IR 05000346/1988010

Insp Rept 50-346/88-10 on 880401-0515.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Action on Previous Insp Findings,Operational Safety,Maint, Surveillance,Lers,Bulletins & Fire Protection

ML20155H632
Person / Time
Site:	Davis Besse
Issue date:	06/09/1988
From:	Defayette R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20155H554	List: IR 05000346/1988010 ML20155H552
References
50-346-88-10, IEB-85-003, IEB-85-3, NUDOCS 8806200325
Download: ML20155H632 (13)

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMISSION .

REGION III

Report No. 50-346/88010(ORP) -

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Docket No. 50-346 Operating License No. NPF-3 Licensee: Tolede Edison Company Edison Plaza, 300 Madisoi. Avenue i Toledo, OH 43652 Facility Name: Davis-Besse 1  ;

Inspection At: Oak Harbor, Ohio ,

Inspection Conducted: April 1 through May 15, 1988 ,

Inspectors: P. M. Byron D. C. Kosloff P. J. Prescott

. T. E. Vande11

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Approved By: R. DeFayette, Chief '

Reactor Projects Section 3A Date Inspection Summary  ;

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Inspection on April 1, through May 15, 1988 (Report No. 50-346/88010(DRP)) .

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection by resident inspectors j of licensee action on previous inspection findings; operational safety; maintenance; surveillance; licensee event reports; licensee events; 4 bulletins; and fire protectio Results: No violations or deviations were identified.

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DETAILS 1. Persons Contacted Toledo Edison Company (TED)

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D. Shelton, Vice President Nuclear

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• L. Storz, Plant Manager

• N. Bonner, Assistant Plant Manager, Maintenance

• R. Flood Assistant Plant Manager, Operations

• E. Salowitz, General Superintendent Outage and Program Management L. Ramsett, Quality Assurance Director

• S. Jain, Independent Safety Engineering Director G. Grime, Industrial Security Director

• B. Beyer, Nuclear Projects Director

• T. Myers, Nuclear Licensing Director

• J. Scott-Wasilk, Nuclear Health & Safety v e -tst-P. Hildebrandt, Engineering General Direc J. Wood, Systems Engineering Director W. Johnson, Primary Systems Manager G. Gibbs, Performance Engineering Director V. Watson, Design Engineering Director R. Scott, Chemistry Superintendent

• G. Honma, Compliance Supervisor

• R. Schrauder, Nuclear Licensing Manager D. Erickson, Radiological Control Superintendent R. Donnellon, Mechanical Superintendent T. Haberland, Electrical Superintendent C. Daft, Technical Planning Superintendent D. Lightfoot, Facility Modification Superintendent L. Young, Licensing, Fire Protection J. Moyers, Quality Verification Manager .

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S. Zunk, Nuclear Group Ombudsman D. Harris, Manager Quality Systems

• J. Sturdavant, Licensing Principal C. Bramson, Document Systems Manager G. Skeel, Nuclear Security Operations Manager L. Wade Quality Control Manager L. Worley, Configuration Process Manager E. Benson, Nuclear Materials Manager

• J. Syrowski, Nuclear Training Director (Acting)

"A. Zarkesh, Independent Safety Engineering Manager

• J. Schultz, Quality Control Supervisor USNRC

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) "P. Byron, Senior Resident Inspector

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• Kosloff, Resident Inspector

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P. Prescott, Reactor Inspector

T, Vandell, Reactor Inspector

• Denotes those personnel attending the May 16, 1988 exit meetin __ - -. __ -.

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2. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701) i

' (Closed) Open Item (346/00019-RY): Auxilia;j Feedwater System (AFWS) Reliability Review. After the June 9, 1985, Loss of Feedwater Event, the licensee submitted a Course of Action (C0A)

report to the NRC. The C0A, which inc1'ided numerous commitments, defined tte licensee's program to correct identified weaknesses and deficienc es. Additional information on the C0A may be found in '

NUREG-1177, "Safety Evaluation Report Related To The Restart Of Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1, Following The Event Of June 9, 1985" (Restart SER). Appendix C.2.3 of the C0A included Revision 3 of the "Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Unit 1 Auxiliary Feedwater System Reliability Analysis Based On NUREG-0611," dated November 12, 198 Section 4.2 of the Restart SER reported the NRC staff's conclusion that the AFWS reliability had been improved by a factor of at least five and was sufficiently ,

reliable to permit restar The Restart SER also reported t'st the licensee had committed to completing and submitting an additional i AFWS reliability study within 90 days of restar Revision 0 of Impell Corporation Report No. 021040-1376, "Auxiliary Feedwater System Reliability Analysis," was co-pleted on March 29, 1987, and .

submitted to the NR This item is closed, (Closed) Open Item (346/00021-RY): Surveillance Test Review. The licensee's C0A report included a commitment to establish a System Review and Test Program (SRTP). One function of the SRTP was to review the scope of serveillance testing conducted on systems ,

important to safe operation to assure that the systems are properly 3 tested. The surveillance test review was inspected as part of the '

SRTP inspection and the inspectioi was documented in Inspection Reports 50-346/85036, 85039, 86009, 86015, 86022 and 8603 The test review as described in the C0A was completed and this item is closed. However, due to problems identified during the SRTP, the -

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licensee began a Technical Specification Verification Program (TSVP)

of greater scope. The TSVP is still in progress and is being tracked as open item 346/86030-01(ORP). (Closed) Open Item (346/00022-RY): Test Program. The licensee's C0A report included a commitment to establish a System Review and Test Program (SRTP). One function of the SRTP was to develop a test program for each system important to safe plant operation which would identify testing required to assure that the system would perform all functions important to safe operatio The test program included verification of operation after modifications and included tests in addition to normal surveillance testing- The test program was inspected as part of the NRC inspection of the SRTP and the inspection was documented in Inspection Reports 50/346-85036, 85039, 86009, 86015, 86022 and 8603 The test program as described in the .

C0A was completed and this item is close I i

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d. (Closed) Unresolved Item (346/85016-04(DRP)): Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) testing does not test each set of solenoid valves independently. The licensee issued Potential Condition Adverse to Quality Report (PCAQR) 86-0538 to document the described conditio The licensee replaced the original surveillance test with surveillance test procedure ST 5031.20, "Main Steam Isolation Valves Response Time Test," which initiates MSIV closure by individually tripp,ing Steam and Feedwater Line Rupture Control System (SFRCS) actuation channel The licensee verified this test during the restart effort in December 1986 by the performance of Test Procedure TP 851.11, "MSIV Response Time Test." The licensee issued Licensee Event Report (LER)86-042 to report this event in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73. The LER was closed in Inspection Report No. 50-346/87008(DRP) which also closed out this ite e. (Closed) Unresolved Item (346/86014-02(DRP)): Deficiencies in the storage of service water pump parts that had been removed for repair of the pump. The Assistant Plant Manager - Maintenance and the Mechanical Superintendent discussed their corrective actions with the inspectors. The corrective actions appeared to be appropriat Since this item was identified the inspectors have periodically observed jobsite storage for work in progress and have noted that storage has been satisfactory. This item is close f. (Closed) Open Item (346/86023-02(DRP)): Failure to follow Generic Guidance Memorandum, POL-21, "Vert.Tl Communications," in that operators were no repeating back verbal orders. Section 6.7. of Administrative Procedure AD 1839.00, "Conduct of Operations,"

Revision 17, dated January 19, 1988, requires that for all non-written directives the person receiving the directive shall repeat back the directive to the originator whenever eye contact is not possibl This action closes this item. However, the inspectors have observed marginal adherence to this requiremen .

The inspectors noted that procedural language may contribute to poor adherence in that the requirements are guidelines rather than mandator g. (0 pen) Open Item (346/86030-01(DRS)): Completion of P'hase II of the Technical Specification Verification Program (TSVP). The inspectors reviewed the licensee's progress toward completion of the TSVP. The licensee had originally intended to complete Phase II by December 198 However, the licensee has expanded the scope of the TSVP and the current six-month refueling outage has reduced rewurces available for completion of the TSVP. The licensee now 6nticipates that Phase 1: of the TSVP will be completed in early 198 (Closed) Unresolved Item (346/87008-02(DRP)): Heat damage of an electrical flex conduit (Sealtite) associated with the motor operator for Main Steam Valve MS 10 The inspectors reviewed the licensee's written evaluation of the damage and the conditions that l

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caused the damag A steam leak from a check valve near MS 107 raised the ambient temperature around MS 107, which caused the operating temperature of MS 107 and its associated electrical components to increase. The licensee's evaluation determined that the environmental qualification of MS 107 would not be adversely affected as long as the ambient temperature around the valve was returned to normal within ten years. The inspectors verified by observation that the steam leak and the Sealtite were repaired, and that the ambient temperature in the area was normal following the repairs. This item is close (0 pen) Open Item (346/88007-03(DRP)): Review of the licensee's response to recommendations related to air-operated valves (A0V).

The recommendations were included in licensee SRTP reports SW-RR-007 and SIA-NRR-019. Discussions with licensee personnel revealed that a task force has begun further evaluations of A0V's. On May 5, 1988, ADV service water valve SW 1429 failed to open on derrand. The licensee documented this failure in PCAQR 88-0340. The plant was in Mode 6 at the time of this failure and SW 1429 is not required to be operable in Mode 6. As documented in Inspection Report No. 50-346/88007, the licensee had concluded that improved control of maintenance on SW 1424, SW 1429, and SW 1434 would reduce failure of these valves. SW 1429 was recently referbished using the improved maintenance controls. The subsequent failure of SW 1429 indicates that an additional failure mechanism may exis The inspectors will review the licensee's corrective actions for PCAQR 88-0340 in conjunction with their further review of this open ite No violations or deviations were identified in this are . Operational Safety Verification (71707)

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The inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs '

and conducted discussions with control room operators during the months of April and May. The inspectors verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of affected component Tours of the reactor, auxiliary, turbine, water treatment and service water buildings were cor, ducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fare hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations l and to verify that ma'ntenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance. The inspectors by observation and direct i interview verified that the physical security plan was being implemented i in accordance with the station security pla l The inspectors observed plant housekeeping and cleanliness conditions and verified implementation of radiation protection control During the months of April and May, the inspectors walked down accessible portions i

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of the Safety Fea Mres Actuation, Service Water, Emergency Diesel ,

Generator, Essentt 1 120 Volt AC, Essential 4160 Volt AC, Essential 480 l Volt AC, Essential 125 Volt DC, Component Cooling Water and Spent Fuel l Pool Cooling Systems to verify operabilit These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility operations were in conformance with the requirements establist ed l under technical specifications, 10 CFR, and administrative procedure I l

Recently, a licensed operator tested positive during a random drug screening. However, confirmatory tests revealed that the individual had been taking prescription medication which caused the positive results in )

the initial tes The inspectors questioned the licensee and determined it was unaware that the individual was on medication. Further questioning revealed that the Health Conter was aware of the situation but its policy precluded giving this information to the license The inspectors reminded the licensee of previous concerns relating to the Employee Assistance Program (Inspection Reports No. 50-346/87008 and No. 50-346/87014). It appears that the licensee did not consider all of the ramifications of the inspectors' previous concern The inspectors were concerned that if operators were taking medication it could affect job performance and it was important that licensee management be aware to determine the fitness of the individuals to perform their dutie The inspectors discussed their concern with the license Licensee management reached an agreement with the Health Cent';r Provider to allow licensee ;aanagement to know the potential side effects of medication, The shift supervisor will have access to information relating to potential side effects of various medication This policy is in effect only for licensed operator The inspectors have reviewed the procedure governing the process and it appears to satisfy the requirements. The inspectors will periodically review the program to verify its effectivenes .

No violations or deviations were identified in this are . Monthly Maintenance Observation (62702) and (62703)

Station maintenance activities of systems and components important to safety and listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards and in conformance with technical specification The following items were considered during this review: the limiting l conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the -

work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were '

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performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and fire prevention controls were implemente Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to maintenance of equipment which is safety related or important to safety which may affect system performanc The following maintenance activities were observed / reviewed:

Cleaning, inspection and eddy-current testing of Component Cooling Water (CCW) Heat Exchangers (HXs). The licensee removed a significant amount of silt and corrosion products from the Service Water side ol all three CCW HX's. Upon completion of removal of loose material frcm all three HX's, the licensee began a more

' thorough removal of tightly adherent material from CCW HX 1- During this process the licensee discovered significant local corrosion of HX shell welds. The licensee documented this condition in PCAQR 88-0339 and notified the inspectors of the condition. The licensee is continuing to evaluate the condition and develop a corrective action plan. This is considered an open item (346/88010-01(DRS)) pending review of the licensee's evaluation and corrective actio Installation of new redundant safety grade AFWS flow indicatio *

Installation of new SFRCS cabinet Installation of new Post Accident Monitoring System instrumentation in the control roo Modification of Motor Driven Feedwater Pump discharge pipin Preventive maintenance on AFWS Pump Turbine 1-1. The inspectors observed balancing of the rotor and turbine wheel. The inspectors noted that the Maintenance Work Order (MWO) did not refer to a maintenance procedure, nor did it include any guidance for this work item other than a statement telling the technicians to balance the rotor and wheel assembly. The inspectors also noted that the technicians were recording data on a form which was not a part of the MW0. Discussions with the technicians and an engineer at the jobsite revealed that the technicians had been trained on the use of the IRD balancing equipment, were familiar with the IRD equipment ,

manual, and that the engineer was present to assist the technicians !

in determining the specific method to use in balancing the rotor and wheel assembly. A representative from Dresser, the turbine I

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manufacturer, was also presen However, no one present was aware of any procedure or other written instructions intended to control the specific task of balancing the AFWS pump turbine rotor and wheel assembly. Although licensee personnel at the jobsite seemed unsure of some details of the balancing process, they appeared to be performing the work in a cautious manner commensurate with the safety significance of the AFWS pump. However, it appeared that the scope of the work was being controlled by the workers rather than a work control document (MW0). The inspectors then discussed the work control process with Mr. Bonner, the Assistant Plant Manager -

Maintenance. Mr. Bonner informed the inspectors that the work in progress was part of a new effort to gather baseline data on rotating equipment. Mr. Bonner also stated that he would ascertain what written instructions were appropriate for the tas Mr. Bonner later informed the inspectors that the work had been stopped and the balancing data program was being reviewed to determine the best method for controlling the proces This will remain an open item (346/88010-02(DRP)) until the inspectors can review the licensee's method of controlling work related to the rotating machinery balancing progra Preventive maintenance of Class 1E electrical breake Installation of new electrical cubicle to allow electric power to be supplied to the Startup Feedwater Pum Removal of existing decay heat removal (DHR) and high pressure injection (HPI) flow indicators in the control roo Installation of new DHR and HPI flow indicators in the control room and in the auxiliary shutdown panel. After the indicators were installed, operations personnel noted that a fuse was repeatedly *

blowing in the circuit supplying power to the indicator The licensee documented this concern in PCAQR 88-0352. This is considered an open item (346/88010-03(DRP)) per. ding the inspectors review of the licensee's corrective actio Preventive maintenance of Emergency Diesel Generator 1- Folicwing completion of maintenance on the Service Water, CCW, and DHR Systems the inspectors verified that these systems had been ; turned to service properl No violations or deviations were identified in this are . Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)

The inspectors observed technical specifications required surveillance testing on the Reactor Protection System, ST 5091.01, "Source Range i

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Functional Test," and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that test instrumentation was calibrated, that limiting conditions for operation were met, that removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished, that test results conformed with technical specifications and procedure requirements were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personne The inspectors also witnessed portions of the following test activities:

ST 5031.01, "Safety Features Actuation System Monthly Test" ST 5075.01, "Service Water System Monthly Test" ST 5092.02, "Core Alteration Prerequisites and Periodic Checks" No violations or deviations were identified in this are . Licensee Event Reports Followup (92700) Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with technical specification { Closed) LER 83-031: Chlorine Detectors Not Adequately Protected f rom Tornado-0 riven Missiles. The licensee used a railroad tank car to store liquid chlorine for its chlorination system. Chlorine detectors AE 4863 A and B were located near the tank car to protect the control room atmosphere if the tank car rupture Certain .

tornado-driven missiles could disable the chlorine detectors. As short term corrective action, the licensee changed AD 1827.00,

"Tornado Procedure," to require the operators to isolate the control room atmosphere from the outside air if a Tornado Warning was declared. As long term corrective action, the licensee installed a sodium hypochlorite solution chlorination system and permanently removed the tank car (Closed) LER 83-038: Trip Alarm received on Steam and Feedwater Line Rupture Control System (SFRCS) Logic Channel 3 causing half trip of Actuation Channel 1. Revision 1 to this LER was also reviewed. The licensee determined that the corrective action for this event was to provide forced ventilation to the SFRCS cabinets. The inspectors observed the operation of the forced ventilation system that the licensee installed. The reactor is currently defueled and the SFRCS cabinets involved in this event have been remove New SFRCS cabinets will be installed prior to refuelin . .

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(Closed) LER 86-015: Seismic Qualification, Domestic Water Lines in Battery Rooms A and B. Domestic water lines above Class 1E electrical equipment were not seismically qualified. The inspectors verified by observation that the domestic water lines have been remove (Closed) LER 88-002: Class 1E Battery Charger Placed in Service after Maintenance without All Seismic Qualification Requirements Me The following LER's were reviewed during the inspection period but could not be closed:

(0 pen) LER 88-007: Air Operated Valve Accumulator Leakage and Subsequent Decay Heat Removal System Inoperabilit {0 pen) LER 88-008: Nuclear Safety Related Equipment Potentially Impacted by Non-Seismic Equipmen {0 pen) LER 88-009: Incorrect Termination of a Continuous Fire Watc (0 pen) LER 88-010: Missed Fire Watch due to Unidentified Inoperable fire Detectio No violations or deviations were identified in this are . Bulletins (92703)

For the Bulletin listed below, the inspectors verified that the written response was within the time period stated in the bulletin, that the written response included the information required to be reported, that the written response included adequate corrective action commitments based on information presented in the bulletin and the licensee's ,

response, that licensee management forwarded copies of the written response to the appropriate onsite management representatives, that information discussed in the licensee's written response was accurate, and that corrective action taken by the licensee was as described in the written respons (0 pen) 85-03: The licensee identified the selected safety-related valves and their associated maximum differential pressures as reo.uested by Action Item e. of Bulletin 85-03, "Motor-Operated Valve Common Mode Failures During Plant Transients Oue to Improper Switch Settings." The licensee's program to assure valve operability was defined in its letters to the ,

NRC dated May 15, 1986, and February 25 and April 22, 1987. The letters j indicated the need for additional information which was contained in a l Region III letter dated August 11, 198 l

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Review of the licensee's September 18, 1987 response to this request for additional information indicates that the licensee's selection of the applicable safety-related valves to be addressed and the valves' maximur.

i differential pressures met the requirements of the bulletin and that the program to assure valve operability requested by Action Item e. of the bulletin is now acceptabl The results of the inspections to verify proper implementation of this program and the review of the final response required by Action Item of the bulletin will be addressed in additional inspection report No violations or deviations were identified in this are . Onsite Followup of Events (62702), (82201), (82203), (82206) and (93702)

During the inspection period the licensee experienced several events, some of which required prompt notification of the NRC purs'uant to 10 CFR 50.72. The inspectors pursued the events onsite with licensee personne In each case, the inspectors verified that the notification was correct and timely, that the licensee was taking prompt and appropriate actions, that equipment functioned properly, if required, and that activities were conducted within regulatory requirements. The specific events are as follows:

• April 6,1988: At 6:25 a.m. EDT, the licensee declared an Unusual'

Event due to the transportation off site of an injured potentially radiologically contaminated ma The individual was transported to Magruder Hospital by the Carroll Township EMS in his protective clothing. It was determined at the hospital that neither the individual nor his clothing were contaminate The Unusual Event was terminated at 7:14 a.m. Two communication weaknesses were identified during this event. The -

computerized automatic notification system (CANS) failed to operate and the white ringdown phone did not operate properl The CANS is used to notify key site personnel of abnormal plant l conditions or events. The licensee determined that the source of the problem was an error in data entry which has been correcte The whit -ingdown phone is a dedicated phone system connected to the Luct 'y, Ottawa County and State of Ohio emergency response  !

groups 'te and initiate required state and local respons .

The sti - 31 agencies were notified by commercial telephone line .ensee is investigating this problem. The inspectors will foll ..ie licensee's actions in determining the cause of the failure of the ringdown phon l l

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A local citizen contacted the Resident Office and discussed several

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concerns related to the event. The citizen had been informed that neither the Carroll Township EMS nor Magruder Hospital had been notified that the victim was potentially contaminate The inspectors listened to the recorded conversations of the Ottawa County Sheriff's dispatcher relating to the incident. Both organizations were notified that the victim was contaminate ,

I The licensee reviewed the event and identified other weaknesses which were less important than the two previously identified weaknesses. The licensee's report of its review of the event included proposed corrective actions for the identified weaknesse May 6, 1988: The licensee determined that one containment air

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cooler could not remove heat from the containment at the rate stated in the USAR. The licensee documented this condition in PCAQR 88-0345 and notified the NRC via the EN The licensee later determined that the ENS report was not require During the inspection period, the licensee also identified potential degradation in the heat transfer rate of the CCW HX. The licensee documented this condition in PCAQR 88-0245. The licensee's analysis of the data gathered in response to PCAQR 88-0245 indicated that the CCW HX's were capable of performing their safety function. The licensee discovered both cases of degraded performance during performance testing of the equipment. This testing verifies the essential performance attribute of coolers; such testing is not required by the technical specification The inspectors discussed the heat exchanger and cooler performance testing program with licensee personne The discussion revealed that it is difficult for the licensee to develop a credible program because of the dearth of information and experience within the industry, lack of installed instrumentation, and low differential temperatures across the H The inspectors will continue to follow the licensee's effort ,

May 9, 1988: An inadvertent Level 1 actuation of the Safety Features Actuation System (SFAS) occurred when a used radioactive filter was placed near SFAS radiation monitors for Channels 1 and l No violations or deviations were identified in this are '

9. Fire Protection (64704)

The licensee is having difficulty managing its corrective actions for the problems associated with its fire protection program from both the ;

engineering and implementation aspect The increased number of fire '

protection LER's which have been issued recently is indicative of thi i However, there are indicators that the licensee may be beginning to l effectively deal with the problem First, there is a higher level of management involvement. The Engineering General Director has been made l

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& a personally responsible for the success of the program. In addition, the

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licensee restructured the fire protection group and named a contractor as-Fire Protection Compliance Manager. The licensee also plans to complete the program on a room-by-room basis rather than on a system-by-system basis. The Plant Manager made this suggestion in order to gain control of the program within the plan The licensee has developed tools which should reduce the number of j problems associated with implementation. The inspectors have met with 1 the licensee to discuss the new programmatic approach and review some !

of the new tools. It appeared that some of the tools developed by the l licensee failed to incorporate the needs of all the users and suffered from a limited view of the problem. The licensee issued a procedure to assist the shif t supervisor in determining location of fire barriers and detectors by room numbe This procedure is to be used to dispatch fire watches. However, security officers who perform fire watch duties utilize door numbers rather than room numbers as a reference. The licensee had a separate procedure which listed the applicable door number with a specific fire barrie The inspectors suggested to the licensee that all the information be contained in one procedur The inspectors l will continue to follow these issues to evaluate the effectiveness of the '

most recent change .

No violations or deviations were identified in this are . Open Items Open items are matters which ve been discussed with the licensee, which will Da reviewed further by tia inspectors, and which involve some action

, , , on the part of NRC or licensee or bot Open items disclosed during the inspection are discussed in Paragraph "

. Exit Interview (30703) ,

The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)

throughout the month and at the conclusion of the inspection and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities. The licensee acknowledged the findings. After discussions with the licensee, the inspectors have determined there is no proprietary data contained in this inspection repor