IR 05000346/1986012
| ML20206A567 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 06/04/1986 |
| From: | Darrin Butler, Jackiw I, Wohld P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20206A561 | List: |
| References | |
| TASK-2.E.1.1, TASK-TM 50-346-86-12, NUDOCS 8606180251 | |
| Download: ML20206A567 (15) | |
Text
m
.
,.
.
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Report.No. 50-346/86012(DRP)
Docket'No. 50-346 License No. NPF-3 Licensee: Toledo Edison Company Edison Plaza, 300 Madison Avenue Toledo, OH 43652 Facility Name: Davis-Besse 1 Inspection At: Oak Harbor, OH Inspection Conducted: March 4 through April 30, 1986 Inspectors:
P. M. Byron D. C. Kosloff P. R. Wohld
["bN Date D. S.
u 1er b b 9[
Date W. E. Gunther (BNL)
'
Approved By:
I. N.'Ja'c ie
,
Reactor Pro cts Section 28 Date Inspection Summary Inspection on Maren 4 through April 30, 1986 (Report No. 50-346/86012(DRP))
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection by resident inspectors of licensee action on previous inspection findings, operational safety, operational events, licensee event reports (LERs), maintenance, reactor coolant pump testing, service water pump maintenance, fire protection, 10 CFR Part 21 report, TMI items, Interim Performance Enhancement Program, Performance Enhancement Program, design changes and modifications, IE Bulletins, corrective action plans, and Commissioner visit.
Results: Of the fourteen areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified in eleven areas, one violation was identified in the area of LERs (failure to submit an LER within 30 days) and one violation was identified in the areas of followup of previous inspection findings and design changes and modifications (failure to carry out activities related to quality in accordance with procedures, three examples)
-
%6]gy %
0
<
"
..
.
DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted a.
Toledo Edison J. Williams, Jr., Senior Vice President Nuclear D. Amerine, Nuclear Mission Assistant Vice President
- L. Storz, Plant Manager
- S. Smith, Assistant Plant Manager, Maintenance
'M. Schefers, Information Management Director
+*W. O' Conner, Assistant Plant Manager, Operations
+L. Ramsett, Quality Assurance Director J. Ligenfelter, Operations Engineering Manager M. Stewart, Nuclear Training Director R. Peters, Nuclear Licensing Manager
- J. Wood, Nuclear Plant Systems Director
- T. Bloom, Senior _ Licensing Specialist
- J. Lee, System Engineer
- C. Momenee, System Engineer R. Flood, Technical Support Manager
+J. Stotz, Technical Support Group
+R. Cook, Senior Licensing Specialist
+H. Brinkman, Nuclear Facility Engineering Director
+B.
Beyer, Nuclear Projects Director
+E. Salowitz, Planning Superintendent
+P. Hildebrandt, Nuclear Engineering Group Director
+M. Fortel, Nuclear Licensing b.
NRC
+*P. Byron, Senior Resident Inspector
+*D. Kosloff, Resident Inspector
- P. Wohld, Region III Inspector D. Butler. Region III Inspector W. Gunther, BNL
- Denotes those personnel attending the April 18, 1986, interim exit.
,
+ Denotes those personnel attending.the May 1, 1986, exit meeting.
The inspectors also interviewed other licensee employees, including members of the technical, operations, maintenance, I&C, training, health physics and nuclear materials management department staff.
2.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (0 pen) Open Item (346/85004-07):
Safety Features Actuation System power supply commons.
The inspector observed work in progress on Facility Change Request 85-177, which separates the power supply commons.
-
- -
.
r
.
,
(Closed) Unresolved Item (346/85020-01):
Procedural error in surveillance testing with no test deficiency written. A test deficiency was not written after licensee technicians made an error while performing ST 5030.12.13.
Enclosure 2 of Administrative Procedure AD 1838.00.12, " Surveillance and Periodic Test Program," states that responsibilities of test personnel include recording... all test deficiencies on test deficiency list."
Section 4.2 of Administrative Procedure AD 1838.02.13, " Performance of Surveillance and Periodic Tests" states that "The Test Deficiency List is provided to ensure that all test deficiencies... are recorded...."
Failure to write a test deficiency is a violation (346/86012-01c) of Technical Specification 6.8.1.
The inspector determined that the licensee's corrective action was adequate to prevent recurrence and the violation is closed. The licensee determined that the procedural error occurred because the procedure was confusing. The inspector verified that the licensee's corrective actions were prompt and adequate even though a test deficiency had not been written. The inspector reviewed Revision 14 of ST 5030.12 and verified that Step 6.4 had been clarified.
(0 pen) Violation (346/85025-18): Overpressurization of No. 1 Steam Generator during auxiliary feedwater pump testing. The inspector verified that test procedure TP 850.03, " Motor Driven Feed Pump Acceptance Test" provided a vent path for the steam generators.
(0 pen) Unresolved Item (346/86005-06):
Inspection and evaluation of fire barriers. The inspector verified that the licensee's walkdown was in progress and observed completed fire seals.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (346/86005-08):
Non-seismic water lines over Class 1E battery chargers.
The inspector reviewed the LER submitted for this item and requested that the licensee provide additional information as required by 10 CFR 50.73 (b) (3). Details are in the following Paragraph (3).
No other violations or deviations were identified.
3.
Licensee Event Reports Followup Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with technical specifications.
(0 pen) LER 86-11:
Essential Instrument AC Power Seismic Unqualified Cabinets. The Class IE Cyberex electrical equipment cabinets were seismically qualified with six bolts in each door. Tne bolts were removed sometime in the past and not replaced. On January 10, 1986, as a result of discussions with a Cyberex representative the licensee initiated SURVEILLANCE REPORT 86-022 to document a concern that the bolts were required to maintain seismic qualifications. On April 11, 1986, after reviewing LER 86-11, the inspector found that the bolts had not been reinstalled, that some fasteners were missing from the back panels of two
'
.
.
of the Cyberex battery chargers, and that some fasteners were missing from the Class IE battery breaker cabinet covers.
The inspector informed the licensee of the conditions and requested that the licensee explain how compliance with Technical Specification 3.8.2.1 was being maintained. The licensee could not provide an immediate explanation and began locating and installing replacement bolts. The inspector also informed the licensee that, based on his findings, they should expand their fastener inspection of other Class 1E electrical equipment. This item will remain unresolved (346/86012-02) until the inspector reviews the licensee's inspection results and engineering evaluations.
(0 pen) LER 86-12:
Lack of Venting HPI System Piping High Point in Containment. The inspector found that the licensee's engineering analysis for this LER was inadequate.
IR 86009 includes additional discussion of this LER. The inspector informed the licensee that, in general, the engineering analyses for LERs need to be improved.
(0 pen) LER 86-15:
Seismic Qualification, Domestic Water Line in Battery Rooms A and B.
On February 19, 1986, the inspector notified the licensee that domestic water lines installed directly over three of the six Class 1E station battery chargers apparently were not seismically qualified.
The licensee isolated and drained the water lines, eliminating the hazard to Class IE equipment. On March 21, 1986, the licensee completed an engineer-ing evaluation confirming that the water lines were not seismically qualified. On April 28, 1986, 68 days after discovery of the event, the licensee submitted LER 86-15 reporting the event.
requires that an LER be submitted within 30 days of the discovery of an event of this type.
Failure to submit the LER within 30 days of discovery of the event is a violation (346/86012-03) of 10 CFR 50.73 (a).
The inspector also informed the licensee that the engineering analysis of this event was inadequate.
The licensee is currently expanding their engineering analysis of this event.
4.
Operational Safety Verification The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during the months of March and April. The inspector verified t.Se operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and ver#fied proper return to service of affected components.
Tours of the reactor, auxiliary and turbine buildinjs were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance.
The inspector by observation and direct interview verified that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security plan.
r
~
.
'
,
The inspector observed plant housekeeping and cleanliness conditions and verified implementation of radiation protection controls.
During the months of March and April, the inspector walked down the accessible portions of the Emergency Diesel Generator and Main Steam systems to verify operability.
These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility operations were in conformance with the requirements established under technical specifications,10 CFR, and administrative procedures.
No violations or deviations were identified.
t 5.
Monthly Maintenance Observation Station maintenance activities of safety-related systems and components listed below were observed or reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards and in conformance with technical specifications.
The following items were considered during this review:
the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were imple-mented; and fire prevention controls were implemented.
Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to safety-related equipment maintenance which may affect system performance.
The following maintenance activities were observed / reviewed:
Removal of the station vent flow probes, FT-5090 and FT-5090A, for factory calibration.
Reactor Protection System Channel 2 cabinet energization.
Static zero shift test on Reactor Coolant Flow Channel 3, Rosemount 1153 differential pressure transmitters.
Facility Change Request (FCR) 85-0035, Waste Gas Oxygen Monitor.
FCR 85-0177, Safety Features Actuation System Channels 2 ar.d 4, Power Supply Commons Separation.
FCR 85-0265, Control Room Emergency Ventilation Syste, Cabinet Wiring Checks and Instrument Calibrations.
.
T
.
.
FCR 85-0161, Once Through Steam Generator Level Delay Time Adjustment.
Following completion of maintenance on the above items, the inspector verified that these systems had been returned to service properly.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) Shaft and Impeller Cap Screw Testing After a RCP shaft failure and impeller-to-shaft cap screw failures at Crystal River (NRC Information Notice 86-19) the licensee began an inspection and evaluation of its similarly designed pumps.
In situ ultrasonic testing (UT) of all four RCP shafts identified apparent cracks in all four shafts approximately 52 inches from the motor coupling end.
RCP 2-1 rotating assembly was then removed and sent to Babcock and Wilcox in Lynchburg, Virginia, for further examination and evaluation.
As of May 1, 1986, dye penetrant testing and 50X microscopic visual examination at Lynchburg have not revealed any shaft cracking in the areas of concern. Also, UT of the shaft no longer indicates cracks. The licensee is continuing to evaluate these recent findings. Examination of the four cap screws that attach the impeller to the shaft revealed a sheared bolt, two cracked bolts, and one apparently cracked bolt.
Initial examination of the four drive pins revealed no cracks. The licensee intends to replace the existing 16 A-286 cap screws, four per pump, with Inconel X-750 bolts of better design.
Final decision on changeout of the drive pins awaits additional testing of RCP 2-1 pins and further engineering evaluation.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's evaluation and repair program for the RCP work. No problems were identified; management attention, and onsite expertise appeared adequate in all respects.
Further activities in this area will be followed both by NRC Region III and Headquarters personnel.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Service Water (SW) Pump Maintenance and Repair Service Water Pump 1-1, one of three safety-related pumps in the plant ultimate heat sink, has been inoperable for approximately 20 of the last 24 months.
It is a Goulds, two stage centrifugal, deep-draft pump.
Problems with the shaft and motor combined with unavailability of parts forced the long outages.
Pump 1-1 has several severely scored shaft bearing surfaces and is inoperable due to a sheared shaft segment. Also, periodic inservice vibration test data show that Pump 1-3 is degrading.
The licensee's engineering evaluation of Pump 1-3 shows a 110 day operating life expectancy.
The licensee stated that Pump 1-3 would be pulled for inspection and repaired prior to plant startup.
-
- -
-
-
-
-
-
-
- -
-
-
-
-
. -
-
-
p
"
.
'
.
The inspector expressed concern for the overall quality of activities affecting operability of the SW pumps as demonstrated by a high failure rate, lack of parts, and an ineffective periodic inspection program. The licensee prepared a formal action plan for these pumps. Activities in this area are considered an unresolved item (346/86012-04) pending inspection and repair of Pump 1-3, repair of Pump 1-1, and review of the proposed action plan for everall programs affecting operability of the SW pumps.
The licensee will notify the inspector so that he may witness the pump pulling and inspection.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Team Inspections Maintenance Survey Team Inspection - A followup maintenance survey was conducted from March 24 to 27, 1986, by a team from I & E, NRR and Region III. The followup survey was made to determine the progress the licensee has made in implementing programs which affect the quality of maintenance since the team's original survey of September 16 to 20, 1985.
Tne results of these surveys will be documented in the forthcoming Safety Evaluation Report (SER).
Detailed Control Room Design Review (DCRDR) Team Inspection - An NRR team conducted an inspection from March 31 through April 2, 1986. An earlier team inspection (April 29 through May 3, 1985) identified 29 human engineering deficiencies (HED's) on which the licensee was to complete action prior to start up.
This inspection reviewed the licensee's corrective actions for the 29 HEDs. Details of this inspection will be documented in the forthcoming SER.
No violations or deviations were id?ntified.
9.
Fire Protection During an inspection tour of the 603' Heater Bay area, the inspector noticed an information tag hung on a broken air sight glass.
The sight glass provides a path for air from Service Air Valve SA 223 to fire protection air supervisory pressure switch, PSL 4501. The sight glass was tagged by the Special Task Force, STF No. 6078.
The STF number was traced to work request No. 85-4907. The initial failure was documented on October 16, 1985, and the work request was reviewed on December 14, 1985. As of March 5,1986, no Maintenance Work Order (MWO) had been issued by the mechanical planners.
Discussions with operations personnel in charge of fire protection indicated that although they were aware of the problem, they had been unsuccessful in getting a MWO written to repair the signt glass. This portion of the fire protection system is not controllec by technical specifications.
The attitude seems to be that it is rot a critical item to correct at this time. Although the heater bay syste- (C-4501) will actuate, in its present condition problems with the sprinkler heads or piping will not be revealed.
~
.
.
The inspector identified the following deficiencies:
a.
Nuisance trouble alarm to the Control Room computer since October 16, 1985 b.
Trouble switch (C-4501) units silence position without being tagged c.
Trouble lamp (C-4501) not lit d.
Low pressure lamp (C-4501) not lit e.
Pressure switch not tagged as inoperable f.
SA valve not ta,geu as closed Procedure PT 5116.03.04, "Preaction Sprinkler Test" is due for completion in May 1986. The test for the 603' Heater Bay could not be completed with the system in its present condition.
The inspector recommended that a method be devised to prioritize corrective maintenance activities on all equipment providing a protective function.
This is considered an Cpen Item (50-346/86012-8).
No violations or deviations were identified.
10.
Followup on 10 CFR Part 21, Consolidated Controls Corporation Field Wire
_Wrap Practice Toledo Edison (TED) personnel observed a Consolidated Control:. Corporation (CCC) field engineer sliding existing wire wrap connections down their terminal posts in the Steam and Feedwater Line Rupture Control System (SFRCS) cabinets to make room for additional wires.
TED review of Military Standard MIL-STD-1130B and CCC procedure QCI-110 revealed that a minimum wire wrap pull force of two pounds is specified to prevent the wire from being stripped from its terminal.
Pull testing performed on undisturbed wire wrap connections showed that they failed with eight to 12 pounds of pulling force.
Four wire wraps that had been pushed down on their terminal posts were tested. One wire wrap stripped at 2 1/2 pounds, one at two pounds and two at one pound.
Two of the four did not meet the MIL or QCI.
The licensee stopped all wire wrapping being performed by CCC.
The licensee has approved and issued the following twc, wire wrapping procedures:
IC 2701.20.00, " Instruction for the Installation and Removal of Wire Wrapped Connections" IC 2701.21.00, " Strip Force Test for Wire Wrapped Connections"
-
-
-
-
-
r
'
.
.
I&C mechanics performing wire wrapping have been trained and qualified on these procedures. The training included actual wire wrapping, removal, and strip force testing.
In addition, QCIC inspectors attended the training to assist them in qualifying wire wrap operations.
All wire wrap connections for the logic modules and card racks in the SFRCS cabinets have been stripped and reterminated.
SFRCS is the only nuclear safety-related system in which CCC has performed wirewrapping.
Licensee Event Report (LER)86-009 reported the wire wrap issue. Additional inspections of wire wraps in other systems are in progress and any findings will be documented as a supplement to the LER.
Past testing of the SFRCS has demonstrated its ability to fulfill its safety function.
The licensee has adequately reported this item (including Part 21) and the item is considered closed.
No violations or deviations were identified.
11. TMI Items (0 pen) II.E.1.1.2 Long Term Modifications of the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW)
System The inspector reviewed the Safety Evaluation Reports (SERs) of August 3, 1984; February 21, 1984 and May 9, 1985.
Twelve short term recommendations (GS-1 through GS-8 and B.1 through B.4), five lono term recommendations (GL-1 through GL-5), and one evaluation of the design basis for AFW flow requirements encompass the scope of II.E.1.1 as presented in the SERs. The information provided in the SERs indicates that only recommendations GS-2, GS-3, GS-6, 8.1, B.4, and GL-3 require NRC inspection. The six recommend-ations and the inspection results for each are presented below:
GS-2:
The licensee should lock open single valves or multiple valves in series in the AFW system pump suction piping and lock open other single valves or multiple valves in series that could interrupt all AFW flow.
Monthly inspections should be performed to verify that these valves are locked open. These inspections should be included in Technical
Specification (TS) surveillance requirements.
Status:
The licensee proposed a TS change on August 29, 1985, to add the verification to the surveillance requirements for the AFW system, TS 3.7.1.2.
The non-automatically positioned suction and discharge valves designated in PT 5186.01.14 " Locked Valve Verification Periodic Tast",
are now locked open and controlled by AD 1839.02, " Operation and Control of Locked Valves." PT 5186.01.14 requires monthly verification of locked valves. The inspector reviewed the piping and instru ent diagrams showing the flowpath of both AFW trains and determined that all appropriate valves from the condensate storage tank water source to the a::alicable steam generator were controlled by PT 5186.01.14.
During a similar review of the seismically qualified water source, the inspector found that the discharge valves of the service water pumps were not locked open or controlled by PT 5186.01.14.
The inspector contacted the NRR licensing project manager by telephone in early March 1986, identified this condition
r
.
.
'
.
to him, and asked him if these valves were included in the scope of this TMI item and should be subject to the surveillance requirements of the proposed TS. Guidance in this area has yet to be provided by NRR.
This item will remain open until the inspector can verify that this surveillance requirement has been incorporated into the licensee's TS and surveillance matrix and guidance on the scope of locked valve control is received from NRR.
GS-3: The licensee should reexamine the practice of throttling AFW system flow to avoid water hammer.
Status:
The licensee performed a water hammer test on August 21, 1982, which was witnessed by an inspector as documented in IER 82027. The test results did not reveal the presence of water hammer. GS-3 is closed.
GS-6: The licensee should confirm flow path availability of an AFW system ficw train that has been out of service to perform periodic testing or maintenance as follows:
a.
Procedures should require an operator to determine that the AFW system valves are properly aligned and require a second operator to indepen-dently verify the valve alignment.
Status: The inspector verified that the monthly surveillance test, ST 5071.01, requires independent verification that the manual valves
.
manipulated during the test are returned to their normal operating position.
b.
The licensee should propose TS to assure that, prior to plant startup following an extended cold shutdown, a flow test is performed to verify the normal flow path from the primary AFW system water source to the steam generators.
Status: The licensee proposed a TS change on August 29, 1985, to add the flow test to the surveillance requirements for the AFW system, TS 3.7.1.2.
This item will remain open until the inspector can verify that this surveillance requirement has been incorporated into the licensee's TS and surveillance matrix.
B.1: The licensee should provide redundant level indication and low level alarms in the control room for the AFW system primary water supply, to allow the operator to anticipate the need to make up water or transfer to an alternate water supply and prevent a low pump suction from occurring.
The low levol alarm setpoint would allow at least 20 minutes for operator action, assuming that the largest capacity AFW pump is operating.
Status: The inspector verified that Valves CD 103 and CD 164 are designated as locked open valves in PT 5186.01. The inspector observed one level indicator per condensate storage tank present in the control room This item is closed.
_
. _.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - -
__ _
.
'
.
B.4:
Licensees with plants which require local manual realignment of valves to conduct periodic tests on an AFW system train which have only one remaining AFW train available for operation should propose TS to provide that a dedicated individual, who is in communication with the control room, would align the valves in the AFW system from the test mode to its operational alignments.
Status: The inspector reviewed ST 5071.01.29, " Auxiliary Feedwater System Monthly Test", and determined that step 4.6 of the Precautions and Limita-tions Section requires an operator in the AFW Room be in direct contact with the Control Room to close Valve AF 21 or AF 22, depending upon the train being tested, should a Steam and Feedwater Line Rupture Control System actuation occur with valve AF 23 open.
Closing one of these valves would assure adequate AFW flow to the appropriate steam generator.
The inspector reviewed ST 5071.02.12, " Auxiliary Feedwater System Refueling Test", and found the same guidance in the precautions and limitations section of that procedure; however, the safety evaluation report of May 9, 1985, stated that this recommendation should be in the licensee's TS. This item will remain open until the inspector can verify that this surveillance requirement has been incorporated into the licensee's TS and surveillance matrix.
GL-3: At least one AFW system pump and its associated flow path and essential instrumentation should automatically initiate AFW system flow and be capable of being operated independently of any AC power source for at least two hours.
Conversion of DC power to AC power is acceptable.
Status:
The inspector verified through review of electrical one line drawings and observation of installed equipment that valves MS 106, AF 3870, and AF 360, and the No.1 AFW pump turbine governor were powered by direct current.
Therefore, the No. 1 AFW pump is capable of supplying AFW from the condensate storage tank to the No I steam generator without alternating current.
The inspector verified that the closing interlocks associated with Steam Supply Valve MS 106 were powered with direct current.
The inspector notified the NRR Licensing Project Manager in the first week of March 1986 that the AFW pump room ventilation system is powered with alternating current. The ventilation system must be operable to maintain operability of that AFW train.
This item shall remain open until NRR indicates whether or not the support systems for an AFW train are required to be functional without alternating direct current.
No violations or deviations were identified.
12.
Interim Performance Enhancement Program (IPEP)
(Closed) Item (346/RP-06011): 06-1(01) Review procedures and correlate
,
i them with the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR). The licensee stated
!
in a April 30, 1985, letter that this task would be accomplished in the
!
annual USAR review and would be completed by July 1, 1987. This IPEP
'
item is closed but will be tracked as an open item (346/86012-05).
No violations or deviations were identified.
!
,
_. _ _ _. _. _ _. _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _
__
_ _ _ _. _ _ _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _
_... _. _ _. _. _. _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _ _.. _ _ _
_ _ _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
.
,
13. Performance Enhancement program (PEP)
(Closed) Item (346/RP-88004):
A-6, Continuation of PEP. The licensee has superseded the PEP with the response (Course of Action (C0A)) to the 10 CFR 50.54 (f) letter.
This item is closed.
No violations or deviations were identified.
14.
D s_i n Changes and Modifications ai n
An intpection was performed from March 10 to 14, 1986, to review the modification program controls. The inspection concentrated on the review of Facility Change Requests (FCRs) to verify that the licensee modification program commitments are being followed. These include the proper inter-faces between engineering and those groups in engineering, construction, operations, training and administration which are involved with procedure and drawing controls. The program meets the licensee's commitments with some exceptions. Several of the exceptions are as follows:
a.
Administrative Procedure AD 1845.03.0, "FCR Implementation,"
Section 7.1.7, states, " Operator Training is coordinated and completed prior to equipment / system return to service." Work on FCR 84-189, involving the emergency diesel generator (EDG) governor was completed and the unit was declared operable on, or about, March 11, 1986; however, 21 shift licensed operators, 6 nonshift license holders and 20 non-licensed operators had not completed training as of March 12, 1986.
This is considered a Violation (346/86012-01a) of Technical Specification 6.8.1.a.
b.
The licensee has conflicting requirements for returning equipment to service following modifications.
Section 11.4.3 of the Nuclear Quality Assurance Manual (NOAM) states in part, "If the acceptance criteria has been met, the Plant Manager's,... review must be completed prior to declaring the affected system operable."
Section 6.4 of AD 1801.00.8, " Station Modification Acceptance Test Program" states in part, " Operability - Test results....
The Shift Supervisor, by his judgement (sic) can declare a system operational prior to the Plant Manager's approval of the test results." The NQAM is a higher tiered document than the Administrative procedure, and thus takes precedence.
This is considered to be an Open Item (346/86012-06).
c.
Two Control Room Errergency Ventilation System control cabinets (C6714 and C6715) were installed as a part of FCR 85-0265.
The cabinets are seismically qualified, yet they are located beneath nonseismically supported water lines.
The Design Review Checklist (Item 5) contained in Nuclear Factitty Engineering procedures NFEP-011. " Conceptual Design" and NFEP-090, " Design Verification" requires that environmental considerations be reviewed.
The review was inadequate for cabinets C0/14 And C6715 because a break of the nonseismically supported water lines was not considered.
The inspector brought this condition to the attention of the licensee.
.
-
.
F
.-
- -_
-
- .
l
l.-
l The licensee immediately began a review of the design of the cabinets
,
'
which revealed that, fortuitously, the cabinets are capable of withstanding water spray. Technical Specification 6.8.1.a. requires that written procedures be implemented as recommended in Appendix "A" of Regulatory Guide 1.33.
Procedures for the control of modification work are recommended by the Regulatory Guide.
Procedures NFEP-011 and 090 control modification work. The initial inadequate review of the cabinet environment is an example of inadequate implementation of procedures and is considered a Violation (346/86012-Olb) of Technical Specification 6.8.1.a.
i l
l No other violations or deviations were identified.
15. Corrective Action Plan Observations I
l l
The licensee has developed corrective action plans for each troubleshooting i
action plan that had been developed to investigate the systems which may i
l have contributed to the abnormal behavior of equipment during the June 9,
'
!
1985, event. The resident inspectors, with assistance from other Region III inspectors, observed portiens of the work in progress and reviewed Facility Change Requests (FCR) during the inspection period.
The status of these activities had previously been reported in Region III inspeciton reports.
Listed below are the significant observations made by the inspectors for
'
each corrective action plan:
a.
Main feedwater pump turbine (MFWPT) and controls: No observations were made of corrective actions for this action plan during this inspection, b.
Auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pump turbine and controls: The inspector verified that the licensee has installed an in plant telephone near
-
the No. 2 AFW pump turbine, c.
Steam and feedwater line rupture control system (SFRCS): The inspector verified that the licensee has modified the SFRCS manual
,
actuatior, switches to eliminate the human engineering deficiency.
d.
Startup feedwater control valve SP7A: The inspector serified that controls and indication for this valve had been relocated onto the
'
control room operators console. The inspector verified that the licensee also relocated the controls and indication for the equivalent
!
valve for the other steam generator.
e.
Source range nuclear instruments (N!-1 and NI-2): No observations were made of corrective actions for this action plan during this inspection.
f.
Turbine bypass valve (TBV) SP13A2:
The inspector verified that the
'
TBV had been repaired, g.
Power operated relief valve (PORV):
The inspector verified that the
licensee had installed redundant position indicating lights near the PORV controls. The indicating lights respond to signals from the PORV acoustic flow monitors.
-
.
.
r
-
-
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
__
_
.
.
h.
Auxiliary feedwater valves AF 599 and AF 608:
No observations were made of corrective actions for this action plan during this inspection.
1.
Steam line pressure discrepancies: The inspector verified that the licensee had removed the manual actuators for the main steam safety valves.
J.
Service water valve controls for the auxiliary feedwater supply: No observations were made of corrective actions for this action plan during this inspection, k.
Valve MS 106: No observations were made of corrective actions for this action plan during this inspection.
No violations or deviations were identified.
16.
IE Bulletin Followup
-
For the IE Bulletins listed below, the inspector verified that the written response was within the time period stated in the bulletin, that the written response included the information required to be reported, that the written response included adequate corrective action commitments based on information presentation in the bulletin and the licensee's response, that licensee management forwarded copies of the written response to the appropriate onsite management representatives, that information discussed in the licensee's written response was accurate, and that corrective action taken by the licensee was as described in the written response.
(Closed) IEB 78-12, 12A and 128, Atypical Weld Material in Reactor Pressure Vetsel Welds No violations or deviations were identified.
17.
Conmissioner Visit Conmissioner F. Bernthal, accompanied by the Deputy Regional Administrator, A. B. Davis, NRC staff and the licensee toured the site on April 3, 1986.
The tour focused on the June 9, 1985, event.
The Commissioner observed the eqJipment involved and walked the routes the operators followed during the event.
In addition, the tour included observation of the disassembly of Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) 2-1 and significant improvements and modifica-tions made since June 9, 1985. The licensee briefed the Commissioner on problems associated with motor operated valve testing and indicated cracks ir the RCP shafts.
,
I'
e.
.-
18. Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance, or deviations. Unresolved items disclosed during the inspection are discussed in Paragraphs 3 and 7.
I 19. Open Items i
Open items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee, which will be reviewed further by the inspectors, and which involve some action on the part of NRC or licensee or both. Open items disclosed during the inspection are discussed in Paragraphs 12 and 14.
20. Exit Interview
,
The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)
throughout the month and at the conclusion of the inspection and summarized
'
the scope and findings of the inspection activities. The licensee acknowledged the findings. Af ter discussions with the licensee, the inspectors have determined there is no proprietary data contained in this inspection report.
l
.
-*
- --
-
- - - -
- - -
-
- - -
- -
- -