IR 05000346/1990016
| ML20058F487 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 10/24/1990 |
| From: | Jackiw I NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20058F486 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-346-90-16, NUDOCS 9011080315 | |
| Download: ML20058F487 (14) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION III
Report No. 50-346/90016(DRP)
Docket No. 50-346 Operating License No. NPF-3 Licensee: Toledo Edison Company Edison Plaza, 300 Madison Avenue Toledo, OH 43652 Facility Name:
Davis-Besse 1 Inspection At:
Oak Harbor, Ohio Inspection Conducted: August 14, 1990 through October 9, 1990 Inspectors:
P. M. Byron D. C. Kosloff R. K. Walton b
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Approved By:
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, Chief
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Re tor je:ts Section 3A Date Inspection Summary Inspection on August 14 through October 9,1990 (Report No. 50-346/90016(DRP))
Areas Inspected: A coutine safety inspection by resident inspectors of licensee actions on previous inspection findings, licensee event reports, plant operations, refteling, radiological controls, maintenance /survei? lance, emergency preparedness, security, engineering and technical support, and safety assessment / quality verification was performed.
Results: The licensee experienced a trip of one main feedwater pump from 100% power resulting in a plant transient but not causing the plant to trip.
The ability of the plant to withstand such a transient was an attribute to good engineering design and analysis. The initiating event was caused by the establishment of inadequate isolation for maintenance (Paragraph 4). The inspectors have noted that fire fighter fatigue during drills could potentially affect the quality of fire fighting at the facility and needs to be addressed by the licensee (Paragraph 4). An unusual event was declared at the facility due to a chlorine gas release caused by a chemical reaction between two reagents in the Water Treatment building sump. Two workers were sent to a local hospital for observation. One was released the same day and the other was released the following day without injury (Paragraph 5). The licensee determined after a detailed review that the failed makeup system letdown valve (MU2B) had little contribution to the outage dose contrary to 9011080315 901024 PDR ADOCK 05000346 G
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its original contention.(Paragraph 5).
The annual emergency preparedness drill was performed,at the facility with the NRC participating. The licensee's performance during the drill was considered good (Paragraph 7).
The licensee has completed its Course of Action program which was established after its Loss of Feedwater event in June of 1985 (Paragraph 10). The_NRC presented the licensee its Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance
'($ ALP) report on October 2,1990 (Paragraph 10).
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted a.
Toledo Edison Company D. Shelton, Vice President, Nuclear G. Gibbs, Director, Quality Assurance L. Storz, Plant Manager
- M. Heffley, Maintenance Manager
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- R. Brandt, Plant Operations Manager (Acting)
M. Bezilla, Superintendent, Operations E. Salowitz, Director, Planning and Support
- S. Jain, Director, DB Engineering K. Prasad, Nuclear Engineering Manager (Acting)
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G. Grime, Industrial Security Director
- D Timms, Systems Engineering Manager R. Uebbing, Maintenance Coordinator
- J. Polyak, Radiological Control Manager R. Coad, Radiological Protection Supervisor
- J. Lash, Independent Safety Engineering Manager
- T. O'Dou, Radiological Assessor
- J. Moyers, Manager Quality Verification
- T. Anderson, Manager Maintenance Planning and Outage Mgmt.
- G. Honi..a,. Compliance Supervisor
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- R. Gaston, Licensing Technologist b.
- P. Byron, Senior Resident Inspector
- R. Walton, Re>ident Inspector D. Kosloff, Resident Inspector
- Denotes those personnel attending the October 1, 1990, exit meeting.
- Denotes those personnel attending the October 9,1990, exit meeting.
2.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701)
(CLOSED)UnresolvedItem(346/88026-03(DRPll:
The inspectors noted excessive vibrations of the auxiliary feedwater piping during the performance of DB-PF-10049, Startup Feedwater Pump Acceptance Test. The vibrations were caused by full auxiliary feedwater; flow through the cavitating venturis into a depressurized steam generator (SG).
The licensee obtained strain measurements from the pipes in question during Mode 3 and Mode 5 operations testing and has determiaed that the strain levels ard resultant stresses were within ASME limits for unlimited service 1dfe for Mode 3.
However, due to fatigue, the flow indicator instrumer.t tubing lifetime was expected to be only 6.5 days with full flow to a depressurized SG in Mode 5.
The only time this condition exists is during the_ performance of auxiliary feedwater testing.
The licensee has l
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modified these tests procedures to ensure that flow rates through the venturi are restricted when using the auxiliary feed water line to fill a depressurized SG or that the cavitating venturi is removed if excessive flow rates are required.
This will minimize stress on the instrument l
tubing and maximize its service lifetime. This item is closed.
(CLOSED) Open Item (346/88026-06(DRP)):
During the fill of the refueling canal, the licensee discovr. red a leak on the Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP)
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1-1 seal assembly due to a thermocouple not being installed.
The thermocouple was removed by I&C personnel under an electrical maintenance
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work order (MWO) that supported mechanical work being performed on the RCP.
The I&C support MWO requested that the component be isolated prior to work being performed as required by procedure DB-0P-00015, " Safety Tagging". However, I&C personnel knowing that the RCP had already been tagged out for other maintenance, proceeded to perform work on a thermocouple without referencing the component as being isolated. When the work on the RCP was completed, the mechanical isolation was removed.
- Since the I&C work on the thermocouple had not yet been completed and the refueling canal was refilled, primary coolant leaked on the RCP through i
the removed thermocouple. The licensee has modified the safety tagging
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procedure and has counseled 'naintenance supervisors. This item is closed.
{ CLOSED) Violation (346/88037-02(DRP)): A maintenance planner failed to adequately ensure that the work to be performed on control rod group 3 could be_ performed without changing plant conditions. The planner relied on the experience of the I&C mechanic who failed to utilize all the necessary drawings to ensure power to the rod circuitry would not be disrupted. The lack of precautions to utilize auxiliary power resulted in rod group 3 dropping into the core.
The licensee's corrective action included. placing a sign on all rod programmer drawers to ensure that rods are powered from an auxiliary power source prior to performing maintenance.
I&C personnel have had enhanced training on rod drive maintenance'and they now have a more complete set of cross-referenced rod control drawings for easier use. The inspectors note that system engineers and I&C mechanics have recently been sent to the Babcock and Wilcox Training Center for training on the control rod drive system including troubleshooting techniques.
This item is closed.
(CLOSED) Violations (,346/88037-04(DRP) and (346/88037-05(DRP)): During a rod drop event on December 18, 1988, operators made late log entries
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and did not indicate that the entries were late entries.
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the reactor operators log did not provide sufficient detail to enable a reconstruction of events.
Licensee management has counseled operations personnel in log keeping practices.
Procedure DB-0P-00005, " Operating Logs and Reading Sheets", has been revised to clarify log keeping
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_ requirements. Operations'_ personnel have received training on this
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procedure and' log keeping is reinforced during simulator training.
l The inspectors have noted an improvement in the quality of log keeping.
This item is closed.
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{CLOSEDLViolations (346/88337-06 and 346/88037-07(DRP)): On December 18, 1988, rod group 3 dropped into the core during performance of maintenance.
Control room operators, while performing a plant start up, withdrew group 3 rods without first inscrting regulating rods (grorps 5 through 7) as required by procedure DB-PF-06203, " Approach to Criticality".
In addition, the licensee did not have any procedures to address multiple rod drop events. As a result of this event, the licensee received a level III violation and a civil penalty. The licensees corrective actions to this event included classroom training on the revised procedure for control rod drive malfunctions for all licensed operators.
This procedure revision included operator actions to multiple rod drop events. All licensed operators have received simulator training on reactivity events at low power. Additionally, operators have received training in other areas as discussed in the above paragraphs.
The inspectors consider the licensee's actions to be adequate.
These items are closed.
{. CLOSED) Violation (346/88037-08(DRP)):
The licensee failed to notify the NRC of the December 18, IM8 event within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> as required by 10 CFR
50.72. The licensee did not determine that the event was reportable until January 24, 1989.
The licensee has since redefined the terms "in operation" and " shutdown" to prevent confusion.
This item is closed.
(CLOSED) Violation (346/88039-02(ORP)):
The licensee submitted an Updated i
Safety Analysis Report (V!iXRTrevision dated July 1988, to recognize that i
an over current relay for the Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) would be i
bypassed during an under voltage condition on the essential bus or a loss of coolant accident. The USAR revision was made to describe a condition which had existed for 11 years and was incorrectly processed as an
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editorial chan9e by the licensee. As such, the revision was not accompanied by a safety evaluation as required by 10CFR50.59b(1).
The licensee has since issued a new USAR revision with the required safety-i evaluation.
The licensee has determined that no other USAR revisions were improperly incorporated as editorial changes or without a safety j
evaluation.' This item is closed.
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,(CLOSED)OpenItem(346/88039-03(DRp)):
The inspectors noted deficiencies during the performance of Performance Test 5103.07, "13.8 Kv Bus Transfer L
Test," and notified the licensee. The licensee corrected the test
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deficiencies 'and issued a new procedure, DB-SC-04026 "13.8 KV Bus A&B Fast Transfer." The inspectors did not understand how the test could be performed as written without any test deficiencies noted. They were
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change-had not been. issued to correct the known deficiencies. The
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licensee also issued Management Corrective Action Report (MCAR 88-03)
which addressed procedural problems including the reluctance of personnel to write' procedure change requests to correct noted deficiencies.
MCAR 88-03 attributed this to a lack of understanding by personnel of the
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-procedure-change process.
The licensee has trained its personnel on the i
. procedural change process.
The. inspectors have noted that the licensee is enforcing _its procedure change requirements and have observed few examples
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i of procedures not being changed.
This item is-closed.
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(CLOSED) Violation (346/88039-04A, B, and C(DRP)l: With the plant in Mode 5, the licensee started Decay Heat Pump (DHP) No. I with both suction
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valves shut. The cause of this event was an improper turnover from the on-shift reactor operator who was aware that both suction valves were closed, but did not include this in his turnover.
It was further compounded by the failure of the oncoming operator to recognize that both suction valves were shut as indicated on the control panels. Operations personnel involved in this event have been counseled by management and
,the plant manager has discussed this event with all shift personnel.
7his item is closed.
(CLOSED) Violation (346/88039-04D(DRP)): On November 11, 1988, Containment Air Cooler (CAC) No. 2 was tagged out for maintenance.
CAC No. 2 maintenance was completed but the retest results were not reviewed until November 29, 1988.
However, on November 27, 1988, an operator-opened the breaker that supplied power to CAC No. 3 believing that he was returning it to a normal lineup.
This administratively left only CAC No.
1 operable. The licensee did not realize that it had entered into a Technical Specification Action Statement that required two CAC's to be operable. The cause of this event was inattention to detail as the
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operator was not aware of equipment status.
The licensac nas since modified its conduct of operations procedure, DB-0P-00000, to include improved methods.for tracking and delineating out of service equipment.
The inspectors reviewed the cevised procedure.
The inspectors have roted that the status board now provides better indication of equipment which is out of serv *ce or in an abnormal lineup. It is noted that the status board is being properly maintained by the operators.
This item is closed.
(CLOSEden Item (346/88039-05(ORp)): The licensee identified excessive vibrations during minimum flow conditions while testing Decay Heat Pump (DHP) No. 1.
The licensee determined that the vibrations did not affect pump operability and conducted further analysis to assess the point at which the vibration was. indicative of pump degradation. The licensee performed dyr amic and static analysis of the DHP's and determined that pump bearing failure should not occu prior to 16000 hours of run time at minimum flow conditions. Additicnally, during the sixth refueling outage (RFO), +.he licensee checked pump and piping alignment and found no discrepancies. An operational test performed on April 12, 1990, determined that the vibration had decreased.
The licensee' plans to
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replu : the pump bearings during the seventh RF0. This item is closed.
(CLOS;-)OpenItem(346/89005-03(DRp)]: The licensee discovered during tb operation of the Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Turbine that the trip torottle valve could not be reset due to inadequate clearances of the linkages. Adjustments were made to the ' linkages. The licensee has revised both the as-found drawings and maintenance procedures.
The inspectors-have not observed any problems resetting the trip throttle and consider the fixes-to be effective. This item is closed.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
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3.
Licensee Event Reports Followup (92700)
Through direct observation, discussions with licensee personnel, and
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review of records the following licensee event reports (LERs) were reviewed to deturmine that reportability requirements were fulfilled,
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that:immedir+e corrective actions to prevent recurrence was accomplished in accordae.e tith Technical Specifications (TS). The LERs listed below are consid-i closed:
[ CLOSED)_LER 88001:
Seismic Trigger Does Not Meet Technical SjieWiication Frequency Range. On January 6,1988, the licensee determined that the seismic trigger which had been installed since June 1977, did not meet the Technical Specification raquirements for frequency response. A new seismic trigger which meets the Technical Specifications was installed.by the licensee on April 11, 1988.
The licensee has submitted a license change request to ensure that the Technical i
Specifications and Regulatory Guide requirements of the trigger are similar and is of an available design.
Procedures now exist to ensure a proper safety review process is followed for plant modifications.
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LER is closed.
(CLOSED) LER 89007: One of Four Strong Motion Triaxial Accelerometers
' Inoperable for more than 30 Days.
On June 14, 1989, a power supply fuse for the Seismic Monitoring System failed. The licensee determined that a strong motion detector mounted inside containment had failed.
During the sixth refueling outage, the detector was examined and a choke on the regulated circuit board was found to have degraded insulation in the vicinity of a mounting screw. The licensee believes that tha insulation was damaged during initial installation and degraded with t we which finally resulted in a short to ground via the choke to the mounting screw. The licensee has repaired the damaged detector and has examined the'other strong. motion detectors for. degraded conditions.
No other detectors exhibited'such conditions.
This item is closed.
(CLOSED) LER 90011:
Safety Features Actuation System level 1 Actuation Due,tc hmoving the Wrong Radiation Mc itor.
This event was discussed in
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Inspection Report No.- 50-346/90015.
This-LER is closed.
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.(CLOSED) LER 90013:
18 Month Fire Barrier Inspections not completed due
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to Procedural leficiencies-This event was discussed in Inspection
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Report'No. 50-346/90015.. This LER is closed.
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No violations or-deviations were identifie'd.
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Plant Operatior,s (715C0, 71707, 93702)
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Operational Safety' Verification Inspections were routinely performed to ensure that the licensee conducts activities at the facility safely and in conformance with regulatory requirements. The inspections focused on the
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implementation and overall effectiveness of the licensea's control of operating activities, and on the performance of licensed and non-licensed operators and shift managers.
The inspections included direct observation of activities, tours of the facility, interviews W
and discussions with licensee personnel, independent verification of safety system status and limiting conditions of operation (LCO), and reviews of facility procedures, records, and reports.
The following items were considered during these inspections:
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Adequacy of plant staffing and supervision.
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Control room professionalism, including procedure adherence,
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operator attentiveness, and response to alarms, events, and off-normal conditions.
Operability of selected safety-related systems, including
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attendant alarms, instrumentation, and controls.
Maintenance of quality records and reports.
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The inspectors observed that control room shift supervisors, shift managers, and operators were attentive to plant conditions, performed frequent panel walkdowns and were responsive to off-normal alarms and conditions.
On December 18, 1988, the licensee attempted to recover Group 3 control rods which had dropped during a reactor startup without benefit of a procedure.
This event is documented in Inspection-Report 50-346/88037(DRP). One of the actions the licensee took was toitake the shift supervisor off shift and review his performance.
He was evaluated and given additional training which addressed identified weaknesses.
None of the weaknesses were in 'he technical a
or decision making areas.
On May.1, 1989, the licensee informed Region III that it had returned the shif t supervisor to duty on an interim basis.
Region III ~ requested that the licensee submit the final evaluation to the-NRC~ prior to returning the shift supervisor to full duties. On 0ctober 4, 1990, the licensee presented the evaluation to the Senior Resident Inspector for his review.
The evaluations were reviewed and nothing was noted which would prevent the shift supervisor from
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assuming full duties. Discussions with the licensee in:' Dated that-it plans'to return the individual'to. full duties but will provide m
management oversight for an undetermined time period. -This
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At,1:34 p.m. on August 14, 1990, with the unit at 100% power, main feed water pump,(MFP) No. -1 tripped _due to low lubricating oil pressure to the MFP turbine.
The Integrated Control System (ICS)
ran back reactor power _ to 60% and-increased _the speed of the
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remaining main feed pump.
Maintenance personnel had disassembled
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P the Turbine Plant Cooling Water (TPCW) side of MFP No. I lube oil cooler to remove debris which had been entrained in the TPCW system.
The TPCW side of the cooler had been tagged out but the lube oil side of the cooler remained pressurized.
Maintenance and engineering personnel were not aware that the tube bundle section of the cooler
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was designed as a removable unit. A gasket and retainer ring at the bottom of the cooler was the only pressure barrier between the pressurized lube oil system and the disassembled cooler.
Approximately 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> after maintenance personnel disassembled the lower head of the cooler, a worker inspecting the lower tube bundle area of the cooler noticed that the gasket between the lube oil system and the
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open cooler was deforming. The worker immediately exited the area.
The gasket failed and approximately 1000 gallons of MFP lubricating oil poured from the cooler into tl,e confined pit area. The loss of lubricating oil caused the MFP to trip on low lube oil pressure.
No personnel injury or equipment damage resulted from this eant. The licensee repaired the lube oil cooler and MFP No. I was returned to service on August 16, 1990.
Reactor power was raised to 100% a day later.
The fact that the unit did not trip when sub9 cted to such a transient was attributed to good engineering analysh and modifications made to the Integrated Control System and the Reactor Protection System.
During an unannounced fire drill performed by the licensee on August 29, 1990, certain actions required by the Fire Brigade procedure, (DB-FP-00005), were not performed by the fire brigade or the fire brigade captain. As a result, the controller declared the drill to be a failure.
The performance of the control room personnel was determined to be satisfactory. The-licensee has written a Potential Condition Adverse to Quality report (PCAQR 90-0611) to address these deficienc.ies.
During the drill, a fire brigade member suf:ered from a mild case of heat exhaustion due to physical stress and aggravated by his protective clothing.
Similarly, during a fire-drill on August 8,1989, a fire brigade member became ill during the
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course of the drill.
The fire fighter's fatigue was attributed to
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the brigade being-trained the previous day.
The inspectors are concerned that these conditions could affect the brigade's-effectiveness.
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Off-shift Inssection of Control Rooms The inspectors performed routine-inspections of the control room during off-shift and weekend periods; these included inspections
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between' the hours of 10:00 p.m. and 5:30 a.m.
The inspections were-
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conducted to assess overall crew performance-and,.specifically, control room operator attentiveness _during night shifts.
The inspectors determined that both licensed and non-licensed operators were alert and attentive to '. heir duties, and that the administrative
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controls relating to the conduct of operation were being adhered to.
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ESF System Walkdown The operability of selected engineered safety features was confirmed by the inspectors during walkdowns of the accessible portions of several' systems. The following items were included:
verification that procedures match the plant drawings, that equipment, instrumentation, valve and electrical breaker line-up status is in agreement with procedure checklists, and verification that locks, tags, jumperc,, etc., are properly attached and identifiable. The following systems were walked down during this inspection period:
480 Volt AC Electrical Distribution System
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Component Cooling Water System
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Emergency Diesel Generator System
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OC Electric Distribution System
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Service Water System
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Plant Material Conditions / Housekeeping
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The inspectors performed routine plant tours to assess material conditions within the plant, ongoing quality activities and plant-wide housekeeping.
Housekeeping was adequate.
Plant deficiencies _were appropriately tagged for deficiency correction.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Radiological Controls (71707)
The licensee's radiological controls and practices were.outinely observed by the inspectors during plan + tours and during the inspection of selected work activities. The inspection included direct observations of health physics (HP) activities relating to radiological surveys and-monitoring, maintenance of radiological control signs and barriers, contamination, and radioactive waste controls.
The inspection also included a routine review of the licensee's radiological and water chemistry control records and. reports.
Health physics controls and practices were satisfactory, Knowledge and training of personnel were satisfactory.
About 3:00 p.m. on October 8,1990, the licensee experienced a chlorine gas release.in the water treatment building. Two chemistry testers who were in the water treatment building at the time of the event were transported by ambulance to Magruder Hospital for observation. One'of the individuals was kept overnight for continued observation.
The licensee declared an unusual event at 3:32 p.m. in accordance with its emergency plan. The licensee attributes.the release to a leak in the sodium hypochlorite system caused by an equipment malfunction coincident with backwashing/ regenerating a cation demineralizer with sulfuric acid.
The licensee is investigating the cause of the event.
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The ' licensee has performed an analysis to determine the effect of the f ailure of ' letdown valve MU2B on outage dose rates.
The licensee has concluded that the failure of this valve had very little effect on oocage-dosage other than that received during the repair of MU28.
No violat*ons or deviations were identified.
6.
Madntenance/ Surveillance (61726, 62703, 92701,.93702)
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Selected portions of plant surveillance, test and maintenance activities on systems and components important to safety were observed or reviewed to ascertain that the activities were performed in accordance with
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approved procedures, regulatory guides, industry codes and standards, and
the Technical Specifications.
The following items were considered during
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these inspections:
limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating' work; activities were accomplished using approved
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procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing or calibrction was performed prior to returning the components or systems to service; parts and materials used were properly certified; and appropriate fire prevention, radiological, and housekeeping conditions were maintained.
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Maintenance The reviewed maintenance activities included:
Maintenance on radin feed pump 1-
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Validyne input card calibration
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Main Turbine. Control Valve Testing
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1roubleshoot Auxiliary Feedwater Valve -Indication
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Spent Fuel Pool Trash Removal
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Condensate Pump Motor replacement 1
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Troubleshoot Control Rod Drive Circuitry
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b.
Surveillance The reviewed surveillances included:
Procedure No.
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DB-ME-03003 Station Battery Charger Test
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DB-MI 03023 RPS Shutdown' Bypass HF Press and Hi Flux Trip Functional Test
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Procedure No.
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08-5C-03070 Emergency Diesel Generator 1 Monthly Test 08-5C-03071 Emergency Diesel Generator 2 Monthly Test e
DB-MI 04550 Radiation Monitoring System Channel Calibration
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ST 5030.11 RPS Power Range Calibration DB-MI-03043 RPS Containment Pressure Calibration DB-SP-03151 Auxiliary Feed Pump #1 Quarterly Test DB-MI-03012 RPS Channel 2 Trip Module Logic and Trip Breaker Test
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Personnel performing rnaintenance or surveillances used correct procedures and proper work control documents.
Work authorization had been obtained for the jobs performed.
Prerequisites for performing the job, such as
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worker protection and tagging had been performed.
Surveillance continues
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to be an area where only an occasional minor problem arises.
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No other violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Emergency Preparedness (71707, 82301)
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An inspection of emergency preparedness activities was performed to-assess.the li:ensee's implementation of the emergency plan and implementing procedures. The inspection included monthly observation of emergency _ facilities and equipment, interviews'with licensee staf f, and _a review of selected emergency implementing procedures,
t On August 29, 1990, the licensee conducted an emergency preparedness-drill.
The drill tested the licensee's ability to assess and respond to k
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- emergency conditions and take adequate actions to-protect the health and safety of the public and station personnel.
The inspectors observed that the_ control room operators did a good jobiof evaluating the. scenario-
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conditions and took appro'
ste corrective actions.
Problems with the a
alternate Joint,Public Ini tion Center (JPIC; were identified during
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- thel drill _. The licensee ns...I that communications were delayed:and the-in-information released was at times inaccurate.
Additional training for-
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the-personnel at.the~ alternate JPIC was previded by the licensee. The-
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, licensee judged the drill as successful.
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'On September 19,.1990, the licensee conducted its annual emergency L'
-' preparedness exercise with designated members of the NRC staff participating. The exercise consisted of a steam generator tube leak (which eventually evolved into a rupture)~with the station radiation t%
' monitors unavailable. The exercise participants declared an alert condition and this caused 'the NRC -to dispatch ~a team to the site. The w
state and county officials-also participated to a limitad extent. This exercise is-discussed in Insrett ion Report 50-346/9001L (DRSS).
No violations or deviatiot,; w re identified.
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Security Q1707)
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The licensee's security activities were otaerved by the inspectors during routine f acility tours and during the inspectors' site arrivals and l
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departures.
Observations included the security personnel's performance
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associated with access control, security checks, and surveillance i
activities, and focused on the adequacy of security staff;ng, the l
security ' response (compensatory measures), and the security staf f's j
attentiveness and thoroughness.
Security personnel were observed to be
alert at their posts. Appropriate compensatory measures were established in a timely manner.
Vehicles entering the protected area were thoroughly searched.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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9.
Engineering and Technical Support (37700, 62703, 71707, 92701)
An inspection.of engineering and technical support activities was
performed tol assess the adequacy of support functions associated with
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operations, maintenance / modifications, surveillance and testing o'
activities. 'The inspection focused on routine engineering involvement in
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plant operations and response to plant problems.
The inspection included
-direct observation of engineering support activities and discussions with engineering, operations, and maintenance personnel.
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Ouring the sixth *efueling outage, the licensee noted that a number of
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motor operated valves (MOV) had failed.
The valves. included MU-28, RC11 and RC2 which were discussed in Inspection Reports 50-346/90002 and-i 50-346/90013.
The licensee has conducted an investigation as to the
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cause of~ failure-of these valves.
It concluded that there was no common
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failure mechanism but two areas of 'he MOV program were identified as
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needing additional attention: Higher than anticipated valve cycling and j
the ' existence of hydraulic lock in the MOV spring pack. The licensee is
. continuing to evaluate what changes are to be made to the MOV program to'
enhance'MOV performance, i
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10.
Safety _, Assessment / Quality Verification (92701, 92702, 30703, 35702_,
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E01,[9TM i
An inspect. ion of the licensee's quality programs was performed to assess the implementation and fectiveness of program. associated with management control, verification, and oversight' activities..The
- ins ~pectors considered areas indicative of overall management involvement in' quality matters,.self-improvement programs, response to regulatory and j
' Industry-. initiatives, the frequency of management plant tours and control room observations, and management personnel's participation inftechnical
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-and planning meetings; The insoectors reviewed Potential Condition
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- Adverse'to Quality Reports-(PCACR), Station Review Board (SRB) and
- Company Nuclear Review Board meeting minutes, event critiques, and-
related documents; focusing on the licensee's root cause determinations i
-and corrective actions.
The inspection also included a' review of quality records and selected quality assurance audit and surveillance activities.
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M-
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On October 2, 1990, the Regional Administrator with members of his staff met with Senior Corporate and licensee management and members of their staf f at Davis-Besse to present a summary of SALP 8.
The' licensee received the same ratings as were in the previous SALP report.
SALP 8 is documented in Inspection Report No. 50-346/90001.
Following the Loss of Feedwater event on June 9, 1985,-the licensee embarked on a program to improve performance.
The program which detailed
actions to achieve the goal was called the Course of Action (C0A)-
pregram.
The licensee notified the NRC that the commitments made under this program are complete as of September 26, 1990, with the exception of the
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plant simulator.(which is due to be comple+.e by Mid 1991) and to submit conclusions of the System Review and Test Program (SRTP).
The SRTP is a continuing program.
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y 11.
Exit Interview (30703)
The ' inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)
throughout the inspection period <nd at the conclusion of the inspection i
and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities. The licensee' acknowledged the findinos. After discussions with the licensee,
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the: inspectors have determined there is no proprietary data contained in this inspection report,
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