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Category:REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE REPORT (SEE ALSO AO LER)
MONTHYEARML20216E5401999-09-0707 September 1999 Special Rept:On 990826,discovered That Meteorological Sys Upper Wind Speed Cup Set Broken,Causing Upper Wind Channel to Be Inoperable.Cup Set Replaced & Channel Restored to Operable Status on 990826 ML20210R1051999-08-0606 August 1999 Special Rept:On 990628,cathodic Protection Sys Was Declared Inoperable After Sys Did Not Pass Acceptance Criteria of Bimonthly Surveillance.Work Request 98085802 Was Initiated & Connections on Well Anode Were Cleaned or Replaced ML20206P2081998-12-31031 December 1998 Special Rept:On 981218,inoperability of Meteorological Monitoring Instrumentation Channels,Was Observed.Caused by Data Logger Overloading Circuit.Replaced & Repaired Temp Signal Processor ML20198B1341998-12-14014 December 1998 Revised Special Rept:On 980505,discovered That Certain Fire Barriers Appeared to Be Degraded.Caused by Removal of Firestop Damming Boards.Hourly Fire Watches Established in Affected Areas ML20196D4041998-11-19019 November 1998 Rev 1 to Special Rept:On 980618,determined That Method Used to Calibrate Wind Speed Instrumentation Loops of Meteorological Monitoring Instrumentation Sys Does Not Meet TS Definition for Channel Calibration.Procedure Revised ML20153B0531998-09-16016 September 1998 Special Rept:On 980817,errors in Implementation of Selected Licensee Commitment Testing Requirements on Fire Protection Sys Instruments,Was Discovered.Caused by Error in Interpretation of SLC Requirement.Will Revise Procedures ML20236M9151998-07-0707 July 1998 Special Rept:On 980611,determined That Required Firewatch Patrol Had Been Missed.Caused by Firewatch Being Performed on Wrong Unit Due to Human Error.Employee Was Verbally Counseled on Firewatches & Documentation Was Corrected ML20236G4451998-07-0101 July 1998 Special Rept:On 980618,declared Wind Speed Instrumentation Loops of Meteorological Monitoring Instrumentation Sys Inoperable.Caused by Failure to Meet TS Definition of Channel Calibr.Will Revise Selected Licensee Commitment ML20248K1431998-06-0202 June 1998 Special Rept:On 980505,discovered That Certain Fire Barriers Appeared to Be Degraded.Caused by Shrinkage of Foam & Improper Installation During Construction of Plant.Posted Fire Watches & Repaired Firestop F-AX-348-W-134 ML20247H5351998-04-12012 April 1998 Special Rept:On 980415,missed Insp of Fire Hose Caskets Was Discovered.Caused by Error in Transferring Info from One Procedure to Another.Planned Rev of Applicable Procedure to Include Gasket Insp at Appropriate Frequency ML20216B0211998-04-0606 April 1998 Special Rept:On 980325,determined That Loose Parts Monitoring Sys Being Inoperable for Greater than Thirty Days.Caused by Incorrect Testing.All Channels of Loose Parts Monitoring Sys Tested Utilizing Revised Test Method ML20217K9271998-03-26026 March 1998 Special Rept:On 971229,procedure Step for Closing Safety Injection Pump Cold Leg Injection Isolation Valve Was Inadvertently Skipped.Caused by Injection of Water Into RCS from Rwst.Simplified Procedures & Discussed Event ML20216D5641998-03-0505 March 1998 Special Rept:On 980204,discovered That Fire Detection Panel Was Apparently Not Communicating W/Several Local Fire Detectors.Caused by Faulty Computer Sys Cards.Replaced Four Computer Cards in Sys ML20202C4701998-02-0505 February 1998 Ro:On 971228:Unit 1 Loose Parts Monitoring Sys Channel 6 Was Declared Inoperable Due to Excessive Static on Channel. Caused by Loose Connection.Work Order Has Been Written to Pursue Repairs ML20138E6851997-04-24024 April 1997 Special Rept:On 970318,Unit 1 Loose Parts Monitoring Sys Channel 13 Was Declared Inoperable Due to Sporadic Electical Static.Channel Was Removed from Svc & Entered Into TS Action Item Logbook as Inoperable ML20149M7251997-01-20020 January 1997 Special Rept:On 961209,Unit 1 Loose Parts Monitoring (Lpm) Sys Channel 20 Declared Inoperable Due to No Signal Being Received from Field.Lpm Channel 20 & 22 Operable & Providing Monitoring Coverage for Primary Side of 1D S/G ML20134K4901996-11-0606 November 1996 Special Rept:On 961009,selective Licensee Commitment for Operability of Fire Protection Sprinkler Sys Not Maintained. Continuous Fire Watch Established within One H Following Identification of Incorrect Remedial Action ML20134H1331996-11-0404 November 1996 Special Rept:On 961004,Unit 1B DG Failed Due to Failure of Motor Operated Pot,Electronic & Mechanical Governor,Governor Droop Relay & Mechanical Binding of Fuel Rack Control Linkage.Dg Procedures Will Be Revised ML20113A1801996-06-17017 June 1996 Special Rept:On 960521,declared Detectors A01 for Zone 69 & A04 for Zone 60 Inoperable Because Detectors Effectively Isolated from Area in Intended Protection.Detectors Relocated,Tested & Declared Operable on 960524 ML20100H9801996-02-20020 February 1996 Special Rept:On 960111,Unit 1 Loose Parts Monitoring Channel 21 Declared Inoperable,Due to Spurious,Unexplainable Electronic Bursts.Work Request Initiated to Pursue Corrective Action ML20100H9751996-02-20020 February 1996 Special Rept:On 960111,Unit 2 Loose Parts Monitoring Sys Channel 7 Declared Inoperable,Due to pre-amp Bias Voltage Indicating Zero Volts Twice During Previous Seven Days.Work Request Written to Pursue Corrective Action ML20097F5011996-02-11011 February 1996 Special Rept:On 960102,Unit 2 Loose Parts Monitoring Sys Channel 17 Was Declared Inoperable.Two Other Channels Operable & Providing Coverage Against Loose Parts ML20096E7731996-01-12012 January 1996 Special Rept:On 951214,unit 2 DG Valid Failure Occurred. Caused by Fuel Line Fitting Backing Off from Cylinder Head Connection,Which Resulted in Fuel Oil Leakage.Dg Successfully Started,Run & Declared Operable on 951215 ML20096A8761995-12-18018 December 1995 Special Rept:On 951120,during Periodic Surveillance Testing, Lpms Channel 5 Declared Inoperable.Caused by Erratic Preamp Bias Voltage Indications.Work Request 95048483 Initiated to Perform Corrective Maint During Unit 1 Cycle 9 ML20094Q5811995-11-13013 November 1995 Special Rept:On 951014,auxiliary Bldg Filtered Exhaust Sys Pump Room Heater Declared Inoperable Due to Blown Fuse & Not Restored to Operable Status within 7 Days Per Ts. Technical Investigation Will Be Performed ML20094B8291995-10-25025 October 1995 Special Rept:On 950919,loose Parts Monitoring Sys Channel 1 Declared Inoperable Due to Erratic Preamp Bias Indication. Work Request Written to Investigate & Repair Channel ML20098A4641995-09-19019 September 1995 Special Rept:On 950817,Unit 2 Lpms Channel 12 Was Declared Inoperable Due to Channel Sensor Failing Acceptance Criteria During Performance of PT/O/A4600/03 ML20092G6041995-09-14014 September 1995 Special Rept:On 950815,CNS Unit 1 DG 1A Invalid Failure Occurred Due to Main Bearing High Temp Trip Signal.Caused by Failed Splice Installed in Circuit for RTD 1LDRD5630.New RTD Installed in Main Bearing 5 ML20086H1401995-07-12012 July 1995 Special Rept:On 950615,Channel 4 Was Declared Inoperable Due to Noise Uncharacteristic of Healthy Channel Detected Via Vibration & Loose Parts Monitoring Sys.Corrective Maint Will Be Performed During 1EOC9 Outage ML20086H1431995-07-11011 July 1995 Special Rept:On 950608,Channel 13 Was Declared Inoperable. Trending of Bias Voltage & Background Rms Evaluated to Conclude Channel Was Experiencing Periodic Failures. Corrective Maint Will Be Performed During 1EOC9 Outage ML20086C6441995-06-29029 June 1995 Special Rept:On 950523,Unit 1 Train a Fuel Handling Ventilation Filter Heaters Declared Inoperable.Evaluation Done to Determine Fault ML20085M4061995-06-20020 June 1995 Special Rept:On 950501,lower Rv Tube 4 Was Declared Inoperable ML20084N7271995-05-25025 May 1995 Special Rept:On 950425,valid Failure of DG 1A Occurred. Caused by Jacket Water Thermostatic Control Valve Sticking in Position Which Reduced Engine Cw Flow Through Heat Exchanger.Thermostatic Cv Internals Removed & Replaced ML20082L2711995-04-17017 April 1995 Special Rept:On 950308,Unit 2 Cathodic Protection Sys Was Declared Inoperable & Remained Inoperable Greater than 10 Days ML20081D4851995-03-13013 March 1995 Special Rept:On 950211,actuation of PORV 1NC32B Occurred. Procedure OP/1(2)/A/6100/02 Revised to Require More Emphasis on Monitoring Pressure Indication During Sensitive Evolutions ML20080Q8701995-03-0202 March 1995 Special Rept:On 950202,Unit 1 DG 1B Invalid Failure Due to Overcurrent Breaker Trip During Governor Troubleshooting ML20149H7821994-12-20020 December 1994 Special Rept:On 941129,discovered That Selective Licensee Commitment (SLC) for Visual Insp of Fire Rated Assemblies Exceeded Due to Misinterpretation of Requirements of SLC 16.9-5.Fire Barriers Visually Inspected ML20078R0021994-12-12012 December 1994 Special Rept:On 941103,Channel 3 (Upper Rv a) Declared Inoperable.Caused by Channel Sensor Failure of Acceptance Criteria During Performance of PT/0/A/4600/03.Repair Planned for End of 2EOC7 Outage Due to Containment Entry Required ML20078K7361994-11-17017 November 1994 Special Rept on 941021,DG 1A Invalid Failure Occurred Due to Main Bearing High Temp Trip.Operability Performance Test Successfully Completed & Engine Declared Operable on 941022 ML20149G8041994-11-0101 November 1994 Special Rept:On 940922,CNS,Unit 2 Cathodic Protection Sys Declared Inoperable & Remained Inoperable for Greater than 10 Days.Wo 94080948-01 Initiated to Replace Prepackaged Anode Well 1.WO Scheduled for 941114 ML20076F3191994-10-0404 October 1994 Special Rept:On 940908,valid Failure of D/G 1A Occurred Due to Air Start Valve Sticking Open.Maint Procedure MP/0/A/7650/99 Revised,New Air Roll Criteria Developed & Sixteen Starting Air Valves Replaced ML20072P4251994-08-23023 August 1994 Ro:On 940719,channel 9 (S/G a Channel 2) Declared Inoperable.Work Request Was Generated to Repair Channel During Future Outage of Sufficient Length Since Containment Entry Required for Work ML20072E5961994-08-15015 August 1994 Special Rept:On 940715,inoperability of Unit 2 Vibration & Loose Parts Monitoring System Channel 4 & 6 Occurred.Caused by Leds Not Lighting During Performance of PT/0/B/4600/03. Work Orders 94051250-01 & 94051251-01 Initiated ML20071N7441994-07-28028 July 1994 Special Rept:On 940711,delta-t Channel on Chart Recorder Found to Be out-of-tolerance Due to Drifting of Analog to Digital (A/D) Converter Card.A/D Card Replaced & delta-t Channel Chart Recorder Declared Operable ML20071N8511994-07-28028 July 1994 Special Rept:On 940711,main Steam Relief Valve Exhaust Monitors Declared Inoperable Due to Engineering Calculation Concerns.Engineering Calculation CNC-1229.00-00-0047 re-performed Using EPA-400 Methodology ML20070K0191994-07-18018 July 1994 Special Rept:On 940630,re Inoperability of Main Steam Line Radiation Monitor 2EMF12.Work Request 94026262 Generated to Reattach 2EMF12 to Main Steamline.Work Request Completed on 940701 ML20069H0861994-05-31031 May 1994 Special Rept:On 940501,Unit 2 DG 2A Invalid Failure Occurred Due to Right Bank Turbocharger Vibration Trip.Based on Cooper-Enterprise Recommendations,Procedure Changes Made to Calibr Procedures for All Four DGs ML20065K5011994-04-13013 April 1994 Special Rept:On 940314,invalid Failure of Diesel Generator 1B Occurred Due to Output Tripping During Calibration of Electronic Governor.Dg 1B Started Successfully on 940315 & Declared Operable ML20064G2911994-03-15015 March 1994 Special Rept:On 940203,SG Channels 9 & 11 Declared Inoperable.Channels Failed to Meet Band Limited Rms Acceptance Criteria During Performance of 18 Month Channel Calibr Test.Work Request Written to Repair Channels ML20064G2771994-03-0707 March 1994 Special Rept:On 940125,Channels 6,7 & 10 Were Declared Inoperable.Channels Failed to Meet Acceptance Criteria During Performance of 18 Month Channel Calibr Test.Work Request Written to Repair Channels 1999-09-07
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20217H0201999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20216E5401999-09-0707 September 1999 Special Rept:On 990826,discovered That Meteorological Sys Upper Wind Speed Cup Set Broken,Causing Upper Wind Channel to Be Inoperable.Cup Set Replaced & Channel Restored to Operable Status on 990826 ML20212B4711999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20217H0321999-08-31031 August 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20211B1281999-08-31031 August 1999 Dynamic Rod Worth Measurement Using Casmo/Simulate ML20211A9791999-08-20020 August 1999 Safety Evaluation Granting Licensee Request for Approval of Proposed Relief from Volumetric Exam Requirements of ASME B&PV Code,Section Xi,For Plant,Unit 2 ML20211F3441999-08-17017 August 1999 Updated non-proprietary Page 2-4 of TR DPC-NE-2009 ML20211C1291999-08-17017 August 1999 ISI Rept Unit 1 Catawba 1999 RFO 11 ML20210R1051999-08-0606 August 1999 Special Rept:On 990628,cathodic Protection Sys Was Declared Inoperable After Sys Did Not Pass Acceptance Criteria of Bimonthly Surveillance.Work Request 98085802 Was Initiated & Connections on Well Anode Were Cleaned or Replaced ML20210S2891999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for July 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20212B4871999-07-31031 July 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20209E4361999-07-0909 July 1999 SER Agreeing with Licensee General Interpretation of TS LCO 3.0.6,but Finds No Technical Basis or Guidance That Snubbers Could Be Treated as Exception to General Interpretation ML20196K6631999-07-0707 July 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Licensee 990520 Position Re Inoperable Snubbers ML20210S2951999-06-30030 June 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20209H4501999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for June 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20209H4561999-05-31031 May 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20206T4771999-05-31031 May 1999 Rev 3 to UFSAR Chapter 15 Sys Transient Analysis Methodology ML20196L1881999-05-31031 May 1999 Non-proprietary Rev 1 to DPC-NE-3004, Mass & Energy Release & Containment Response Methodology ML20196A0001999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for May 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20206P5201999-05-14014 May 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting GL 96-05, Periodic Verification of Design-Basis Capability of Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valves ML20206N8391999-05-0404 May 1999 Rev 16 to CNEI-0400-24, Catawba Unit 1 Cycle 12 Colr ML20206R1811999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20196A0041999-04-30030 April 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20206N8261999-04-22022 April 1999 Rev 15 to CNEI-0400-24, Catawba Unit 1 Cycle 12 Colr. Page 145 of 270 of Incoming Submittal Not Included ML20205S5551999-04-21021 April 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting Response to GL 96-06, Assurance of Equipment Operability & Containment Integrity During Design Basis Accident Conditions ML20205N3651999-04-12012 April 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting IPE of External Events Submittal ML18016A9011999-04-12012 April 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Defect in Component of DSRV-16-4,Enterprise DG Sys.Caused by Potential Problem with Connecting Rod Assemblies Built Since 1986,that Have Been Converted to Use Prestressed Fasteners.Affected Rods Should Be Inspected ML20206R1931999-03-31031 March 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20205P9521999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20205P9561999-02-28028 February 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20204C9111999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20203A2581999-02-0505 February 1999 Safety Evaluation of TR DPC-NE-3002-A,Rev 2, UFSAR Chapter 15 Sys Transient Analysis Methodology. Rept Acceptable. Staff Requests Duke Energy Corp to Publish Accepted Version of TR within 3 Months of Receipt of SE ML20204C9161999-01-31031 January 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Repts for Jan 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20199K8711999-01-13013 January 1999 Inservice Insp Rept for Unit 2 Catawba 1998 Refueling Outage 9 ML20199E3071998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Dec 1998 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20216F9931998-12-31031 December 1998 Piedmont Municipal Power Agency 1998 Annual Rept ML20205E9441998-12-31031 December 1998 1998 10CFR50.59 Rept for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2, Containing Brief Description of Changes,Tests & Experiments,Including Summary of Ses.With ML20206P2081998-12-31031 December 1998 Special Rept:On 981218,inoperability of Meteorological Monitoring Instrumentation Channels,Was Observed.Caused by Data Logger Overloading Circuit.Replaced & Repaired Temp Signal Processor ML20203A4101998-12-22022 December 1998 Rev 16 to CNEI-0400-25, Catawba Unit 2 Cycle 10 Colr ML20203A4041998-12-22022 December 1998 Rev 14 to CNEI-0400-24, Catawba Unit 1 Cycle 11 Colr ML20198B1341998-12-14014 December 1998 Revised Special Rept:On 980505,discovered That Certain Fire Barriers Appeared to Be Degraded.Caused by Removal of Firestop Damming Boards.Hourly Fire Watches Established in Affected Areas ML20196J8351998-12-0808 December 1998 Safety Evaluation Granting Relief Request Re Relief Valves in Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Sys ML20199E3221998-11-30030 November 1998 Revised MOR for Nov 1998 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 Re Personnel Exposure ML20198E3151998-11-30030 November 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Nov 1998 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20196C0251998-11-27027 November 1998 SER Accepting Clarification on Calibration Tolerances on Trip Setpoints for Catawba Nuclear Station ML20196A6881998-11-25025 November 1998 Safety Evaluation Granting Relief Request 98-02 Re Limited Exam for Three Welds ML20196D4041998-11-19019 November 1998 Rev 1 to Special Rept:On 980618,determined That Method Used to Calibrate Wind Speed Instrumentation Loops of Meteorological Monitoring Instrumentation Sys Does Not Meet TS Definition for Channel Calibration.Procedure Revised ML20195E5521998-10-31031 October 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Oct 1998 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20198E3261998-10-31031 October 1998 Revised Monthly Operating Repts for Oct 1998 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20154M7661998-10-12012 October 1998 LER 98-S01-00:on 980913,terminated Vendor Employee Entered Protected Area.Caused by Computer Interface Malfunction. Security Retained Vendor Employee Badge to Prevent Further Access & Computer Malfunction Was Repaired.With 1999-09-07
[Table view] |
Text
.
. Dukeiburr Company H?tussR AkCOLUM.)R Cataa ha Nuclear Generation Department Vice hnident
, 4M(IConcordhbad (M3)S314.M10fnce
)brk, SC29745 (M3JS1140iFla DUKEPOWER
@ June 17,1996 ,
I U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555
Subject:
Catawba Nuclear Station Docket No. 50-413 and 50-414 Special Report l
Gentlemen:
Attached is a Special Report conceming a SELECTIVE LICENSEE COMMITMENT FOR OPERABILITY OF FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION NOT MAINTAINED.
This event is considered to be of no significance with respect to the health and safety of the public. ;
l Very truly yours, S.
l W. R. McCollum, Jr. !
Attachment cc: Mr. S.D. Ebneter INPO Records Center Administrator, Region 11 700 Galleria Place U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Atlanta, GA 30339-5957 101 Marietta St., NW, Suite 2900 ;
Atlanta, GA 30323 Mr. P. S. Tam Marsh & McLennan Nuclear U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1166 Avenue of the Americas Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation New York, NY 10036-2774 Washington, D.C. 20555 Mr. R. J. Freudenberger NRC Resident inspector gg Catawba Nuclear Station 9606240155 960617 0 PDR g$'
8 ADOCK 05000413 PDR na a w a m
DUKE POWER COMPANY CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION DOCKET NUMBERS 50-413 and 50-414 SPECIAL REPORT SELECTIVE LICENSE COMMITMENT FOR OPERABILITY OF FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION NOT MAINTAINED ABSTRACT This Special Report is being submitted to document non compliance with operability requirements of Fire Detection Instrumentation per Selected Licensee Commitment (SLC) 16.9-6. This SLC is part of the Catawba Fire Protection Program and therefore subject to the provisions of the Catawba Facility Operating License Conditions C.(8) for NPF-35 (Unit 1) and C. (6) for NPF-52 (Unit 2). On May 21, 1996, at approximately 1100 hours0.0127 days <br />0.306 hours <br />0.00182 weeks <br />4.1855e-4 months <br />, with Units 1 and 2 in Mode 1, Power Operations, at 100% power, Engineering recommended that detectors A01 for Zone 69 and A04 for Zone 60, located in rooms 480A and 490A respectively, be declared inoperable because the detectors were effectively isolated from the area of intended protection as specified in SLC 16.9-6 and SER 9.5.1.7. These detectors were declared inoperable by the Operations Shift Manager at 1400 hours0.0162 days <br />0.389 hours <br />0.00231 weeks <br />5.327e-4 months <br />. An hourly fire watch was initiated, as a conservative measure, and work requests initiated to relocate the detectors. On May 24, 1996, the detectors were relocated, tested, declared operable, and the hourly fire watch was suspended.
Review of plant documentation, which included drawings, procedures, Work Management System history files, and interviews with numerous plant and General Office personnel , indicate that the cause for the inoperability of Zones 69 and 60 is due to lack of programmatic controls between the Fire Detection Program and the Fire Stop Installation Program. Expertise within Civil and Electrical Engineering was utilized during the design and construction phase as programmatic control for the installation of fire detectors and fire stops. Due to inadequate interface requirements between these two programs, it is most probable that the detectors were installed prior to fire stop installation which resulted in the separation of the cable shafts from the detectors. Since turnover from the design and construction phase
l I
DUKE POWER COMPANY / CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION PIP 2-C96-1167/SPECIAL REPORT PAGE 2 )
to operational phase, the Nuclear Station Modification process is utilized to review and implement changes to systems, structures, and components. The NSM process is designed to review any changes and to verify that those changes do not violate station commitments. Therefore, no programmatic corrective actions are necessary. Subsequent corrective actions taken and completed included reviewing all Fire Detection System (EFA) Test Procedures (IPs) and EFA System drawings required for safety i related equipment to ensure simi3 ar situations did not exist with I other required detectors. IP/0/A/3350/10 and IP/0/A3350/11, EFA System Detector Test Procedures, have been revised to reflect the location and access to the detectors in question.
BACKGROUND The Fire Detection System (EFA) monitors unattended areas of the plant for smoke or fire and alerts plant personnel of the existence and location of a fire. Safety Evaluation Report (SER), Section 9.5.1.7, Fire Detection, requires that "with the exception of rooms listed, fire detection systems will be installed in all areas of the station containing safety-related i
system components and cables."
Selected Licensee Commitment (SLC) 16.9-6 is a part of the Catawba Fire Protection Program and therefore subject to the provision of the Catawba Facility Operating License Conditions C.(8) for NPF-35 (Unit 1) and C. (6) for NPF-52 (Unit 2).
SLC 16.9-6, Fire Detection Instrumentation, states that "as a minimum, the fire detection instrumentation for each fire detection zone shown in Table 16.9-3 shall be OPERABLE." The remedial action to be taken "with any, but not more than one-half the total in any fire zone", becomes inoperable states to
" restore the inoperable instruments (s) to OPERABLE status within 14 days or within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> establish a fire watch patrol to inspect the zone (s) with the inoperable instruments (s) at least once per hour..." This requirement is applicable "whenever equipment protected by the fire detection instrument is required to be OPERABLE."
DUKE POWER COMPANY / CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION PIP 2-C96-1167/SPECIAL REPORT 4 PAGE 3 SLC 16.9-6, Testing Requirements, Section (a), states that each flame detection instrument required in Table 16.9-3, "shall be demonstrated operable at least once per 6 months by the performance of a VISUAL INSPECTION and at least once per year by performance of a TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST",
(TADOT).
IP/0/A/3350/10 , EFA System Detector Test Procedure (s) , is utilized to perform the yearly TADOT per SLC 16.9-6 which includes Zone 60, detector A04. IP/0/A/3350/11, EFA System Detector Test Procedure, is utilized to perform the yearly TADOT per SLC 16.9-6 which includes Zone 69, detector A01.
Zone 60 consisted of 18 detectors, one being A04, which is for fire detection of the Unit 1 Cable Shaft. The Unit 1 Cable Shaft is a vertical shaft running from elevation 543 to 593 which houses B Train cable. Seventeen of the eighteen required detectors for this zone can be accessed frcm elevation 574 of the Auxiliary Building. Detector A04 had to be accessed from elevation 594 of the Auxiliary Building.
Zone 69 consisted of 18 detectors, one being A01, which is for fire detection of the Unit 2 Cable Shaft. The Unit 2 Cable Shaft is a vertical shaft running from elevation 543 to 593 which houses B Train cables. Seventeen of the eighteen required detectors for this zone can be accessed from elevation 574 of the Auxiliary Building. Detector A01 had to be accessed frem elevation 594 of the Auxiliary Building.
EVENT DESCRIPTION 1981 Original installation of detectors, A04 for Zone 60 and A01 for Zone 69, on the ceiling (approximately elevation 609) of the Controlled Area Chiller Water (YC) Room directly above each cable shaft.
1984 Fire stop material was added to the opening at the top of the cable shaft at elevation 593 which closed off the shaft from the 594 elevation.
DUKE POWER COMPANY / CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION PIP 2-C96-1167/SPECIAL REPORT PAGE 4 May 16, 1996 Trip Actuating Device Operational Test (TADOT) was (Thursday) being performed per yearly requirements of SLC 16.9-6 and IP/0/A/3350/10.
1400 Ionization Detector A01 in fire zone 69 could not be located .
Engineering recommended that an hourly fire watch be performed. J l
1647 Fire Panel Console Operator (FPCO) initiated an '
hourly fire watch, as a conservative measure.
I Engineering initiated Work Request 96020969 to l install a detector and PIP 2-C96-1167 was I generated.
1750 During work being performed under Work Request ;
96020969, Maintenance located detector A01 in Zone 69 on 594 elevation in the YC Chiller Room.
Per guidance from Engineering, detector A01 for Zone 69 was successfully tested using Work Request 96020969.
Engineering contacted the FPCO and stated that the !
detector had been located and successfully tested.
(It was not recognized at this point that the detector was located in an area that would not provide detection capability for the cable shaft.)
1815 FPCO terminated fire watch.
May 17, 1996 Maintenance technician working on yearly TADOTs (Friday) sent an electronic note to Engineering stating concern that detector A01 in Zone 69 may not be located as needed to provide fire detection capability for the cable shaft.
I
DUKE POWER COMPANY / CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION PIP 2-C96-1167/SPECIAL REPORT PAGE 5 May 21, 1996 Upon receipt of the note, Engineering (Monday) determined that the detector should be located below the fire stop in the ceiling of elevation 574 (at elevation 593). Unit 1 corresponding detector (A04 in Zone 60) was checked and also found to be in the wrong location.
1100 Engineering initiated an Operability Notification Form recommending that' Zone 69 and Zone 60 be declared inoperable.
1400 Operations declared Zone 69 and Zone 60 inoperable.
1515 FPCO initiated an hourly fire watch, as a conservative measure.
Engineering initiated Work Requests to have the detector A01 for Zone 69 and detector A04 for Zone 60 relocated.
May 24, 1996 Fire detector A01 in Zone 69 and A04 in Zone 60 (Friday) were relocated and successfully tested.
1300 Zones 69 and 60 were declared operable.
1400 Hourly fire watch for Zones 69 and 60 was terminated.
DUKE POWER COMPANY / CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION PIP 2-C96-1167/SPECIAL REPORT PAGE 6 CONCLUSION This event is attributed to less than adequate interface requirements between the Fire Detection Installation Program and the Fire Stop Installation Program utilized during the design and construction phase of Catawba. Expertise within Civil and Electrical Engineering was utilized during the construction phase as programmatic control for the installation of fire detectors l and fire stops. Due to inadequate interface requirements between I these two programs, it is most probable that the detectors were ;
installed prior to fire stop installation which resulted in the I separation of the cable shafts from the detectors.
Since turnover from the construction phase to operational phase, the Nuclear Station Modification process is utilized to review and implement. changes to systems, structures, and components.
The NSM process is designed to review any changes and to verify that those changes do not violate station commitments. ;
Therefore, no programmatic corrective actions are necessary. The NSM process currently in place would prevent this event from recurring.
Subsequent corrective actions taken and completed included reviewing all Fire Detection System (EFA) Test Procedures (IPs) and EFA System drawings required for safety related equipment to ensure similar situations did not exist with other required detectors. IP/0/A/3350/10 and IP/0/A3350/11, EFA System Detector Test Procedures, have been revised to reflect the location and access to the detectors in question.
A review of the operating experience database, including Problem Investigation Program reports, for the twenty four months preceding this event did not identify any events in which SLC 16.9-6 had been violated. Additionally, this review did not identify any similar events with the same cause. This event is not considered to be recurring.
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i DUKE POWER COMPANY / CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION PIP 2-C96-1167/SPECIAL REPORT !
PAGE 7 l
I CORRECTIVE ACTIONS i
SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS
- 1) TSAIL entry was initiated declaring Zones 69 and 60 inoperable.
- 2) Jul hourly fire watch was established as a conservative
! measure. The Remedial action required by.SLC 16.9-6 is to restore the inoperable instrument (s) to OPERABLE status within 14 days or within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> establish a fire watch patrol at least once per hour.
- 3) Detector (s) A01 in Zone 69 and A04 in Zone 60 were relocated and successfully tested to comply with requirements of SLC 16.9-6.
- 4) .IP/0/A/3350/10 and IP/0/A/3350/11 were revised to
! reflect new location of A01 in Zone 69 and A04 in Zone 60.
l 5) A review of all EFA System Detector Test Procedures (IPs) required for safety related equipment was performed to ensure similar situations did not exist l
with other required detectors.
- 6) A review of all EFA System drawings required for safety related equipment was performed to ensure similar situations did not exist with other required detectors. j PLANNED None l
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l DUKE POWER COMPANY / CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION PIP 2-C96-1167/SPECIAL REPORT l PAGE 8 ,
l SAFETY ANALYSIS ,
1 Detectors are required at the top of the unit 1 and 2 B train i cable shafts (rooms 480A and 490A) in accordance with SER and SLC commitments, and design drawings (EFA system). These detectors were found to be located incorrectly and this was documented in station Problem Investigation Process (PIP) report 2-C96-1167.
For the reasons summarized below, the overall impact of the detectors being missing from the cable shafts would have been minimal.
- These cable shafts would not normally house any combustible materials. Therefore, any fire in these shafts would have been due to transient materials. These shafts are enclosed by three hour rated fire barriers except for the 574+0 elevation. The 574+0 elevation is open to an area that includes 17 other detectors. The shafts have no intermediate floor levels from elevation 543+0 (bottom of shafts) to elevation 593+0 (top of shafts). Therefore, the most likely location of the initiation of a fire would be at elevation 543+0. There are no normal or typical station activities that would result in transient combustible materials at the bottom of the shaft (elevation-543,0). Additionally, both cable shafts have detectors at approximately elevation 554+0. These devices at 554+0 would provide adequate detection for a fire initiated at elevation 543+0. It should be noted that a small amount of scaffolding boards and wooden form work were discovered near the top of the unit 2 cable shaft. The scaffold and form material was subsequently removed. This wood was required to be fire retardant per site directives on " Control of Combustible Materials". Additionally, the scaffold and form material were located in close proximity to the sprinkler heads. Had these materials become a source of ignition the sprinkler system would have actuated within a short time frame (see discussion below regarding the sprinkler system).
, , 4 g DUKE POWER COMPANY / CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION PIP 2-C96-1167/9PECIAL REPORT PAGE 9 The shafts contain only cables and their associated cable trays.
The cables are all an armored interlocked cable that are also shielded and grounded. Therefore, the cables themselves would not create a source of fire and they do not have exposed combustible insulation. The cables will self extinguish when a fire source is removed. Additionally, only one train of safe shutdown cables (train "B") is housed in each shaft. Therefore, a fire in one shaft could only affect one train of safe shutdown equipment. The Safe Shutdown Facility (SSF) would not be affected by a fire in either shaft.
- Both shafts are equipped with an automatic sprinkler system (RF system) which would actuate at 165 degrees Fahrenheit. The damage threshold for the armored interlocked cables is 700 degrees Fahrenheit. Thus the sprinkler system would actuate prior to cable damage threshold temperatures being reached.
Also, the sprinkler systems would transmit a flow alarm to the Control Room. The sprinkler alarms would have served as a delayed detection system.
1 In conclusion, the net effect of having the detectors located improperly would be delayed detection. However, the transmission of the flow alarm and sprinkler system actuation are expected to occur before any cable damage.
This event was considered to be of no significance with respect to the health and safety of the public. No damage to safety related systems or components resulted from this event.
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