IR 05000348/1992031

Insp Repts 50-348/92-31 & 50-364/94-31 on 921109-1208.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Operations,Maint,Surveillance,Cold Weather Preparations, Training for Emergency Preparedness & Previous Findings

ML20126D972
Person / Time
Site:	Farley
Issue date:	12/15/1992
From:	Cantrell F, Maxwell G, Morgan M, Wright R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20126D966	List: IR 05000348/1992031 ML20126D963
References
50-348-92-31, 50-364-92-31, NUDOCS 9212280247
Download: ML20126D972 (11)

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. O 4, UNITED ST ATES

y .. fg NUCLE AR REGULATOnY COMMisslON g g REGION 11

, t 101 M ARIE T T A ST R E E T. o, [ AT L ANT A. GE ORGI A 30323

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Report Nos.: 50-348/92 31 and 50-364/92-31 Licensee: Southern Nuclear Operating Company, In P.O. Box 1295 Birmingham, AL 35201-1295 Docket Nos.: 50-348 and 50-364 License Nos.: NPF-2 and NPF-8 Facility name: Farley 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted: November 9 - December 8, 199 Inspectors: Isp4 tJ 4M: in/<5-/9m George F. MaxweTll Sr. Resident Inspector Date Signed (k'M ' h . h I M 11/2 12 //5/9 E Michael J. Morgan,' Resident inspector 'Date Signed Y 'R yf]& Y- I2-l/Sl9 Robert W. Wright, Ril Farly Project I) ate Signed Engineer (November 30- ecember 4, 1992)

Approved by: 'AtI Floy'd~ S. Cantrell, Ch'ipf /

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Dats Signed Reactor Projects Section IB Division of Reactor Projects

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SUMMARY Scope:

This routine, resident inspection involved on-site inspection of operations, maintenance, surveillance, cold weather preparations, training for emergency preparedness, and action on previous insaection findings. Deep backshifts were performed November 21, 29 and Decem)er 4, 199 Results:

Major items of Unit I refueling outage number 11 were completed November 29, paragraph 3.a-. On November 29, one of two offsite sources of power was lost to the "lA" startup transformer due to a fault on a ring bus breaker, paragraph On November 21, the "lA" residual heat removal (RHR) pump suction relief lifted, paragraph 3.c. During the week of November 30, the inspectors conducted a review of licensee's cold weather preparations, paragraph 6. On December 1,-the inspectors observed portions of an "in-house"

, emergency preparedness training exercise, paragraph No deviations or 'tiolations were identifie Results of this inspection indicate that actions by management, operations, maintenance and other site personnel were adequat gR12280247 921215 g ADOCK 0500034g PDR

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REPORT DETAILS i  !

i Per:ons Contacted Licensee Employees

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W. Bayne, Supervisor, Safety Audit and Engineering Review

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R. Coleman, Modification Manager L. Enfinger, Administrative Manager S. Fulmer, Superintendent, Operations Support

• R. Hill, General Manager - Farley Nuclear Plant M. Mitchell, Superintendent, Health Physics ano Radwaste

• C, Nesbitt, Operations Manager

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• J. Osterholtz, Technical Manager

• L. Stinson, Assistant General Manager - Plant Operations

• J. Thomas, Maintenance Manager L. Williams. Training Manager l B. Yance, Systems Performance Manager

Other licensee employees contacted included, technicians, operations personnel, security, maintenance, I&C and office personne * Attended exit interview

F. S. Cantrell, Section Chief, DRP, IB was on site December 7-9, 1992, i to review inspection activities, meet with resident inspector, and attend the exit intervie During the week of November 30 - December 4, the Farley Region 11 Project Engineer, R.W. Wright, assisted the site resident inspector Acronyms and initializations used throughout this report are listed in the last paragraph.

l Plant Status l

l Unit 1 Status

Unit I was in a refueling outage at the beginning of the inspection period. The reactor was returned to power (critical)

November 29 at 1:25 p.m., achieved Mode 1 operation November 30 and placed on the grid December 2 at 8:46 p.m..

l Unit 2-Status

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Unit 2 operated at approximately 100 percent power for most of the reporting period, NRC/ Licensee Meetings and Inspections During the week of November 30, Region 11 Radiological Effluents l and Chemistry personnel conducted inspections of radiation and i environmental monitoring, radioactive waste processing,  !

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. transportation of radiological material and documentation work

! practices. Results of the inspection are to be documented in l Inspection Report 50-348,364/92-3 l On November 17 U.S. Department of the Interior personnel, from the Boise, Idaho office met with the resident inspectors and  ;

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licensee personnel in order to update interagency emergency preparedness informatio During the week of November 16, Region 11 Test Programs personnel

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conducted a follow-up ins)ection of motor operated valves. Results of the inspection are to se documented in Inspection Report 50-i 348,364/92-30.

During the week of November 16, Region 11 Plant Systems personnel

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conducted an inspection of FNP's fire protection system and

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program. Results of the inspection are to be documented in Inspection Report 50 348,364/92 29.

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! Operational Safety Verification and Unit 1 Refueling /0utage Activities i

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(71707 and 60710)

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The inspectors conducted routine plant tours to verify licensee l requirements and commitments were being implemented. The inspection tours included review of site documentation, interviews with plant

personnel and an on going evaluation of licensee self-assessment.

' Scheduled Refueling Outage Activities and Return To Power - Unit 1 On September 26, 1992, Unit I was shutdown to begin it's eleventh

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scheduled refueling outage. Major items of the outage were completed and the reactor was returned to power (critical)

November 29 at-1:25 p.m.. The unit achieved Mode 1 operation November 30 and was placed on the grid December Throughout the

outage the inspectors observed in-process work activities associated with the following:

o Steam generator (S/G) pressure pulse cleaning on all S/Gs

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o S/G "lA" "J" nozzle inspection o 100 percent eddy current testing on all S/Gs o 4160V bus cleaning on the "lD", "lE", "lH" and "1J" busses

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o Laser weld sleeving on all S/Gs o M0V actuator refurbishments and functional testing Reactor coolant pump "lC" rotor refurbishment by the vendor

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o o Reactor vessel flange repair

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j o LP turbine, generator and exciter inspections

o Overhaul of the "lB" motor driven auxiliary feedwater (AFW)

pump

} o inservice inspection hydrostatic testing of the "B" train t i

residual heat removal (RHR), AFW suctions and RCS letdown 4 systems o S/G tube pulls and repair demonstrations

The inspectors observed various stages of the startup which was conducted in accordance with FNP-1-U0P-1.2, Rev. 40, Startup of-i Unit from Hot Standby To Minimum Load. During startup operations on December 2, the inspectors noted that-the unit experienced two turbine trips. The first, at approximately 2:41 a.m., was-a manually actuated turbino trip upon recognition that condenser pressure had degraded because of insufficient steam pressure to '

the steam jet air ejectors. The second, at approximately 4:38 a.m., occurred when the "lB" unit auxiliary transformer differential relay tri ape The main generator was not on line during either of the aaove turbine startup trip The inspectors determined that operator actions during those events were conducted in accordance with site procedural requirement Partial loss of Offsite Power While In Hot Standby - Unit 1 On November 29, at about 12:01 a.m., one of two offsite sources of power was lost to the "lA" startup transformer. At 1:00 a.m. the .

inspectors arrived at the site and observed the on-going activities associated with the loss of power. As a result they determined that power was lost due to a fault on the internal gas operated breaker, "904", located on the supply side of the-transformer. This fault caused the breaker and other internal-breakers to automatically open for both internal fault and ring bus number one protection. These arotective interlock actions,.in .

turn, isolated the number one 230 (V offsite bus from the onsite loads. This resulted in a loss of power to nonvital 4.16 kV buses

"1A" and "lD" and a temporary loss of power-to vital 4.16 kV bus

"lF". The "l-2A" diesel generator (D/G) automatically started and aligned to provide power to the "A" train emergency safety

features (ESF) loads supplied from bus "lF". Loads were satisfactorily sequenced on the bus. . Power to the "B" train ESF loads.was unaffecte Loss of power to nonvital bus "lA" resulted in one-of three

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running reactor coolant pumps (RCP), the "lA" RCP, and_-the "1A" -

condensate pump to trip. ._The other RCPs continued to run throughout the event and condensate pump "lC" was manually started. The associated 4.16 kV circuit breakers for the "lA" RCP and the ".1A" condensate pump, failed to open on the undervoltage

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j 4 (UV) condition. Subsequent investigation revealed that the i breaker's UV relay failed to operate as designed because of disk j sticking within the UV rela The sticking relay (contacts) were cleaned, the relay was then i tested and placed back into service. The sticking relay would not

have impacted the ability of the plant emergency safety shutdown j equipment to perform their safety related functions, i

i Unit I was-stable and remained in a hot standby, Mode 3, condition j throughout the event. Unit 2 remained operating at about 99 _

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i percent power and was unaffected by this even At about 4:24 a.m., the licensee electrically isolated the faulted .

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supply breaker, "904" and reenergized startup transformer "lA" and i nonvital buses "1A" and "1D". At 4:47 a.m., the licensee 4 paralleled the "1-2A" D/G with startup transformer "lA", the "l-

! 2A" D/G was secured after power was reestablished through the i startup transformer.

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The inspectors assessed the above event and concluded that the plant was not placed in an unsafe condition. FNP has written LER 92-007 to document circumstances, conditions, and corrective i actions related to the event.

Residual Heat Removal Pump "lA" Relief Valve Lifting While in

' Mode 5 - Unit 1 On November 21 at 6:16 a.m., the "lA" residual heat-removal (RHR)

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pump suction relief lifted. The inspectors arrived at the site -

! about 7 a.m. and observed the in-process evaluations which had already started. The initial information revealed that prior to

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the event, RCS pressure was at about 400 psig with control on'a i pressurizer (PZR) bubble and RCS temperature was being maintained l at 182 degrees F. The "lB" and "lC" RCPs were running, the "lA"

. RCP was secured and the. licensee was preparing to swap the running

{ RCPs. RHR pump lA" was running and RHR pum) "lB" was tagged out

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of_ service for maintenance. At 6:16 a.m., tie "1C" RCP was L secured for an RTD-inspection and immediately after the pump-was

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secured, a pressure spike close to 495 psig was observed. The

! "lA" RHR pump suction relief valve _ lifted since the pressure l setpoint is approximately_450 psig. PZR level dropped from about

31-percent to O percent in about 3 minutes. Correspondingly, the i PZR relief tank (PRT) level rose from approximately 7 percent to

about 86 percent.

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The event data and interviews.with plant operators revealed that the control _ room operators performed immediate actions'to restore PZR level by increasing charging flow to- the- RCS. The RHR relief valve reseated and-PZR level rose from 0 to approximately 9 percent in about 2-minutes. The operators manually reenergized i

PZR heaters after PZR level was returned to normal. - Approximately -

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1500 gallons of water was relieved from the RCS to the PRT. RCS forced cooling was maintained throughout the event by the "lB" RCP, RCS temperature rose to about 190 degrees and RCS pressure dropped to approximately 330 psig. The reactor core was covered

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throughout the event and RCS temperature and pressure were j restored to approximately 182 degrees F and 365 psig at about

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A task force consisting of Bechtel, Westinghouse, and SNC

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corporate and site personnel was immediately formed, to assess cause and effects of the even .

The inspectors evaluated the above events and concluded that the i

plant was not placed in an unsafe condition. The licensee has

drafted a special report as required by Technical Specification 3.4.10.3, to document the circumstances, conditions, and corrective actions related to the event. This special report is

to be designated 92-00 No deviations or violations were identified in this area. The results of inspections in the operations area indicate that operations grsonnel conducted assigned activities in accordance with applicable procedure . Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)

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The inspectors reviewed various licensee preventative and corrective

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maintenance activities, to determine conformance with facility procedures, work requests and NRC regulatory requirements.

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Portions of the following maintenance activities were observed:

o MWR-223466; VCT purge flow indication pegged high - investigate and repair

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Inspectors observed trouble-shooting efforts associated with the i

gauge. The indication was pegged high and the associated alarm remained actuated. The transmitter was found to have a higher

' than expected output signal. The signal was adjusted and the circuitry was tested. Inspectors noted that work performed was satisfactory and in accordance with directions contained in the MWR.

I o MWR-268558; AFW flow indication to the "10" S/G reading high -

repair Inspectors noted that the indication was at about 180 gpm with no flow on the system. The associated computer point reading indicated 184.5 gpm. The transmitter, FT-3229C, required ventin The transmitter was filled and vented and testing was performed to verify proper indication prior to ? lacing the indication back in service. Inspectors noted that wor ( performed was satisfactory and in accordance with directions contained in the MWR and the

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service, inspectors noted that work performed was satisfactory and in accordance with directions contained in the MWR and the associated work package, j o MWR-269821; Fire main leak inside the service water (SW) intake structure Problems with the fire main were not readily detectabl Inspectors observed craft personnel excavating the area for investigation and possible repair. Two leaking joints were found near a 45 degree elbow fixtur The joints were cleaned, repaired by retightening and the SW area backfilled with grading material. Inspectors noted that work c performed was satisfactory and in accordance with the directions contained in the MWR and associated work package. In discussion with licensee personnel the-inspectors were informed that SNC corporate office has been directed to form a task force to review the current problem with underground leaks and develope a program to reduce the likehood of these leaks from occurrin o MWR 266667; Thermostat contact not opening for freeze protection system componen .

The inspectors observed the trouble shooting, the replacement,

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testing and return to service of the freeze protection thermostat for the gaseous chlorination syste .

No deviations or violations were identified in this area. The results of inspections in the maintenance area indicate that both operations and maintenance personnel conducted. assigned activities in accordance with applicable procedure . Monthly Surveillance Obser_vation (61726)

Inspectors witnessed surveillance test activities performed on safety related systems and components, in order to verify that such activities were performed in accordance with facility procedures and NRC regulatory- *

and licensee technical specification requirement '

The following surveillance activities were observed:

o- 1-STP-1.0; Operations Daily / Shift Surveillance _ Requirements Modes 2-STP-1.0; 1, 2,-3, and 4 Inspectors ~ routinely observed unit operators while parameters were monitored, documented and evaluated.-

o 1-STP 226.lB ; "BlG" Sequencer Operability Test Inspectors observed I&C~ technician performance for portions of _the

' test and responses to Agastat performanc . _ _ , _ - _ . _ _ ~ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ . - _ . . _ . . , _ _ , _

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. o 1-STP-109.1; Power Range Neutron Flux Channel Calibration With

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Plant Computer Operable - Unit 1

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The inspectors evaluated the completion of STP 109.1 on December 7, which was conducted while at approximately 88 percent powe l o 1-STP-27.1; AC Source Vertfication - Unit 1 The inspectors observed the AC power source electrical configuration and found it to be consistent with the alignment documented by the plant operators.

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o 0 STP-60.3; EOF /TSC/0SC Intercom System Annual Operability i Test I The inspectors verified that the plant intercom system testing was conducted in accordance with STP-60.3. This test was completed on December The inspectors noted that the site annual emergency preparedness exercise is scheduled to be held on December 9, 199 Therefore, completion of STP-60.3 provides assurance that the intercom system should function as expected during the emergency exercis No deviations or violations were identified in this area. The results of i inspections in this area indicate that personnel conducted assigned

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activities in accordance with applicable procedure . Cold Weather Preparations (71714)

The inspectors conducted a review of licensee's cold weather preparations to ascertain if effective measures were implemented for protection of safety related systems from extreme cold weather.-

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Procedures 1/2-EMP-1383.01, Rev. 2, Freeze Protection Inspections were completed by WA-380442 for Unit 1 and by WA-380443 for Unit 2 on December 1. These procedures require inspections and tests to 4 demonstrate operability of the freeze protection heat tracing, heaters

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and insulation installed to protect the system from freezing during severe cold weathe The licensee identified some discrepancies during their inspections and work orders were issued to correct the discrepancies. The inspectors verified that the maintenance work orders for these items were either completed or scheduled for work to assure the functional acceptability of the equipmen The inspectors witnessed the work-associated with the thermostat replacement (NIR37S041-N) per MWR 266713 and the subsequent verification testing to assure the thermostat was functional, that 120 VAC was present and that all circuitry power sensing pilot lights were operabl _ - - - - -

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1.icensee actions indicate that they have an adequate arogram in place which can mitigate plant systems and components from acing damaged during severe cold weather, Training for Emergency Preparedness (82206)

On December 1, the inspectors observed portions of an FNP " full-scale" training exercise. This exercise was conducted as part of training for one of the designated emergency preparedness response groups. The plant general manager-operations, served as the emergency director during the exercise and all designated personnel responded appropriately and expeditiously to the emergency alarms and the overall drill scenari . Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92702)

(Closed) NOV 50-364/92-20-01, Removal of the EOF and TSC ENNs without establishment of backup emergency telecommunication The inspectors evaluated SNC response dated November 30, 1992, for Report 348,364/92-20. The inspectors noted that the related FNP emergency preparedness procedures have been revised to clarify that commercial telephones are to be used as the alternative for the ENN during initial notifications. Therefore, this item is close (Closed) NCV 50-348/92 24-01, Individual contaminated due to inadequate draining and tagging of system boundary valve The inspectors evaluated the corrective action and actions to prevent recurrence for this item. The inspectors noted that the shift foreman and shift supervisor were " coached" concerning their responsibilities to assure adequate isolation of systems prior to releasing wor Actions have been taken to revise the administrative procedure for safety clearance and tagging, AP-14 Revision 12, to address any weakness in the development and execution of tagging order Additional formal training is being scheduled for plant personnel who prepare tagging orders. Operations personnel responsible for reviewing and authorizing tagging orders are scheduled to be reinstructed on their responsibilitie The actions which have been taken by FNP as it relates to more definitive actions to be taken and establishment of a resonable date for completion of these actions was evaluated by the inspectors and was found to be acceptable. . Therefore, this non-cited violation as described in the cover letter for Report 50-348,364/92-24 from Region 11 dated October 28, 1992, does not require additional response from SN These additional steps taken by your staff have been found to be satisfactory. This NCV is close ;

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, Exit Interview I The inspection scope and findings were summarized during management interviews throughout the report period, and on December 8, with the plant manager and selected members of his staff. The inspection 1 findings were discussed in detail. The licensee acknowledged the inspection findings and did not identify as proprietary any material i

reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection. 1he licensee was

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informed that the items discussed in paragraph 8 were close . Acronyms and Abbreviations 4 AFW - Auxiliary feedwater

! ALARA - "As low As Reasonably Achievable" I A0P - Abnormal Operating Procedure i AP -

Administrative Procedure ,

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j APC0 - Alabama Power Company

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BTRS - Boron Thermal Regeneration System i CFR - Code of Federal Regulations CVCS - Chemical and Volume Control System CCW - Component Cooling Water CRDM -

Control Rod Drive Mechan CS -

Containment Spray System

DDFP - Diesel Driven Fire Pump D/G - Emergency Diesel Snorator DRP - Division of Re". t Per N+ s DPM - Disintegration a '-

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Emergency Cont t .-  ;,cedure

EIP - Emergency Pla . a ., snting Procedure

ENN - Emergency Not.ru . on Network '

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Emergency Operatio.6 Facility EP -

Emergency Preparedness

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EPA - Environmental Protection Agency EQ -

Environmental Qualifications

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ESF - Engineered Safety Features FNP - Farley Nuclear Plant FSP + Fire Surveillance Procedure

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GPM - Gallons Per Minute HHSI - High Head Safety Injection .

HSB - Hot Standby l I&C -

Instrumentation and Controls IN -

Information Notice ISI - Inservice Inspection IST -

Inservice Test

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LC0 - Limiting Condition for Operation i'

LHS1 - Low Head Safety injection LLRT -

Local Leak Rate Testing LER -

Licensee Event Report ,

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MDFP - Motor Driven Fire Pump i MOV -

Motor-Operated Valve ,

M0 VATS- Motor-0perated Valve Actuation Testing i MWR -

Maintenance Work Request i

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10 l NCR - Nonconformance Report NRR - NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation NSSS - Nuclear Steam Supply System 0ATC - Operator at the Controls OSHA - Occupational Safety and Health Administration OTDT - Over-temperature Differential Temperature PAP - Primary Access Point PCCV - Positive Closing Check Valve PCN - Plant Change Notice ,

PCR - Plant Change Request l PMD - Plant Modifications Department )

PORV - Power Operated Relief Valve PPB - Parts Per Billion PRT -

Pressurizer Relief Tank PSID - Pressure per Square Inch Differential PVC - Polyvinyl Chloride PZR -

Pressurizer RCP - Reactor Coolant Pump RCS - Reactor Coolant System RHR -

Residual Heat Removal RPC- -

Rotating Pancake Coil RTD - Resistance Temperature Detector RWST - Refueling Water Storage Tank S/G -

Steam Generator SI - Safety injection SAER -

Safety Audit and Engineering Review SCS - Southern Company Services SFI - Shift Foreman - Inspecting SF0 - Shift Foreman - Operating SGFP -

Steam Generator feedwater Pump l S0 -

Systems Operator SFP -

Spent Fuel Pool S0P - Standard Operation Procedure SP -

Systems Performance Group SPDS - Safety Parameter Display System SS -

Shift Supervisor

. SSPS - Solid State Protection System l STAR -

"Stop, Think, Act, Review" i STP -

Surveillance Test Procedure I SWS - Service Water System TS -

Technical Specification

TSC -

Technical Support Center VCT -

Volume Control Tank-VDC - Voltage Direct Current WA -

Work Authorization l

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