IR 05000346/1988017

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Insp Rept 50-346/88-17 on 880412-0916.No Violations Noted. Allegation Inspected:Individuals Inappropriately Placed in Util Employee Assistance Program &/Or Placed on Plant Denied Access List for Criticizing Mgt Policies
ML20206M035
Person / Time
Site: Davis Besse Cleveland Electric icon.png
Issue date: 10/27/1988
From: Creed J, Kniceley J
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20206M032 List:
References
50-346-88-17, NUDOCS 8811300357
Download: ML20206M035 (9)


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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i

REGION III 1 Report No. 50-346/88017(DRSS)  ;

i Docket No. 50-346 , License No. NPF-3 ,

i Licensee: Toldedo Edison Company l Edison Plaza 300 Madison Avenue l

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Toledo, OH 42652 l i >

3 Facility Name: Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station '

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Inspection At; Davis-Besse Site, Oak Harbor, Ohio i Toledo Edison Corporate office, Toledo, Ohio

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and NRC Region III office, Glen Ellyn, Illinois (

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4 Inspection Conducted: April 12 through September 16, 1988 l Date of Last Security Inspection: January 11-15, 1988 Inspector: Some kbCovW1 /e1 /C/<M./88 [

Jam 4s R. Kraceley " (/ Date 4 j Physical Security Inspector j Approved By: D/87/88 Arces R. Creed, Chief Date 4 (3'afeguardt Section  !

l i j Inspection Summary i i

! Inspection on April 12 through September 16, 1988 (Report No. 346/88017(ORSS)) l

Areas Inspected: Included a Special Inspection of allegations that

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individuals were inapp'opriately placed in the Toledo Edison Company's i Employee Assistance Program (EAP) and/or placed on the Plant's Denied Assess  :

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List (DAL) for criticizing management policie ;

! Results: The licensee was found to bc in compliance with NRC requirements  ;

I within the areas inspected. The allegations were not substantiated. Records i j review showed that actions taken by the licensee's management against the l

! specifically named individuals were appropriate for the specific circumstance I

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DETAILS Key Person Contacted G. Grime, Security Director, Toledo Edison (TED) - Corperate G. Skeel, Nuclear Security Operation Manager, TED C. Detray, Nuclear Security Support Manager, TED G. Bradley, Nuclear Licensing Specialist, TED A. Schumaker, Access Control Manager, TED J. Waddell, Security Investigator, TED - Corporate P. Weaver, Security Investigator, TED - Corporate M. O'Reilly, Attorney, TED - Corporate B. Gissel, Attorney, TED - Corporate B. O'Connor, President / Business Manager, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, L. V. 1413 P. Byron, Senior Resident Inspector, USNRC, Region III D. Kosloff, Resident Inspector, USNRC, Region III J. Porter, Compliance Specialist, US Department of Labor, Sandusky, Ohio H. Drummond, Vice President-Director of Contract Services, Family Services of Northwest Ohio In addition to the key members of the licensee's staff listed above, the inspector interviewed other licensee employees and members of the security organizatio . ExitMeeting(MC30703)

A telephone exit meeting with Mr. G. Grime, Security Director, was held on October 6, 1988. He was advised of the specific allegations and the conclusions, as described in Section 3 of the Report Detail He was also .dvised that the inspectior, conclusions were subject to

NRC, Region III, management review and that the final report would contain the formal perspectivs of the inspection results. He

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acknowledged the inspector's comments partaining to the allegation review and conclusio . Investigation - Allegation Review I The following information, provided in the form of allegations were

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reviewed by the inspector as noted below:

a) Background: Allegation Nos. RIII-86-A-0051, and RIII-87-A-0095.

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(1) Starting in March 1986, NRC Region III began receiving allegations regarding the operation and management of the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station. These allegations consisted

! of concerns regarding plant operation and were linked by a

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, common concern that employees who voiced opinions contrary to that of plant management or who raised concerns, were subject to

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harassment, intimidation and adverse job actions. Most of what has been alleged related to management / labor relation issues which specifically fall outside of the NRC's purview. None of these allegations related to specific nuclear safety concerns and related only to alleged management policies and practice The overall impact of such alleged management is of concern because of the potential adverse impact on people doing safety-related activitie The specific allegations reviewed and addressed in this report are limited to the following while other identified concerns may still be under revie (a) An individual was unfairly denied a transfer from a Toledo Edison fossil fueled plant to the Davis-Besse Nuclear Plant because of previous psychological problems and for having contact with the NR (b) Two individuals were entered into the Employee Assistance Program (EAP) for criticizing management policie (c) Management used the security screening program by denying access to the plant, to punish two employee (2) The licensee's Employee Assistance Program (EAP) is a highly confidential counseling and referral service offered to Toledo Edison employees and their eligible dependents. The program is designed to assist people who have various personal problems such as alcohol or drug dependence, emotional stress, marital or severe financial difficultie There are two ways in which an individual may become involved in the Employee Assistance Program. The first, and preferred way, is for the employee to seek help voluntarily; that is to realize the existence of a problem and to contact the Program Coordinator or Human Affairs International directly. The second method of employee involvement is for a supervisor to initiate actions, due to observed deterioration of an employee's job performanc The decision of whether or not to actually follow through with help offered by the EAP rests with the individual. The EAP is designed to aid in improving job performance and is not intended to grant special privileges to employees who fail to show improvement. The intent of the EAP is to help their employees and dependents maintain good health and restore positive work performance by alleviating or easing a personal proble The program requires that all matters pertaining to the employee's or dependent's involvement in the EAP be kept in strict confidence. Information will only be released with written authorization by the employee or dependent. The employee or dependent will not be identified to the Toledo

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Edison Compan Expenses incurred for diagnostic and referral services available through the EAP will be assumed by The '

Toledo Edison Company. The employee is only responsible for the cost of treatments not covered under the group health -

insurance plan Employees who are participating in the EAP are expected to meet existing job performance standards and to comply with established work rules. No employee's job security or promotional opportunity will be jeopardized as a result of seeking and conscientiously following a program treatment or assistance. If the counselor perceives a patient to be a threat to the plant, he would intervene and identify the patient and perceived threat to the company. The need to protect the health and safety of the public was fully understood by the EAP contractor and would take precedence over the confidential program aspect (3) The licensee's Denied Access List (DAL) is a listing of those individuals who have been denied access to either the Protected / Vital Areas or to the Davis-Besse site. A person may be denied access to the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, or the Protected and Vital Areas, for the following reasons:

(a) Criminal history check result (b) Failure to meet minimum screening requirement (c) Fitness for duty incident (d) Violation of company policies or procedure (e) Other circumstances which cast doubt upon an individuals security reliability and *.rustworthines If an individual wishes to appsal or change their Denied Access status the Industrial Security Committee (ISC) will review the case and issue a decision. The Industrial Security Committee (ISC) is comprised of the Industrial Security Director, Human Resources Administrator, and the Plant Manager, or their designees. The ISC is responsible for reviewing decisions concerning access denial and reviewing appeals filed by individuals desiring to change their denied access statu (4) In order for NRC to adequately evaluate the allegations, access to personnel files and the confidential EAP files was necessary. After lengthy discussions between Region III counsel and Toledo Edison legal counsel the following agreement was made and access to the required records was give Each a11eger was contacted and signed a release form authorizing the NRC to review, inspect and copy all records (e.g., EAP, medical, personnel and plant security access) of the Toledo Edison Company and its contractors concerning the basis for their placement on OAL or their

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J entrance into the EAP. The allegers also agreed to the release of their names to the Toledo Edison Company in order to obtain expeditious access to the record None of the allegers provided any information indicating

. any adverse impact on the safety of the plant related to

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their concerns. Each person interviewed stated that regardless of any disagreements with management they did their jobs correctly and would continue to do s While reviewing the EAP files of the service contractor

, (Family Service of Northwest Ohio) Mr. Heyward L. Drummond; Vice President-Director of Contracts, stated that on June 30, 1987 the Tdedo Edison Company terminated the EAP contract with his firm. The contract was allegedly lost because Mr. Drummond refused to give names of Toledo Edison employees who voluntarily sought help under i,

the EAP self-referral program. It was Mr. Drummond's

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opinion and program policy that self-referrals were confidential and without written permission from the

< individual their names would not be revealed. The utility 4 wanted to bring in a clinical psychologist to act as a

buffer to evaluate facts of a self-referral to determine 1 whether or not management should be given the employee's
name and to evaluate the prescribed case action, ultimately deciding on the employee's suitability for work. It was determined by the Davis-Besse management personnel that the EAP provider was "not being cooperative". It was determined that Human Affairs International would be their new EAP provider and as cf kne 30, 1987. Mr. Drummond

, states that he lost approximately 25% of his business because he refused to give Davis-Besse management confidential EAP informatio Mr.. Drummond acknowledges that he understood his responsibility to identify any individual, to the company, who is determined to be a i threat or safety hazard to the company or individual ! He was also fully aware and understood the screening /

j access control requirements for nuclear power plant Interviews with the Security Director and review of the l' EAP proceduras show that the EAP contractor must identify to the company any threats, safety-related information or

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safety hazards which are developed or identified during EAP session The licensee's new EAP provider (Human Affairs j Internatiorial) is required by contract to inform the licensee's

, Medical Director of all life threatening or safety / security related information developed through the EAP process. The

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Medical Director will then evaluate and relay this information I to plant management for further review and disposition. The Medicsl Director does not routinely audit the EAP provide l The EAP provider is supplied with a list of specific key j individuals (e.g., operators) who must be identified to the

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company if they request assistance through the EAP. The j contractor's EAP coordinator is a licensed psychologist who

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is trained to identify behavior which could be detrimental to plant safety or security. The Security Review Committee also i reviews any EAP referral or other disciplinary action which i results in removal of an individual's access. It ap. nears that the licensee has taken the appropriate steps to identify any .

individuals who may be harmful to themselves or the plan '

B b) The allegations, NRC review and conclusions are described below: -

(1) Allegation: An individual contended he was unfairly denied a transfer to Davis-Besse from a Toledo Edison fossil fueled plant because of previous psychological problems and for having contact with the NR j (AMS No. RIII-86-A-0051) L

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NRC Review: The inspector reviewed this individual's ;

personnel file, Employee Assistance Program (EAP) l file, Denied Access List (DAL) file, and the !

Industrial Security Committee (ISC) records. The !

review of these records showed that the individual ;

on occasions appeared to be experiencing emotional I and psychological problems which cast a doubt on his !

reliability. As a result he was denied access to the >

Davis-Besse plant. On several occasions the ISC reviewed the request for onescorted access to the Davis-Besse plant for this individual. The requast for unescorted access to Davis-Besse was denied !

because the ISC concluded that the individual's l previous emotional problems could reoccur due to long work hours, job stress, emergency situations, et '

Although the individual acknowledged that he went to :

the NRC for information there were no indications or i records to show that the individual was denied access i for having contacted the NR l Conclusion: The Industrial Security Committee (ISC)

is responsible for determining security reliability ,

of an applicant for work at the Davis-Besse Nuclear j Power Station in cases where negative or possible !

disqualifying information is developed during the t course of their background investigation. The ISC determined that this individual demonstrated aberrant behavior and appeared to be experiencing emotional and psychological problems which cast a doubt on his reliability and he was deniod access to Davis-Bess We have determined that the licensee's management acted within its prerogative and in accordance with established procedures in denying site access to this individual when they considered him to have questionable reliability due to his demonstrated emotional and psychological problems. There were no

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indications or records that showed that the individual was denied access due to his contact with the NR This allegation was not substantiated and is considered close (2) Allegation: Two named individuals were entered into the Employee Assistance Program (EAP) for criticizing management policie (AMS No. RIII-86-A-0051)

NRC Review: A review of the Employee Assistance Program (EAP) files for these individuals, which were kept either by the company or contractor, showed that these individuals were referred into the EAP for

evaluation and/or treatment. The individuals'

behavior indicated to management that they may have

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been experiencing emotional problems and when placed in stressful situations may have difficulty functioning

in a rational manner. At the time of these allegations j there were significant management and operational

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changes which were a departure from past Davis-Besse

{ practices and these changes met with resistance from

! some employee These individuals verbally or in

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writing disagreed with management styles and practice These disagreements were demonstrated to management i through the use of profanity and abusive language as well as in written form, such as, "You better watch j ou This may be the beginning of a long hard road."

] These individuals were interviewed on several occasions during the investigation and they indicated that they

! may have over reacted emotionally in some cases in

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9 their views and disagreements. Management i interpreted these complaints as threats to the plant which *. hey concluded demonstrated behavioral and

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emotional outbursts (aberrant behavior) and therefore

cast a doubt on their reliability and stability.

l Site management required the individuals to enroll

into the EAp in order to help these individuals correct their emotional problem The individuals ( started and completed the EAP progra i l Conclusion: A review of personnel and EAP files in

addition to interviews with the allegers showed that j these individuals may have over reacted emotionally J

when disagreeing with plant management's practices

, and styles. Although management determined that these individuals made implied threats to the plant t

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and demonstrated unacceptable behavior the individuals stated that they never intended to make any threats l but wanted only to relay information on how unhappy people were.

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We have determined that the licensee's management acted within its prerogative and in accordance with established procedures in requiring evaluation of the individuals through the EAP. This allegation was not substantiated and is considered close (3) A11egatiey Management used the security screening program to punish two named employee (AMS No. RIII-86-A-0051 and RIII-87-A-0095)

NRC Review: Prior to granting access to the plant, background investigations are required to be performed on each individual. The investigations include, but

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are not limited to, drug screening, criminal history checks and psychological testing as identified in Administrative Procedure No. AD 1808.16 entitled,

"Personnel Screening". Failure to meet minimum screening requirements would result in personnel being placed on the Denied Access List. The licensee 4 has five reason codes for placing individuals on the Denied Access List. They are: (1) Criminal History i Chee.k Result; (2) Failure to Meet Minimum Screening I

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Requirements; (3) Fitness for Duty Incidents;

! (4) Violation of Company's Policies or Procedures; (5) Others.

I; The inspector reviewed the security screening

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documents for the individuals involved. The record l review showed that the screening requirements for the

individuals were completed as required by the i licensee's tscurity plan and no other requirements j were placed on these individual Record review showed that both of these individuals
were denicd access to the plant due ', heir written l and/or verbal outbursts, such as the use of profanity

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and abusive language towards supervisors, which demonstrated to management that they were experiencing behavioral and emotional difficuitie There was no documentation to show that the individuals were punished, harassed, intimidated, or adverse job actions taken by management through the improper use of the security screening program. The security screening program as de/ined in the licensee's Physical Security Plan is being followed. It should be noted that one individual was a company employee and voluntarily entered and completed the EAP while the other individual was a temporary contractor employee who was terminated and was not entitled to EAP assistanc *

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Conclusion: Based on record review and review of the licensee's security screening program implementation, this allegation was not substantiated. The licensee appeared to have just cause for denying access as required by the)r ser.aity screening p.ogram due to the aberrent behavior demonstrated by these individuals. This allegation is considered close ,

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