IR 05000346/1997007

Insp Rept 50-346/97-07 on 970602-06.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Plant Support Re Emergency Plan Exercise

ML20217H311
Person / Time
Site:	Davis Besse
Issue date:	08/04/1997
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20217H296	List: IR 05000346/1997007 ML20217H295
References
50-346-97-07, 50-346-97-7, NUDOCS 9708110073
Download: ML20217H311 (11)

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U. S, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION '

REGION lli Docket No: 50-346 License No: NPF-3 Report No: 50 346/97007(DRS)

Licensee: Toledo Edison Company f

Facility: Davis Besse Nuclear Power Station Location: 5503 N. State Route 2 Oak Harbor, OH 43449 t

Dates: June 2 - 6,1997 Inspectors: Robert Jickling, Emergency Preparedness Analyst Thomas Ploski, Emergency Response Coordinator Stan Stasek, Senior Resident inspector Kevin Zellars, Resident inspector William M::'er, Emergency Preparedness Specialist Donald Fur 4 Emergency Preparedness AnLlyst Approved by: James R. Creed, Chief, Plant Support Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety 9708110073 970804 PDR ADOCK 05000346 G PDR l

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station NRC Inspection Report 50 346/97007 This inspection included evaluation of performance during the plant's biennial exercise of the Emergency Plan and review of previous emergency preparedness open items by the resident staff and headquarters and regional emergency preparedness inspector Plant Suncort Overall performance during the 1997 Emergency Preparedness exercise was soun Emergency offsite notifications and offsite protective action recommendations were correct and time:y. Transfers of command and control of event respor se were timely and well coordinated. Simulated events were accurately diagnosed, proper mitigation actions were performed, and emergency declarations were timely and accurat *

Overall, control room crew performance was proficient. The Shift Supervisor (SS)

promptly recognized the Alert entry conditions. Initial notifications were made to the Stato and local autherities in a timely manner. Communications by control room personnel were effective. Good teamwork was exhibited by the cre (Section P4.1.b.1)

• Overall performance by the Technical Support Conter staff was effective. The Emergency Plant Manager maintained excellent command and control of the staf Effective prioritization of accident mitigation and repair activities were demonstrated. (Section P4.1.b.2)

The Operations Support Center facility manager established clear task priorities as the simulated emergency conditions changed and kept his staff informed of changing priorities. Two inspection Followup Items were identified for evaluating staffing levels of respiratory and self-contained breathing apparatus qualifications of emergency response team members and poor radiological control practice (Section P4.1.b.3)

Overall performance by the Emergency Control Center (ECC) personnel was proficient. Command and control of the facility by the Emergency Offsite Manager was effective. Facility briefings were thorough and frequent. Effective communications and teamwork were observed. Good communications and self-checking prevented errors in reported information. (Section P4.1.b.4)

• Overall response by onshift personnel to a simulated contaminated, injured worker was exceptional. The first aid team's leader demonstrated excellent command and control of the onscene response and kept the control room wellinformed of onscene activities. (Section P4.1.b.5)

• .One inspection Followup Item was identified for poor simulation of radiological data by controllars. (Section P4.1.b.8)

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Report Details IV. Plant Support P3 Emergency Preparedness Procedures and Documentation P Review of Exercise Objectives and Scenario (82302)

The inspectors reviewed the 1997 exercise objectives and scenario and determined that they provided an appropriate framework to support demonstration of the-licensee's capabilities to implement its emergency plan. The scenario included a large radiological release and several equipment failures, P4 Staff Knowledge and Performance in Emergency Preparedness P Evaluated Biennial Emeroency Preparedness Exercise insoection Scope (82301)

On June 4,1997, the licensee conducted a biennial exercise involving partial participation by Ottawa, Lucas, and Sandusky counties and the State of Ohio. The exercise was conducted to test major portions of the onsite and offsite emergency response capabilities. The licensee activated its emergency response organization and emergency response facilitie The inspectors evaluated licensee performance in the following emergency response facilities:

Control Room Simulator (CRS)

• Technical Support Center (TSC)

• Operations Support Center (OSC)

• Emergency Control Center (ECC)

. The inspectors assessed licensee recognition of abnormal plant conditions, classification of emergency conditions, notification of offsite agencies, development of protective action recommendations, command and control, communications, radiation and contamination control, and the overall implementation of the emergency plan. In addition, the inspectors attended the post-exercise critiques in each of the facilities to evaluate the licensee's self assessment of exercise performanc On June 3,1997, an inspector evaluated the onsito portions of a medical drill involvin0 transport of a contaminated injured person to the Fremont Memorial Hospita i

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• Ememency Resoonse Facility Observations and Findinas Control Room Simulator Overall control room crew performance was proficient. Tbs Shif t Supervisor (SS)

promptly recognized the Alert entry conditions and appropriately used the emergency implementing procedures to declare the emergency. Initial notifications were made to the State and local authorities within 15 minutes and the NRC within 30 minutes of the emergency classificatio Communications by control room personnel were effective and used " repeat backs" to avoid miscommunications. Also, good teamwork was exhibited among the CRS crew, specifically, good questioning attitude was displayed by reactor operators before carrying out orders to manipulate plant equipment when the loss of power and instrument air prevented operation of certain equipmen Communications between the CRS and the emergency response facilities were crisp and concise. Radiological conditions, pla. .:onditions, and current emergency response activities were continuously relayed between the facilitie The CRS effectively used the TSC's engineering support to follow up on restoration of offsite power and depressurizing the plant early in the exercis The transfer of command and control from the CRS Emergency Director (ED) to the TSC ED was smooth and well coordinated. The Operations Supen.'tendent prepared to relieve the SS of emergency responsibilities; however, command and

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control was effectively transferred to the TSC instead, due to the rapid activation of

, the TS Technical Suonort Center Overall performance by the TSC's staff was effective. TSC staff were in place, briefed and ready to perform their duties within 30 minutes of the Alert declaratio The responding ED, who was procedurally allowed to float between the TSC and the adjacent ECC, initially reported to the TS The transfer of lead responsibility for the licensee's emergency response from the CRS to the TSC was completed in an orderly and timely manner, approximately 45 minutes from the Alert declaration. The transfer of lead responsibility was broadcast over the plant public address (PA) system as were subsequent emergency reclassification The Emergency Plant Manager (EPM) maintained strong command and control of TSC staff activities during the emergency response. The EPM effectively used a dedicated ccmmunications line to communicate frequently with CRS and OSC'

management. The frequent communications allowe.1 these managers to maintain a common knowledge of changing plant conditions, related response decisions, and changing prioritie _ ____ -_ _ __

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The TSC engineering staff effectively monitored the Emergency Action Levels

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(Eats) and identified potential EALs on a status board at,, ant conditions change The ED correctly declared the Site Area Emergensy and General Emergency in a timely manner following further degradation in plant conditions. Emergency classifications and protective actions we,re appropriately announced over the plant PA syste Status boards were frequently end accurately updated to display plant parameter data, current tasks assigned to TSC engineering staffs and OSC management, and t

event chronology and major decisions. However, the inspectors noted that status boards did not indicate when repair, survey, and sampling teams were actually dispatched from the OSC, which led to the EPM having to request this information from OSC staff.

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Effective prioritization of emergency mitigation and repair activities were observed for identifying and isolating the radiological release, replenishing the emergency diesel generator tanks, and restoring offsite electrical power.

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Good periodic briefings were conducted by the TSC Manager and EPM during which all key TSC staff contributed significant emergency information, b.3 _Ocerational Support Center (OSC) and inolant Teams Overall OSC personnel performance was capable. The OSC was activated in a timely and coordinated manner and functioned well. Staffing for the exercise was in accordance with the emergency plan and appropriate procedure ,

After the reactor pressure decreased and the radiological re ease stopped, the OSC ,

Manager ordered an emergency response team (ERT) to weld the component cooling water line that was cracked provided the release path to the environmen The Radiation Coordinator required tile repair team to wear self contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) because of the unknown levels of airborne contamination. None of the welders available were qualified to wear SCBA respiratory protection. The OSC Manager decided to send the welder to get qualified for wearing SCBA, which could take two to four hours, if the situation had been different and required a SCBA qualified welder to terminate a radiological release in progress to the environment and one was not available, it could have affected the health and safety of the public. The evaluation of and any subsequent corrective actions for maintaining sufficient staffing of respirator and SCBA qualified welders and other personnel for emergency response will be tracked as an inspection Followup Item (50-346/97007-01(DRS ).

Communications with the ECC and the TSC were appropriate. Communications -

within the OSC were effective and included concise facility briefs that were conducted every half iiour. ERTs were fully briefed prior to dispatch and effectively debriefed upon return to the facility. The OSC staff maintained satisfactory communication with the ERTs in the plan Command and controlin the OSC was strong. The OSC Manager established clear task priorities as the simulated emergency conditions changed and kept his

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sabordinates informed of changing priorities. Noise and confusion in the facility were generally kept to a minimum; however this deteriorated slightly toward the end of the exercis The OSC staff exhibited severalinstances of poor radiological control practices during the exercise. The radiation protection technicians (RPTs) performing habitability surveys in the OSC did not routinely take portable air samples. The inspectors observed only one air sample performed late in the exercise. Also. RPTs conducted radiation and contamination surveys of only one OSC entrance and not the entire facilit Additionally, the OSC staff did not adequately 'ontrol access to the facility for returning ERT members. The second entrance to the facility was not closed off to personnel. A number of returning ERT members entered the OSC from this entrance without a step off pad or contamination controlin plac Finally, the inspectors observed OSC staff continue to eat after the OSC Manager <

had announced that eating, drinking, or chewing was not permitted. One ERT member was observed chewing gum across the radiologically restricted area (RRA)

boundary. The poor radiological control practices during the exercise will be tracked as an inspection Followup item (50-346/97007-02(DRS)).

b.4 Emeraency Control Conter

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Overall performance by the ECC personnel was effective. Staffing of the ECC was promptly initiated after the Alert declaration per procedures. The facility staff was briefed and ready to perform their duties within 25 minutes after the Alert declaratio Command and control of the facility by the Emergency Offsite Manager was effective in that facility briefings were thorough and frequent. ECC advisors effectively participated in these briefings by providing comments on the current status of emergency response, for which they were responsible, on the facility PA syste Effective communications and teamwork were observed by the inspectors in the ECC. Good communications and self-checking prevented errors by the facility staf When differences in containment dome radiation levels were received in the facility from the TSC, ECC personnel promptly took actions to determine the actual radiation levels. Early in the exercise, the ED request personnel to use the appropriate units when reporting data. Personnel knew their emergency responsibilities and peduimed them efficientl The ED and ED Advisor proactively reviewed the classification procedure and EALs to ensure the appropriete emergency classification was declared.. Current plant status was continuously provided to the ED by the Operations Adviso Radiation Monitoring Teams (RMTs) were effectively positioned and tracked by the RMT Coordinator. The Dose Assessment Coordinator provided timely information

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to the ED regarding dose projections, contingency calculations, and Protective

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Action Recommendations (PARS).

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i Communications with the State and county representatives were appropriately l maintained by the ED. The FCC staff correctly revised their PAR after identifying a shift in wind direction and discussed this information with the State and county representatives in the facility before the revised PAR was communicated to State and county Emergency Operations Center Onsite Medical Resconga Overall response by onshift personnel to a simulated contaminated, injured worker was exceptional. The first aid team's leader demonstrated effective cornmand and control of the onscene response and kept the control room wellinformed of

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onscene activities.

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l Coordination among the first aid team, a security officer, and RPTs was performed well. Higher priority was appropriately given to the worker's medical and emotional

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we:I being. The injured worker was carefully examined for other potential injuries

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and always attended by at least one responder. Contamination control techniques demonstrated by all onscene responders were appropriate to prevent the spread of contaminatio The security officer maintained communications with his points of contact and kept other onscene responders wellinformed of the onsite progress of ambulance

,ervice personne The RPTs accurately documented the worker's medical and contamination conditions per procedures. This information was shared with ambulance service personnel before the injured worker was transferred to their care. A radiation protection supervisor and two RPTs were assigned to proceed to the local hospital to provide their expertise in support of the hospitas medical care providers, Recovery Discussions The ED convened key responders from the CRS and all emergency response facilities for an initial recovery planning discussion using the recovery procedur The recovery discussion was thorough and included identification of a recovery organization, current emergency conditions, plant equipment that would be necessary for maintaining cold shutdown, and offsite agencies to be called for assistance, Licensee Self-Critiaue The inspectors observed and evaluated the licensee's pcst-exercise facility critiques immediately following the exercise. Exercise participants and controllers participated in the discussions and completed formal critique form _ _ . _ _ _ . - . _ . _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

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.. Participants and controllers were self critical. Numerous issues, both positive and

negative, were discussed. - All personnel had an opportunity to speak. Controllers c

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requested written comments from the participants to augment the controllers'

documents, b.8 - Scenario and Exercise Control

' The inspectors made observations during the exercise to assess the challenge and realism of the scenario and to evaluate the control of the exercise.

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. The inspectors determined that the scenario was appropriate to test emergency

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capabilities and demonstrate onsite exercise objectives.

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Exercise control was appropriate with the exception of inadequate simulation of radiological control data. The inspectors identified three examples of inadequate

.' radiological control data. The first example was the failure of a repair team

controller to require adequate simulation of radiological control practices at various

entrances to the RRA, the use of which were simulated but not actually employed for the exercise. Players simulated entry into the RRA via a turbine building entrance that was not normally used. The repair team actually entered the RRA via the normal entry point, but they did not simulate nor discuss the need for

establishing a radiological control point at the RRA boundary simt. lated exit.

A second example of poor controller simulation of radiological data involved a

controller providing local radiation levels to players. The controller inappropriately announced the area radiation levels to the RPT instead of requiring actual use of the

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survey meter by the technician.

A third example of poor controller simulation of radiological data involved the data

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provided to RPTs performing habitability surveys of the OSC area. The inspectors j, observed one simulated habitability survey that consisted of the RPT obtaining the j

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survey log sheet and asking the controllers in the OSC what the radiation and contamination levels were. The controllers provided requested information to the

technician even though he was not carrying a meter.

l The poor. simulation of radiological data by controllers affected the ability of the inspectors to evaluate radiological control practices by the participants and wik be -

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tracked as an inspection Followup item (50-346/97007-03(DRS)). Overall Conclusiong

The exercise was an effective demontration of the licensee's capabilities to implement its emergency plans and procedures. Event classifications were correct

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and timely. Strong direction and control were observed at ali of the emergency facilities. Offsite notifications and offsite protective action recommendations were correct and timely. Inplant activities were well-thought out and well coordinate .

p Transfers of command and control were appropriately coordinated.

. Three Inspection Followup items were identified for evaluating staffing levels of

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respiratory and self-contained breathing apparatus qualifications of ERT members,

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-4 poor radiological control practices in the OSC, and poor simulation of radiological data by controller .The licensee's overall self assessments during the post exercise facility critiques were self critical and both exercise controllers and participants were provided an opportunity to provide comment P8 Miscellaneous EP lesues (Closed) Inspection Followup item (50 346/95008-05): During the 1995 exercise the TSC did not forrnally track OSC ERT activitios or status, and this information was erased from TSC status boards. During the 1997 exercise, the "OSC Significant Tasks" and " Problem Analysis" status boards were used by TSC staff to track ongoing assignments for_ERTs and TSC engineering statt, respectivel Results of completed tasks remained posted on these status boards until they were adequately documented on forms maintained to facilitate subsequent reconstruction of response activities. This item is close V. Maneaement Meetinas Exit Meetina Summarv (-

The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management and staff at the conclusion of the onsite inspection on June 6,1997. As a result of a telephone conference with licensee staff on June 27,1997, to obtain additional information related to training commitments and qualification status, it was determined that no exercise weaknesses or violations of NRC requirements were observed. The licensee acknowledged the findings presente The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the incpection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identifie ._ _ - _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ - - _ .

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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee --

M. Beier, Quality Assessment Manager B. Cope, Senior Emergency Preparedness Specialist L. Dohrmann, Quality Services Manager

- J. Freels, Regulatory Affairs Manager

- L. Hughes, Supply Manager -

J. Lash, Plant Manager D. Lockwood, Compliance Supervisor P. McCloskey, Emergency Preparedness Supervisor J. Michaelis, Maintenance Manager J. ONeill, Quality Control Supervisor J. Rogers, Plant Engineer Manager H. Stevens, Nuclear Safety Manager l P. Timmerman, Senior Emergency Preparedness Specialist M. White, Emergency Preparedness Representative J. Wood, Vice President Nuclear l

NRC Stan Stasek, Senior Resident inspector

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Kevin Zellars, Resident inspector INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 82301 Evaluation of Exercises for Power Reactors IP 82302 . Review of Exercise Objectives and Scenarios for Power Reactors ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED ,

Opened 50-346/97007-01 IFl Evaluation of staffing levels of respiratory and SCBA qualifications of ERT members, 50-346/97007-02 IFl Poor radiological control practices in the OS /97007-03 IFl Poor simulation of radiological data by controller Closed /95008-05 IFl The TSC did not formally track OSC emergency response team status or activitie J

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LIST OF ACRONYMS USED-CFR Code of Federal Regulations CRS Control Room Simulator DRS Division of Reactor Safety EAL Emergency Action Level ECC Emergency Control Centor ED Emergency Director ENS Emergency Notification System EPIP Emergency Plan implementing Procedure EPM Emergency Plant Manager ERDS Emergency Response Data System ERO Emergency Response Organization l ERT Emergency Response Teams IFl Inspection Followup item-NPF Nuclear Power Facility NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission OS Operations Superintendent OSC Operations Support Center

?.* Public Address PAR Protective Action Recommendation PDR NRC Public Document Room RPT Radiation Protection Techniciar, RRA Radiologically Restricted Area SCBA Self Contained Breathing Apparatus SS Shift Supervisor TSC Technical Support Center

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