IR 05000346/1989018

Insp Rept 50-346/89-18 on 890707-11.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Annual Emergency Preparedness Exercise Involving Observations by Six NRC Representatives of Key Functions & Locations During Exercise

ML20247B449
Person / Time
Site:	Davis Besse
Issue date:	09/01/1989
From:	Foster J, Ploski T, Snell W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20247B439	List: IR 05000346/1989018 ML20247B436
References
50-346-89-18, NUDOCS 8909130038
Download: ML20247B449 (28)

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l h i n U.S.' NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIO '

REGION III g

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Report No. 50-346/89018(DRSS)-

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. Docket-No. 50-346 Operating License'No. NPF-3 L

. Licensee: Toledo Edison Company

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Edison Plaza

.< -300 Madi' son Avenue 0 Toledo, OH 43652 Facility Name: Davis-Besse,-Unit 1

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?Inspectio'n At: Davis-BesseLSite, Oak Harbor, Ohio Inspection Conducted: August 7-11, 1989

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Inspectors: 1T. Ploski

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Team. Leader's .Date

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J. Foster '

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~ Gate a Accompanying Inspectors: P. Byron

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T. Wambach '

, G. Stoetzel W :. S J

. Approved By: W. Snell, Chief . f//Bf Radiological Controls and Date Emergency Preparedness Section Insp'ection Summary i Inspection on August 7-11, 1989 (Report No. 50-346/89018(DRSS))

Areas Inspected: Routine, announced inspection of the annual Emergency Preparedness-(EP) Exercise (IP 82301) involving observations by six NRC

. representatives of key functions and locations during the exercise. The following.other aspects of the licensee's EP program were also evaluated:

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licensee action'on previously-identified items (IP 92701); onsite-meteorological monitoring program (IP 80721); and offsite dose assessment

.p'rovisions (IP 82207). The inspection involved six NRC inspector g Result.v: No violations, deficiencies or deviations were identified. The

licenste's ovarall response to a challenging and complex scenario was very

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F goo However, the need for Control Room personnel to utilize procedural l' guidance to better. ensure that the NRC's information needs are satisfied L following an emergency declaration was-identified.' Several improvements were

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recommended regarding preplanning for a response to an onsite accident having

. contamination complications that could occur,. beyond the plant's Radiatiori Control Are The onsite meteorological monitoring. program was being well maintained.

! Program activities were highly proceduralized. ,Very good percentages of high

._ quality _ data have been obtained in recent years. However, the Project Leader, L .who had meteorological' expertise, planned to leave the licensee's employment

. shortly, while that individual's supervisor had-already-done so.' Qualified replacements for.both. key positions-had apparently not yet been identifie '

The licensee's provisions for assessing the offsite radiological impact of a potential release were good with two exceptions: the lack of provisions for addressing a. local lakebreeze.effect, the existence of which was determined by the licensee's study performed in the early 1980s;'and the lack of verification

., -and validation documentation for one of several computerized methodologies utilized for offsite dose assessment. The licensee should also train appropriate staff on significant differences between its and the State' offsite dose assessment methodologie >

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DETAILS

, , 'NRC Observers and Areas Observed T. Ploski,. Control Room, Technical Support Center (TSC), Operations Support-Center (OSC),. EmergencyLControl Center (ECC), Joint Public Information Center.(JPIC)

J. Foster, TSC, JPIC P. Byron, Control Room, Fire Brigade Response

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T.'Wambach,-ECC ,

4 R. Serbu, OSC, Inplant Teams, Onsite Medical Response G. Stoetzel, OSC, Inplant Teams, Post-Accident Sampling Team

. Licensee Personnel Contacted *

'D. Shelton, Vice President,. Nuclear T. Meyers, Technical Services Director B. Demaison, Emergency Preparedness Manager

• • B. Cope, Onsite. Emergency Preparedness Supervisor

• • I. Borland, Emergency Preparedness Staff

• The above and approximately 75'other licensee representatives attended the licensee's critique on August 10, 1989. The majority of these persons attended the NRC exit interview which followed the licensee's

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critiqu **A separate exit interview was conducted on August 10, 1989, with theseJ individuals.regarding other than exercise-related inspection activitie . Licensee Action on Previously-Identified Items (IP 92701)

s (Closed) Open Item No. 346/86032-16: Apparently out-of-date information was retained on the " Employee Hotline" regarding site access during local flooding condition The on-call Emergency Offsite' Manager (E0M) is responsible for maintaining an awareness of local flooding conditions and for ensuring that the " Employee Hotline" contains information on site access during local flooding conditions. The licensee has initiated a procedure revision to better ensure that the E0M will maintain an-awareness'of local; flooding conditions and will revise the " Employee Hotline's" information in a timely manner. This item is close (Closed) Open Item No. 346/88040-01: During the 1988 Exercise,-

there was disagreement over the interpretation and applicability of the Emergency Action Level (EAL) 3.C.3 to simulated plant condition Jhe licensee has revised EAL 3.C.3 so that it better conforms to the fegulatory guidance of NUREG-0654, Revision 1. The revised criteria of tiie EAL clearly distinguish it from a related EAL associated with

! an Alert classification. Periodic training on all EAls for all

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licensed personnel having emergency classific~ a tion responsibilities

. began on_ August 11, 1989,~and will continue during the six week

. training cycle. .This: item is closed.

w Genersl (IP 82301):

An exercise of the Davis-Besse. Nuclear Power Station (DBNPS) Emergency P1an was conducted on August 8-9, 1989, testing the integrated ^

capabilities of the licensee's, States' and counties' Emergency Response Organizations (ER0s) to respond to a hypothetical accident scenario resulting in a simulated majorirelease of radioactive material. This daytime exercise: involved the full scale participation of the State of

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Ohio, Ottawa and Lucas Counties in Ohio, and the partial! scale l participation of the State of Michigan. This was the first Ingestion Pathway Exercise involving an Ohio nuclear power facility. The-attachments.to this report consist of the licensee's exercise scope of participation and' objectives, plus a scenario narrative summary.

, General Observations (IP 82301)

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'a; Procedures This exercise was conducted _in accordance with 10 CFR Part5'0, Appendix E requirements using the DBNPS Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures, as well as the Emergency .

Plans land related procedures of State and county ER0 Coordination s I

The licensee's,overall response was coordinated, orderly and .

timely. If the sce'nario events had been real, the actions taken

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by the-licensee's ERO would have been sufficient' to allow State and local authorities to take appropriate actions to protect the public's health and safety. The Federal' Emergency Management Agency's'(FEMA's) evaluation of the capabilities of State and local ER0s will be. documented in a separate report to be. issued by FEM I Observers-The licensee's observers monitored and critiqued this exercise along with six NRC observers.

. Critiques The licensee held critiques .in each of its response facilities

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immediately following the exercise. Lead controllers presented a summary of self-identified findings to an audience of about 75 players,' controllers, and NRC ob' servers on August 10, 198 This presentation wa$ fcllowed by the inspectors' exit intervie The NRC Team Leader discussed the observed strengths and weaknesses

.during the exit intervie FEMA Region V hosted a Public Critique at the Ottawa County Courthouse on August 11, 1989, during which NRC and' FEMA, representatives summarized their agencies' preliminary

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? evaluations of the exercise _ performance of the licensee'h States',

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6'. Specific Observations-(IP 82301)

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'a . Control Room-(CR)

CR activities were observed only during the first few hours of the exercise. The Shif t Supervisor (SS) quickly and correctly declared an Alert at 0745 for a fire ~potentially affecting the No. 2 diesel generator. .The SS then used the Public Address (PA)-system to activate the Emergency Response Organization (ERO) and to have J nonessential onsite personnel report to their assembly area Both actions were in accordance with thy Emergency Pla Minutes after the fire brigade had been activated, the SS chose to

. implement a procedurally correct option to begin reactor shutdow This action was blocked by exercise controllers in order that futur onsite and offsite exercise objectives would be unaffecte State and" county officials were initially informed of the Alert declaration within the 15 minute regulatory time limit. This adequately detailed notification was made using the dedicated

"4-way" communications line to the State and both counties within the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ).

The SS prudently ordered an inspection of the station's other emergency diesel generato He ordered a detailed assessment of 3 the No. 2 diesel generator upon learning that the fire brigade had quickly extinguished an oil fire affecting that diese The Emergency Assistant Plant Manager (EAPM) and a communicator, who had reported to the adjacent Satellite Technical Support Center (STSC)

following the Alert declaration, reported the brigade's accomplishment to the TSC and the Operations Support Center (OSC)

using dedicated telephone line t Meanwhile, the Shift Technical Advisor (STA) had begun initially notifying the NRC Headquarters Operations Center of the Alert declaration. Although the licensee had proceduralized a version of the NRC's Event Notification Worksheet to facilitate conversations with the NRC's Duty Officer, this form was not utilized. Until asked by an inspector who roleplayed the NRC's Duty Officer, the STA provided only the information contained on the initial message form used for State and county officials. This information was almost fifteen-minutes old, and did not include such facts as the fire was extinguished, the onsite arrival of local fire department f personnel, the" continuing activation of the licensee's ERO, and the protective actions being taken by onsite personnel. Such information was sh'ortly provided in update messages to State and county officials. The failure to utilize the proceduralized Event Notification Worksheet to better ensure that the NRC's initial I information needs were adequately addressed following an emergency I declaration is an Open Item (No. 50-346/89018-01).

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.s 3 ,. An orderly transfer of command and control responsibilities from the

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SS to the Emergency Director (ED) located in the Emergency Control-Center (ECC)'took place shortly before 0830. CR personnel were informed of the transfer'of this lead responsibility and the associated responsibility for notifying offsite agencie As the' exercise pronressed, the numbers of exercise participants, controllers, and evaluators in the rear' area of the CR near the STSC caused noise levels and congestion in the CR. The presence of these additional personnel did not, however, adversely impact plant safety.

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With the' exception of the Open Item, this portion of the' licensee' program was acceptable. In addition, the following item should b considered for improvement:

• Prior to'the availability of an onsite simulator, the licensee should make additional. efforts to reduce. con.gestion and noise

. levels in the CR resulting.from the presence of exercise participants, controllers, and evaluator b. Technical Support Center (TSC) .

Prior to the exercise, equipment in the TSC was in a state of readiness without pre-staging. Status boards existed for Emergenc Organization, Sequence of Events (electronic copyboard), Plant

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Status, Plant Data, Problem Analysis,. Site Map, and EPZ Ma Several blank boards were also availabl The TSC was staffed and activated within 30 minutes of the Alert declaration. An activation checklist was utilized to verify that all activation steps had been completed. The Emergency Plant Manager (EPM) promptly verified that all initial notifications had been made. . Regular and adequately <ietailed briefings of the TSC staff were held throughout the exercise. -Radiological habitability of the facility was verifie Good command and control were displayed by the EP Adequate logs, formal and informal, were kept to facilitate later reconstruction of actions taken and the decisionmaking processes behind the At approximately 0846, the EPM indicated that he would have

- downgraded to an Unusual Event classification. This was consistent with plant status (the simulated diesel generator fire was

" extinguished" more quickly than anticipated). A controller prevented this action to preserve the scenaric timeline. The EPM and Emergency Director (ED) conferred on various important matters at appropriate interval At approximately 0904, a radiation monitor in the auxiliary building'~ swaste gas valve room, whose normal reading was approximately .5 mR, increased to 75 mR. The area was evacuated and all Radiation Work Permits (RWPs), first for the immediate area, and then for the entire plant, were cancelled. The Radiation Control Manager (RCM) properly questioned this action, as no other plant parameter supported this elevated readin ._____.___.______U

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J When the- Rdactor-Coolant Pump? leak initiated, a' Site Area- Emergency .. "

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l 41 . ' waszdeclared, based on Emergenc'y Action Level"2.A.4,'" loss of coolan f'

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beyond; makeup capacity."j The.EAL.was'a< valid selection leading to; the' expected. declaration s u ..

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, , e .Throughout the exercise, the: Systems. Engineering,; Operations . .

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% "  ;'well.- The leakr' a te in the reactor ' coolant system was quickly ' , Engine Dp ~

n ' analyzed. ;It was quicklyt recognized l that. the primary and secondary ;

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. systems were; uncoupled. Alternate methodsEof cooling ~the ' core were'

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lS Lresearched. TSC. staff anticipated plant systems reactions to th , =<

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c scenario and' aggressively attempted mitigating. strategies. At allL W '

.. times, TSC staff showed-a thorough understanding'of overall'p;1 anti

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statusLand-potential problems. System'drswings'and; equipment '

specifications information available from the TSC libraryLwere ~

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b 1 extensively used.' '

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Th'e EPM assigned, tasks to the engineering groups. These" assignments

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s. ; were, posted'on'the: Problem Analysis' status board. Throughout'the A.. 1

!- exercise, the EPM'and RCM remained' current onithe condition of the N injured, contaminated man. ,The'TSC did.not determine'that the'

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. original cause of lack of makeup flow was#a failed Borated Water'

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' Storage availableTank.(BWST)

to focus on this-event valve; however,: versus thelittleother (scenario) time was. , ions systems'~evaluat

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,Lthat were in' progres '

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'At times, it' appeared that information related to;radiationflevels'

did not,immediately go to the RCM, and.he would: receive thi 'information after other '

For example,,he was-advised of:the simulated. evacuation-of nonessential personnel some 23 minutes after this action was ordered. He had not been consulted prior _to the ~

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cancellation of-all onsite RWPs following one questionable reading

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l... Based upon the above findings, this portion of the' licensee's--

• . program was -acceptable; however, the. following item should' be

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• TSC and OSC. Radiation Controls supervisory personnel should improve their information sharing capabilitie Operations Support Center (OSC) and In-plant Teams

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Both the OSC Manager and OSC Radiological Control Coordinator (RCC)

provided frequent briefings to the OSC staff throughout the

. exercis The OSC Manager;provided information on plant status,.

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while'the'RCC.provided information on radiological conditions

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, in' plant and OSC habitability statu The status boards were-generally' maintained in a timely fashion throughout the exercise. The " Emergency Response Team Dispatch" board and the " Personnel- Dose".. board were particularly well maintaine t

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Habitability' checks of the OSC and the Radiological Control Access

, ,  ?(RCA) area were performed' routinely throughout the exercise. ' A

- Radiological Control Technician (RCT) was dedicated to performing

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this functio '

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The 0SC staff effectively' assembled, briefed, and dispatched about-24 in plant' teams during the exercise. . Appropriate forms were

filled out when briefing / debriefing teams. Forms in procedure

'HS-EP-2410 included information on personnel doses, task-

description, required dosimetry, route to follow in going to work

' location,. communication method, protective clothing requirements; anticipated radiation levels, and' equipment requirements. The RCC and his staff effectively incorporated relevant ARM data in their=

briefings. The RCTs recorded exposure rate information on: log sheets while inplan An inplant team was dispatched to the auxiliary building to investigate a simulated alarm signal from a~ radiation monito ~

L , The'05C supervisory staff's responses to this alarm signal were

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overly conservative. All inplant RWPs were cancelled until the investigation.was completed, although no other scenario data i supported this alarm signal. The inplant team assigned to this l

task donned full protective clothing, including Self-Co'ntained

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Breathing Apparatus <(SCBAs), which briefly delayed their dispatc Approximately one hour elapsed from the time that an inplant team had been requested until CR and TSC decisionmakers were correctly.

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informed that the alarm' signal was false. .The team did, however, i

successfully demonstrate their capability to use the Gai-Tronics system while wearing full face masks to communicate with the OS Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was acceptabl Borated Water Storage Tank (BWST) Accident Scene The exercise included the response of OSC personnel to a simulated outdoor accident within the Protected Area. During the Protected '

Area evacuation, the scenario postulated that a maintenance man unsuccessfully attempted te secure a bottle of compressed gas that

, he found near the BWST. The bottle fell and its valve assembly

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broke off. The bottle then flew into the BWST and made a hole near ground level. The man supposedly struck his head while fleeing from the scene and became contaminated when he fell into the simulated pool of water from the leaking BWST. Onscene responses to the

' simulated victim and simulated contaminated liquid spill were evaluated.-

A first aid team and several RCTs reached the accident scene approximately ten minutes after the CR had been notified of an

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onsite injur The first aid team correctly diagnosed the victim's injurie An RCT adequately determined the simulated levels of contamination on the victim's skin and clothing. Priority was properly given to the victim's medical states. However, neither

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the first aid team nor the initial RCT responders wore any

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protective clothing articles upon their arrival at the scene.

L Another RCT brought gloves, booties, and other Health Physics supplies about 30 minutes later. These supplies were apparently obtained from stockpiles maintained at the access point to the plant's Radiation Control Aret aowever, not all licensee responders donned gloves and/or booties after thece supplies

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became available. Had events been real, some instances of cross-contamination among the onscene responders would have been likel An ambulance was promptly admitted to the Protected Area'and adequately escorted to the accident scene. The interface between the ambulance crew and the' licensee's onscene responders was goo Adequate measures were implemented to avoid contaminating interior surfaces of the ambulance. The victim was carefully placed in the ambulance. The vehicle promptly left the Protected Area. Given the extent of the^ victim's simulated injuries, he was enroute to a local hospital'within an acceptable time period after..the CR had received the initial accident repor Contamination control measures for the simulated spill of thousands of gallons of liquid from the damaged BWST did not begin until about one hour after the spill had occurred. In this scenario, however, ERO personnel had already reported to their assigned locations while nonessentials were evacuating the Protected Area from their assembly areas when the spill began in a relatively remote onsite area. No one was in overall command of the response efforts at the spill scene to better ensure that CR, TSC, and/or OSC decisionmakers were kept well informed of all accident scene activities and to ensure that adequate personnel and supplies were promptly sent to the scene. Responders to the BWST spill were not equipped with a radio. Fortunately, an outlet of the plant's Gai-Tronics system was nearby so that onscene personnel could communicate with persons in the CR, TSC, or OS Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was acceptable; however, the following items should be considered for improvement:

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• A quantity of protecting clothing and other Health Physics supplies should be stored in the OSC so that OSC staff can more rapidly respond to a contamination control situation outside the plant's Radiation Control Are * Pre planning for a response to an accident having contamination I control and/or hazardous materials control complications should include the designation of an onscene commander to better ensure that decisionmakers are kept informed of accident scene status and needs. This individual should be provided with adequate communications equipmen i i

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pTl^  ? C'L PASS Drill' , ,

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The1 briefing provided to the

Post-AccidentiSampling; System l(PASS)

4 ' i^ , u ' ; team:(two Chemistry Technicians and one. Health. Physics Technician) ,e was very good. In addition to the information. required by

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C '- lprocedureHS-EP-2410,.therewere'discussionsontheanticipated ,

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' dose rates from collected samples, the availability.of count rooms *

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< based.on simulated radiological conditions in lthe. plant,q and the CW ' '

need.for extra SCBA bottles;to be brought near the PASS are '

Dose--

II- Ylimit'siwere established'for the PASS team.-

%n Q~ ' Radiological.-controls associated with the drill'were very good. . ' '

Exposure rate levels were continuously monitored during.the' sample:

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colbction, transpoit, analysis, and counting activities. ; Air ..

f sampling;was performed during'the. sample line purge and sample collection actions at the PASS panel location. 'The PASS collections

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,m ,e- team wore LSCBAs- as;a precaution during the sample collection proces Air sampling was also performed during the sample preparation ff.X' ' . activities.in the hot ilab;

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Gamesmanship during the drill was excellent. No actions were .

simulated. Actual'off gas and reactorJcoolant' samples were collected: . /

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and analyzed in approximately 1- hour: and 50. minute Players moved n

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quickly as if abnormal radiological conditions-~were rea SCBAs

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were actua11y'used which allowed a-test of communications betweenL PASS; team personnel. ! Procedures.were followed step-by ste .

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lA :The PASS' team had' momentary difficulty finding' a hand pump'that e

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, was supposed.to' be locked in the' PASS storage locker near:the PASS - ,

panel. ;The storage' locker was locked and sealed when the' PASS team:

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arrived. .The item'was soon found'outside its storage locatio The .

. licensee should assure that allsappropriate equipment is'in the e locker before sealin Based uponLthe above' findings, this' portion of the licensee's ',

program was' acceptabl Emergency Control Center (ECC) and Radiat' ion Monitoring Teams (RMTs).

A, - The ECC was quickly activated after the Alert declaration. The Emersency-Director (ED) kept well informed'of an inplant team's efforts to verify that a radiation' monitor' alarm in the auxiliary building was fals The ED promptly and. correctly declared a Site Area Emergency at 1020

and a General Emergency at 1219. Both declarations were made after appropriate consultation with the, EPM and the-Emergency Offsite Manager-(E0M). sState and county officials were initially notified of both. declarations well within the.15 minute regulatory time V . ,  : limit. The ED approved both-initial notification messages and all

. periodic update messages prior to their transmittal by a dedicated  ;

-communicator over the dedicated "4-way line." These message forms  !

were also.telecopied to offsite official %.

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e A response cell of controllers. roleplayed NRC duty officers., k These roleplayers were initially' informed of both emergency

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reclassifications in a timely manner. A de.dicated communicator p provided supplemental.information to these simulated NRC officialsf L based on the EOM's frequent update briefings. Open line'

communications was eventually demonstrated.with the simulated NRC officials' . H L ;The' ED, E0M, and .EP . Advisor remained very well. aware of what-i protective actions were being implemented by offsite of'ficial f They knew when county officials implemented the option of closing-a nearby wildlife refuge and. Lake Erie portions of the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) following the Alert declaratio After the' procedurally correct Protective Action' Recommendation (PAR)-

had'been transmitted to offsite officials with the General Emergency declaration message, ECC staff q:ickly learned the State's  ;

recommendation and which protective actions were chosen for-

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implementation by. county officials. ECC staff tracked when the counties had simulated activating the Prompt Notification System e (PNS)..and which Emergency Broadcast System messages had been chosen l

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by local official ECC staff. demonstrated the capability to .. ,

remotely interrogate the PNS, and informed county officials'of. the 1 results of these siren operability checks. Such action would enable county officials to sooner implement route' alerting in areas where aJ ;

siren was apparently' inoperable. Recommended and implemented offsite protective action data were kept' current on several ECC l status' boards, as was information on when the Governor had declared a " state of emergency" and when the State had requested support from '

various Federal agencie s i

The Dose Assessment Coordinator (DAC) and his staff closely >

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. monitored current and forecast weather information and kept these j 3'

data current'on ECC status boards. They also monitored containment

' radiation level' and release rate trends. Containment. radiation ;

level, release rate, and RMTs' measurements were inputs to computerized dose proje'ctions. The DAC reviewed the results of these computerized calculations, and kept the ED and EOM adequately

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informed of these1results and their meaning with respect to the current PA Four RMTs were dispatched from the Radiation Testing Laboratory (RTL)',-located near the ECC workspace, during the exercise. The RMT and RTL Coordinators adequately interfaced when directing the activities of the RMTs. The RMTs were effectively deployed to track and measure the simulated plume as it moved through the western !

portion of the 10-mile EPZ. The teams' measurements and their  :

simulated exposures were closely" monitored by the RMT Coordinator who directed their movements and' gave the teams updates on local weather conditions and release statu Habitability monitoring was adequately demonstrated after the Site Area Emergency declaratio The switching of the building's ventilation system to recirculation mode was simulated, as was the

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, x transfer t'o the emergency water supply. All,ECC status boards were u

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, kept; current' with accurate information'. . A dedicated logkeeper

= recorded the ED's and other key ECC staff's decisions to facilitat ;

[' later reconstruction of their activities.

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JAs.th'e exercise progressed, the ED remained in the ECC or went to L l F the TSC to confer.with his. key aides in these facilities as he-deemed necessary.- The EOM and EPH also spent brief periods in each- ,

e other's-facilities to~ confer with the ED.on current issues. Senior staffs in the'ECC and TSC were adequately aware ^of the movements o *

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ED,1 EPM, and EOM, which were allowable per the. licensee's centralize emergency management concept outlined in'the Emergency Pla !

> At 1300 hours0.015 days <br />0.361 hours <br />0.00215 weeks <br />4.9465e-4 months <br />, the ED participated'in a useful conference call with' l State and county officials to better ensure that they were informed  :

of efforts.in progress to mitigate the consequences of the i

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accident.- At about 1400 hours0.0162 days <br />0.389 hours <br />0.00231 weeks <br />5.327e-4 months <br />, the emergency phase of the exercise  :

was conclude The'ED and senior staff from the STSC, TSC, OSC, and

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RTL: convened to conduct a preliminary onsite recovery planning .

discussion. Procedural. guidance was consulted,. leading the ED-to ,

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the correct conclusions that the situation remained classifiable as a General Emergency and that no relaxation of offsite protective ,

actionsishould be recommende The planning group discussed.a good r number of short and longer term onsite recovery action items prior 1 to exercise terminatio Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was acceptabl Joint Public Information Center (JPIC)

A review of the news releases issued on the first day of the exercise was performed. In general, news releases were found to be

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adequately detailed and timely, and contained accurate informatio However, News Release Number 8 was overly brief, and lacked any 4 description of the events -leading to the declaration of the Site 1 Area Emergency or the generic definition of a Site Area Emergenc Similarly, News Release Number 14 also lacked information on plant conditions causing a release of radioactive material or the generic definition of a General Emergency. The frequencies of local Emergency Broadcast System stations were not included in any of the licensee's press releases. . Definitions of all emergency classes were, however, found in News Release Number Activities in the JPIC were observed on the second day of the exercis Activities were simulated to take place in the licensee's corporate office building (as JPIC staff had simulated relocation on County representatives did not

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[' the first day of the exercise).

participate on this date. Media roleplayers challenged a panel consisting of State of Ohio, State of Michigan, and Toledo Edison representative ;

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i Five formal briefings were observed. These briefings were held at

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approximately equal intervals. During the briefings, panel members:

adequately presented available information and adequately responded' '

to questions posed by the simulated media personnel. When information i

, was not.readily available, panel members properly _ committed t !

researching the information and responding late ~i-j Between several of the formal briefings,. licensee technical staff  ;

discussed technical matters (such as the characteristics'and effects

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.of radioactive release plumes). A representative of the licensee legal staff addressed issues related to insurance and compensation ,

available for individuals effected by a nuclear plant acciden !

Visual aids such as plant system diagrams, a listing'of the effects of radiation exposure, and EPZ maps were well utilize Some issues were the subject of repeated questioning and considerable discussion. Development of '! fact sheets" would simplify response to questions related to radioactive plumes, -  ;

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radiation exposure, and compensation issues. Such " fact sheets" s could include general information such as the nature and j characteristics of noble gasses, radioactive plume deposition and

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dissipation characteristics, hazards and precautions necessary in  :

contaminated areas, insurance provisions, and compensation claim procedure ,

Based upon the above findings, this portion of_the licensee's program was acceptable; however, the following items should be '

considered for' improvement: '

• " Fact sheets" related to radioactive release plumes, radiation exposure, and compensation issues should be  !

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develope *. Press releases involving emergency re-classifications should include a plain language definition of the emergency class and the reason for the re-classificatio ,

, Exercise Scenario and Control (IP 82302) -l

~The exercise scope and objectives, and copies of the scenario, were

' submitted by the established deadlines. The licensee was responsive to a number of minor comments on the scenari The scenario was challenging in several respects. It was the first ,

ingestion pathway scenario for an Ohio nuclear power statio j The scenario included a post-accident sample collection and sampl analysis demonstration; the dispatch of four offsite Radiation Monito ing 'l teams (RMTs); the dispatch of approximately 24 inplant teams; and an ,

onsite medical response to a simulated, contaminated / injured accident victim. Offsite response to this medical emergency included a backup ambulance service and one of the alternate local hospital l

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,a-A response cell of controllers was utilized to simulate NRC Duty Officers once.offsite notification responsibilities had been transferred from the'

CR to ECC staff. The controllers eventually had the ECC's-dedicate communicator maintain continuous communications. Three persons from

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..Centerior Corporation also roleplayed a contingent of an NRC Site Tea Use of these roleplayers provided an extra dimension to the challenge of satisfying the perceived information needs of the NRC following the Site Area Emergency declaration. The simulated Site Team members were

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. initially briefed by TSC and ECC representatives before separating to perform information gathering task The scenario also included a simulated onsite fire that was meant to involve the onsite ' response of a local fire department. However, due to the apparent illness of one fire brigade member, this demonstration was terminated.soon after the brigade reached the No. 2 diesel generator room. Offsite fire department personnel drove into the Protected Area only to~ learn that the' demonstration had been terminated. While the licensee's fire brigade adequately demonstrated the capability to promptly respond with sufficient equipment, their ability to coo,rdinate their activities with local firefighters could not be assessed. At the exit interview, the licensee indicated that the extra fire brigade crew, which had been made available for the exercise, had spent the previous day fighting fires at an offsite. training facility. The onscene controller elected to terminate the demonstration before another participant might become il The exercise was well critiqued.by licensee staff. Lead controllers-presented a detailed summaryLof the scenario and their preliminary findings to an audience of approximately 75 participants, controllers, and the NRC evaluator Key. participants from each emergency response facility were also given the opportunity to address the audience. The licensee's critique presentation was candid, with self-identified problems being in good agreement with those items identified by the inspection tea Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was acceptable; however, the following item should be considered for improvement:

• Scenario developers should ensure that exercise participants, who are expected to perform strenuous activities during an exercise, are excused from physically exhausting training activities shortly before the day of the exercis . Onsite Meteorological Monitoring Program (IP 80721)

Some aspects of the onsite meteorological monitoring program were '

evaluated to determine the program's scope, the adec;uacy of the program's description in the Emergency Plan, and to determine whether the monitoring equipment met' applicable regulatory guidance and was being adequately j maintained. An evaluation was also made of the licensee's provisions

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for ensuring that onsite data, which may be acquired and utilized by various organizations during an Emergency Plan activation, were

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I representativebfcurrentmeteorologicalconditions. The monitoring site was visited. A sample of program records and procedures were '

W  : reviewed and discussed with the staff meteorologist currentlyLascigned-as the program's Project Leade *

L0nsite meteorological measurements were being made using one train o sensors mounted on either a 340-foot-freestanding tower or.a nearby

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33-foot tower. This tower configuration has apparently been in place since the mid-1970s. Temperature difference measurements were obtained

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for the 340 to 35-foot and the 250 to 35-foot interval Dewpoint:

temperature. measurements were available from the 35 and 340 foot elevation Precipitation was measured at ground level. JWind speed and direction sensors ~were mounted at the 250 and 340-foot elevations of the freestanding n tower and atop the nearby 33-foot tower. .. Sensor accuracies satisfied applicable criteria of Regulatory Guide 1.2 .

Both towers were located in a flat grassy fiel'd in the southwestern portion of the. sit ~

The 340-foot tower was. equipped with a' lightning ro Both towers.were grounde The licensee indicated that an. upgrade had been made in April 1989 to provide additional electrical surge .

protection to some monitoring system components to reduce potential ,

damage resulting from lighting strikes. .The licensee indicated that-there had been no lengthy system outages'due to lightning damage in a recent~ years. However, there had been infrequent instances of ,

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lightning-related" damage:to a sensor or a signal processor. Wind speed and direction sensors'were provided with heater elements to' minimize the

combined adverse effects of low temperature and moisture on these sensors. Temperature sensors were within aspirated shields. Power to the' aspirator motors could be verified, but not the adequacy of the airflow around the temperature sensors. Signal processing equipment

.and analog strip charts were housed in an environmentally: controlled

. shelter near the 340-foot tower. Data availability in the CR, TSC,

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and ECC was also as described in the Emergency Pla I&C technicians have performed surveillance of the monitoring equipment several times each week in accordance with Periodic Test (P1) No. 5179.0 The Project Leader and/or one of his staff typically visited the monitoring

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. site each week. Routine maintenance, emergency maintenance, and calibration

. activities have been performed by the same vendor for some years. The

~1icensee' indicated that the vendor maintained stores of spare system components at an offsite location, rather than having such items stored onsite. The vendor's contract included provisions for initiating timely emergency repairs. Records review indicated that system calibrations had been conducted at least' semiannually,~as mentioned in th'e Emergency Pla The random sample of recent years' maintenance and calibration records were adequately detailed and indicated that actions had been timely to correct identified problems. Calibration records were complete, well-detailed, and indicated that monitoring system calibrations have been thorough. It was concluded that the monitoring eqt ipment was being

adequately maintaine Prior,to the hiring of a staff meteorologist in 1987, the licensee had apparently assigned primary responsibility for data quality control an validation to the vendor, who had remotely interrogated the monitoring i

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p system 'at frequentiintervals arid had reviewed the analog charts and other L v system records to.better ensure data quality. The licensee's L meteorologist had developed proceduralized and/or computerized data j review practices and techniques which were-being performed at daily or h~ ' ' weekly. intervals, depending on whether the data were digital or analog.

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. Based on discussions with the. Project Leader and a spot check of procedures,.these data review practices and techniques were very thorough o and would provide' good assurance that the resulting set of validated data L were representative of onsite meteorological conditions. The Project

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Leader was also responsible for maintaining a validated set of.onsite1 t

meteorological data for use in various envirorimental impact calculations

, # performed per regulatory requirements. While Regulatory Guide 1.23

- established a goal of at least 90 percent availability for certain l parameters measured onsite, the 1987 and 1988 validated data recovery L

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rates for.' individual parameters ~and combinations of parameters utilized l in these' calculations exceeded 95.5 percent. These very high recovery I

rates were very good given the apparent thoroughness of the data qualit a controliefforts and the lack of a redundant train of sensor .

L . Responsibility.for the onsite meteorological monitoring program was assigned to the' Technical Services Division, which included the Emergenc Preparedness Department and the Environmental Compliance (EC) Unit. The EC Supervisor?and the Meteorological Monitoring Project Leader were both procedurally responsible for monitoring program activities. However, the L EC Supervisor position was vacant at the time of this' inspection. The

Project- Leader had apparently. assumed primary responsibility for all dally program activities. The Project Leader, who was a meteorologist, indicated

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'2 that he would shortly be leaving the licensee's employment. The Project-l Leader had trained several assistants and had developed' detailed procedures for reviewing the data and for interfacing with the vendor who maintained the moni_toring system. .However; the. Project Leader was uncertain who would replace him or the EC Supervisor regarding immediate supervisory and technical leadership responsibilities for day-to-day monitoring

program activities. Assuming that the licensee continues to provide the degree of support for the onsite meteorological monitoring program that was apparent for at. least the previous 18 to 24 unths, the -licensee's and offsite agencies' ER0s should continue to have reasonable assurance that the program's data are representative of onsite meteorological condition As indicated in the Emergency Plar, the meteorological monitoring system was located to provide data representative of onsite conditions. Neither

,the Project Leader nor the EP staff were aware of any technical study 1-intended to determine to what extent data from these onsite towers represented meteorological conditions for the entire plume exposure pathway EPZ. Records indicated that a study had been performed prior to

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1985 which identified the existence of a local lakebreeze effect given certain wind and temperature conditions. The study was largely based on 1981 data from the onsite monitoring program. Records also indicated that some work had been done towards modifying the licensee's atmospheric dispersion model ("A" model) to address the local lakebreeze effec However, based on discussions with several licensee staff, the intended modification of the model was never accomplished.

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j\ Proce sres HS-EP-2240, 2245, and '2250 were reviewed to determine-if they

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Lincluded references'to the existence of a lakebreeze effect for certain '

local wind ~and temperature conditions. -These' procedures addresse % offsite, dose assessment, offsite Protective Action Recommendation (PAR).

LV decisionmaking, and offsite radiation' monitoring team activities,

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respectively. No mention of~a potential lakebreeze effect was'found-in these procedures. 'The existence of a lakebraeze effect wauld likely;

-influence the downwind movement and concentration of an atmospheric-

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release in affected portions of the EPZ.~ The existence of a lakebreeze effect.could, therefore, affect the selection of offsite PAR options and the, movements of offsite survey teams. The licensee must revise:

4 ' appropriate procedures and dose assessment methodologies to; address-the local lakebreeze effect, so that decisionmakers can be aware of'

the-lakebreeze's potential: effects on offsite PAR options and radiation m ' monitoring team deploymen This is an Open Item (50-346/89018-02).

9 With the exception of the Open' Item,~this portion of the licensee's program was acceptabl ~ >

. Dose Calculation and Assessment (IP 82207) Dose Assessment capability

The inspectors evaluated the. licensee.'s dose assessment capability _

in'accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9) and the , ,

guidance of NUREG-0654,Section I ~.

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The licensee's' basic dose assessment procedure, HS-EP-2240,~"Offsite

. Dose Assessment," was reviewe The procedure addressed all the

" modes of dose calculation and assessment used by the licensee, and considered = appropriate source terms, release magnitudes based on

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plant systems parameters and effluent monitors, and onsite and offsite exposures and contamination levels for various meteorological conditions. A variety of methods for acquiring meteorological data automatically or manually were available, with appropriate procedural guidance for. acquisition. Meteorological

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data can be accessed by other onsite personnel, the State,.and the NRC. Methods for determining release rates and projected

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doses were available in the event of offscale or inoperable

' instrumentation. The procedure and systems provided default values and the capability for manual ~ inputs and field measurements where appropriate. Simplified dose projections using nomographs can be

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conducted by qualified on-shift personne The inspector did not compare the licensee's model with the State

! . of Ohio's model for consistency in methods and assumptions during l ,

this inspection, due to time constraints and the unavailability of

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such documentation.' The licensee stated that some comparisons have been done, but the documentation was not available. According to the licensee's procedures, the PC Dose model ("A" model) is somewhat different than the model used by the State of Ohio (straight line '

Gaussian), and may give differing results under some condition The licensee's procedure calls for the Dose Assessment Coordinator

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k to provide .the licensee's "A model X/Q's to the State when -

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significant' differences.are' apparent and to coordinate' resolution of the differences. The inspector noted that prior knowledge of p' such differences would preclude taking time during the dose assessment and PAR decisionmaking' processes to determine.wh differences occurred and whether they were due'to modelLassumption differences or ta. human error The inspector evaluated the dose assessment systems for proper

. verification and validation, and the documentation of softwar 'The licensee required documentation of testing, identification of methods, and test conclusions as part of the verification and validation program for computer programs, in accordance with procedure NG-1M-00111, " Computer Software Administrative Control."

Information for the PC Dose System was readily available, detailed, and thorough. Documentation included information on the compilation language ("TURB0 PASCAL"), t.he user manuals (EP-2240, EP-2245),

Program Documentation, including a general description and user interface, module functions and descriptions, program logic,

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variables, and interface with emergency procedures.' Documentation extended through several' revisions,1and included Quality Assurance (QA) review. Documen_tation was maintained in a singlo location under the cognizance of the responsible project engineer. Th validation and verification for PC dose was very well done, and met the intent of NUREG-0654 and licensee procedure The manual nomogram method of dose calculation has been reviewed on an an'nual basis as an.EP procedure. The dose assessment project engineer maintained a folder verifying the consistency of the nomograms with PC Dose, as documented in an August 4, 1988 lette Nomogram verification and validation was. adequat One component of the Data Acquisition and Display System (DADS) also served the dose' calculation and assessment system, automatically

. integrating effluent monitor data, plant status, and meteorology to generate: dose rates which can be manually translated into doses, using the dose assessment procedure. The system can also generate plume maps. The DADS component dedicated to dose rate calculation, had not received any formal verification and validation as a dose-assessment system, although it was being well controlled under Computer Systems procedures for controlling access, performing functions, and making changes. The DADS aspect of the dose assessment system has evolved under the management of the Computer Systems group. Verification and validation'of the dose assessment component of DADS is an Open Item (50-346/89018-03).

With the exception of the Open Itam, this portion of the program was acceptable; however, the following item should be considered for improvement:

• 'The licensee should consolidate documentation of the comparisons of its and the State's dose assessment model _ _ _ _ .

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The inspector interviewed two currently qualified dose assessor These personnel were observed performing dose asses'sment

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calculations using the PC Dose System and DADS. The' dose

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assessors were very familiar with their equipment and orocedures, and satis-factorily performed a variety of dose and dose rate calculations for a variety of plant conditions, effluent monitor readings, and meteorological condition Based on the above findings, this portion of-the licensee's program was acceptabl Equipment and Decisional Aids

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Dose' assessment equipment and decisional aids as required by the licensee's emergency preparedness procedures were in place,

. operational, and were. adequately maintained. Equipment was adequate to meet or exceed the guidance in NUREG-065 Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was acceptabl . Dose Assessment Training The inspector reviewed training modules associated with dose assessment training (EPT-00A-101.00, 9/21/87),for the PC Dose System, the Data Acquisition and Display System (DADS), and manual calculations using nomographs. Lesson plans were straight forward, readily understandable,'and covered the key aspects of using~the dose assessment systems. Hands-on training on the systems was also required. Several representative examples of the different types of circumstances, plant conditions, and calculations affecting dose assessment were included as part of the training module However;thetrainingdidnotaddressdifferencesbetweenthe licensee's and State s models and the significance of such differences. A list of' currently qualified dose assessors was maintained, routinely updated, and documented in the organizational phone book. Training records of currently qualified personnel were not reviewe Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was acceptable; however, the following item should be considered for improvement:

• The licensee should';.rovide its dose assessment staff and affected decisionmakers with overview training on the differences between the licensee's and the State's dose assessment methodologies with_ emphasis on the significance of such difference __ = __ = _ -_ _ ____ .- - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ - - _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - -

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$. 1 Exit Interviews (IP 30703)'

l0nAugust 10, 1989, the inspectors held separate interviews with those

licensee representatives denoted in Section 2 regarding exercise related4 and other inspection activities. The licensee indicated:that none of the items discussed were proprietary in nature .

The, licensee's.overall response-to a complex and challenging exercise scenario'was good. However, the need for Control' Room personnel'to adhere to procedural guidance to better ~ ensure that the NRC's initial information needs would be satisfied following an emergency declaration was ~

identi.fied. Several improvements were also recommended regarding preplanning for a response to' an onsite accident, .having. contamination control complications, which could occur beyond the plant's Radiation Control Are The onsite meteorological monitoring program was being well maintaine Program activities were. highly proceduralized. .Very good percentages of high quality data have been obtained in recent years. However, the Project Leader planned to leave the licensee' employment-shortly, while that individual.'s. supervisor.had already done so.' Qualified replacements for both key positions had apparently not yet been . identified. Assuming that the licensee would continue to provide the same level of' support to this ' program as was evident in recent years, licensee, State, and Federal emergency responders should continue to have reasonable assurance that the program will provide quality, data' representative of onsite meteorological- '

. condition Trie licensee's provisions for offsite radioactive dose assessment were good with two exceptions: the lack of provisions for addressing a local'

lakebreeze effect, the existence of which was determined ~by the licensee's study performed in the early 1980s;'and the lack of verification and validation documentation for.one of several computerized methodologies-utilized for offsite dose assessment. 'Thd licensee should also train appropriate' staff on significant differences between its and the State's-methodologies for computing offsite dose projection

Attachments:

Exercise Scope.and Objectives Scenario' Narrative Summary

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-h . SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES-

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' l'.1 Scope:

The 1989 Davis-Besse Emergency Preparedness. Exercise, to be conducted on August 8 and 9, 1989 vill test and provide the opportunity to eval-unte the Toledo Edison Emergency Plan and' Emergency Plan procedure It vill also test the . emergency response organization's ability to assess and respond to emergency conditions and take adequate actions to protect the health and safety of the public. The exercise vill

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demonstrate the utilization of the Station's Emergency Response Organ-ization " Team A" personnel with exceptions.- The exercise vill not involve activation of the Toledo Edison Corporate Emergency Response-Organization (CER).- Whenever practical, the exercise incorporates provisions for " free play" on the part of,the participant The scenario vill simulate a sequence of events resulting in a radio-logical release to the environment. This release vill be of suffi-cient magnitude to warrant mobilization of State and local agencies in response to the emergency, including the State of Ohio, State of

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Michigan, Ottava County, Lucas County and Sandusky County emergency response organization Ingestion Exposure Pathway activities vill be demonstrated on August.9, 198 :The exercise vill also incorporate the conduct of the. Station's Annual Medical Drill,' semiannual post-a

REGION III EMERGENCY l E.ERATIONS CENTE Rev. 1

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~4 1-4 Toledo Edison Objectives Continued -

31 D.12 DEMONSTRATE THE COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITY VITH FIXED AND HOBILE MEDICAL SUPPORT FACILITIE DEMONSTRATE THE METHODS AND TECHNIQUES FOR DETERMINING THE SOURCE TERM OF RELEASES OR POTENTIAL RELEASES OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL VITHIN PLANT SYSTEM DEMONSTRATE THE METHODS AND TECHNIQUES FOR DETERMINING THE MAGNI-TUDE OF THE RELEASES OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS BASED ON PLANT SYSTEM PARAMETERS AND EFFLUENT MONITOR DEMONSTRATE THE ABILITY TO ESTIMATE INTEGRATED DOSE FROM PRO-JECTED AND ACTUAL DOSE RATES AND TO COMPARE THESE ESTIMATES VITH THE PAG' DEMONSTRATE THE ABILITY TO IMPLEMENT EXPOSURE GUIDELINE DEMONSTRATE THE ABILITY TO CONTINUOUSLY MONITOR AND CONTROL EMER-GENCY VORKER EXPOSUR DEMONSTRATE THE RESOURCES AND CAPABILITY FOR FIELD MONITORING VITHIN THE PLUME EXPOSURE EP DEMONSTP. ATE THE ABILITY TO ESTIMATE TOTAL POPULATION EXPOSUR E.15 DEMONSTRATE THE CAPABILITY FOR TRANSPORTATION OF A RADIOLOGICAL ACCIDENT VICTIM. (MEDIAL DRILL REQUIREMENT.)

40 E-17 DEMONSTRATE THE RESPONSE TO AND ANALYSIS OF, SIMULATED ELEVATED AIRBORNE AND LIQUID SAMPLES AS VELL AS DIRECT RADIATION MEASURE-MENTS IN THE ENVIRONMEN (HEALTH PHYSICS DRILL REQUIREMENT)

41 E.18 DEMONSTRATE THE CAPABILITY TO ANALYZE AN ACTUAL SAMPLE OBTAINED FROM A PLANT SYSTEM INCLUDING USE OF THE POST ACCIDENT SAMPLING SYSTEM VITHIN 3 HOURS. (HEALTH PHYSICS DRILL REQUIREMENT)

42 DEMONSTRATE THE ABILITY TO RECOMMEND PROTECTIVE ACTIONS TO APPRO-PRIATE OFFSITE AUTHORITIES; BASES OF RECOMMENDATIONS TO INCLUDE CONSIDERATION OF PROTECTION AFFORDED BY SHELTERING, AS VELL AS EVACUATION TIME ESTIMATE DEMONSTRATE THE OPERATION OF THE JOINT PUBLIC INFORMATION CENTER AND THE AVAILABILITY OF SPACE FOR THE MEDI DEMONSTRATE THE ABILITY TO BRIEF THE MEDIA IN A CLEAR, ACCURATE AND TIMELY MANNE DEMONSTRATE THE ABILITY TO PROVIDE ADVANCE COORDINATION OF INFOR-MATION RELEASED (DEMONSTRATED ONLY VITH FULL OFFSITE PARTICIPA-(. TION.)

46 DEMONSTRATE THE CAPABILITY TO EVACUATE NON-ESSENTIAL PERSONNE Rev. I

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1-5 Toledo Edison Objectives Contir ued 47 DEMONSTRATE THE ABILITY TO ACCOUNT FOR ALL INDIVIDUALS IN THE PROTECTED AREA VITHIN 30 FINUTE DEMONSTRATE THE ABILITY TO CONDUCT SEARCH AND RESCUE PROCEDURE F.10 DEMONSTRATE ABILITY TO ESTABLISH AND OPERATE RUMOR CONTROL IN A COORDINATED FASHION (DEMONSTRATED ONLY VITH FULL OFFSITE PARTICI-PATION)

50 F.11 DEMONSTRATE THE CAPABILITY FOR ONSITE FIRST AI (MEDICAL DRILL REQUIREMENT)

51 F.12 DEMONSTRATE THAT PROVISIONS ARE AVAILABLE FOR THE EVALUATION OF ,

RADIATION EXPOSURE OF, AND RADIt. TION UPTAKE IN A RADIOLOGICAL ACCIDENT VICTIM. (MEDIAL DRILL REQUIREMENT)

52 DEMONSTRATE PRELIMINARY DISCUSSIONS OF REENTRY AND RECOVERY CAPA-BILITIES AND AVAILABILITY OF PROCEDURE (

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6.1 Narrative Summary The 1989 Annual Exercise vill be a two day event. .The first day vill encompass the accident scenario involving both the Station and the offsite agencies. The offsite activities may not be conducted in sequence with the Station simulated events. Second day activities vill focus on the States of Ohio and Michigan conducting an analysis of radioactive material deposited by the release from the Station, demonstrating sampling tech-niques and providing Ingestion Pathway Zone related information/ advisories through the JPIC. There vill be a time jump of three days involved with the second day activities. This vill allow for both the decay and the transport of the radioactive material. In addition to the states involve-ment in.the second day activities, the Station vill draw its Post Accident Sample on the second day of the exercise which vill provide more realism in the conduct of the exercis The scenario vill begin with the plant operating at 100% power by heat balance. The electrical lineup is normal, and the Makeup Tank level is 70". Component Cooling Vater Pumps 1-1, 1-2, and Service Vater Pumps 1-1 and 1-2 are rur.ning. A monthly load test of Emergency Diesel Generator #2 is in progress (it was started at 0530) in accordance with ST 5081.0 '

During the conduct of a test run of HPI Pump #2 during the midnight shift, a major oil leak vas found. The HPI Pump #2 is in the process of being repaire (LCO 3.5.2 Restore in 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be shutdown in the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.) Unknown to the operators the stem and disc have separated on ( DH-79 the BVST suction isolation valve. This vill cause HPI and Makeup pump failure when they are called upon to start later in the scenari Also unknown to the operators is the failure of one of the Containment Vacuum breakers. At the SA shutdown the isolation valves for all Vacuum Breakers will close properly. One vill open due to an electrical short later in the exercise, setting up the release path for the radioactive material that is released from the cor At the onset of the exercise the Control Room staff and the Continuous Service personnel vill be briefed and vill discuss the initial plant conditions for the exercise. The Lead Exercise Controller vill have the Drill Code "9696969696" sent out on the ERO Pager Syste Ten minutes after the exercise has commenced, a fuel line on the running diesel generator vill fail causing a fire in the space. The operator vill stop the engine on his way out of the generator room and vill notify the Control Room of the fir The Control Room vill sound the alarm and call away the fire brigade. This fire affecting safety related equipment is the basis for the declaration of an Alert. (EAL 7.A.2 Fire affecting plant equipment.)

Offsite Notifications vill be made and the Emergency Response Organization vill be activated. The security force vill restrict access to the station at this time (for 5 minutes only).

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( When the fire brigade arrives at the scene of the fire, offsite assistance vill be requested and a local fire company vill respond to the statio After the arrival of the offsite assistance, the fire vill be put out and ,

de-smoking of the area vill take plac .

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The activities involving the fire vill last approximately an hour. After which the responding personnel vill be involved in establishing the extent of the damage and what further. actions are require At 0900 a spurious Radiation Alarm on RE 8707 vill be received. This alarm

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is to add some activity for the team to think about and investigate. The area radiation vill not change until atter the release area At approximately 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> and 40 minutes into the scenario the 2-2 RCP esal-vill fail with a leak rate of approximately'250 GPM. In response.to the leak the operators. vill start the second Makeup Pump. As the level in the-Makeup Tank decreases, the operators vill shift suction to~the BUST. This

- vill. occur at the same time as the low pressure trip comes in on the reactor protective system. The operable HPI pump vill; start at approximately the same time that the suction is shifted to the BVST. This

- vill result in the failure of both Makeup Pumps and the only operable HPI Pump due to loss of suction. This leak combined with the HPI and Makeup pump failures meet the conditions of EAL 3.D.2 requiring the declaration of a Site Area Emergenc With the declaration of a SAE, Protected Area Evacuation vill be required and will be accomplished.- Owner Control Area Assembly vill be simulate As'the Protected Area Evacuation is nearing completion, a Maintenance Man on his way out vill see a CO2 bottle north of the BUST that is not properly secure He' vill attempt to secure tne bottle, and in the attempt, the bottle vill fall over breaking the valve assembly off th'e top. -The bottle (

vill fly off into the BVST making a hole at approximately ground leve The man attempting to leave the area vill run into an obstruction and vill injure his head. The water coming out of the BVST will contaminate the man as he stumbles through it. He vill fall down outside of the pool of water that is rapidly accumulating in the are The mans failure to badge out of the Protected Area vill cause Security to inform the OSC of his missing status. Additionally another individual vill fail to badge and he vill be missin Search and Rescue operations should be conducted. When he is located, the first aid team vill be called to assist the injured man. The OSC vill slso be required to handle the spill i:

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of contaminated water arout' the BVST. (The leak rate is approximately 12,000 GPM.) The BVST vill empty approximately 30 minutes after the bottle

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creates the hol Approximately three hours and forty minutes into the scenario, fuel failure vill occur. This is due to the loss of coolant and the inability to inject water.- At approximately the same time, the simulated NRC incident response team is expected to arrive at the sit Four hours into the exercise the RCP's will be started in response to L procedure. Shortly after this the Core Flood Tanks vill discharge into the core, At four hours and forty-five minutes into the drill the vacuum breaker isolation valvst controller vill short and fail the vacuum breaker isolation '

valve to open. A release to the atmosphere is now in progress.

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= (E A General Emergency should be declared IAV EAL 1.D.5, 1.D.6, or l.E.1. Th RKT teams will track the plume as the Dose Assessment personnel evaluate the release information. This information vill be provided to the state and counties for their information, evaluation and action.

L Expected protective action recommendations should include,.as a minimum, the evacuation of EPZ subareas 1, 2, 10 and 12; and sheltering within I subareas 3 and 11. . Protective action recommendations developed by.the players may, however, be more conservativ At five hours and fifteen minutes into the exercise the BWST vill be repaired. Once the BWST is repaired filling can commence from whatever source of water.the operations personnel can locat Six hours and. fifteen minutes into the event the TSC and OSC personnel will be successful in the repair of the vacuum breaker isolation valve that failed and vill terminate the releas Injection of water and antinued core cooling vill be conducted as water becomes available to the operator Six hours and thirty minutes into the event the Emergency Phase of the exercise vill be terminated.. At which time critiques of the facilities and restoration of the facilities vill be accomplishe ( Approximately seven hours and fifteen minutes after the commencement of the

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exercise reentry / recovery discussions vill be hel Day two activities vill begin with a briefing of'the individuals involved to be held at approximately 073 The events for the day are scheduled to commence at 0800 at which time OSC personnel vill be directed to obtain a PASS Sampl The States of Ohio and Michigan vill be dealing with the postulated deposi-tion problem in accordance v$th their respective plans and information as provided by the Davis-Bessa station and their controllers.

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As appropriate the Joint Public Information Center vill release information to the media regarding plant activities and radiological ingestion informatio Three hours after the Emergency Plant Manager directs a PASS sample to be obtained, the sampling vill be complet The states vill continue to resolve the deposition problems until the exercise is terminated at approximately 150 (

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