IR 05000346/1990017
| ML20059J270 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 09/13/1990 |
| From: | Gardner R, Westberg R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20059J253 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-346-90-17, GL-85-06, GL-85-6, NUDOCS 9009190240 | |
| Download: ML20059J270 (7) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l
REGION III
I Report No. 50 346\\90017(DRS)
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Docket No. 50 346 License No. NPF 3
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Licensee: Toledo Edison Company i
Edison Plaza
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300 Nadison Avenue
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Toledo, OH 43652 Facility Name: Davis Besse Nuclear Power Station Inspection At: Davis Besse Site, Oak Harbor, OH 43449 Inspection Conducted: August 27 through 31, 1990 G D Inspector:
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Rolf %)%Destberg (j Date
%N Approved By:
R. N. Gardner, Chief Date Plant Systems Section Insoection Su===rv:
Insoection on August 27 throuch 31. 1990 )Recort No. 50 346/90017(DRS))
Areas Insoected: Special announced inspection of implementation of 10 CFR 50.62, the ATWS Rule, per temporary inspection instruction (TI) 2500/20 l
(25020) (SIMS Number MPA A 20).
Resulta: No violations or deviations were identified. TI 2500/20 and Generic Letter 85 06 were closed.
Two previously identified open items were closed.
Based on the inspection, the inspector reached the following conclusion:
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The Quality Assurance applied to the Diverse Scram System generally exceeded the guidance given in Generic Letter 85 06.
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1 9009190240 900913
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PDR ADOCK 05000346
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DETAILS 1.
Eersons Contacted Toledo Edison Comoany (TE)
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L. Storz, Plant Manager-
- R. Schrauder, Manager, Nuclear Licensing
- N. Peterson, Licensing
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C. Butcher, Design I&C D. Reia, Procurement Engineering
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A. Zarkesh, Nuclear Engineering j
- D. Kuhtenia, Nuclear Engineering
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- M. Beier, Quality Assurance i
- C, Rupp, Design Engineering i
L. Stalter, Design Engineering
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- B. Shingleton, Licensing
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- D. Cerren, System Engineer
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P. Roelant, System Engineer I
- C. Homma, Licensing Agh, cock and Wilcox (B&W)~
- S. Love, Site Representative U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
- P. Byron, Senior Resident Inspector
- K. 'Jalton, Resident Inspector -
- Indicates those attending the exit meeting on August 31, 1990.
Other personnel were contacted during the inspection.
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2.
(Closed) Generic Letter (CL) 85 06: Ouality Assurance Guidance For ATWS Eauinment that is not Safetv Reinted The inspector verified that the licensee generally met or exceeded the supplemental QA controls guidance given in CL 85-06 (See Section 4 of l
this report).
CL 85 06 is considered closed.
- 3.
Licensee Action on Previous 1v Identified Insnection Findines a.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (346/88023 01): Licensee to substantiate the battery temperature correction factor based on historical data when Calculation No. C-EE 002 005 is revised.
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The inspector reviewed Revision 1 to Calculation No. C EE 002 005-dated November 1, 1988, and determined that the battery temperature correction factor reflected the actual historical temperatures seen in the battery room. This item is considered closed.
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(Closed) Unresolved item (346/88029 02): Licensee to investigate i
the trend of seven load swings on the 125 Vdc battery chargers
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since November 1986.
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The inspector reviewed Procedure No. DB ME 09201, " Battery charger
l and Regulated Rectifier Maintenance," Revision' 00, which.was
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enhanced to give better direction and found it acceptable.
Since the replacement of the control boards on two of the battery-l chargers, there have been no detectable load swings.
This item is-
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considered closed.
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(Closed) Tannorary Instruction (2500/20) (SIMS Nu=her MPA A-20)
l 10 CFR 50.62, "The ATWS Rule",' requires that each pressurized water reactor have equipment from sensor output to final actuation device, j
that is diverse from the reactor trip system (RPS), to automatica!.ly initiate the auxiliary (or emergency) feedwater system and inis te a turbine trip under conditions indicative of an ATWS.
This equipwent
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must be designed to perform its function in a reliable manner and be.
independent (from sensor output to the final actuation device)'from the existing reactor trip system. In addition, each pressurized water reactor manufactured by Combustion Engineering or by Babcock and Wilcox
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must have a diverse scram system from the sensor output to the control
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rods.
This scram system must be designed to perform its function in a J
reliable manner and be independent'from the existing. reactor trip system (from sensor to interruption of power to the control rods).
The Babcock and Wilcox Dwner's Groop (BWOG) submitted a generic. design
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for ATWS mitigation system actuation circuitry (AMSAC) in response to
This design, Report No. 47 1159091 00, " Design
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Requirements for DSS (Diverse Scram System) and AMSAC (ATWS Mitigation Actuation Circulty)," was approved by.the NRC in a safety evaluation l
report (SER) dated August 10, 1986.- However, this SER required fu> ther approval of many plant specific details.~
The Davis Besse plant specific design was approved by the NRC in an SER dated September 29, 1989. However, the SER contained.one open item relative to qualification of the isolation devices between non Class 1E and Class 1E systems. The SER also considered the existing Steam and.
Feedwater Rupture Control System (SERCS), a Class 1E system, as'
equivalent to the required AMSAC.
Therefore, the plant-was only l
required to install the DSS, which was installed and tested during the refueling outage completed in the Spring of 1990, i
The objective of this inspection was.to determine whether the DSS complied with the 10 CFR 50.62 rule requirements and whether the
_I effectiveness of the QA controls applied to the major activities (design, procurement, installation, and testing) for DSS equipment complies with Generic Letter 85-06, "QA Guidance for ATWS Equipment That
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Is Not Safety-Related," or with 10 CFR 50, Appendix B.
The inspection also assessed the operational adequacy and reliability of the installed equipment, j
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Document:_ Reviewed (1)
Safety Evaluation Renorts (a)
NRC Evaluation of BWOG Generic Report
" Design
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Requirements For DSS and ANSAC", dated August 10.
1986.
(b)
NRC Evaluation of BWOG Generic Report - " Design-
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Requirements for DSS and AMSAC", dated August 19,
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1988.
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(c)
Evaluati;n of the Davis-Besse Nuclear ~ Power Station Compliance With 10 CFR $0.62 Requirements for i
Re?uction of Risk From Anticipated Transients Vf thout Scram (ATWS), dated September 29, 1989.
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(2)
La tters (a)
J. Williams to NRC, " Implementation Schedule," dated October 11, 1985.
(b)
NRC to J. Williams, " Davis Besse, Unit 1 Schedule for Implementation ot* the'ATWS Rule", dated March 10,
1987.
(c)
D.. Shelton to NRC, " Implementation Schedule Delay,"
dated April 14, 1987..
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NRC to L Stalter, " August 17, 1988, B&W/NRC ATWS Meeting," dated September 7, 1988.
(e)
D. Shelton to NRC, " Davis Besse ATWS Design Requirements and Implementation Schedule," dated October 31, 1988.
(f)
D. Shelton to NRC, " Plant Specific Submittal for ATWS Implementation," dated February 28, 1989..
(g)
NRC to D. Shelton, " Anticipated Transients Without Scram (ATWS 10 CFR 50.62 Implementation Review),"
i dated May 3, 1989.
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D. Shelton to NRC, " Revision to Plant-Specific
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Submittal for ATWS Implementation," dated June 30, 1989.
'I (3)
Modification No. 88-0193. " Diverse Scram System," Revision 2.
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_(4)
Post Modificatoin/ Surveillance Test No. DB-PF-10099.
" Diverse Scram. System Test," Revision 00,1 dated May 30, 1990.
(5)
Maintenance Work orders-various.
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Aurmanted Quality List-
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Toledo Edison'Purchame Order No. S-005715 D89. dated November 11,_1989, and Change Orders.
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Training Records for Personnel On-Shift - various.
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Drawing'No. E-7. "250/125Vde and Inatrumentation AC One Line
,ingram." Revision 18.
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Insnection Results-
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The inspector verified the following aspects'of:the DaviA-Besse
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DSS installation.
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(1)
Design Enzineerinn The inspector's reviewfof the DSS uiring and schematic
diagrams, the. site speciff.c design submittalse and selecto.L.
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Reactor-Protection System'(RPS) wiring: diagrams ~ confirmed that the DSS did not compromise :the safety; features 4 of the existing safety related'RPS. ;Walkdown offsel'cted portions
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e of the installed DSS also' supported thiriconclusion.
Review of the-DSS modification package indicated.that the l
design endorsed by the'NRR SER'was properlyjimplemented.
The inspector also reviewed the test report supporting the-
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qualification of t.
' boro 2AO-VA1: isolation devices
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bstween the non-Class nd Class 1E' interfaces.and found
'I it acceptable.
(2)
Procurement'and Installation of the' DSS'Eadioment The inspector' reviewed.the DSS procurement' packages and
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verified that the technical requirementcicf-the'DavisLBesne
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site specific design.were in compliance 1with the'SER and'the
.ATWS rule.
Through review:of the procurement package'for the DSS'
equipment.and' receipt inspections of the jquipment,"the a
inspector determined that the proper receipt inspection, identification, and storage controls were employed.
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During a walk-down of the DS9 installe. tion,.the' inspector
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observed the following'
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The DES equipment met the configuration specified.
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The DSS' equipment was installed in the proper location-and was oriented'and supported as specified in.the (:
design package.
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The DSS: installation met the plant. physical separatioa criteria for; electrical: independence between safety related and nonsafety related circuits'and redundant channels.-
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(d)
.Reviev offthe DSS installation work request packsge's
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indicated that the installers.used the proper, tools,-
that-radiolor,ical and fire protection controls were i,
observed, end that QC performed neessary inspections.
(3)
fdmfirmation of QMol'etad Worn-
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(a)
The.insp'ector verified that the DSS performed.as specified in the' Davis Besse site specifir design-
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through a review.of1the modification package and'the-
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functional test.
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(b)'.The inspector reviewed the DSS and SERCS' annunciator:
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procedures andLthe ATWS training lesson plans.with acceptable-results.. ATWSjtraining for on-shift personnellin'the control room was verified'as h ving
'been performed,
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(c)
Davis-Besse has committed to a complete <.nd to end
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test of the DSS during:each refueling outage snd; l
periodic testing of those portions of the DSS that can
be tested at powerL The ins 1.ector. reviewed the i
proposed: surveillance procedures with acceptable-
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results, j
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The inspector verified the existence.of the-a permanently installed master? bypass switch in the DSS l
control panel and the related annunciator (DSS Not
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Normal) in'the control room.
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(f)
.The inspector verified through review'of the DSS logic j
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diagrams,that once the mitigative action is. initiated, il the action-is sealed in'and subsequent return to
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normal operations,can be accomplished by.the; operator L
by deliberace actions after the syste's times out, l
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The Davis-Besse DSS design does not include a manual
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initiation switch; however, the inspector verified
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. that.ths SFRCS has manual initiation capability in the:
control room.
(4):
ouality' Assurance and Dualifications The inspector verified that. portions of the major activities such as design control, procurement,, installation, and
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testing were accomplished as Augmented Quality infaccordanca j
with the plant's established procedures.
In addition, QC'
perforwed documonted inspections of the DSS receipt -and installation.
.t During this inspection, the inspector observed that the:
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licensee' generally exceeded the supplemental QA controls
- guidance given by Generic. Letter 85-06.
Personne1 Lcontacted during-the inspection such.as: the technica11 staff engineer and the Assistant Shift Supervisor were well trained and knowledgeab7e in the ATWS systems.
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12xi t.. Interview
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The inspector met with licensee representatives;(denotedlin Paragraph;l)
.during and et the conclusion of the inspection on: August:31, 1990if.The
' inspector summarAzed.the scope and results of therinspectionLand:
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i discussed tidi likely informational content of the inspection report with-regard to documents or processes reviewed byitherinspector during]the
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L inspeccion.. Thel 31censee did not identify any such documents orr
y processes as, proprietary.1
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