IR 05000346/1989013

Insp Rept 50-346/89-13 on 890515-19.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Followup on Actual Emergency Plan Activations,Licensee Action on Previously Identified Items & Operational Status of Emergency Preparedness Program

ML20244B696
Person / Time
Site:	Davis Besse
Issue date:	06/06/1989
From:	Ploski T, Snell W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20244B692	List: IR 05000346/1989013 ML20244B691
References
50-346-89-13, NUDOCS 8906130214
Download: ML20244B696 (10)

Text

- _ . _ _ _ - , __

- _

..: .c ,

. ,

- .

e

' y U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION:

REGION III-Report No. 50-346/89013(DRSS)

. Docket No. 50-34 License No. NPF-3

'

-Licensee: -Toledo Ediso'n Company

' Edison Plaza 300. Madison Avenue

.

Toledo, OH 43652

-

Facility Name: Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1

. Inspection ~At: Davis-Besse Site, Oak Harbor, Ohio

,-

Inspection. Conducted: May 15-19, 1989

' Inspector: s'k 6/5/8)

Date-L W.SnQell, Approved By: hief (,/6Af

~

Emergency Preparedness Dat~e and Effluents Section Inspection Summary Inspection on May 15-19, 1989 (Report No. 50-346/89013(DRSS))

Areas Inspected: Routine, announced inspection of the following areas of the Emergency Preparedness-(EP) program: followup on actual emergency plan activations (IP 92701); licensee action on previously-identified items (IP. 92700); operational status of the emergency preparedness program (IP 82701); and EP.' training (IP 82206). Section 5 of this report contains

'

an update on the status of EP-related Safety Issues Management System (SIMS)

items. The inspection involved one NRC inspecto Results: . Management's strong support for the EP. program remains evident by the quantity and quality of annual training provided to the Emergency Response Organization (ERO). ERO staffing levels remain good for all key ara support positions. 'The licensee remains responsive to offsite EP concerns, as indicated by: -the establishment of a computerized plant parameter data link to the Ohio Emergency Management Agency; assistance in developing plans for the Ingestion Pathway Emergency Planning Zone; and by assistance in providing annual. training to various of fsite support organizations. Recent years'

audits of the EP. program have had good scope and depth, and were further-improved in 1989. -Emergency response facilities and equipment remain well maintaine ..

8906130214 890606 gDR ADOCK0500gg6

_ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ . . __- -_ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _

_ _ - _ .

c .

.

-

.

.  !

.

DETAILS 1. . Persons Contacted

• B.' DeMaison, Emergency Preparedness Manager

• Johnson, Maintenance Department Manager

• J. Moyers, Quality Verification Manager

• B. Cope, Onsite Emergency Preparedness Supervisor

• K. Brewster, Licensing Technician T. Myers, Technical Services Director D. Staudt,. Shift Supervisor S. Martin, Shift Supervisor V. Sodd, Shift Manager-M. Burns, Shift Manager D. Gordon, Emergency Preparedness Staff I. Borland, Emergency Preparedness Staff G. Summers, Training Instructor B. Nickerson, Training Instructor

. Collings, Quality Assurance Engineer

'* Attended,the May 19,.1989 exit. intervie . Licensee' Action on Previously - Identified Items (IP 92701)

(0 pen) Open' Item No. 50-346/88040-01: During the November 1988 exercise, decisionmakers in the. Technical Support Center (TSC) and Emergency Control Center (ECC) did not promptly declare a Site Area Emergency, as they concluded that degraded plant conditions did not satisfy all conditions of the relevant Emergency Action Level that had been postulated by scenario developers. As a result of this significant difference of opinion, the licensee was required to re-evaluate the wording and interpretation of EAL No. 3. Emergency Preparedness (EP) and Operations Department staffs had not yet finalized their re-evaluation of this EAL. This item remains ope . Emergency Plan Activation (IP 92700)

The licensee activated the Emergency Plan on one occasion between July 1, 1988, and May 15, 1989. The Shift Supervisor correctly declared an Unusual Event on February 8,1989, when persistent strong winds caused the Lake Erie water level at the Station's intake structure to decrease below the setpoint value of the relevant EAL. County, State, and NRC officials were initially notified of this declaration in a timely manne Comparison of the licensee's records of this declaration with

-

records generated by NRC Headquarters and Region III duty officers

'

indicated that the NRC had been provided with adequately detailed, accurate information.

l

I V_ __ __ _-

.

,,. __ _ _ .

.

.

.

'

V

/

, , .

,

)'

t '. 7 r,., .. ,

.

ye .

>

' '

~

' Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was acceptable.

' ' Operational Status-of the Emergency Preparedness (EP) Program (IP 82701)

. , Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures The: licensee's provisions for preparing, reviewing, and approving new and revised Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs)

remained acceptable and essentially unchanged from those evaluated during the 1988. routine inspection (Report No. 50-346/88020(DRSS));

'As described in Section'4c of the 1989 routine.._ inspection report, a change in'the licensae's normal organization has resulted in the Technical Services Director replacing the Nuclear Health and Safet Manager on the approval chain'for new or revised EPIP EPIP changes have been reviewed for consistency with regulatory guidance and Emergency Plan commitments by the Region'III EP Analyst assigned ~to inspect this' licensee's program. No unacceptable changes have been identified for those EPIPs received since the

July 1988 inspectio The licensee implemented several acceptable refinements to the Station's EALs. in . late 1988 and early 1989. Onshift personnel were informed of these' changes through required _ reading package State and county officials were notified of .these changes. during the required annual meeting on the Station's Eats, which was conducted in March 1989. The licensee. revised the wording of EALs associated with' reactor. shutdowns required by the Station's Technical

' Specifications to clearly indicate that an unusual Event declaration is required when-shutdown begins, rather than when a Technical Specification becomes applicable. Records review indicated that EP, engineering, and licensing staffs participated in a re-evaluation of the Unusual Event, Alert, and Site Area Emergency EAL setpoints for low lake level. Documents reviewed in the re evaluation included the Updated Safety Analysis Report and Regulatory Guide l' 27,.

entitled " Ultimate Heat Sink". The setpoint values for these EALs were appropriately revised following this well-documented re-evaluation effor Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was acceptabl ' Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs), Equipment, and Supplies The' inspector toured the following ERFs: Satellite Technical Support Center (STSC); Operations Support Center (OSC); TSC;

Emergency Control Center (ECC), which is the licensee's Emergency Operations Facility; and the Joint Public Information Center (JPIC). All were as described in the Emergency Plan and EPIP l

_ . _ - _ . -_ _ ___ - _ _ - -_- __ - _ a

- - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _

. ..

.

f

Based on spot checks. of 1989 ' records of periodic ' communications equipment

.'

tests and supplies inventories and/or observation of these ERFs 1 during walkthrough drills conducted during this inspection, it was concluded that these facilities and their equipment were being

~

well maintained and ready for use. . Records also indicated that all field survey team vehicles and their associated communications

equipment and supplies ~ were being frequently checked for operational readiness.. The various communications test and supplies inventory records indicated that any identified problems had oeen corrected in a timely. manne Staffs of the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station (DBNPS) and the Perry Nuclear Power. Plant (PNPP) have worked with State officials to develop a computerized data link so that Ohio Emergency Management Agency (0EMA) duty officers have access to a 15 minute averaged set of. plant parameter. data from each site. The data link, which became operable for both sites in' late February 1989, was developed in response to recommendations of the State's Emergency Evacuation Review Team. Both licensees and State officials had. agreed to the site-specific parameters which would initially be provided on the data link,.with the understanding that the set of parameters could l later be revised or expanded. At DBNPS, the computerized data link

.

is known as the Nuclear Data System (NDS).

The licensee indicated that, should a parameter's setpoint limits be exceeded by a 15-minute averaged value, the OEMA duty officer would ninterface.with the licensee's on-call Emergency Offsite Manager (E0M),'who'also has access to the' data. The E0M is a. key member of the licensee's ECC staff. The E0M would interface as necessary with the Control Room's Shift Manager and/or with computer systems staff to determine the cause of the data problem and report his findings to the OEMA duty' officer. The licensee indicated that several operational problems have been identified with the NDS, and that these problems have been discussed with OEMA officials. The problems were either due to communications line problems between the site and Columbus, Ohio or to equipment associated with a parameter being temporarily out of service for maintenance or testin Section 4d of this report includes information on the training that l DBNPS and PNPP staffs have already provided to State agency representatives on the computer link and the data it provide Based on the above ' .Minos, this portion of the licensee's program was acceptabl c ., Organization and Manag o 3 Control The Nuclear Health and Safety Manager, who had been the EP Supervisor's immediate supervisor, left the licensee's organization in February 198 The Industrial Safety Manager has been appointed

__ _

~ ,.

o -

,

,

as'an-interim replacement. -The EP Supervisor indicated, however,-

that on day-to-day matters he has been reporting directly to the Technical Services Director. Otherwise, the organization and responsibilities of the licensee's onsite and offsite EP staffs remained unchanged from those outlined in the 1988 routine Inspection Report No. 346/88020(DRSS).

The Emergency Response Organization (ERO) has remained well staffed,-

-

with at least three' individuals trained for each key and support position. There were no cases of:a person being identified for more than one ERO position. In previous years, a pool of five senior

-

managers had been trained for both the Emergency Director (ED) or Company Spokesperson position The ERO has remained organized into three-(A, B,.and C) response teams, with fourth"and fifth. persons qualified for a minority of specific positions being referred.to as the "D team". However, each team has remained a blend of-experienced and newer ERO members so that the A, B, and C designators'do not imply different levels of capabilitie On-call responsibility has continued to be rotated-among the three response teams on a weekly basis, with the exception that JPIC staff have been rotated on a quarterly basis. An administrative system was in use that required an on-call person to formally notify the EP staff and alternates for his/her position in the event:that the on-call person would be unavailable during the week. The EP staff has developed a computerized method for keeping the ERO roster and the EP telephone' directory up to date and for tracking the currency of ERO members' trainin The telephone directory has been updated on at. least a quarterly frequency. Organization charts listing ERO personnel have remained prominently posted in a hallway of the Davis-Besse Administration Building (DBAB) as one means of informing ERO members as to which individuals are on-call for the current and next two weeks. The EP staff also issue weekly updates to the ERO roster to each ERO member assigned to be on-call during the next three weeks. These internal mailings have sometimes included an 18 month projection of which team would likely be on-call each week, plus information on scheduled holidays and major events such as the next exercis The EP staff has maintained a number of pagers given to persons having key positions in the ERO. Key personnel having support staff have also been provided with wallet-sized cards listing their current support staffs and instructions on how many support staff they are to contact in the event of a full ERO activatio Records review indicated that the licensee had conducted successful, semi-annual, off-hours augmentation drills since the 1988 routine inspection. Corrective actions were taken as neede In the Spring of 1989, the EP staff completed the development of position descriptions for 2 STSC, 12 OSC, 16 TSC, 17 ECC, and 5 JPIC

_ _ - _ _

r * .?

.

.a '

t- .

p

>

!- positions. Division Directors have been given the primary responsibility for selecting replacement ERO members. The position L descriptions were intended as reference material to the Division Directors and EP staff to facilitate the identification of ERO candidates. The position descriptions included information on:

periodic training requirements; emergency responsibilities; reporting location;~ relevant equipment; and other required or desired selection criteria such as operations experience, communications skills, and . leadership traits. The final determination of an individual's qualifications for ERO membership remained based on training and drill performance The EP Supervisor, offsite EP Supervisor, and their staff remained very involved with assisting State and county officials in conducting annual training for offsite support organizations and in helping to maintain the State and county Emergency Plans and implementing procedures for the DBNPS's Emergency Planning Zones. In preparation for the 1985 exercise, this work has included assisting in the .

development of materials for the ingestion exposure pathway (50-mile)

Emergency. Planning Zone (EPZ). A detailed review of.the licensee's assistance in offsite plan and procedure development was not included in this inspectio The licensee's internal final critique report for the November 1988 exercise.was reviewed. It was well-detailed and objective. A spot check of the EP Activity Scheduling System (EPASS) showed that a number of self-identified items from the exercise had been added to this corrective action tracking system to better ensure resolutien of these concerns. A number of these concerns had already been correcte Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was acceptabl d. EP Training (Also IP 82206)

Very good management support for the EP program has been evident for several years from the annual training program, practically all of which has been conducted by the EP staff. During the first three weeks of May 1989, each of the licensee's three teams of responders participated in challenging "walkthrough drills". These drills were in addition to one team's participation in a practice exercise, scheduled several weeks before the annual exercise, which utilizes a different scenario. The annual training program consists of:

classroom training per a proceduralized training matrix; required reading of relevant procedures; walkthrough drills; EP drills listed in the Emergency Plan; and the practice exercis A week's walkthrough drill schedule was as follows: Monday-ECC; Tuesday-TSC; Wednesday-OSC and inplant teams; Thursday-JPIC; and

.__ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - - - - _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - - - - -

_ _ _ -

,

- .1 i

.

.

Friday-integrated drill involving personnel assigned to the aforementioned facilities plus the Control Room, STSC, Radiological Testing Laboratory, and field survey teams. Portions of the following walkthrough drills and/or critique sessions were observed during this inspection: TSC, OSC; and the integrated drill in the

.05C and EC A facility drill lasted two to three hours, while the integrated drill involved three to six hours participation for a given facility or activit Drill scenarios were derived from previous exercises scenarios. Controllers reviewed training objectives, procedure changes, facility modifications, and previous evaluation comments before beginning the drill. As the drill

. progressed, controllers made reminders and criticisms as deemed appropriate. Verbal critiques followed each dril The TSC drill involved about twenty players and six controllers, including a response cell portraying STSC, NRC, or State agency personne The OSC drill involved about thirty player Some converted the workspace from its normal to its emergency configuration. About six inplant teams were briefed and dispatched. A company vehicle was also used to simulate an ambulance arriving onsite to transport an accident victi The Training Department coordinated with the EP staff in developing a computerized " Introduction to EP" training course for new ERO members. Student handouts were also available. The licensee indicated that about twelve persons had already taken this computerized course, which was developed to eliminate one-on-one training sessions. The self-study program was creative and user f rier.dly. It introduced a number of generic and site-specific EP concepts and jargon. The program summarized a scenario so that the trainet. could learn how the licensee's and offsite agencies' ER0s would hll respond to an accident. The trainee had the capability to request computerized definitions of jargon and summaries of ERO position description Successful completion of a computerized examination was required. The licensee has identified the need to modify or expand the test bank question One-on-one, open book interviews were conducted with two Shift Supervisors and two Shift Managers regarding the responsibilities of the Initial Emergency Director. Interview topics included:

emergency classification decisionmaking; offsite agency notification requirements; and onsite and offsite protective action decisionmaking. All interviewees were well aware of the time limits for notifying county, State, and NRC officials after any emergency declaration, and the requirement to maintain continuous communications with the NRC upon regnest. All were able to make correct onsite and offsite protective action decisions using procedural guidance. While all interviewees were able to correctly classify three or four situations, several were a bit slow to l

finalize one classification decisio A member of the EP staff

____ -____________________ _ _ -

___

. I

-

i

.

+

.

indicated that classroom training on the EALs was last conducted about twelve months ago'and was scheduled to begin in about six i week 'l l

The computer link to the Ohio Emergency Management Agency (DEMA). i became operable in late February 1989. Associated training was provided to OEMA' duty officers and other state agencies'

representatives by DBNPS and PNPP staffs in mid-February. The licensee's Emergency Offsite Managers, who would interface with the OEMA duty officers, and the Operations Superintendent also attended the training. The 3 day course included: nuclear power plant fundamentals; overviews of DBNPS and PNPP systems; and interpretation of Nuclear Data Systems outputs for both sites, so that the trainees could more easily identify abncrmal plant conditions from the data. 'The instructor, who presented the

. licensee's portion of the training, indicated that examinations were

.given after some of the sessions and that handout materials were also provide Records indicated that annual training on the licensee's EALs was provided to State and county officials in mid-March 1989. Annual training to local media was provi.ded prior to the November 1988 exercise,'and was scheduled prior to the August 1989 exercis Records indicated that all drills associated with Emergency Plan commitments had been conducted as scheduled since mid-1988 and had been critique Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was acceptabl Audits The 1988 audit of the EP program was conducted during the period July '25 through August 4,1988. This audit was adequate in scope and depth to satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(t). Records indicated that acceptable corrective actions were completed on both findings and all observations. Auditor followup on these results, which required written responses within 30 days of audit completion, was timely. State and local officials had been formally notified of relevant audit result The next audit of the program was conducted duririg the period May 1-11, 1989. One finding and ten observations were identified by the audit team. Review of the draft audit report indicated that its scope and depth was at least as good as the 1988 audit. State and county Emergency Management Agency officials were contacted by the auditors, as had been done during the previous audit. In the 1989 audit report, the auditors made a summary statement on the l

f l - - . _ - -

._- _ - _

--_ - - - - _ - - _ - _ - _ _

<,. 1

. L.; 1

'

-

.,-

. ,

F

overall. quality of the' licensee's. interface with offsite support

'

organizations, based on their. interviews with offsite officials an ;

' records reviews. Another refinement to the 1989 audit was the~

inclusion of a senior member of the PNPP's onsite EP staff as the'

>

audit team's technical specialist. . Use of another~1_icensee's experienced EP specialist on an audit team should be beneficial t the EP programs of both the DBNPS and the PNPP, as the annual audit is an opportunity to acquire and,to share in-depth information on day-to-day-EP program activities. The EP staff's responses to 1989 audit. findings-and observations, plus auditor' followup activities, will be evaluated during a-future inspectio In addition to the annual audits', Quality Assurance (QA) Department staff conducted several surveillance of specific EP program or related activities since mid-1988. Topics included periodic tests of the Computerized Automated Notification System (CANS) utilized to activate the ERO and a record review of validation testing for a

revised offsite dose calculation' program. A QA Department representa_tive indicated.that a surveillance of /,ugust 1989 exercise

'was -being planned, as.the means to satisfy the quarterly requirement

^to conduct a surveillance of an activity of the Technical Services Department, which includes EP, industrial safety, and nuclear licensing staff Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was acceptabl . TMI Safety Issues Management System (SIMS) Items-On October 31, 1980, the NRC issued NUREG-0737, which incorporated into

- one document all .TMI-related . items approved for impleme stion by the Commission at that. time. On December 17, 1982, the NRC issued Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737 to provide additional clarification regarding Regulatory Guide 1.97 (Revision 2)'-- Application to Emergency Response Facilities, and Meteorological Data, as well as other areas. The status of the completion of these TMI SIMS items are internally tracked by the NR ,, The August 3, 1988 Inspection Report.(No. 50-346/88020(DRSS)) provided a status listing of the SIMS items related to emergency preparedness. The following listing provides an updated status of those SIMS items that were "open" in the August 3, 1988 report. All other emergency preparedness related SIMS items are closed (complete) or no longer applicabl II Current Status: Closed

!

This item has been determined to be no longer applicable, and has been administratively close b

{ -_ -- -_

__ . _ _ _ . - _ - - - _

i: ,

..

..

<

,.

l

'

III.A. Current Status': Closed

! This item has been determined to be no longer applicable, and.has been administrative 1y close III;A. Current Status: Closed This item has been determined to be no longer applicable, and has been administratively close III.A. ' Current Status: Closed This item has been determined to be no longer applicable, and has been administratively close III.A. Current Status: Closed This item has been determined to be no longer applicable, and has been administratively close MPA-F-63 Current Status: Open This item involves a review of the TSC during a future inspectio MPA-F-65 Current Status: Open This item involves a review of the EOF during a future inspectio . Exit Interview (IP 307038)

On May 19, 1989, the inspector met with those licensee staff identified in Section 1 to present the preliminary inspection findings. The licensee indicated that none of the items discussed was proprietary in natur The licensee was informed that management's strong support for the EP program remains evident by the quantity and quality of annual training provided to the Emergency Response Organization (ERO). ERO staffing levels remain good for all key and support positions. The licensee remains responsive to offsite EP concerns, as indicated by:

establishment of a computerized plant parameter data link to the Ohio Emergency Management Agency; assistance in developing plans for the Ingestion Pathway Emergency Planning Zone; and by assistance in providing annual training to vcrious offsite support organizations. Recent years'

audits of the EP program have had good scope and depth, and were further improved in 1989. Emergency response facilities and equipment remain well maintaine _- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _