IR 05000346/1988023
| ML20207H098 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 08/16/1988 |
| From: | Gardner R, Westberg R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20207H066 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-346-88-23, NUDOCS 8808240354 | |
| Download: ML20207H098 (7) | |
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i U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSI0li
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REGION III
Report No. 50-346/88023(ORS)
Docket No. 50-346 License No. NPF-3 Licensee: ' Toledo Edison Company
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Edison Plaza, 300 Madison Avenue
Toledo, OH 43652 Facility Name:
Davis-Besse 1 B
Inspection At: Oak Harbor, Ohio Inspection Conducted:
August 1-5, 1988
.OuttA~1 s/ic /8 8 Inspector:
Rolf A.
estberg M
Date bbb Approved By:
Ronald N. Gardner, Chief b IIV Plant Systems Section Date i
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Inspection Summary Inspection on August 1-5. 1988 (Report No. 50-346/88023(DRS))
Areas Inspected:
Routine announced inspection of licensee action on previously i
identified inspection items (92701 92702) and licensee compliance with the ATVS i
Rule,10 CFR 50.62 per Temporary Instruction 2500/20 (25020), (SiHS i' umber
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MPA-A-20).
Results:
No violations or deviations were identified. One previous 13 identified violation, one unresolved item and four open items were closed.
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Based on the inspection, the inspet.sor concluded that design calculations still reflect a lack of attention to detail although they are technically
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adequate.
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l 3808240354 080016 i
PDR ADOCK 05000346
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Toledo Edison Company (TED)
L. F. Storz, Plant Manager
- P. C. Hildebrandt, Engineering General Director L. O. Ramsett, Quality Assurance Director S. C. Jain, Nuclear Engineering and Independent Sufety Engineering Director
- V. M. Watson, Design Engineering Director W. F. Emerson, EQ Program manager E. P Salowitz, Assistant Plant Manager - Outage J. K. Wood, Systems Engineering Director
- J. L. Darby, Systems Analysis Manager
- R. W. Schrauder, Nuclear Licensing Manager
- R. W. Gaston, Nuclear Licensing i
J C. Sturaavant, Licensing Principle J. B. Keagler, Associate Nuclear Engineer E. D. Schock, Assistant Nuclear Engineer T. A. Lang, Senior Engineer P. E. Goyal, Engineer Bechtel I. Whorten, Engineer U.S. NRC
- P. M. Byron, Senior Resident Inspector
- S. M. Klein, Principal Engineer (ERC International)
- Indicates those attending the exit meeting on August 5,1988.
2.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings a.
(Closed) 346/88006-01 (0 pen Item):
Resolution of superseded calculations in motor operated valve (MOV) reliability files.
FCR 78-126 was a modification to the drain lines from the steam generators to the condenser.
A number of inadequac.2s were identified in a final design calculation (No. C-ECS-063-002)
filed with the package.
The purpose of the calculation was to determine motor ho.asepower and torque switch settings for the valves.
Toledo Edison had advised that all safety-related motor operators were tested using the MOVATS testing system under the Davis-Besse Motor Operated Valve Reliability Program.
However, since this calculation was still on file, the inspectors were concerned that it could be used in the future by engineers as a source of design basis data.
In addition, other similar calculations may exist which have been superseded by those in the Davis-Besse MOV reliability files.
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In response to'these concerns, TED provided a memorandum (NE0-88-00995, dated June 6,1988) which stated that:
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(1) A complete document search was performed.
-(2) A listing of calculations was reviewed and;those calculations relating to MOV's were identified and reviewed.
(3) No other calculations were found which required revision.
Calcula'.lon No. C-ECS-063-002 was voided and returned to Records Management.
Based on the above response by the licensee, this item is considered closed, b.
(Closed) 346/88006-02(0penIteml:
Review of finalized calculation confirming adequate high pressure injection (HPI) flow to the reactor.
FCR 79-308 added a second independent and redundant miniflow recirculation line from the HPI pumps to the Borated Water Storage Tank (BWST). 'The inspectors were unable to find any documented analyses which completely addressed an SRB concern that the sdditional line could result in reduced HPI flow to the reactor.
During the inspection, TED provided a draft' calculation indicating that HPI flow would.not be reduced.
However, the item remained open pending completion of a final calculation.
The inspector reviewed final Calculation No. 33.34, Revision 0, dated June 23, 1988.
This calculation confirmed that the additional flow path resistance was small compared to the resistance of the orifices in both recirculation lines.
Thus, the reduction in HPI flow was negligible.
This item is considered closed.
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(Closed) 346/88006-07 (Unresolved Item}:
Review of licensee's evaluation of qualifying the Startup Lube Pump Motor For the
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temperature determined in the Pump Room Heatup Analysis._ During the review of enhancements made to feed and bleed capability (FCR 86-432),
the inspectors determined that a calculation (No. 540-72-22501, Revision 0, dated Septamber 25, 1987) took credit for shutting down one of the makeup pumps.
The calculation was performed to determine j
temperatures in the makeup pump rcom during feed and bleed operations.
However, a listing of equipment located in the room indicated that the
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startup lube oil pump motors for the makeup pump will not be qualified for the pump room environmental temperatures.
Since the shutdown pump might not be capable of restarting in the high temperature environment, a single failure of the redundant pump could eliminate feed and bleed capability.
Toledo Edison provided a memorandum (NEN-88-10242, dated June 13, 1988) 5411ch stated that the main AC oil pump will be qualified to operate in the makeup pump room environmental temperatures.
This memorandum did not clearly address the need for the "stertup" lube oil pump to be qualified for these temperatures.
In further discussions with the inspectc, the licensee advised that the use
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r' the term "startup" lube oil pump was a misnomer'since this pump-not required to start the makeup pump.'
The licensee stated that onlyLthe main AC lube oil pump was required tofstartithe makeup pump.
In fact, the DC ("startup") lube oil pump motor served as s-backup
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to the A': main pump motor and was only required in the event of the
. failure of the main AC pump motor.
Since the failure of the main.
.I AC pump motor would constitute a single active failure, the' inspector agreed that qualificat.on of the DC punip motor was not required.
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item is considered closed.
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(Closed) 346/88006-08 (0 pen Item):
Review of the final calculations for the enhanced feed and bleed flows.
The inspectors identified deficiencies in a-calculation, dated December 30, 1986,. performed by an'outside contractor to substantiate FCR 86-432.
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calculation was used as W hasis for the B&W analysis of feed and-bleed capability for Da asse.
Toledo Edison indicated that a final calculation of flows had recently been completed by TED and was being reviewed.
j The inspectors reviewed Calculation No. C-NSA-65.01.-005, Revision 0, dated March 11, 1988, "Makeup Pump System Curve" and No. C-NSA-65.01-008, Revision 0, dated June 13, 1988, "MU & HPI Pump NPSH after FCR 86-432" as part of this closecut inspection.
The inspectors found that these calculations were technically adequate and demonstrated that:
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(1) The modified makeup system was capable of supplying sufficient feed and bleed flows to meet B&W requirements in the "piggy back" mode, i.e., when suction to the makeup pumps is provided by the LPI pumps.
However, without operation in the piggy back mode,
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the system may not be capable of supplying sufficient flow to meet B&W established requirements assuming the single Silure of one makeup pump.
TED informed the inspectors that, procedurally, this (piggy back mode) is the only mode of operation ~under which feed and bleed would be initiated (otherwise, credit must be taken for ARTS if only one makeup pump is available and the system is not in the piggy back mode).
(2) When in the piggy back mode, sufficient NPSH'is available to the makeup pumps to meet vendor requirements at maximum anticipated flow rates and assuming Technical Specification levels in the BWST.
The inspectors had no further technical questions on these issues.
This item is considered closed.
However, the inspectors did note a number of minor weaknesses in the calculations which indicate that emphasis is not being p!'ced on the development of design analyses and compliance with the requirements of ANSI N45.2.11.
For example, in Calculation No. C-NSA-65.01-005:
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(1) There was no basis provided for the BWST~ elevation used.
Calculation No. C-NSA-65.01-008 used a higher level which was substantiated in that calculation, thus the value-used-in this calculation was conservative.
(2) Justification of the use of the friction factor for turbulent flow was included, but some of the associated calculation wa-not included.
(3).A computer program was written and used in the analysis.
Verification of the program (provided in the calculation) was based on a comparison of the_ pressure: drop computed by hand and that obtained from the program.
However, the verifichtion did'
not address other aspects, e.g., the static heads, elevations, and pump developed heads determined by the program and used to produce the final _results.
However, using the data in the-l calculations, the inspectors were able to verify the balance of the program calculations.
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(4) The calculation did not provide a statement of the conclusion i
or any summary for the calculation results concerning the capability of the system to meet design requirements.
However, sufficient information was provided in the curves generated.in the program to permit an independent assessment of the calculated results.
(5) There was not sufficient information related to the computer
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program output (labels, etc.) to permit a review without recourse to the originator.
These minor weaknesses contribute to the inspectors' concerns that the development of design analyses at Davis-Besse may reflect a
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less than adequate commitment to compliance with the requirements
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of ANSI N45.2.11.
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(Closed) 346/88006-09 (0 pen Item):
Review of resolutioa to inspector's concerns and revision of the calculation to document basis for assumed room congestion.
As part of the review of enhancements made to feed and bleed capability (FCR 86-432),
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Calculation No. 540-72-12501,- Revision 0, dated September 25, 1987,
"Analysis of the Makeup Pump Room (Rm 225) Heat Up," was reviewed.
The inspector identified several assumptions made in the analysis
which were not adequately substantiated:
(1) The calculation assumed that 30% of the room volume was congested.
(2) Lighting heat loads were neglected.
(3) Credit was taken for heat transfer to cold pipe.
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TED provided a revised calculation which-included adequate substantiation for-the assumed 30% congestion.
However, the revised calculation did not adequately address congestion in holes in.the floor, the lighting loads, or credit taken for heat transfer to cold. pipes.
In further conversations with TED engineering personnel,.TED stated that:
(1)- The lighting loads represented a small percentage of the total heat load (2%) and would not significantly affect
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the peak temperatures in the room.
(2) An actuator in.the holes in the floor occupies approximately half the volume of the holes.
(3) The effect on the peak temperature due to heat transfer to cold pipes was less than three degrees.
TED indicated the calculation would be reviced to document these effects.
The inspector nad no further questions on this matter, and the item is considered closed.
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(Closed) 346/88006-10 (Violation):
Specification No. 12501-E-18Q was changed administratively to include a revised load profile for the station batteries' performance test without going through the l
facility change process or applying appropriate design control.
The inspector reviewed Document Change Request.No. 88-0158,.
USAR Change Notice No.88-031, and Procedure No. EN-DP-01021,
"Specifications" Revision 0.
This review verified that the
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corrective actions taken in response to the violation were
completed and acceptable.
This violation is considered closed.
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The inspector also reviewed the battery sizing Calculation No. C-EE-002-005, Revision 0.
This review led to several questions relative to the documentation of the calculation's assumptions and the conservatism of some of the assumptions,. Subsequent discussions
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with the calculation's originator answered all the questions with the
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exception of the conservatism of the temperature correction factor.
i The originator indicated that the calculation was going to be revised I
because of some concerns of the Safety Review Committee and some proposed selective battery load shedding, j
Tha inspector voiced the following concerns at the exit meeting:
(1) The battery calculation was technically adequate; however, the documentation of the assumptions and givens did not meet the intent of ANSI N45.2.11 in that these inputs were~not sufficiently detailed such that a person' technically qualified.
in the subject could' review and understand the adequacy of their basis without recourse to the or*ginator.
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.(2) A battery temperature' correction factor corresponding to
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60 F was used in calculating when.the lowest actual measured temperature of battery electrolite was 46 F, which occurred.
back in 1982.
The licensee indicated that since then, the door to the electrical equipment room from.the battery room had been blocked open.
The inspector was aware of this fact and asked the' licensee to' substantiate the battery correction factor based on actual historic data when the calculation is revised.
Pending review of the revised battery calculation relative to Items 2f(1) and (2), this item is considered. unresolved (345/88023-01).
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Temporary Instruction (TI) 2500/20 (SIMS No. MPA-A-20)'(0 pen)
l The' inspector reviewed the licensee's response to 10 CFR 50.62, the
"ATWS Rule," and Generic Letter 85-06, "Quality Assurance Guidance for
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ATWS Equipment that is not Safety-Related." This review indicated that i
it was too soon to assess the implementation of these commitments.
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Unresolved Items An unresolved item is a matter about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether it is an acceptable item, an open item, a deviation, or a violation.
An unresolved item is discussed in Paragraphs 2f(1) and (2).
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Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives denoted in Paragraph 1 during and at the conclusion of the inspection on August 5, 1988.
The
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inspector summarized the scope and results of the inspection and discussed l
the likely content of this inspection report.
The licensee acknowledged the information and did not indicate that any of the information disclosed during the inspection could be considered proprietary in' nature.
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