IR 05000346/1989017

Insp Rept 50-346/89-17 on 890614-16.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Licensee self-initiated Engineering Evaluation Efforts,Including SSFIs for Auxiliary Feedwater Sys & Station & Instrument Air Sys

ML20246E791
Person / Time
Site:	Davis Besse
Issue date:	07/05/1989
From:	Phillips M, Yin I NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20246E781	List: IR 05000346/1989017 ML20246E778
References
50-346-89-17, NUDOCS 8907120384
Download: ML20246E791 (6)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

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lReportNo:.50-346/89017(DRS) ,

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Docket No'J. 50-346' License No.~NPF-3

' Licensee: Toledo Edison Company-300. Madison ~ Avenue

, Toledo', OH .43652 Facility Name: Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station

Inspection At:. Oak Harbor, OH 43449 E Inspection Conducted: .~ June 14-16, 1989 Inspector: ' T. Yin-Date kW

' Approved By: M. P. Phillips, Chief

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Operational Programs Section 7/kk Date LInspection Summary'

Inspection on June.14-16, 1989 (Report-No. 50-346/89017(DRS)) .

Areas Inspected: Routine, announced inspection of licensee self-initiated

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-engineering evaluation efforts condected at'the site including Safety Systems Functional Inspections (SSFIs) for the Auxiliary Feedwater.(AFW) system and the station'and instrument air systems, the configuration management program,-

and ac~and dc power distribution protection systems. The inspection was based

on selected portions of NRC Inspection Procedures 90713 and 3070 Results

.The~ licensee's SSFI program has shown significant improvement There was.a lack of demonstration that cumulative effects of discrepancies l identified in the configuration management program would not have any immediate-safety concerns in a subsystem. The licensee is moving forward with their plans

,to evaluate the adequacy of its electrical protective devices coordinations activities; however, no completion date has been established.

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. DETAILS y

- Persons Contacted

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. Toledo'Ed'ison Company (TE).

• T. J. Myers, Technical Services Director--

A. J. VanDenabeele, Engineering Assurance (EA)

. D. Wilczyniski, Systems Engineer

• C. E. Ackerman, Independent Safety Engineering (ISE)

• A..K. Zarkesh, Manager, ISE

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L. W. Wonley, Quality Systems Manager S. C. Jain, Director, D-B Engineering

• D. L. Haiman, EQ Manager E. D. Schock, Electrical Engineer, Design Engineer (DE)

1. : M. D.'Calcamuggio, Electrical Engineer, DE l P. W.' Jacobsen,- Supervisor, DE Electrical l P.- W.-Gaffney, General Supervisor, DE W 'M. A. Becraft, Data Engineer

• R. W. Schrauder, Manager, Nuclear Licensing

• G. Honms', Compliance Supervisor

• R. Geston, Licensing Engineer

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L U.S.- Nuclear Regulatory Commission

• P. M. Byron, Senior Resident Inspector

• D.'C. Kosloff, Resident Inspector

• K. Walton, Resident Inspector ~

• Indicates those attending the exit meeting on June 16, 1988 at Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Statio . Introduction This inspection was to observe a number of engineering evaluation program being conducted at the site by TE and to determine the quality of self-evaluation activities associated with engineering work at the sit . TE Engineering Programs and Staffing A number of engineering programs were initiated by TE since the June 9, 1985, loss of feedwater event. These were implemented both to address NRC concerns and to implement the licensee's own desire to upgrade its J system operations. These programs included the following:

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e' System Reviews and Test Program

• Upgrade of Motor Operated Valve Testing

• Upgrade of Preventive Maintenance Program

• Configuration Management Program (CMP)

• Safety Management (transients management and actions) Program

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.-In order to'(1)L-implement these program,-(2) perform self-initiate SSFIs,- and (3) perform timely evaluation of site events, a design oriented engineering organization was established at the site on Ja' permanent basis. . Present-staffing includes:

'* . Electrical-(12 TE and 21 contractor staff)

Mechanical-(19 TE and 25 contractor staff)

• I&C'(13 TE and 3 contractor staff)

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• Civil and Piping (13 TE and 14 contractor staff).

L The NRC inspector selected the CMP for a more detailed review. The system walkdown to record configuration and equipment nameplate data was completed in September 1988. Approximately 3500 discrepancies were identified in areas such as design drawing, equipment listing, P&ID, logic diagram, and vendor drawing;~and 1500 discrepancies in equipment tagging. In addition,'

.two Potential Conditions Adverse to Quality (PCAQs) were issued for-safety-related components and equipment; and 50 Requests for Action

'(RFAs) were issued for non safety-related items. TE corrective actions to address the findings-were'as follows:

• Immediate actions were taken to ccrrect any discrepancies D.

that could affect operational schematic * The equipment tagging problems were resolve * Mechanical discrepancies are to be dispositioned by the end of June.198 * Electrical discrepancies are to be resolved by the end of 198 * All RFAs remained ope (There were no current estimates as to when they would be closed out.)

During the' observation.'and discussion, the NRC inspector was not able to determine if the licensee had performed any narrow scope sample evaluation to ensure there were no concerns within a subsystem that could result from cumulative effects of electrical, mechanical, I&C, and non safety-related supporting functional discrepancies identified during the CMP.

' TE Initiated In-depth System Assessment

.The following major engineering self-evaluation activities had been

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undertaken:

• A SSFI of AFW was conducted from September through December 198 No significant safety findings were identifie * A Safety Systems Outage Modification Inspection (SS0MI) of the AFW system was conducted during the fifth refueling outage in 198 There were significant safety findings, such as:

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_ . AFW' discharge valve' control' breakers circuit design failed -

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to. meet the single failure criteri The battery' sizing calculation failed t'o -include de loads, such as emergency diesel generator start circuit, breaker operations and energizing of solenoid valve * A'.SSFI of the station and instrument air systems has been in progress

• since May 1, 1989, and is scheduled to be complete by the end of July 1989. A number of significant safety issues have already been 1 identified. These preliminary findings include:

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Fuel handling area air dampers for the ventilation system that connects to the emergency ventilation system have received no preventive maintenanc A number of safe shutdown air operated valves were not listed in the USA Lack of test' documentation for a number of containment air cooler outlet throttle valve Numerous. service and instrument air system valve lineup errors were identified. These errors could be attributed to' discrepancies between P& ids and operational procedure The NRC inspector observed significant improvements in the licensee-self-initiated SSFI program based on a review of the AFW and air system inspections: Imp'rovement was made in review scopes; for example, the first SSFI

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of AFW did not review electrical systems and relied on another ongoing program to ensure design basis documentation, but the ongoing SSFI of air ~ systems showed better scoping and utilized a'. matrix format for checking all required review areas.

l Improvement was made in the quality of the reviewers by selecting knowledgeable senior level engineers from different consulting companies and the TE engineering organization to conduct the SSF Improvement was made in training of SSFI team member A detailed

" Vertical Audit Training" program was conducted by the United Energy Services Corporation (UES) in 1988 at the site. This program manual has since been used and referenced by TE on a routine basis, Improvement was made in inspection preparation; for example, the SSFI of air systems included pre-inspection review of (1) detailed background and findings from other SSFIs compiled by UES and similar documentationbyStoneandWebsterEngineeringCorporation,and (2) the " Instrument Air System Review Report, dated December 1986, by the B&W Owners Grou l

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The NRC inspector concluded that the present licensee self-initiated SSFI program is well structured, and is being implemented in a professional manne . Modifications Done During the'Fifth Refueling Outage (5RF0)

There were a number of significant plant system and equipment modifications conducted at the site during the SRF0. The modifications that were subjected to the licensee-initiated SSOMI and Engineering Assurance reviews included:

• Improvement of AFW level control

Phase II of adding a motor driven feedwater pump to the AFW system Completion of Changeout made to Steam and Feedwater Rupture Control System,(SFRCS)

Installation of a reactor vessel head vent Replacement of station battery

• Emergency diesel generator overhaul

Repower startup feedwater pump In discussion with the TE staff, the NRC inspector was uncertain as to the level of overviews that had been given to the other significant modifications by TE during the SRF0 in view of some of the safety concerns that were identified during its SS0MI on AFW and related systems (Paragraph 4). Electrical Issues Identification The NRC inspector randomly selected three commonly seen system design weaknesses identified by the NRC and/or other licensee self-initiated SSFIs in the electrical areas, and evaluated whether TE was aware of the issues and what actions had been taken, Protective Devices Coordination TE Design Engineering (DE) is presently in the process of purchasing a computer program CYMC00RD to perform the subject evaluation for all plant safety-related power circuit The evaluation criteria were established in TE Design Criteria Manual, Section 5,

" Protective Relaying and Relay Coordination," Revision 0, dated June 27, 1988. Training had been provided for some design engineers who would perform the work. Present protective relay settings are provided by Centerior (the parent company of TE),

and tracked / controlled at the site by TE Design Electrical Departmen Power Bus Load Management (1) A,C TE DE purchased the Sargent and Lundy Electrical Load Management System (ELMS) computer programs for performing load flow, voltage drop, short circuit analyses in a distribution

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system under various operational scenarios. Loading of nameplate data and operating parameters into the ELMS will be completed by the end of June 1989. The ELMS is expected to be fully operational starting August 198 (2) DC TE DE is soliciting bids for a computer program to manage the DC system loads, which were tracked manually at the presen Sizing of DC Batteries A sizing calculation for the purchase of new station batteries was found unacceptable by the TE self-initiated SSOMI. The revised TE !

calculation, No. C-EE-002-005, " Battery Sizing," Revision 1, dated November 1, 1988, was done in accordance with the IEEE Standard 485-1983 criteria and methodology and resolved all findings identified in the SSOM I 7. Conclusions '

The~ licensee's self-initiated in-depth technical system reviews have been gradually maturing and should become'an effective tool for assessing plant safety under existing configuration and design consideration . Exit Meeting The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)

on June 16, 1989, at Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station and summarized the purpose, scope, and conclusions of the inspection. The licensee stated that the inspector had no access to proprietary informatio l

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