ML20056G870

Special Rept:On 930803,discovered That Cylinder on 2-EDG Lower than Normal Operating Temps.Caused by Fuel Pin on Cylinder Injector Pump Not Fully Engaged

ML20056G870
Person / Time
Site:	Peach Bottom
Issue date:	08/27/1993
From:	Geoffrey Edwards PECO ENERGY CO., (FORMERLY PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
CCN#93-14117, NUDOCS 9309070255
Download: ML20056G870 (2)

Text

.CcN#93-14117

. PIIILADELPIIIA ELECTRIC COMPANY  !

i

1. , PEACH BOTIUM ATOMIC POWER STATION

.frx R.D. I, Box 208

% Delta, Itansylvania 17314 l GARRETr D. EDWARDS (717) 45t>-4244 l*

PIA %1 MAhMilk August 27, 1993 Docket Nos. 50-277 l 50-278 i License Nos. DPR-44 i DPR-56 i Document Control Desk  !

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission '

Washington, DC 20555  ;

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SUBJECT:

Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station - Unit 2 & 3 "

Special Report for a Valid Failure of the E-2 Emergency Diesel Generator on 8/03/93 i l

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REFERENCE:

Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Technical Specification (Tech Spec) 4.9.A.1.2.L i i

This Special Report is submitted pursuant to the requirements of Tech Spec 4.9.A.1.2.L li This Surveillance Requirement requires reporting of all Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) failures, valid or non valid, within 30 days. This report is required to include the  ;

l information recommended in Regulatory Position C.3.b of Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.108 l l

• Periodic Testing of Diesel Generator Units as Onsite Electric Power System at Nuclear i

. Power Plants", Revision 1 August 1977. j l On 8/03/93 at 0316 hours0.00366 days <br />0.0878 hours <br />5.224868e-4 weeks <br />1.20238e-4 months <br /> with Unit 2 and 3 at approximately 99% power, during the l

performance of a quarterly Surveillance Test (ST)-O-52 312 2 *E2 DIESEL GENERATOR l SLOW START FULL LOAD AND IST TEST", a Nuclear Plant Operator discovered that the number 5 cylinder on the E-2 EDG had lower than normal operating temperatures. ,

Troubleshooting was immediately conducted to determine the cause of the low cylinder i temperature condition. It was determined that the cause of the occurrence was that the  !

fuel pin on the number 5 cylinder injector pump was not fully engaged. The E-2 EDG was  !

declared inoperable.  :

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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 E-2 EDG number 5 cylinder pin was repaired at approximately 0321 hours0.00372 days <br />0.0892 hours <br />5.30754e-4 weeks <br />1.221405e-4 months <br />. Subsequently, the EDG was then successfully tested. The cause of the pin disengagement was due to the hardening of the lubricating pin oil which prevented proper pin spring action. The lubricating oil was hardened by repeated heating and cooling over time. The same pins on this EDG and the other EDGs were satisfactorily inspected. Preventive Maintenance or Routine Tasks will be created as appropriate to inspect and clean these pins as necessary. Considering the EDG inoperable is based on a review of the Electrical Loading Studies for this EDG which could not guarantee that the EDG would maintain the maximum design bases loads as specified in the SAR.

The E-2 EDG failure was classified as a valid failure using the guidance of RG 1.108, Revision 1,1977. Because this occurrence was classified as a valid failure and was the first valid failure in the last 100 valid tests, the current surveillance testing interval will remain at once per 31 days which is in conformance with RG 1.108, Revision 1, Section C.2.d.

During the course of this event, the E 2 EDG was unavailable for operation approximately 5 minutes. The EDG was available but considered administratively inoperable for the remainder of the event. When the EDG was available but administratively inoperable, it would have started if an initiation signal occurred. However, if a design bases Loss of Coolant Accident / Loss of Offsite Power condition occurred prior to engaging the pin, the E-2 EDG may not have been able to maintain the necessary electrical parameters as described in the SAR. It is known that the pin became disengaged during the EDG start because these pins were verified, as part of the EDG start procedure, to be properly l engaged just prior to this run. The remaining EDGs were operable and would have provided adequate AC power to safety related loads in the event of an actual loss of offsite power.

If you have any questions or require additional information, please do not hesitate to contact us.

Sincerely, / ,

s v .

cc: R. A. Burricelli, Public Service Electric & Gas W. P. Dornsife, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania T. T. Martin, US NRC, Region l R. l. McLean, State of Maryland B. S. Norris, US NRC Senior Resident inspector H. C. Schwemm, Atlantic Electric C. D. Schaefer, Delmarva Power 1 .

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