IR 05000346/1998018

Insp Rept 50-346/98-18 on 981110-990102.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Maintenance,Engineering & Plant Support

ML20206S086
Person / Time
Site:	Davis Besse
Issue date:	01/22/1999
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20206S083	List: IR 05000346/1998018 ML20206S081
References
50-346-98-18, NUDOCS 9901280109
Download: ML20206S086 (16)

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l U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION '

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Docket No: 50-346 i License No: NPF-3 1 Report No: 50-346/98018(DRP)

Licensee: Toledo Edison Company l

Facility: Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station l

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Location: 5501 N. State Route 2

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Oak Harbor, OH 43449

Dates: November 10,1998 - January 2,1999 I

Inspectors: S. Campbell, Senior Resident inspector K. Zellers, Resident inspector S. Dupont, Project Engineer ,

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Approved by: Thomas J. Kozak, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 4 PDR ADOCK 05000346 G PDR l'

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY i Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station NRC Inspection Report 50-346/98018(DRP)  !

This inspection included aspects of licensee operations, maintenance, engineering, and plant support. The report covers a 7-week period of resident inspectio Operations

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The initial corrective actions taken to address the events which led to several plant trips and a plant runback in the latter part of 1998 resulted in event-free performance since mid-October 1998 (General). 1

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Operations management took conservative measures to commence shutting down the plant, due to lowering intake forebay levels, in anticipation of the possibility that the Technical Specification 3.7.5.1 timit for intake forebay water level would be exceeded l

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The operations department action plan to isolate and restore letdown in order to l minimize personnel dose was well thought out, executed, and managed (Section M1.2). l Maintenance

Although the initial action plan developed to address a packing leak on letdown j

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cooler 1-1 isolation valve MU-1 A did not take into account the additional stress that would exist on the body-to-bonnet bolts if the valve was shut, the final plan used to ;

address the leak, which resulted in stopping the packing leak and slowing the body-to- l bonnet leak, was comprehensive and conservative. Good teamwork was exhibited by operations, engineering, maintenance, and radiation protection personne ;

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(Section M1.2).

• FirstEnergy technicians inadvertently left a test device installed during restoration of a transmission control circuit, resulting in the inadvertent opening of switch ABS 34626 and the temporary unavailability of one of the two qualified offsite circuit Subsequently, station management took comprehensive remedial corrective actions by i

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verifying compliance with the technical specifications, stopping work on high risk activities, determining the apparent root cause, assessing the damage to ABS 34626, requiring continuous station personnel oversight for the remainder of the switchyard testing activities, and restoring the switchyard to a normal lineup (Section M1.3).

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Inadequate work instructions led to a contractor creating an opening in the control room negative pressure boundary greater than the allowed three square inches which rendered both trains of control room emergency ventilation inoperable. This was a Non-Cited Violation of NRC requirements (Section M8).

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Although station personnel identified that silt had built up in the eastern end of the intake canal and developed a plan to dredge the canal, the inspectors determined that a plan had not been developed to ensure the sitt level in the intake canal would be monitored at a frequency sufficient to ensure it remained below 562 feet (Section O2.2). 4

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Engineering personnel anticipated a lowering lake level due to a forecast of high winds, and took pro-active measures to notify operations and maintenance personnel to monitor canal water level and to be prepared to remove some of the silt buildup with a backhoe (Section O2.2).

Plant Support

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The inspectors concluded that station personnel took effective measures to minimize dose and the spread of contamination during valve MU-1A maintenance and containment air cooler cleaning activities (Section R1.1).

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Report Details Summary of Plant Status The plant was operated at nominally 100 percent reactor power until November 11 when reactor power was reduced to 38 percent as a precaution because of lowering intake forebay water levels due to high winds. After the high winds subsided and intake

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forebay water levels were trending upward, operators raised reactor power to nominally 100 percent for the remainder of the inspection period. The initial corrective actions taken to address the events which led to several plant trips and a plant runback in the latter part of 1998 have resulted in event-free performance since mid-October 199 I. Operations 01 Conduct of Operations 01.1 General Comments (71707)

Using inspection Procedure 71707, the inspectors conducted frequent reviews of ongoing plant operations. In general, the conduct of operations was professional and safe. Shift turnovers and shift briefs were conducted in a comprehensive manne Operations management efforts to improve operator three-way communication practices resulted in clearer communications with operators and other plant personne O2 Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment O2.1 System Walkdowns (71707)

The inspectors walked down the accessible portions of the following engineered-safety features and important-to-safety systems during the inspection period:

Emergency Diesel Generators

High Voltage Switchgear

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Low Voltage Switchgear

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Low Pressure injection Train 1

High Pressure Injection Train 1

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Containment Spray Pump 1 No substantive concerns were identified as a result of the walkdowns. System lineups and major flowpaths were verified to be consistent with plant procedures / drawings and the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR). Pump / motor fluid levels were within their normal bands and vibration and temperatures of running equipment were normal. Only very minor oil and fluid leaks were noted on occasio __________ - _ _ _ _ _ . __

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I O2.2 Power Reduction Due to intake Forebay Level Decrease Inspection Scooe (71707. 37551)

On November 11, the inspectors responded onsite to assess plant conditions and monitor licensee actions when notified of a reactor power reduction that had been initiated by the operators due to lowering intake forebay level caused by high wind Additionally, after the event, the inspectors conducted a review to determine if station personnel had taken appropriate actions to anticipate the event.

i Observations and Findinos Background A water intake canal extends from the plant eastward to Lake Erie. The intake canal is separated from the lake by a dike and is connected to the lake by a 96-inch diameter intake pipe that extends about 3,300 feet from the beach. The western third of the canal is seismically qualified and serves as the ultimate heat sink for the plant in that it, among other things, provides the water reserve for the service water intake structure so that the plant can be safely shut down in the event of a design basis earthquake. The bottom of the canal is at 556 feet. Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.5.1 requires that the ultimate heat sink water level be greater than 562 feet of water and that the average temperature of the water be less than 85 degrees. If these conditions are not met, the plant must be placed in hot standby within 2.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> and in cold shutdown within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

, in August 1998, the actual intake canal water level was approximately 570 feet. The service water system engineer identified that about 7 feet of silt had built up in the entire width of the eastern end of the intake canal as a result of silt transport in the lake water and due to erosion of the earthen walls of the intake canal. This correlated to an effective intake canal floor level of about 563 feet. Therefore, if lake water level had l

dropped below 563 feet, the canal would most likely have been isolated from the lake l and the licensee would not have been able to maintain the intake canal above the 562 feet required in TSs for continued plant operation. In response to this issue, dredging activities for the non-seismic portion of the intake canal were planned to start in November so that low winter lake levels coupled with potential frazile ice conditions would not jeopardize the connectivity of the lake to the intake forebay.

l Event On November 6, due to a high wind forecast, the service water system engineer briefed operations, maintenance, and engineering management of the potential that winds from the southwest could push the water in the lake away from the plant which could result in lowering the lake level below 563 feet. Dredging activities had not yet started so, if this were to occur, connectivity of the intake forebay from the lake could have been los Operations management was advised to periodically monitor the intake canal at the highest silt level point to assess the connectivity of the intake canal to the lak Maintenance management was advised to ensure the capability existed to obtain a

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l backhoe that would be able to dig through the silt buildup at its highest point in order to maintain connectivity to the lake if it was threatene For a period of about 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />, between November 10 and 11, sustained winds of 30-35 mph with gusts to 60 mph from the southwest pushed the water in Lake Erie away from the southwest portion of the lake, which caused the water level to drop from 569 feet to about 566 feet. Due to the lowering lake water level and the silt bar in the intake canal, operations management conservatively determined that a plant shutdown l

should be started to meet the TS 3.7.5.1 action statement and plant operators commenced a plant shutdown in an orderly manner at 2:25 a.m. on November 11 when the lake was at 566 feet. Operators had stabilized power at 38 percent in order to conduct a shift turnover and to wait for further direction from plant management. Later on November 11, weather conditions stabilized and lake water began to rise. The lowest level reached in the intake canal was 564 feet. Once the weather stabilized and lake level began to increase, the operators returned the plant to 100 percent powe Post Event ,

As of the end of the inspection period, dredging of the intake canal was about 80 percent complete. Dredging operations had removed sitt obstructions so that the intake forebay would remain connected to the lake down to 562 feet. The inspectors determined that the engineering evaluation conducted by the station for the dredging activity was comprehensive and thoroughly documented. However, the inspectors )

determined that a plan had not been established to ensure the silt levelin the canal was monitored at a frequency sufficient to ensure it remained below 562 feet. The licensee I generated a condition report to resolve this issu c. Conclusions Although station personnel identified that sitt had built up in the eastern end of the intake canal and appropriately developed a plan to dredge the canal, the inspectors concluded that a plan had not been developed to ensure the sitt level in the intake canal would be monitored at a frequency sufficient to ensure it remained below 562 feet. Engineering personnel anticipated a lowering lake level due to a forecast of high winds, and took pro-active measures to notify operations and maintenance personnel to monitor canal water level and to be prepared to remove some of the silt buildup with a backho Operations management took conservative measures to commence a plant shutdown due to lowering intake forebay levels, in anticipation of the possibility that the TS 3.7. limit for intake forebay water level may not have been met.

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M1 Conduct of Maintenance M1.1 Maintenance Activities (62707)

The inspectors observed / reviewed the following maintenance activities during the ,

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Motor Driven Feedpump (MDFP) Troubleshooting

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Emergency Core Cooling System Room Sump Pump Troubleshooting The inspectors determined that documentation sufficient to provide guidance appropriate to the circumstances was being used by station personnel at the work site Material segregation, foreign material exclusion, work documentation, and radiation work permit practices were observed by workers in the field. Supervisory assistance was requested for unexpected situations discovered in the field, and engineering assistance during MDFP troubleshooting provided continuity and focus. Good maintenance practices were observed for the above listed activitie M1.2 Letdown Cooler Isolation Valve MU-1 A Leakaae Inspection Scope (62707. 71707. 37551. 71750)

During a containment walkdown on December 21,1998, to determine the source of increasing unidentified reactor coolant system leakage, a plant engineer determined that valve MU-1 A, the inlet isolation valve for letdown cooler 1-1, had a packing leak. The inspectors evaluated the licensee's efforts to assess the condition of the valve and to reduce the leakag Observations and Findinas A multi-discipline team including members of the engineering, maintenance, operations, radiation protection departments, and senior plant manapment met to discuss the issue. An action plan was developed to evaluate the integrity of the motor actuator bolts, shut the valve to reduce the leakage, and then evaluate the integrity of the yoke and packing gland nuts - all to be conducted in a general radiation field of two rem per hour. If the packing leak was stopped, the valve would be left shut until more permanent corrective actions could be developed. However, due to recent problems with the boric acid corrosion of three carbon steel body-to-bonnet nuts (that were supposed to be stainless steel nuts) for pressurizer spray valve RC-2, the inspectors were concerned about the integrity of valve MU-1 A body-to-bonnet nuts. The integrity of the body-to-bonnet nuts could not be established because thermal insulation concealed this area from visual inspection. Subsequent to the meeting, the inspectors discussed with a plant engineer their concern that shutting the valve would put additional force on the body-to-bonnet fasteners without first verifying their integrity. The engineer relayed i

this concern to the team during the ALARA briefing for the action plan and, as a result, l the initial action plan was not implemented.

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By the next day, station personnel had generated a new action plan to: (1) leave MU-1 A open, (2) isolate letdown to obtain lower dose rates in the vicinity of MU-1 A, (3) remove the insulation around MU-1 A so that the body-to-bonnet fastener material condition could be assessed, and (4) restore letdown before pressurizer level got too high. The inspectors reviewed the operations department action plan associated with the letdown isolation and restoration activity and determined that it prescribed conservative operating limits for the activity, and that the likelihood of not being able to restore letdown was remote due to isolating letdown at a point in the system where three parallel isolation valves existed. The inspectors observed letdown isolation activities from the control room and determined that control room operators were well prepared for the activities due to the detailed pre-evolution briefs, that they maintained continuous I communications with personnel in containment, that they easily complied with the l administrative limits of the action plan, and that operations management provided effective oversight for the evolution. Lessons learned from the first evolution were

, incorporated into future letdown system isolation and restoration activitie When the insulation was removed from MU-1 A, a body-to-bonnet leak that encompassed about 270 degrees of the body-to-bonnet seating surface was identifie Subsequent containment entries were made during which it was confirmed that the !

body-to-bonnet fasteners were made of stainless steel (which is resistant to boric acid corrosion), and that the yoke, packing gland nuts, and motor-operator fastener nuts were structurally sound and exhibited no detrimental boric acid corrosion. A plan to torque the body-to-bonnet bolts was executed by first torquing the nuts to an established value, then individually removing, cleaning and lubricating each nut one at a time, then applying a higher torque value to the nuts. The result of this torquing plan was that the !

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leakage was significantly reduced, but not completely eliminated in that there was still a slight leak coming from the valve. As of the end of the inspection period, the plan for further addressing the leak was to incrementally increase the torque to the body-to-bonnet nuts and to evaluate the installation of a furmanite devic Additionally, the licensee stopped the packing leak on the valve by temporarily back-seating the valve. Afterwards, the packing gland nuts were torqued to higher values which completely stopped the packing leak. Subsequently, plant engineering personnel collected valve performance data to measure the change in force to shut and open the valve. The resulting data indicated that the valve would continue to perform its function under design condition The inspectors noted that engineering personnel provided timely support for the action plans by providing torquing values, insulation removal evaluations, valve design information, valve operability determinations, retest requirements, backseat evaluations, and motor-operated valve thrust value calculations and evaluation c. Conclusions Although the initial action plan developed to address a packing leak on letdown cooler 1-1 isolation valve MU-1 A did not take into account the additional stress that would exist on the body-to-bonnet bolts if the valve was shut, the final plan used to address the leak, which resulted in stopping the packing leak and slowing the body-to-bonnet leak, was comprehensive and conservative. Good teamwork was exhibited by

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operations, engineering, maintenance, and radiation protection personnel. The

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operations department action plan to isolats and restore letdown in order to minimize personnel dose was well thought out, executed, and manage M1.3 Maintenance Activity on Switchvard Sianalina'Eauioment Caused inadvertent . I Unavailability of One of Two Qualified Offsite Power Circuits .

l l Insoection Scoos (71707) l

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On November 17,1998, the inspectors followed up on reports that the Switchyard "K" 1 Bus had been de-energized.- I Observations and Findinas .

As part of the FirstEnergy consolidation effort to standardize the controls for its transmission network, a new remote terminal unit was being tested in the 345 KV relay house by FirstEnergy technicians. After a test sequence had been completed, an audible indicating testing device was inadvertently left connected to the relay contacts that provide an open signal to air break switch (ABS) 34626. When the control power was restored to the circuit, the test device provided a short for the relay contacts and provided an open signal to ABS 34626. The switch then opened under load and caused u

a loud electrical flash-over at the breaker contact points. The electrical transient caused the actuation of protective relays which caused the isolation of the 345 Kilovolt "K" Bus and the unavailability of one of the two qualified offsite AC power sources. All of the equipment performed as designe Subsequently, PCAQR 1998-2015 was generated to resolve the issue. Operations personnel entered the TS Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) for one of two qualified offsite circuits being unavailable. Critical work activities which could have had an impact on the plant were suspended. Electrical maintenance personnel visually inspected l: ABS 34626 to determine damage to the breaker, because it was not designed to open -

under load.- Only minor arcing damage was noted. After the root cause was determined I

and station management expectation for the proper execution of the testing activity was

communicated to the FirstEnergy technicians, ABS 34626 was closed, the switchyard was returned to a normal lineup, and the TS LCO was exited. Subsequently, the technicians continued testing under the direct oversight of electrical maintenance personnel. No violations of NRC requirements occurred during this even i d.- - Conclusions I' . FirstEnergy technicians inadvertently left a test device installed during the restoration of a transmission control circuit which resulted in the inadvertent opening of ABS 34626, 3 and the temporary unavailability of one of the two qualified offsite power circuits. Station

< management took comprehensive remedial corrective actions by verifying compliance

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with the TSs, stopping work on high risk activities, determining the apparent root cause,

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assessing the damage to ABS 34626, requiring continuous station personnel oversight  ; for the remainder of the switchyard testing activities, and restoring the switchyard to a normallineu l l

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l M1.4 Protected Train Philosophy (71707)

The inspectors followed up on a failure of the MDFP to start on December 12,199 Because the MDFP was powered from Bus D2, and it was a protected train 2 work week, troubleshooting activities commenced in the protected train high voltage switchgear room. The inspectors questioned whether scheduling the surveillance of the MDFP to coincide with the protected train 2 week was appropriate. Station management responded that the MDFP had not previously been considered a train 1 or a train 2 component, because there was only one MDFP and some of its components,  :

such as a feedwater control valve, were powered from train 1. Nonetheless, the surveillance was rescheduled to coincide with protected train 1 week, because the majority of its equipment was powered from train 2. Other plant equipment has component power sources that come from different electrical trains, and are not categorized as train 1 or train 2 equipment. Additionally, the operations manager was reluctant to limit the use of plant equipment for * protected train" reasoms. As a result of these concerns, and a past event that involved performing maintenance on protected train components, the licensee was in the process of reviewing and modifying its protected train philosophy practices. The inspectors concluded that licensee management was making reasonable efforts to better define its protected train philosoph j M8 Misco'laneous Maintenance issues (92902,92700)  ;

i M8.1 (Closed) Violation 50-346/9S005-04(DRP): The licensee lifted the reactor vessel head l lifting tripod over the open reactor vessel in violation of procedure. Davis-Besse  ;

maintenance procedure, DB-MM-06002, ' Revision 01, * Polar Crane Operation," '

prohibited lifting heavy loads above the open reactor vessel. The crane operator considered the lifting tripod as rigging and did not recognize the tripod as a heavy load; therefore, the licensee revised the procedure to identify the tripod and other devices as heavy loads. Training was also conducted to ensure that devices are recognized as heavy loads. The inspectors reviewed the procedure change and considered that the corrective actions would prevent recurrence. This violation is considered to be closed.

M8.2 (Closed) Licensee Event Report 50-346/1998-004-00: Control room humidifier ductwork failure on June 1,1998, caused an excessive opening in the positive pressure boundar ,

The licensee identified ductwork to the number 2 control room humidifier partially I disconnected from the humidifier. This created an opening greater than the allowed I 3 square inches, and both trains of control room emergency venflation were considered to be inoperable resulting in the licensee entering TS 3.0.3 for a period of about 15 minutes, until the integrity of the ductwork was restored . The cause of the ductwork failure was due to stripped attaching screws. Larger diameter sheet metal screws were used to restore the ductwork integrity. Although the humidifiers are not safety related, the ductwork is essential to maintaining a pressure boundary to ensure that the control room would be habitable during a LOCA. The ductwork was originally installed to meet standards allowing over 200 square inches of leakage; however, the licensee discovered errors in their installation calculations, and the allowable leakage should have been 3 square inches. The calculation errors were previously reported in LER 50-346/96007 which was reviewed and closed in NRC Inspection

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_- . .. . . . Report 50-346/97006. A Non-Cited Violation was issued for the design calculation ;

errors. Because the ductwork was manufactured and installed to specifications less '

conservative than required, the licensee had experienced previous problems with maintaining the integrity of the positive pressure boundary; therefore, the licensee i initiated a review to determine the appropriate long-term corrective action. Additionally i the licensee evaluated the effect of the degraded positive pressure boundary on the I habitability of the control room during a LOCA. It was determined that the dose to control room occupants' thyroids would not exceed the limits of 10 CFR Part 53, Appendix A, General Design Criteria 19. The inspectors determined that the licensee complied with the requirements of TS 3.0.3 in that repairs to the humidifier ductwork were made within the 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> requirement. This issue is closed.

M8.3 (Closed) Licensee Event Report 50-346/1998-007-00: Excessive opening in control room pressure boundary due to a breach in the control room humidifier ductwork. On August 24,1998, the licensee identified that a flanged connection on the humidifier ductwork had partially separated. This created an opening in the control room negative pressure boundary greater than the allowed 3 square inches, which rendered both trains of control room emergency ventilation inoperable, and caused the licensee to enter TS 3.0.3. The integrity of the negative pressure boundary was restored within one minute by turning off the control room equipment room ventilation supply fan. Stopping the fan reduced the flow through the ductwork breach below the equivalent of the 3 square inch allowable opening. The licensee determined that a contractor who had removed insulation on the humidifier on August 21,1998, accidentally separated the flange. The contractor was unaware of the significance of creating the opening because the work instructions for the job, although appropriate for nonsafety-related work, did not provide precautions pertaining to working in the vicinity of control room negative pressure boundary structure The licensee was in the process of implementing corrective actions from a previous June 1998 event (LER 1998-004-00), that also resulted in degradation of the pressure boundary and entry into TS 3.0.3, when this event occurred. Because of the two events, the licensee initiated a modification to replace the ductwork with a more robust design in an isolable area outside the pressure boundary. The licensee determined that, although the allowable opening was exceeded, the consequences would not have resulted in exceeding any regulatory habitability requirements during a postulated LOCA acciden However, because of the significance of the ductwork to maintaining the control room positive pressure boundary, the work instruction for removing the insulation was inadequate in that it did not include cautions alerting the worker to remove the insulation carefully or to report any opening discovered. This is a violation of TS 6.8.1.a which requires that procedures rs?erenced in Regulatory Guide 1.33,1972 Appendix "A" be implemented. Regulatory Guide 1.33, Section 1.1, requires that maintenance which can affect the performance of safety-related equipment should be performed in accordance with written procedures, documented instructions, or drawings appropriate to the circumstances. This non-repetitive, licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation, consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC  !

Enforcement Policy (NCV 50-346/98018-01(DRP)). This item is close ._. _ . _ . _ . . . __ _

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lil. Enaineerina E8 Miscellaneous Engineering issues (92903)

E8.1 (Closed) Violation 50-346/E93-297: Inadequate corrective actions for configuration control problems resulting in auxiliary feedwater system being inoperable. An enforcement conference was held on December 17,1993, to discuss the apparent violations and the licensee's corrective actions. Short-term corrective actions were reviewed during the conference and determined to be acceptable. The licensee's long-term corrective actions were to implement quality assurance audits of the

licensee's corrective action program. Audits were conducted March 21 through April 18, l 1994, and February 28 through March 30,1995. In addition, several followup audits and surveillances of various findings related to the audits were also conducted. The first audit identified that not all corrective actions that had been addressed identified root l causes. The licensee revised their program and increased the involvement of senior management in the process. The second audit identified areas needing improvements, such as recognizing emerging trends and evaluating the collective significance of issues. Training was provided to stress recognizing emerging trends and the importance of evaluating issues collectively to determine broad concerns. The inspectors reviewed both audits, audit findings, management's response to findings, and corrective actions implemented to address the audit findings. The inspectors found the audits to be of sufficient depth to identify program weaknesses and that the corrective actions to the findings were acceptable. This issue is close IV. Plant Support R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry (RP&C) Controls R1.1 General Comments (71750)

The inspectors observed radiological and contamination control efforts pertaining to containment entries to clean the containment air coolers and to address valve MU 1 A leakage. Participants in pre-evolution briefs to maintain dose ALARA, including the workers themselves, contributed to developing an action plan that would maintain dose ALARA. Experience gained from entries made beforehand was considered during subsequent briefs. Personnel exiting containment and the contaminated area maintained the integrity of the contamination area during their exit of the area, and radiation protection personnel provided assistance to workers exiting containment to ensure that they were observing good contamination control practices. The inspectors concluded that station personnel took effective measurec to minimize dose and the spread of contamination during valve MU-1 A maintenance and containment air cooler cleaning activities.

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V. Manaaement Meetinas X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management after the conclusion of the inspection on January 5,1999. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identifie X3 Management Meeting Summary On December 16,1998, licensee management met with NRC Region ll1 management to discuss the licensee's recent performance, which included five reactor trips, a reactor runback, and maintenance issues pertaining to valve RC-2. Licensee management presented a plan to improve plant performance in the futur _ . ._ .. ._. __ _

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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED l

i Licensee J. H. Lash, General Manager, Plant Operations .

D. L. Eshelman, Manager, Operations "

J. K. Wood, Vice President Nuclear L. W. Worley, Director, Nuclear Assurance J. L. Freels, Manager, Regulatory Affairs J. L. Michaelis, Manager, Maintenance H. W. Stevens, Jr., Manager, Nuclear Safety & Inspections M. C. Beier, Manager, Quality Assessment J. W. Rogers, Manager, Plant Engineering l

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C. A. Price, Manager, Business Services L. M. Dohrmann, Manager, Quality Services G. A. Skeel, Manager, Security F. L. Swanger, Manager, Design Basis Engineeiing S. A. Coakley, Manager, Work Management P. R. Hess, Manager, Supply i D. H. Lockwood, Supervisor, Compliance l R. B. Coad, Jr., Superintendent, Radiation Protection

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G. W. Gillespie, Superintendent, Chemistry G. M. Wolf, Engineer, Regulatory Affairs S. P. Moffitt, Director, Nuclear Support Services NRC S. G. Dupont, Project Engineer, Region Ill S. J. Campbell, Senior Resident inspector, Davis-Besse .

K. S. Zellers, Resident inspector, Davis-Besse

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INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 37551: Onsite Engineering IP 62707:' Maintenance Observation IP.71707: Plant Operations IP 71750: Plant Support Activities . .

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IP 92700: Onsite Follow-up of Written Reports of Nonroutine Events at Power Reactor  !

Facilities  !

IP 92902: Followup - Maintenance

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IP 92903: Followup - Engineenng i i

I ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED '

Ooened 50-346/98018-01(DRP) NCV Inappropriate work instructions l

Closed j 50-346/98018-01(DRP) NCV Inappropriate work instructions 50-346/96005-04(DRP) VIO RVHLT lifted over open reactor vesse /1998-004-00 LER Control room humidifier ductwork failure on June 1,1998 50-346/1998-007-00 LER Excessive opening in control room pressure boundary due to breach in control room humidifier ductwork on August 24,199 l 50-346/E93-297 VIO Inadequate corrective actions for configuration control l problems resulting in auxiliary feedwater system being l inoperable l

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND INITIALISMS USED ABS Air Break Switch ALARA As Low As Reasonably Achievable CFR Code of Federal Regulations ESF Engineered Safety Feature l&C Instrumentation and Controls IFl inspection Followup Item IR inspection Report LER Licensee Event Report LOCA Loss of Coolant Accident MDFP Motor Driven Feedpump MWO Maintenance Work Order

'NCV Non-Cited Violation NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission _

PCAQR Potential Condition Adverse to Quality Report PDR Public Document Room SRB Station Review Board TS Technical Specification USAR Updated Safety Analysis Report

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