IR 05000348/1992029

Insp Repts 50-348/92-29 & 50-364/92-29 on 921116-20.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Fire Protection & Prevention Programs

ML20125E368
Person / Time
Site:	Farley
Issue date:	12/02/1992
From:	Branch M, Wiseman G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20125E366	List: IR 05000348/1992029 ML20125E361
References
50-348-92-29, 50-364-92-29, NUDOCS 9212170014
Download: ML20125E368 (7)

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6# 0 UNITED STATES j

(og NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[ o REGION 11 5 .$

• 101 MARIETTA STRE ET, C k ATLANTA, GEORGt A 30323 g...../ NOV - 4 1992 Report No.:

50-348/92-29 and 50-364/92-29 Licensee: Southern Nuclear Operating Company, In North 18th Street Birmingham, AL 35291-0400 Docket No.: 50-348 and 50-364 Facility Name: Farley 1 and 2 License No.: NPF-2 and NPF-8 Inspection Conducted: November 16-20, 1992 Inspector:

G. Wiseman lhuim m /z/z/97 Dat6 S'igned

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Approved by:__ -

l bnNDh /2./1./ 9 Morris Branch Acting, Chief Test Program Section Dat~e Signed-Engineering Branch Division of Reactor Safety 5 SUMMARY Scope:

This routine, announced inspection was conducted in the area of implementation of the fire protection / prevention progra Results:

In the areas inspected, violations or deviations were not identifie The following strengths and weaknesses were identifie Strengths:

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Compliance with the plant fire prevention procedures regarding control of ignition sources and combustible materials during plant maintenance during activities the past year. has resulted in a-low number of fires

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S The strengt use of an auxiliary fire brigade is considered a program Weakness:

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The fire brigade's reluctance to use protective ciothing and breathing apparatus for personal protection during drills is an area that needs improvement. This ite: was identified by the licencee's assessments and critique of onsite drill DR 921104 ADOCK 0500034g PDR

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REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

• Crawford, Fire Protection Worker

• Cumber, Auditor, Safety Audit and Engineering Revicw (SAER) i

• J. Hayes, Fire Marshall

• R. Henley, Plant Instructor

• R. Hill, General Manager

• Jaasma, Auditor SAER ,

i J. Knowles, Fire Protection Worker i C. Lashely, Fire Protection Worker '

• R. Marlow, Technical Supervisor

• C. Nesbitt, Manager, Operations J. Osterholtz, Technical Manager

• L. Stinson, Assistant General Manager, Operations

• J Thomas, Manager, Maintenance Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included l craftsmen, engineers, operators, mechanics, fis- watch personnel, 1 technicians, and administrative personne l l NRC Resident Inspectors

• G. Maxwell

• M. Morgan

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• Attended exit interview

Fire Protection / Prevention Program (64704)

The inspector evaluated the adequacy and implementation of the licensee's Fire Protection Program described in the Final Safety Analysis Report, Fire Protection Organization The General Manager, who reports to the Farley Project Vice President, has overall responsibility for the fire protection program. _This responsibility has been assigr.ed to the Technical Supervisor who is under the supervision-of the Manager Technical -

Nuclea The Site Fire Marshall and a staff of thr:.e engineering aides are assigned to coordinate the implementation of the fire

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protection program through the Operations, Training, Maintenance, and System Performance organization The Fire Marshall has an effective program for monitoring and trending plant fire protection performance. Quarterly fire protection activity reports are provided to senior plant managemen These reports address the status of fire prevention activities, surveillance schedules, fire protection impairments

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and deficiencies, housekeeping conditions and trends, and fire investigation reports. The inspector's review of the 1992 reports on fire protection activities determined that these reports provided an effective management tool for monitoring the effectiveness of the site fire protection / prevention progra Fire Prevention / Administrative Control Procedures The following administrative procedures which describe and

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implement portions of the fire protection- program were reviewed:

Procedure Title FNP-0-AP-35 General Plant Housekeeping Cleanliness Control FNP-0-AP-36 Fire Surveillance Procedures and Inspections FNP-0-AP-38 Use of Open Flame FNP-0-AP-52 Equipment Status Control and Maintenance At!thorization These procedures were found to conform to the licensee's fire protection program guidelines and commitments. Compliance with those administrative procedures governing control of combustibles (housekeeping) and ignition sources such as open flame was observed to be very good. As a result, only one small fire was reported within the past year. This good fire record is indicative of a strong and effective fire prevention program.

l Surveillance of Fire Protection Features -

The following surveillance test procedures were reviewed to verify compliance to the requirements of FNP-0-M-032, tiaster List of Fire Surveillance, and fulfillment of fire protection Technical Specification (TS) requirements, if applicable. Within the review no discrepancies were note .

Technical Specification Surveillance Test Number litle Reference FNP-0-FSP-43 Visual Inspection of None Kaowool Wraps FNP-0-STP-5 Fire System Underground 4.7.11.1. Piping Operability Test FNP-0-STP-5 cire Distribution System 4.7.11.1.1 9 Flow Test

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l FNP-0-STP-129 Low Pressure CO2 Systems 4.7.ll.3.2. .7.ll 3.2.b 2 FNP-1-STP-131.07 Smoke Detectors - 4.3.3.9.1

Semi-annual T2st FNP-1-STP-134 Fire Doors and Dampers 4.7.12 Functional Inspection FNP-0-STP-135 CO2 System Valve Position 4.7.11. Check-Monthly FNP-0-STP-425 Analysis of Fire Diesel 4.7.ll.l'. Fuel Storage Tank Contents Fire Brigade-(1) Organization The plant trained fire brigade staffing for the forth quarter 1992 consists of 112 personnel from Operations, 30 persons from the Security Force, and 31 persons from the Chemistry Staff. Each operations shift is assigned a fire brigade of five (5) qualified persons for the safety-related power plant areas and an additional five peisonnel assigned to an auxiliary fire brigade for outside area building Each fire brigade is supervised by a chief who is the operations shift foreman. The other shift brigade members inclade two system operators, a plant guard and a chemistry technician. The inspector verified that sufficient shift personnel were available to G aff both an ori-shift primary fire brigade and the auxiliary fire brigade with at least five (5) qualified fire brigade members. The use of the auxiliary fire brigade concept is considered a program strer.gth-in that non-safety. plant areas are protected without depleting the fire brigade coverage for essential safe shutdown plant area (2) Training and Drills A review of the training records for eight.' fire brigade members indicated that the_ training, drills and respiratory requirements for each of these personnel were current and all were qualified per plant procedures and NRC commitments, i Due to Unit I being shutdown and the high priority work in-progress, a fire brigade drill was not conducted during this inspection. To evaluate drill performance, drill critique data for the drill scenarios for the third quarter 1992 were reviewed. These indicated problems in the lack of use of full protective clothing and self contained breathing-

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apparatus (SCBA's) by the brigade member This was also identified as an area that needed improvement in the 1992 triennial fire protection audit conducted in July 1992. The inspector's review of the licensee's ccreective actions for this item indicated that this weakness needed further improvemen The inspector also reviewed the shift fire brigade drills -

conducted for each operations shift in 1992 and noted t. hat the periodic drill requirements were met for each shif e. Fire Protection Audits The inspector reviewed the following audits of the fire protection program:

Audit N Audit Dates Iype ES-01-2110 October 2-4, 1991 12 months SAER 92-037, January 1, 1992 through Composite FNP-NC-20-92/06 March 24, 1992 Safety Audit and Engineering Review FP 92-0946 July 13-17, 1992 Triennial / Annual Fire Pratection Audi A total of three major findings and a number of weaknesses were identified. A review of the three major findings indicated that Corrective Action Reports (CAR ) 1916, 1917, and 1918 had been initiated on these items. A review of these CARS indicated that appropriate corrective action had been completed on all but CAR

, 1917. This item involved the continuing problems with the Motor l Driven Fire Pump (MDFP) flow, and leakage of the underground fire

main piping. The inspector's review of the MDFP corrective actions indicated that the issue received high level management attention and prompt corrective actions had been taken. The MDFP was promptly restored to service and has passed-the most recent surveillance tests; however, the plant is continuing a review of the accuracy of the testing flow devices in an effort to resolve the past test failures. This approach appears acceptable. The fire system underground piping leakage continues to occu During this inspection several suspect leaks were identified by the site Fire Marshall and maintenance work request (MWRs) 263048, 263049, 251494, and 269821 were ,arepared to excavate and repair the loak >

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The total system leakage exceeds the flow capacity of the (60 gpm)

fire protection jockey pump, requiring the motor driven fire pump to be running'to maintain fire system pressure. On November 19, 1992, the inspector observed portions of the excavation and repair efforts for MWR #263049, yard fire-system leak between the-Unit 1 A&B cooling towers. This leak was identified as a mechanical

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l joint flange seal leak (stimated at I gpm. The system has

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experienced mostly leaks of this type and at most six flangn leaks a vear. However, in spite of continuing extensive repair efforts, other leaks have developed.- The inspector discussed industry-wide repair methods for mechanical joint leakage in fire systems with

, the licensee. Additionally, the licensee planned to reemphasize

the need to. restrict plant activities that utilized the fire protection water supply for routine maintenance activities. This

should reduce the number of pressure fluctuations experienced in the fire main system at the mechanical flange joints. The licensees activities regarding these efforts were determined to be

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conducted in an adequate manner. No deviations or violations were identified in this are Inadvertent Discharges of Carbon Dioxide (CO 2 ) Fire Protection

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System into the IJ 4160v bus Switchgear Panel-Unit 1

During 1992 there have been three inadvertent actuaM ons of the Low Pressure C0 2 to the 4160v bus 1J panel. These events have been reviewed by the NRC end documented in Inspection Report Nos. 50-

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348/92-09, and 92-25. Pending further NRC assessment of the events the issue was documented as an Unresolved Item (URI 50-348/92-09-i 01). Following the last CO . 2system spurious actuation on November 12, 1992, the licensee performed an indepth analysis into the root

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cause of the problem which included an on-site investigation by the CO2 system vendor. The investigation revealed that-the

condition causing the three-spurious discharges was the breakdown

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of the internal composite insulating materials due to aging of the thermal heat detectors within the system. The insulation breakdown -

resulted in electrical system- grounding in the detection

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circuitry and initiation of the CO discharge 2 sequence. The vendor has recommended the complete replacement of the old type problem ,

detectors. The inspector obser/ed work in progress of the detector replacement for the IJ bus-(MWR 266665) and verified that all required technical specification _ (TS) actions were met for the 4 period the CO2 system was deactivated. The inspector noted-improvement in the licensee's expansion of their root-cause analysis program as applied to the recent CO 2 fire protection problems.

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The current. status of URI 50-348/92-09-01 was discussed with the NRC Resident Inspectors who will follow the licensee's long range corrective actions. Pending the licensee's determination that the-current corrective actions preclude further_ spurious actuations of-the'1J bus C03 system, this item will remain open. If th licensee's replacement of the thermal detectors resolves the spurious actuation of the fire suppression system, a generic l- review of other fire protection systems should be performed based on personnel and plant safety concerns involving the inadvertent

, actuations-of CO2 systems.

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l l Exit Interview I

! The inspection scope and results were summarized on November 20, 1992,-

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with those person indicated in paragraph 1. The inspector described the i areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results listed l belo Proprietary information is not contained in this report.

l Olssenting comments were not received from the licensee.

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