IR 05000346/1988040
| ML20245J278 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 11/18/1988 |
| From: | Patterson J, Ploski T, Snell W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20245J275 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-346-88-40, NUDOCS 8903070015 | |
| Download: ML20245J278 (2) | |
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O.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COM4ISSION.
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' REGION III y
'. -i Report No. 50-346/88040(DRSS)
3 Docket No; 50-346
. License Nc..NPF-3
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Licenne: ' Toledo Edison Company
- Edison Plaza 300 Madison-Avenue
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Toledo, OH 43652 Facility Name:
Davis-Besw Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1 Inspection At:. Davis-Besse Site, Oak Harbor, OH Inspection Conducted:
November 1-3, 1988 Y$
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Inspectors:
'.T. Ploski Date'
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..Patterson Date
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Approved By:
..W. Snell, Chief ti/es/as
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- Emergency Preparedness Section Date
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Inspection Summary
' Inspection on November 1-3, 1988 (Report No. 50-346/88040(DRSS)
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~ Areas Inspected:
Routine, announced inspection of the 1988 emergency
. preparedness exercise (IP 82301), involving the observations of four NRC
. inspectors on most of the facilities, equipment, and personnel involved in the exercise.
Re'sults:
No violations, deviations or deficiencies were identified.
The overall performance of the licensee's emergency responders was good, although some. improvement. items;have been suggested..This was the third group of L
emergency responders who have successfully demonstrated their capabilities L
.over~the last three~ exercises. -One Open Item was identified (Section 6)
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which requires the licensee to re-evaluate the wording and interpretation of
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an Emergency Action Level relevant to this exercise scenario.
Field monitoring teams, the post-accident sampling team, the corporate office's emergency support organization, and the near-site Radiological Testing Laboratory were activated but were not observed during this exercise.
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surveys and further core dr. mage assessments were also discussed. _
The urgency of conducting extensive onsite surveys and post-accident lsamplingwasto'beweighedagainsttheneedtoalsoensureemergency
' workers isafety from' risks associated with the incompletely assessed
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earthquake damage.
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The group identified the,need to arrange for wholebody counts for
'.onsite emergency responders and for' members;of the public who had
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remained sheltered within the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ), due'to'
l the possible road damage pcstulated by the scenario.: They realized-
'that such efforts proposed for the offsite populace would have to be
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coordinated with offsite ' officials and the licensee's medical'
consultants.
The need to interact with Federal agencies,; activated j
.in accordance with the Federal Radiological Emergency Response o
Plan,'was very. generally discussed with respect to defining and analyzing the offsite' radiological impact of the simulated release.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's-program was acceptable.
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6.
Exercise Scenario and Controller Actions The' proposed exercise objectives and complete scenario manuals were submitted in accordance with the established schedule. A deletion of medica 1' objectives was later approved by Region III staff,.as medical response' capabilities were~ demonstrated in late October 1988
'and were. evaluated by FEMA Region V staff.
The scenario was creative and challenging.
A " response cell" of controllers was utilizedLto simulate callers from the NRC as well as various media' and' concerned citizens.
Calls from the simulatec-NRC' emergency responders were'used to gather information and to task
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the licensee's responders with preparing for an NRC Site Team's arrival.
These calls ~did not prompt players to.take actions to mitigate the accident-situation. The response cell" also simulated sources of relevant technical information, such as the National Earthquake Information Center and the National Weather Service.
While no significant scenario flaws were identified during the NRC's technical review of the scenario, one significant problem became apparent during the exercise.
The~1icensee's scenario development team had postulated that the Emergency Director (ED) would declare a Site Area Emergency by 4:25 a.m. due to an Anticipated Transient Without a Scram-(ATWS) condition. However, as indicated in Section 5.c of this report, the ED and key aides clearly reviewed the relevant EAL and concurred that all its criteria were not satisfied by current plant conditions.
Controllers then issued a contingency message requiring the' Site Area Emergency declaration, an unpopular action that was necessary to keep the exercise on the intended path.
In order to resolve the obvious
' differing interpretations of EAL No. 3.C.3, the licensee must" w
re-evaluate this EAL, and the associated training, versus current regulatory guidance to better ensure that ATWS conditions will be correctly classified. This is an Open Item.
(50-346/88040-01)
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