IR 05000346/1988035

Insp Rept 50-346/88-35 on 881003-28.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Allegation Re Operation of Facility

ML20206K359
Person / Time
Site:	Davis Besse
Issue date:	11/15/1988
From:	Defayette R, Farber M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20206K357	List: IR 05000346/1988035 ML20206K354
References
50-346-88-35, NUDOCS 8811290377
Download: ML20206K359 (6)

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Rep 9rtNo.50-346/88035(DRP)

Cocket No. 50-346 License fio. NPF-3 Licensee: Toledo Edison Company Edison Plaza 300 Madison Avenue Toledo, OH 43562 Facility Name: Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1 Inspection At: Davis-Besse Site, Oak Harbor, Ohio Inspection Conducted: October 3 through 28, 1988 Inspector: I j r f /gr Approved By: Robert W ay e Reactor Projects, Section 3A

//!/I Date Inspection Sumary inspection on Octo'oer 3 through 28, 1988 (Report No. 50-346/88035(DRP))

Areas Inspected: Special, unannounced safety inspection with regard to

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allegation related to the operation of the Davis-Besse facilit Results: No violations or deviations were idertified.

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8811240377 691123 FDR ADOCK 05000346 0 PDC

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DETAILS Persons Contacted Toledo Edison Company

• L. Storz, Plant Manager R. Flood, Assistant Plant Manger, Operations S. Jain, Independent Safety Engineering Manager J. Moyers, Quality Verification Manager

• R. Schrauder, Nuclear Licensing Manager

• L. Ramsett, Quality Assurance Director

• R. Gaston, Licensing Engineer

• E. Salowitz, Planning and Support Director

• P. Hildebrandt Engineering Director

• A. Zarkesh, Independent Safety Engineering Supervisor NRC P. M. Byron, Senior Resident Inspector D. C. Kosloff, Resident Inspector

• Denotes those persons present at exit meeting on October 28, 1988. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701)

(Closed) Unresolved Item (50-346/88013-01): Out of Tolerance Pressure Switch Setpoint. The licensee provided an analysis which demonstrated that although the as-found setpoint was low there would have been sufficient air in the accumulator to close the valve at that setpoin During discussions with licensee staff the inspector learned that the automatic closure function was being eliminated as part of the licensee's comitment to upgrade the plant's feed and bleed capability. The minimum recirculation lines for the Makeup pumps are isolated during feed and bleed operation and closure of the valve would result in dead-heading of the pump. To prevent pump damage and the resulting inability to resume feed and bleed, the closure signal was being eliminated. The inspector reviewed the Technical Specification uendment submitted by the licensee, a licensee safety evaluation, the Facility Change Request package, and the NRC staff Safety Evaluation Report on the amendment. The inspector has no further concerns in this matter and it is considered close . Allegation Background In July of 1987, NRC Region III received information alleging inappropriate activities being conducted at the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1. This infomation led to the reopening of a previously closed allegation regarding the fitness for duty of the Davis-Besse Plant Manager on the night of December 31, 1986 and raised a number of new issues. An investigation by the NRC Office oi Investigations (01) was opened to determine the circumstances surrounding the fitness for duty

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matter and some of the other issues. The results of that investigation were discussed in a letter from A. Bert Davis, Reginal Administrator, l Region III to Mr. Murray Edelman, President Toledo Edison Company on October 6,1988 (attached). During the period of the investigation an additional allegation regarding the Plant Manager was received. The ,

purpose of this inspection is to review those issues not examined by O!  !

during their investigatio ,

4. Allegation Review ,

I Allegation RIII-A-87-0001  :

(1) Concern: The non-licensed Plant Manager may have ordered licensed control room operators to raise reactor power without proper calibration of nuclear instruments, which would have violated Technical Specification NRC Review: The Senior Resident Inspector reviewed operating logs, operating procedures, Technical Specifications, and l

.JrveillanCe documents to determine whether or not plant l operations had been conducted in accordance with requirements, i The 01 investigation of this allegation is contained in the  !

investigative report dated July 7, 198 !

Conclusions: The Senior Resident Inspector determined that nuclear instrument calibration and plant power ascension had taken place consistent with all regulatory requirements. The l 01 investigation did not substantiate the allegation that the Plant Manager directed reactor operator activities on the i evening in question. This allegation is close '

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(2) Concern: Plant management may be operating the plant in a less  ;

than conservative manner due to NRC's use of plant availability l as one of the considerations in determining plant perfomanc NRC Review: Davis-Besse employees including operator 3, were ,

asked during the course of the 0! investigation to identify any instances where the plant had been operated in a non-conservative manne Plant operation with the auxiliary -

feedwater system in an unreliable condition (allegation No. 5  !

below) and bearing failure of an auxiliary feedwater pump turbine were identified. The inspector reviewed these matters and detemined that they did not constitute non-conservative  !

operation. The unreliable auxiliary feedwater system condition '

is discussed in No. 5 below. The bearing failure was addressed I in an engineering analysis and detemined not to impact the  ;

ability of the system to perfom its intended functio The (

inspector reviewed the Maintenance Work Order for the bearing ,

problem and noted that it was initiated to investigate high  !

bearing temperature exhibited during a period of sustained i operation on April 8, 1987. The turbine was disassembled, and l examined. Measurements of the bearing revealed that clearances j were less than acceptable which resulted in reduced oil flow to 1 B

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the bearing and consequently higher temperatures. Also, some scoring of the bearing was noted but the diameters were unaffected. Review of Potential Condition Adverse to Quality Report (PCAQR) No. 87-0197 showed that the root cause of the problem was failure to include a specific range of clearance values for the reinstallation of bearings. The procedure was revised to include specific maximum and minimum clearances for

"old" and "new" bearings. The PCAQR also indicated that on April 24, 1987, the pump was run and vibration data taken. The analyses done as a result of that run did not show any bearing problen Conclusions: In tne opinion of the inspector, the use of the term "non-conservative" in the allegation is intended to convey dissatisfaction with the use of engineering analyses and

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compensatory measures to justify continued operation rather than declaring the component inoperable and conducting imediate corrective maintenance. Because of the subjective nature of the term "non-conservative" th0 allegation must be resolved based on safety considerations. Review of the examples supplied showed that the licensee's decision to justify operation '.hrough compensatory measares and analyses was correct and ttat safety was not adversely impacted. This allegation I: e.los e (3) Concern: Licensed operators question the ralf ability of the auxiliary feedwater system turbine governo" valve :

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NRC Review: NRC review of this concern is documented in Inspection Report 50-346/87031(DRP).

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Conclusions: The results of this inspection concluded that i the material condition of the auxiliary feedwater system was adequate to allow the system to perfom its safety functio i During 1987, the auxiliary feedwater pump turbines were required l to operate during a number of transients, and they always did so

successfully. Consequently, the reliability of th6 turbine

governor valves was demonstrated through repeated operation '

The allegation is not substantiated and is closed, i

l (4) Concern: NRC enforcement actions since the June 9, ISS5 event I have been "milder" than those prior to that event. Wh in i questioned during the 0! investigation the alleger stated this i

was evidenced by a Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREV)

i system inoperability in 1986 that did not result in civil penalty action although an identical event in 1984 resulted in i a civil penalt NRC Review: The inspector reviewed the Licensee Event Report, the NRC inspection report, and the civil penalty documentation J regarding the 1984 Control Room Emergency Ventilation system

, inoperability occurrence. This occurrence, with both trains of CREV out of service r.ue to their respective chiller switches

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being in the off position, was one of three examples of system 3 inoperability contained in the report and subsequent Notice of Violation. The inspector interviewed the alleger to obtain more information on the Control Room Emergency Ventilation system occurrence to determine if, in fact, the occurrence

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was an enforcement conditio From the interview the inspector determined that the issue was the identification of the migration of freon in the CREV refrigeration system from the water-cooled conder,er to the air-cooled condenser through normally closed s',lenoid valves while the system was in a

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standby conditici. The standby condition has the compressor lined up to the water-cooled condenser with the solenoid valves shut; with fretn migration to the air-cooled condenser the l compressor cyc' ed on and off due to low suction pressure, i This condition was identified not in 1986 as originally alleged but, on October 4,1987 during a monthly surveillance tes The inspector reviewed operating logs for October 3 and 4, 1987, Potential Condition Adverse tv Quality Report (PCAQR)

4 No.87-543 dated October 4,1987, an Operations Notes Update

dated October 12, 1987, and the surveillance test, ST 5076.01

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conducted on October 3, 1987. The cause of the phenomenon is the effect of outdoor temperature on the vapor pressure in the air-cooled condenser. As the temperature dropped, vapor pressure in the condenser dropped 6nd the resulting reduction in differential pressure (d/p) between the two condensers caused the freon migration past the solenoid valves, which are designed to hold tightly under a positive d/p, When the d/p was

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reduced significantly due to temperature changes the refrigerant

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seeped by the solenoid valves and resulted in the water-cooled i

condenser being low on refrigerant. Shifting the system to the j air-cooled condenser node redistributed the charge and the

! system operated satisfactorily in either mode. The system is

manually actuated when its operation is required. To correct

, the problem the licensee revised system procedures to require l shutting the air-cooled condenser isolation valves when in the standby mode and opening them on system startup. When the l condition was identified on October 4,1987, the system was

imediately shifted to the air-cooled mode where it operated satisfactorily, i

Conclusions: Since the system was designed to operate in either i mode, operability was maintained although system redundancy was

, affected. The licensee has taken appropriate corrective action

' to prevent recurrence. Because operability was maintained in the 1987 instance and corrective action was appropriate, no regulatory issue exists and no NRC action is necessary. The allegation is not substantiated and is closed.

l l b. Alleaation RIII-87-A-0171

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j Concern: The Plant Manager berated a quality control inspector

for Ti3Tding up a job.

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NRC Review: From a description of the work in question the job was j identified as the testing of an oil pressure switch on a Control Room

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Emergency Ventilation system chiller; the problem was the use of I unapproved vendor documents to conduct the tes The circumstances involved in this occurrence were reviewed in Inspection

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Report 50-346/88012(DRP) and a Notice of Violation issue Individuals present at the Davis-Besse Plan of the Day meeting in which the work was discussed, including a contract NRC inspector and j the Davis-Besse Resident Inspector, were interviewed. The Plant 1 Manager and the QC Inspector were interviewed. The discussions were i

described by all individuals as loud and contentious with the Plant i Manager forcefully directing all the individuals involved to rtsolve

the problem and return the system to operable status. Only one

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person interviewed (the contract NRC inspector) characterized the Plant Manager as berating the QC Inspector. The Resident Inspector l~

expressed the opinion that the Plant Manager was upset with all t1e people involved and that he did not single out any one person for i criticism. The QC inspector involved did not feel that the Plant

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Manager was berating him nor did he feel that this would deter h'm

{ from reporting similar finding Conclusion % Differences exist between the individuals present at the m'.eting with regard to what they perceive as "berating".

i Becausr. of these differences in perception this allegation can

neither be substantiated nor disproven. Resolution of this I matter depends on whether or not the alleged "berating" could

! result in the QC inspector being reluctant to report problems j in the future. Because he stated that the occurrence would not

, deter him from his work, there is no safety concern and this allegation is close . Exit Interview ,

The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)

at the conclusion of the inspection of October 28, 1988, and summarized l

the scope and findings of the inspection. The insrector also discuss the l likely informational content of the inspection report. The licensee

acknowledged the information and did not identify any of the information j disclosed during the inspection as proprietar Attachment: Ltr RIII to Toledo Edison,

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. ,', UNITED STATES NUCLE AR REGUL ATORY COMMISSION

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..... CCT 4 t;gg Docket No. 50-34tf

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Toledo Edison Corpany ATTN: fir. Murray R. Edleman President Edison Plaza 300 Madison Avenue '

Toledo, Ohio 43652 Gentlemen:

This refers to the investigation conducted by Mr. J. N. Kalknan of the NRC Office of Investigations. Region !!! Field Office anti Messrs. M. J. Farber and '

R. 8. Landsman of the NRC Region !!! Office from October 1,1987 through July 7 1988, regarding certain activities at the Davis Besse Nuclear Power Station authorized by facility Operating License No. NPF-3. A copy of the synopsis is enclosed for the issues associated with the Decerber 31, 1986 inciden One issue addressed during that investigation concerned the activities occurring in the Davis Besse Station Control Room on Decetber 31, 1986 and January 1,1987. Our investigation disclosed that fir. J. Williams, your former Senior Vice President, directed Mr. t.. Sterz, your Plant Manager, at approxinately 8:30 p.m. on December 31, 1986, to report to the site due to schedule delays in the plant startup occurring that evening. Your Plant Manager reported to the Davis Besse Station at approxir.ately 10:30 p.m. on l Decerber 31, 198 j

! While we concluded that the Plant Manager had consumed alcoholic beverages .

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shortly before reporting to the Davis Besse Station, we did not conclude that the Plant flanager was intoxicated. However, the Plant Manager did not follow

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the Toledo' Edison Company Folicy on the Use of Drugs and Alcohol which required l that employees not consur,e alcohol irmediately prior to reporting for wor *

In addition, the Plant Manager has testified that he neither advised his l supervisor of his alcohol consumption nor consitered the effects his alcohol j

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consumption ray have had on his judgment prior to reporting for work, t Our investigatio: also disclosed that shortly prior to being recalled to the l Davis Besse Station, the Plant Manager contacted the Assistant Plant Manager for Operations and directed hin to accompany the Plant Manager to the sit The Assistant Plant Manager for Operations, who was assigned as Outy Operatiens Manager, on call, refused to report to work and resigned his positie Upon ai % 1 at the site, the Plant Manager reported to the control room. Our interviews of the personnel in the control room that evening u vealed that the Flant !!anager conducted several discussions in the control room area in a loud crd distracting r.anner. Post of the personnel ir. the control room were distractt:

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by the F1cnt Manager's behavicr.

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• Toledo Edison Company -2-

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in retrospect, the Plant f an69er should have giveri due considerction to the i

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potential effects of alcohol consurption on his visit to the site', Ue are :

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concerned with the disruptive cemeanor thet he exhibited in the centrol room

on the evening of December 31, 1956. By copy of this letter we hereby notify i

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j the Plant l'anager of our admonition for his performanc '

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Of perhaps greater importance is the need for the maintenance of proper centrol !

room decorum tc ensure continueo safe operation of nuclear facilities. This can only be achieved through tne effective implementation of procedures which l 1 clearly delineate the licensee's expectations with respect to the desired control

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room environment. Additionally, the senior of ficial on shif t must have the !

authority and responsibility for implementation of those procedures, and have y

the support from upper levels of utility management for any actions taken in that ,

regard. While procedures may not be able to be written to cover every case, the

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NRC can reasonably expect that proper actions will be taken to maintain control j

room decorum if ultimate responsibility is clearly assigne '

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i On January 29, 1987, we had requested the President of the Toledo Edison Company ;

l to investigate the allegation that the Plant fianager reported for work shortly after consuming alcohol and was a distraction to some personnel through his j

behavior in the Control Room. In our letter dated March 30, 1987, we accepted

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the report of your investigation submitted on February 19, 1987 by Mr. D. Shelto l

Vice President, Nuclear. .Your conclusion from that investigation was that the j Plant Manager wss not a distraction in the Control Roo !

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! After review of the investigation into these matters by the NRC Office of

! Investigation, we now believe that while your report did describe the scope of ;

the investigation, it should have been broader. Specifically, you should have i

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interviewed control room personnel who had an opportunity to interface with or

) We acknowledge that our. own efforts to understand the f i observe the Plant Manage scope of your review and to resolve the matter could have been better. Nonethe-t

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i less, in the future, we expect nore thorough investigations of matters we j forward to yo In response to these concerns, we expect that Toleio Edison Corpany will review j the ,Mant lianager's actions and behavior that evenng and evaluate the adequacy j

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' of the pimcedures in place for ensuring proper maintenance of Control Room '

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decorum. We also expect that Toledo Edison Company mill review the consistency a of application of those procedures to all plant staff end ranagement. This [

l consistency review should include discussions with sufficient Control Room (

! personnel and other personnel you deem appropriate to assure that these procedures 1 are being properly impler,ented. In addition, you should reemphasize to the I Operations Shift Supervisors their responsibility and authority for assuring [

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compliance with those procedures by all personne l

We request that, within thirty (30) days, Toledo Edison Company submit to NRC l Regien !!! a repert of the results of those reviews and a description of i

corrective actions taken or planned. Specifically, identify changes or additions j to your current procedures which will ensure those retters do not recur, j j

in accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the Cerr.ission's re ulations, a copy of f this letter and your response to this letter will be p aced in the NRC Public j i

Cocunent Cce l i I

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Toledo Edison Company -3- \.

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i The respnnse directed by this letter is not subject to the clearance proccoures l of the Office of Management and Eceget as required by the Paperwork Reducticn Act of 1980, PL 96-11 We will gladly discuss any questions you have regarding this matte

Sincerely, (

[A * tw A. Pert Davis '

Regional Administrator j Enclosure: As stated f cc: L. Storz, Plant Manager i DCD/DCB(RIOS) l Licensing Fee Management Branch Resident Inspector, Region !!!  !

l Harold W. Kohn, Ohio EPA James W. Harris, State of Ohio  !

Robert M. Quillin, Ohio  !

Department of Health i State of Ohio, Public  !

Utilities Comission f

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, SYNOP515 In January 1987, the NRC received an allegation relating to the Divis-Besse Nuclear Foner Station (Davis-Eesse), specifically that on Decenber 31,19E6, the Plant Manager violated the Fitness for Duty Progra . by accessing the site in an alcohol-impaired conditten and proceded to beco e a distraction to the reactor operators and others in the control room that evenin On January 29, 1987, the Region 111 (RIII) Administrator requested that Toledo Edison Company (TEDCe) investigate the allegation and submit their findings to the NRC. On February 19, 1987 TEDCo cceplied with that request

, with a written report assuring the NRC that their investigation had exonerated the Plant Manager of any violation of their Fitness for Duty Program and concluded that he was, in fact, not a distraction to anyone in the control room that evening. Based upon the licensee's report, the NRC closed the Davis-Besse allegation.

In July 1987, the NRC received new infonnation alleging that the Davis-Besse Plant Manager was not only alcohol-impaired while at the site on New Year's

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Eve 1986, but that he also directed reactor operator activities while in the control roo .

On October 1,1987, the NRC Office of Investigations (01) initiated an

investigation relating to an alleged violation of the Davis-Besse Fitness for Duty Program. Although the NRC rules and regulations do not encompass fitness for duty, the NRC Comission authorized the investigation under the NRC Fitness for Duty Policy Statement and its authority t'o assure that any individual who has access to a nuclear power facility dees not comprecise public health and safety as a result of that individual's incompetence or impaired judgement.

. This investigation has developed evidence indicating that on New Year's Eve 1986, the Davis Besse Plant Manager did access the site af ter having consured r a quantity of alcohol, which in his opinion, was of an insufficient quantity

to cause him to question his fitness for duty. That 01 finding partially corroborated the TEDCo internal investigation finding cf the Plant Manager's fitness for duty. This 01 investigation, however, developed evidence, in part, contrary to the TEDCo finding that while onsite New Year's Eve 1986, the Plant Manager did exhibit behavior which was distractirg and disruptive to the

, control room personnel. This investigatinn did not, he=ever, corroborate the allegation that the Plant Manager directed reactor operator activities on the l

evening in questio i Because of the disparity between the TEDCo invastigation report to the NRC j and the 01 finding relating to the Plant Manager's distracting behavior in the i

control room. O! investigated further to detemine whether TEDCo management j willfully misrepresented the facts relevant to that aspect of their report to the NR i I

t j Case he. 3-87 017 1

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This investigation has developed evidence indicating that the Davis-Besse vice President huclear, who personally conducted the internal investigation of the Plant Manager fitness for duty episode, f ailed to thorotghly investigate the i allegation regarding the distracting behavior in the control room. The yi:e Fresident Nuclear received a written stater.ent from an eye witness to the '

events in the control room which confirmed the allegation that the Plant Manager r.ay have been, for a period of tire, a distraction. Rather than atteepting to corroborate that statement by interviewing any of the other eight eye witnesses, the Vice President Nuclear chose to conclude in his letter to the NRC that the allegation was subjective and unsubstantiate ;

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