ML20154P359

Special Rept:On 880415,carbon Dioxide Fire Suppression Sys Taken Out of Svc for More than 14 Days.Caused by Continuous Fire Watch Required in Cable Spreading Room During Repair of Hole in Floor.Hole Repaired & Subj Sys Returned to Svc

ML20154P359
Person / Time
Site:	Peach Bottom
Issue date:	05/27/1988
From:	Logue R PECO ENERGY CO., (FORMERLY PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC
To:	NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
References
NUDOCS 8806030306
Download: ML20154P359 (2)

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PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY 2301 MARKET STREET P.O. BOX 8699 PHILADELPHI A PA.19101 (215)841 4000 May 27, 1988 Docket Nos. 50-277-50-278 Document Control Desk U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555

Subject:

Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Special Report: Carbon Dioxide Fire Suppression System Out of Service for More than 14 Days Gentlemen:

Technical Specification 3.14.B.4.b requires that, if the carbon dioxide fire suppression system (Cardox) protecting the Cable Spreading Room is out of service for more than 14 days, a l special repo.rt be submitted to the Commission within 31 days outlining the cause of the malfunction and the plans for l restoring the system to an operable status. On April 15, 1988 a hole was discovered in the ceiling of a Turbine Building Hallway.

The hole penetrates the floor of the Cable Spreading Room above the hallway. Because the Cable Spreading Room floor is l designated as a fire barrier in accordance with the Technical Specifications, a continuous fire watch was established in the Cable Spreading Room within one hour and the Cardox System was removed from service to ensure the safety of the fire watch.

There was no system malfunction. The automatic and manual Cardox

( System actuation capability was removed. The Cardox System remained out of service in excess of 14 days, necessitating the submittal of this special report. The hole in the Cable

! Spreading Room floor was reported to the NRC in LER 2-88-07, dated May 16, 1988.

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! Significance of Event:

Because Unit 2 is shutdown and Unit 3 is defueled, and l because a continuous fire watch had been in place, the significance of the Cardox being out of service is minimal. If a fire occurred it could have been detected in the incipient stage by the fire watch who would have taken immediate action to alert the fire brigade and suppress the fire. In contrast, the

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I Do'cument Control Desk May 27, 1988 Page 2 automatic Cardox System may not actuate until additional fire damage occurred. In addition to the detection provided by the fire-watch, smoke detectors which alarm in the control room were available. The fire watch was established in the Cable Spreading Room rather than in the Turbine Building hallway below because it appeared to be the more direct method of protecting the vital equipment in the Cable Spreading Room. Technical Specification 3.14.B.4.b permits reactor startup or continued operation in this situation.

Restoration of Cardox System:

The hole in the floor of the Cable Spreading Room was repaired. The Cardox System was returned to service on May 26, 1988. The automatic and manual Cardox System actuation capability had been removed for a total of 42 days.

Previous Similar Occurrences:

None.

If you have any questions or require additional information, please do not hesitate to contact us.

Very truly yours, i

t i b' d " 7 -_ o R. H. Logue Assistant to the Manager Nuclear Support Division l cc: W. T. Russell, Administrator, Region I, USNRC T. P. Johnson, USNRC Senior Resident Inspector T. E. Magette, State of Maryland 1

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