised of all

, cases where inplant teams could be expected to receive one-time

. exposures above the regulatory limits. The EPM then verbally authorized

< such exposures. These authorizations were adequately documented per procedure EP-2620.

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l Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program .

-is acceptable; however, the following items should be considered for improvement:

• Important discussions involving only a few senior TSC staff should not disrupt the activities of others in the facilit * The TSC should be equipped with a status board for summarizing the current status and/or results reported by inplant teams dispatched on critical maintenance, post-accident sampling, and survey task Emergency Control Center (ECC)

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The ECC, which is the licensee's Emergency Operations Facility and is located across the hallway from the TSC in the DBAB, became fully operational within 30 minutes after the Alert declaratio A separate dose assessment room had been added to the ECC since the

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'1985 exercise. -The facility had also been modified with respect to improved seating arrangements, placement and design of status

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boards, and the creation of-a conference area that was set apart fromLthe remainder of.the ECC workspace by a glass partitio The ED, who generally divided his time between the TSC and ECC,-

promptly and correctly classified the Site Area and General Emergencies. ECC staff completed all initial offsite notifications to the State of Ohio and to Ottawa'and Lucas Counties within

- 15 minutes of each declaration. Initial notifications were complete, accurate, and adequately documented on standard message forms that had first been reviewed and approved by the ED. -During the exercise the ED and Emergency Operations Manager (E0M) ensured that frequent followup messages were transmitted to the State and counties. These messages were thorough, accurate, and adequately

' documented. The ED also reviewed draft press releases prepared under the direction of the Joint Public Information Center (JPIC)

Spokesperso The initial offsite protective action recommendation was appropriate-and was issued in a timely manner. Later in the exercise, the ED revised the recommendation from shelter to evacuate for some affected sectors further downwind from the plant. While this recommendation was reasonable and conservative, the ED should have made more of an effort to- briefly discuss his proposed change in the recommendation with his dose assessment staff, the E0M, and the EP It was not apparent to the inspectors to what extent the ED had considered evacuation time estimates and the TSC staff's current best estimates of release duration and the maximum extent of core damage in his unilateral decision to revise the initial offsite protective action recommendation. Later in the exercise, the ED made very good use of his TSC and ECC staffs in decision- making

- regarding the downgrading of the emergency classification and the possibility to again alter the offsite protective action recommendatio The EALs were adequately reviewed and the i correct decision was made that the emergency situation could not be classified as anything less than a Site Area Emergency due to

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containment building radiation levels. A correct decision was

! also made not to again revise the protective action recommendation, as no further changes were justifiable.

, The ECC's status boards were well maintained throughout the exercise.

[ Posted information was clear, concise, and accurate. Status boards

were particularly well utilized to track the completion status of protective actions being implemented by offsite authorities and to

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display current and forecast meteorological information. The dose assessment staff made good use of status boards to display the progress of the radioactive plume as it moved westward through the EPZ, as confirmed by offsite survey team measure:nents. An excellent log of ECC activities was also kept throughout the exercis .

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Dose assessment staff were efficient in ge'nerating offsite dose projections based on current containment radiation levels. The-staff conferred with TSC staff in initially choosing a default 2-hour release. duration, which was not changed prior to release termination. However, while TSC and dose _ assessment staffs l ,

recognized that containment radiation levels were increasing,' there

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-was no: apparent. effort to produce'an offsite dose projection based on a " worst case" estimate of how high the source team could later

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be, given the gradually decreasing containment building and reactor coolant system pressure Late in the exercise, the ED assembled his key aids from the ECC, TSC, STSC, and OSC and conducted a plant recovery discussion. A

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number of appropriate'short and long-term recovery tasks were

, identified, and an adequate attempt was made to prioritize these tasks and to identify additional manpower and material resource needs.

Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program I is. acceptable; however, the following item should be considered for improvement:

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• Dose assessment and TSC staffs should remain in contact regarding latest estimates of release duration and quantity of radioactive material available for release, so that offsite dose projections would also include " worst case" predictions based on changing plant condition ' Radiological Testing Laboratory (RTL) and Radiological Monitoring

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Teams (RMTs)

The RTL was- q'uickly activated and staffed after the Alert declaration.

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Four' RMTs were organized and dispatched from the RTL during the exercise. One team was directed to conduct habitability surveys ,

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of the DBAB,-which houses the TSC, ECC, RTL, and the JPIC. The team

, did not demonstrate good survey techniques at the first few survey

! locations. The' survey instrument's probe was held too far from the

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surfaces being surveyed and was moved to rapidly over the surfaces.

- However, the team's survey techniques were adequate during the remainder of their initial survey of the DBAB.

.r An inspector accompanied one of the offsite RMTs. The team checked their survey and communications equipment for. proper operation prior to leaving the DBAB. The team utilized a four-wheel drive vehicle, one of several procured by the licensee since the 1985 exercis .'

Communications equipment used by the team and by persons directing the RMTs from the ECC operated without malfunction. The ECC dose

assessment staff did a good job on tracking the westward movement

.of the plume, based on scenario meteorological conditions and reports ,

from the RMTs. The team demonstrated good radiation survey and sampling techniques and proper concern for minimizing its exposur .

i l' On several occasions RMT No. 2 also demonstrated good initiative

! in proposing changes to orders received from its controllers in the

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.m EC The team initially.was directed to search for the plume along

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a road which was roughly parallel to the plume's trajectory. The team located ~a roadway which was perpendicular to the anticipated plume. The team successfully convinced the ECC staff that it could better verify the plume's existence by _ proceeding along that second

. roadwa The ECC: staff accepted this suggestion and the plume was

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soon located. Later, this team was directed to take a 10-minute air

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sample in a simulated radiation field of about 600 mR/hr. The team

questioned this order for ALARA concerns and obtained permission to-leave the:-radiation area while the ECC staff debated the need for 3 this air sample. The inspector noted that, while the team's sir sampler required power from the vehicle's battery, another air sampler

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with a portable battery power supply was available in the RTL but was not utilized by this tea ~

Based on_the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program is acceptable; however, the following item should be considered for

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* Portable battery powered air samplers should be provided to RMTs L if the' teams are expected to obtain air samples in locations having high ambient radiation levels.

, Exercise Scenario and Licensee Critiques j The licensee's scenario was suffiently challenging to test the i capabilities of the Station's emergency organization. The scenario i_ development group was responsive to the questions and suggestions provided by Regional staff following review of the draft scenario manual, which was-submitted about forty-five days before the -

exercise.

On the' afternoon of September'24, licensee controllers from each facility and major activity summarized their pr'eliminary findings

before an audience consisting of the inspectors and about sixty-five licensee personnel who had various roles during the exercise. The

, _ presentations were thorough and objective. The participants'

questions and suggestions were adequately addressed by'the speaker I

! Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program is adequate.

ll Exit Interview On September 24, 1986 the inspectors met with those licensee representatives denoted in Paragraph 1 to present their preliminary

. findings. The licensee agreed to consider the items discussed and indicated that none of the items were proprietary in natur Attachments: ExerciseObjectives

, Scenario Timeline and Narrative Summary i

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. ! * SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES

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~1.1 -Scope The 1986 Davis-Besse Emergency Preparedness Exercise, to be conducted on September 23, 1986, will test and provide the opportunity to evaluate the Toledo Edison emergency plans and procedures. It will also test the emergency response organization's ability to assess and respond to emergency conditions and take adequate actions to protect the health and safety of the public. The exercise will not involve '

activation of the Toledo Edison Corporate Radiological Emergency Response (CRER) Organization. Whenever practical, the exercise incorporates provisions for " free play" on the part of the partici-pant The scenario will simulate a sequence of events resulting in a

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radiological release to the e'nvironment. This release will be of sufficient magnitude to warrant mobilizati'on of State and local agencies in response to the emergency, but the participation of these organizations will be limited, and, for the most part, simulated by controller .2 Toledo Edison Objectives This section delineates the specific objectives to be demonstrated by the Toledo Edison Company during the exercis . 2.1- DBNPS Objectives 1. . Demonstrate the ability to exercise the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Stati~on (DBNPS) Emergency Plah, with limited participation by the State of Ohio, and Ottawa County, as required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix t i Demonstrate the ability to critique the exercise, evaluate all recommendations for revisions or improve-

! ments to the emergency preparedness program, and make l

changes, as appropriate.

I Demonstrate direction and control of the emergency response organization, and the ability to implement the emergency plan and associated procedure . Demonstrate the transfer of Emergency Director respon-sibilities from the Control Room to the ECC, as the  :

emergency escalate . Demonstrate the ability to activate and staff emergency j response facilities, within the times specified in the

DBNPS Emergency Plan.

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. 1-2 Demonstrate the ability to coordinate field monitoring activities and provide a central point for the receipt and analysis of radiological monitoring dat . Demonstrate, through the development of relief rosters and relief of selected key personnel, the ability for 24-hour per day manning of communication's links and  ;

Emergency Response Facilitie l s  ; Demonstrate the ability to continuously assess condi-

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tion . Demonstrate the ability to recognize Emergency Action Levels (EALs) and properly classify.the inciden . Demonstrate the ability to develop an initial notifica-tion message and notify key officials within 15 minutes

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of classification (includes TED, Ohio, Ottawa County, and Lucas County emergency response personnel):

1 Demonstrate the ability to notify the NRC within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> of classification of an emergenc . Demonstrate the ability to develop follow-up notifica-tion messages and periodically update off-site author-itie . 1 Demonstrate communication capabilities as follows:

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• Between the DBNPS Control Room, Technical Support Center (TSC), Emergency Control Center (ECC), and Operations Support Center (OSC)

• Between DBNPS and the DBNPS Radiation Monitoring Teams (RMTs)

• Between DBNPS, Ottawa County and Lucas Count '

i l; 15. Demonstrate the ability to develop a legitimate,

). informative and clearly understood message summarizing the emergency to be sent to Ohio, Ottawa County, and Lucas County officials who are responsible 'for activa-

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tion of the prompt notification syste ,

1 Demonstrate the ability to accurately determine sourc term (s) of any actual or potential radioactive release from DENPS.

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1 Demonstrate the ability to use plant process, effluent

[ and/or area radiation monitors to estimate the radia-tion dose rate to individuals exposed to any release (s)

of radioactive material.

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1 Demonstrate the ability to estimate total (integrated)

doses, based on actual or profected dose rater, a compare tnese estimates to the EPA PAG t 19. Determine the ability to estimate total population exposure (person-res) after passage of a radioactive plum . Demonstrate the ability to develop and implement radiation exposure guidelines for emergency worker . Demonstrate the ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposur . Demonstrate the ability to assemble and account for all personnel within the Protected Arsi within 30 minute . Demonstrate the ability to provide on-site first aid to a radiologically contaminated victi . Demonstrate the organizational ability to authorize ,

emergency worker exposures in excess of 10 CFR 20 limit . Demonstrate the ability to formulate and communicate to off-site authorities recommendations for the pro-tectio'n of the publi . Demonstrate activation.and staffing of the Joint Public Information Center (JPIC). (TED staff only, no county or State personnel.)

2 Demonstrate the ability to brief the media in a clear,

. concise, accurate, and timely manner.

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2 Demonstrate the ability to initiate preliminary

' reentry and recovery efforts-(discussions and avail-ability of procedures).

29. Demonstrate the ability to utilize tt.e Post-Accident Sampling System (PASS) to obtain appropriate fluid samples for analysi . Demonstrate the ability to perform chemical and

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radiological analyses of post-accident (sisulated)

fluid samples and communicate the results of these analyses to appropriate emergency response personnel within three hour .

a 3 Demonstrate the ability to evaluate the results of post-accident (simulated) fluid samples, and include these data in the assessment of the accident (e.g., in determining the extent of core damage).

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32. Demonstrate the ability to collect environmental samples (e.g., soil, vegetation, foliage, etc.) within the Ingestion Pathway, and make arrangements for analysis thereo ,

33. Demonstrate the ability to use status boards and 3 periodic briefings to keep personnel in the Operations Support Center'(OSC) and all emergency response facilities apprised of plant conditions.

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7-1 7.1 Initial Conditions: COB, 9/22/86 1.) DBNPS Unit I reactor is on the grid at 100% power, and has been operating the equivalent of 324 full power day l l

2.) Reactor coolant system (RCS) Dose Equivalent Iodine (DEI) =

0.5pci/gn., and has been constant for the past several week .) RCS leakage is as follows:

Pressure Boundary Primary-to-Secondary Isolatio.n Valve Unidentified E4. ) The following equipment is out of service:

• HPI Pump 1-1: Replacement of outboard pump bearing, which failed during monthly surveillance test. Pump is dis-assembled and tagged out; inoperable since 1200, 9/22/86 (MWO-86-XXXX). New bearing is being flown in from B&W, expected to arrive late afternoon, 9/23/8 .

• Containment Spray Pump 1-1: Cracked pump casing. During the. monthly surveillance run, the pump had to be shut down

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due to, extremely high vibration. Subsequent investigation

revealed the crack. Further investigation / repair in progress to determine cause of high vibratio Pump

. declared inoperkble and tagged out since 1530, 9/21/8 .

S.) Monthly surveillance run of #1 Emergency Diesel Generator scheduled for 3rd shift tonight.

i 6.) Tech. Section has requested that two spent fuel elements in the pool be relocated on 9/23 to facilitate inspection of the rack for modifications required to increase storage capacit .) A Radwaste LSA thipment is scheduled to leave the Station at 1200, 9/23/86. Waste compacting will continue through the nigh .2 Initial Conditions: 0800, 9/23/86 1.) DBNPS Unit i reactor is on the grid at 100% power, and has been operating the equivalent of 325 full power day .) Reactor coolant system (RCS) Dose Equivalent Iodine (DEI) =

0.5pCi/gm., and has been constant for the past several week Results of the latest radiochemistry analyses are attache .) RCS leakage is as follows:

Pressure Boundary Prima ry-to-Seconda ry 0.0 l

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- 7-2 Isolation Valve Unidentified 0.2

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4.) The following equipment is out of service:

• HPI Pump 1-1: Replacement of outboard pump bearing, which failed during monthly surveillance tes Pump is dis-assembled and tagged out; inoperable since 1200, 9/22/86 (MWO-86-XXXX). New bearing is being flown in from B&W, expected to arrive late afternoon, 9/23/8 * Containment Spray Pump 1-1: Cracked pump casing. During the monthly surveillance run, the pump had to be shut down due to extremely high vibration. Subsequent investigation revealed the crack. Further investigation / repair in progress to determine cause of high vibration. Pump

declared inoperable and tagged out since 1530, 9/21/8 .) Movement of spent fuel bundles is scheduled to commence at 8:3 .) Radwaste compacting continues for the LSA shipment at noon toda .3 Scenario Time Line'

00/00 Initial conditions established, exercise initiated 00/15 A ground fault trips open the normal feeder breaker to the mer tower, and an automatic transfer switch fai,1s to re-align to the alternate power source. Meteorological monitoring capability is lost, and the Shift Supervisor declares an Unusual Even /45 The Control Room is notified that movement of spent fuel is about to begi /00 One of the spent fuel bundles is damaged while being raised in the spent fuel pool. Cladding is perforated and the team observed gasses bubbling to the surface. They exit the fuel bridge area, and inform the Control Roo /05 The Control Room will confirm the release of activity (increasing area radiation monitor's) and declare an Aler /00 The TSC, ECC, HPMR and OSC should be activated and opera-tional. Discussions and efforts to replace the damaged -

fuel bundle should be underwa /15 The First Aid Team is dispatched to the Radwaste C:gmst ; ll.ee. A str. fen; aman is thought to be suffering from heat exhaustion, and becomes contaminated when his fellow worker attempts to help him. The First Aid Team will find that he is weak

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because of an earlier blood donation, and requires only rest. He will be decontaminated on-site by the C&HP technician (s) and release /45 Operators have evidence of an increasing make-up rate (it is due to leakage out of the upstream (make-up side)

weld on HP-59; there is no RCS leakage at this tim Operators will implement AB 1203.29, "Small RCS Leaks" -

and will be successful in identifying the make-up system as the source of the leakage, and should contact the Load Dispatcher to shut down the reactor due to diminished 4 make-up capacit !

The PORV will be isolated as directed by AB 1203.29, in attempt to locate / isolate the leakage. When operators attempt to re-open RC-11 (PORV block valve) it will fail to ope /00 Operators receive concurrence from the Load Dispatcher, and begin a shutdown. Containment sump level increases as leakage from HP-59 worsen /15 At some point the operators will start HPI/LPI in a " Piggy-(Approx) back" mod When #2 High Pressure Injection Pump is started it will immediately trip, and remain inoperable for the duration of the dril /30 The leakage approaches the capacity of one make-up pump,

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and a second pump is started. The weld on HP-59 has

failed, and the entire' discharge o*f both make-up pumps is

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directed to the containment sump.

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There is now NO high pressure make-up capability. With I HP-59 failed, the Make-up Pumps can't inject water into the RCS, and both HPI Pumps are inoperable. The Emergency -

- Director should declare a Site Area Emergenc .

03/40 The reactor is tripped when pressurizer level d' ops r below

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03/45 An SA-2, signal (RCS <1600 psig) is received, and operators notice that the isolation valve for one of the annulus-to-containment. vacuum breakers has failed to clos /50 RCPs are tripped due to inadequate sub-cooling margin-(<20').

05/00 The seat / disc on HP-59 fails, initiating a LOCA (2.2" hole in the RCS). RCS pressure remains well above LPI. pump shut-off head.

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7-4 05/15- Intermittent inadequate core cooling: saturated / super-06/15 heated conditions in the core, resulting in cladding damage and a release of some gap activity (~40%).

RE 4598 (Station Vent Monitor) reflects a significant increase. A major release of radioactivity to the environ-ment has begun. (The gap activity is being released to the RCS + containment (by way of EP-59) + annulus (by way of the failed open vacuum breaker) + environment (by way of the Emergency Ventilation System and the Station Vent). A General Emergency should be declare /15 RCS pressure decreases below shut off head for Low Pressure Injection, LPI starts injectin /00 RCS <200', containment depressurized, release terminate (CV-5071 may or may not be shut.)

07/30 Reentry, recovery discussions underwa /30 Exercise terminate .4 Narrative Synopsis Significant conditions postulated to exist at the onset of the DBNPS 1986 Emergency Preparedness Exercise include the following: Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Dose Equivalent Iodine-131 (DEI) activity is higher than normal, 0.5pci/gs, but still well below the Tech. Spe .

limit There is no significant identified or unidentified RCS

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Some spent fuel bundles are scheduled t,o be moved the morning of

9/23 to permit inspection of an area of the pool for possible modi- ,

l fication.

Equipment out of service includes #1 High Pressure Injection (HPI)

Pump and #1 Containment Spray Pump. (See Sections 7.1 & 7.2)

l l None of these items of equipment will be available for the duration j of the exercis '

At approximately 00/15 (fifteen minutes after initiation of the

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exercise), the Control Room will receive indications that the Meteoro-logical Tower has failed, and the Shif t Supervisor will declare an Unusual Event per EP-1500, EAL 3.E.1.3, implement the DBNPS Emergency Plan, and assume responsibilities as the interim Emergency Director.

I Subsequent investigation will reveal the cause for the loss of the meteorological monitoring instrumentation to be a failure of the automatic transfer switch when the normal power supply is interrupted by a ground fault. This will take approximately 45 minutes to an hour to repai .. - - - . - . - - - _ - . - . . - . - - . _ _ , _ . - - - , . . - . - _ . , - _ - _ - . _ . - .

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-- 7-5 At 00/45, the Control Room will receive notification that the team is ready to begin movement of spent fuel. Fifteen minutes later (01/00) alarms in the Control Room and reports from the team will confirm that a Fuel Handling Accident has occurred. One of the spent fuel bundles was banged while being raised in the Pool, causing damage and allowing some fission gases to escape and bubble up to the surface of the Spent Fuel Poo Upon observing the gas bubbles, the team exited the fuel bridge, and informed the Control Roo The activity released is not high enough'to activate SEAS (Safety Features Activation System), so an Alert should be declared, per '

EP-1500, EAL 6.B.1, and the TSC, OSC, RPMR, and ECC activate By 02/45 most of the gases will have been dissipated by the ventila-tion system, and a team should be able to re-enter, and restore the bundle in its storage rac At approximately C2/15 a First Aid Team will be dispatched to the radwaste area (refer to Sectio'n 9.1 for additional information).

At 02/30, the RCS make-up rate will begin to increase, and within 30 minutes, will be greater than 10 gpe. Operators will implement the procedure for "Small RCS Leaks" and determine the source of the leak to be the Make-up Syste Check Valve HP-59 has begun to leak, the weld on the make-up side of the valve is leaking make-up water into containment. The Load Dispatcher, when contacted regarding shutting down the reactor will indicate that he can support a shutdow .

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As the reactor ls being' shut down, the leak rate will continue to increase, requiring a second Make-up pump to compensate. As the

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second pump is started, the weld on HP-59 will fail completely, and the entire discharge of the Make-up Pumps will be directed to the containment, leaving no make-up capacit The operators will attempt to increase the discharge pressure of #2 HPI pump by shifting t'o a " Piggyback"'line up with LPI, but when #2 HPI pump is started, it will trip immediatel With both the Make-up and HPI systems inoperable, a Site Area Emer-i gency will be declared, at approximately 03/30, per EP-1500, EAL j 3.D. .

Without make-up water to compensate for RCS contraction due to i cooldown, pressurizer level will begin to decrease, and the reactor will be tripped at approximately 03/40, when level decreases below 100".

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! ators will note that CV-5071, a vacuum breaker isolation valvej has failed to clos "

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For the next 90 minutes, efforts will continue to restore high pressure make-up capability and to depressurize the RCS to below Low Pressure Injection hea At 05/00, a Loss-of-Coolant-Accident will occur when the seat / disc of HP-59 fail, opening a 2.2" hole in the RCS. Pressure will decrease as coolant is lost, but superheated conditions will be reached in the core for several minutes before the Low Pressure Injection pumps provide core cooling. These superheated conditions will result in clad overheating and damage, and the release of fission products in the gap to the containmen Immediately thereafter, the Station Vent Monitor will reflect increased activity being discharged to the environmen (Flowpath: Cladding

+ RCS + Containment + annulus by way of the failed open vacuum breaker + EVS + Station Vent.) If one was not declared when the LOCA occurred, the Emergency Director will declare a General Emergency at this time, based on the loss of all three fission product barrier For the next two hours, efforts will be directed toward terminating the release, cooling the reactor to cold shutdown conditions, depres-surizing the containment, plume tracking and dose assessmen By 07/00 the release will be terminated when CV-5074 is shut. With the containment depressurized and the RCS in cold shutdown, reentry and recovery discussions should begin, and planning efforts initiated to recover DBNP The exercise will be terminated when the Lead Exercise Controller is informed that all objectives have been met, at approximately

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