ML20153B468

Revised Special Rept Re Diesel Driven Fire Pump out-of-svc for More than Tech Spec Limit of 7 Days.On 871111,diesel Driven Fire Pump Declared Inoperable.Probably Caused by Battery Failures.Surveillance Procedure Revised

ML20153B468
Person / Time
Site:	Peach Bottom
Issue date:	03/16/1988
From:	PECO ENERGY CO., (FORMERLY PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC
To:	Russell W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
References
NUDOCS 8803220171
Download: ML20153B468 (3)

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PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY 23o1 MARKET STREET P.O. BOX 8699 PHILADELPHI A. PA.191o1 (215)8414000

. March 16, 1988 Docket No. 50-2'i7 50-278 Mr. W. T. Russell, Administrator Region I U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555

SUBJECT:

Revised Special Report: Diesel Driven Fire Pump Out-of-Service For More than tne Technical Specification Limit of Seven Days

REFERENCES:

(1) Special Report dated December 21, 1987 from W. M. Alden (PECo) to W. T. Russell (NRC)

(2) Peach Bottom Atomic Pcwer Station Unit 2 Technica.' Specifications 3.14.A.2 and 6.9.2

Dear Mr. Russell:

This report is revised to reflect the results of the investigation of the cause which was incomplete on December 21, 1987, e.nd to update the actions which were taken to prevent recurrence. The revisions to the December 21, 1987 report are noted by bars in the margin.

This Special Report is submitted pursuant to the requirements of Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Technical Specifications 3.'4.A and 6.9.2. Limiting Condition for Operation 3.14.A.2 states:

"With one fire pump or logic inoperable, restore the equipment to an operable status with 7 days, or in lieu of any other report required by Specification 6.9.2, submit a Special Report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.3 (subsequently redesignated as 6.9.2) within 31 days outlining the cause of the malfunction and the plans for restoring the equipment to an operable status. Reactor startup and/or continued reactor operation is permissible."

8803220171 880316 PDR ADOCK 05000277 CI68 /

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Mr. W. T. Russell March 16, 1988 Page 2 Specification 6.9.2 states:

"Special Reports shall be submitted to the Director of the appropriate regional office within the time period specified for each report..."

Description of the Event:

On November 11, during the scheduled testing (92 day frequency), the DDFP battery failed the Surveillance test, ST 16.2.2, "Diesel Driven Fire Pump Battery Check", and the DDFP was declared inoperable. The specific gravities in six of the twelve "A" battery cells (7-12) were low, with one off-scale low

(<l.10). The specific gravity of a fully charged battery is 1.265, and the ST acceptance criterion is 1.260. The specific gravities of five "B" battery cells (2-6) were also low. The low set of "A" cells was replaced on November 13, and both batteries placed on a float charge to prevent damage to the other cells.

The installed battery charger was used for charging. By November 18, the batteries had failed the ST three times, and attempts to charge the batteries with portable chargers were also innsuccessful. On November 21, all twelve "B" battery cells were l replaced with new, fully charged cells, which passed the SY. On November 23, tne batteries failed the ST, and did not pass again until December 5, after both sets of cells (A and B) were l replaced. The seven day inoperability of the DDFP makes this event reportable under Peach Bottom Limiting Condition for Operation 3.14.A.

The installed battery charger is a Knight King A40 !

24V-A, and the batteries are DEKA Type 908D, CCA1100. The EIIS codes for the system and components listed in this report are:

KP-Fire Protection, BTRY-battery, BYC-battery charger and P-pump.

Cause of the Event:

The investigation into the root cause of this event is complete. Two possible causes of the battery failures had been identified. The first possibility was the dilution of the electrolyte solution with non-blank water or eyewash. The second possibility investigated was the adequacy of the battery chargers. PECo is confident that the installed battery chargers are operable and adequate for maintaining battery charge. PECo is confident that the cause of the fciled surveillance tests is tha addition of non-blank water to the electrolyte solution in the batteries. Lack of procedural cont rol and inadequate tracking of battery electrolyte level and water addition contributed to the cause of this event.

l

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Mr. W. T. Russell March 16, 1988 Page 3 Consequences of the Event:

The failure of the batteries rendered the DDFP inoperable for 25 days. The motor-driven fire pump was proven to be operable in accordance with the Technical Specifications (Surveillance Requirement 4.14.2) during this time. Each fire pump is capable of supplying water at the required pressure for the largest sprinkler flow in the plant, plus 1,000 gallons per minute for other fire extinguishing devices. Peach Bottom Unit 3 was in the Refueling Mode, and Unit 2 was in the Cold Shutdown during the duration of the pump outage. It is, therefore, concluded that this event resulted in no adverse consequences.

Corrective Actions:

On November 11, 1987, the DDFP was declared inoperable.

The motor-driven fire pump was demonstrated to be operable in accordance with Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 4.14.2. The four sets of cells for the two batteries were replaced and charged with a portable charger. The batteries passed the Surveillance Test on December 5, and the DDFP was declared operable.

The bottle of water, which had been located near the batteries, was removed. The eyewash also located near the

, batteries was replaced with a more clearly labe3ed bottle of eyewash. An administratitely controlled sign (Operator Aid) was installed with instructions to use "blank" water which may be obtained from the shift chemist, when filling the battery cells.

Actions Taken to Prevent Recurrence:

The surveillance test procedure (ST 16.2.2) was revised on February 20, 1988. The revision provides well-defined acceptance criteria and a place on the data sheets to document water level for each battery cell. Calculations using the test data will be performed prior to corrective actions, such as adding blank water to a cell with low level, to permit the most accurate measure of the system's readiness to function. Also, ST-16.2.1, "Fire System Weekly Check" was revised on February 20, 1988 to record when battery cells are filled, rather than revising operators' rounds sheets.

If you have any questions or require additional information, please do not hesitate to call.

Very t ly you s, yg Attachment cc: Addressee T. P. Johnson, NRC Resident Inspector