|
---|
Category:SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT--LICENSING & RELATED ISSUES
MONTHYEARML20217K9931999-10-14014 October 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 234 to License DPR-56 ML20217B4331999-10-0505 October 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 233 to License DPR-56 ML20216H7091999-09-24024 September 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 229 & 232 to Licenses DPR-44 & DPR-56,respectively ML15112A7681999-09-20020 September 1999 SER Accepting Revision 25 of Pump & Valve Inservice Testing Program,Third 10-year Interval for Plant,Units 1,2 & 3 ML20212D1281999-09-17017 September 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Proposed Alternatives CRR-03, 05,08,09,10 & 11 ML20211D5501999-08-23023 August 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 228 & 231 to Licenses DPR-44 & DPR-56,respectively ML20206A2921999-04-20020 April 1999 Safety Evaluation Concluding That Proposed Changes to EALs for PBAPS Are Consistent with Guidance in NUMARC/NESP-007 & Identified Deviations Meet Requirements of 10CFR50.47(b)(4) & App E to 10CFR50 ML20205K7411999-04-0707 April 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 227 & 230 to Licenses DPR-44 & DPR-56,respectively ML20196G7021998-12-0202 December 1998 SER Authorizing Proposed Alternative to Delay Exam of Reactor Pressure Vessel Shell Circumferential Welds by Two Operating Cycles ML20155C6071998-10-26026 October 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 226 to License DPR-44 ML20155C1681998-10-22022 October 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Proposed Alternative Plan for Exam of Reactor Pressure Vessel Shell Longitudinal Welds ML20154H4771998-10-0505 October 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 225 & 229 to Licenses DPR-44 & DPR-56,respectively ML20154J2401998-10-0505 October 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 224 & 228 to Licenses DPR-44 & DPR-56,respectively ML20154G6821998-10-0101 October 1998 SER Related to Request for Relief 01A-VRR-1 Re Inservice Testing of Automatic Depressurization Sys Safety Relief Valves at Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station,Units 2 & 3 ML20154G6631998-10-0101 October 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 223 & 227 to Licenses DPR-44 & DPR-56,respectively ML20153B9651998-09-14014 September 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 9 to License DPR-12 ML20238F2661998-08-24024 August 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 222 to License DPR-44 ML20237A7761998-08-10010 August 1998 SER Accepting Licensee Response to NRC Bulleting 95-002, Unexpected Clogging of RHR Pump Strainer While Operating in Suppression Pool Cooling Mode ML20236R8281998-07-15015 July 1998 Safety Evaluation Approving Proposed Alternative (one-time Temporary non-Code Repair) Pursuant to 10CFR50.55a(a)(3) (II) ML20248F4781998-06-0101 June 1998 Corrected Page 1 to SE Supporting Amends 221 & 226 to Licenses DPR-44 & DPR-56,respectively.Original Page 1 of SE Had Three Typos ML20247N5351998-05-11011 May 1998 SER Accepting Third 10-year Interval Inservice Program for Pump & Valves for Plant,Units 2 & 3 ML20198L3331997-12-18018 December 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Approval of Proposed Merger of Atlantic Energy,Inc,& Delmarva Power & Light Co ML20212G8301997-10-24024 October 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 221 & 226 to Licenses DPR-44 & DPR-56,respectively ML20198S2161997-10-24024 October 1997 Safety Evaluation Accepting Proposed Change to Provisions Identified in Rev 14 of PBAPS QAP Description Re Nuclear Review Board Meeting Frequency ML20217J5631997-10-0909 October 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 225 to License DPR-56 ML20217J6161997-10-0707 October 1997 Safety Evaluation Re Alternative to Reactor Pressure Vessel Circumferential Weld Insps for Plant,Unit 3 ML20211L6241997-10-0303 October 1997 Safety Evaluation Authorizing Licensee Proposed Use of Code Case N-516-1 to Weld Modified Suction Strainer in Suppression Chamber at Plant ML20217D8161997-09-30030 September 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 224 to License DPR-56 ML20211D6201997-09-17017 September 1997 SER Accepting VT-2 Examiner Qualification Request for PECO Energy Company,Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station,Units 2 & 3 ML20216G5601997-09-0404 September 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 220 & 223 to Licenses DPR-44 & DPR-56,respectively ML20217M8001997-08-19019 August 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 219 & 222 to Licenses DPR-44 & DPR-56,respectively ML20149L2841997-07-23023 July 1997 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Relief Request RR-22 for Plant,Units 2 & 3 ISI Program ML20140B0371997-05-30030 May 1997 Safety Evaluation Accepting QAP Description Change ML20135B4111997-02-19019 February 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 218 & 221 to Licenses DPR-44 & DPR-56,respectively ML20149L8681996-11-15015 November 1996 SER Accepting Core Spray Piping Insp & Flaw Evaluation for Plant,Unit 2 ML20128G6941996-09-27027 September 1996 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 217 to License DPR-44 ML20117B4521996-08-16016 August 1996 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 216 to License DPR-44 ML20115H2361996-07-15015 July 1996 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 277 & 278 to Licenses DPR-44 & DPR-56,respectively ML20117N9691996-06-18018 June 1996 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 214 & 219 to Licenses DPR-44 & DPR-56,respectively ML20149L2441996-01-29029 January 1996 Safety Evaluation Accepting Insp & Evaluation Methodology for Operation of Unit 3 Core Shroud for Duration of Current Operating Cycle,Performed in Response to GL 94-03 ML20096E0461996-01-16016 January 1996 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 213 & 218 to Licenses DPR-44 & DPR-56,respectively ML20096D0041996-01-11011 January 1996 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 212 & 217 to Licenses DPR-44 & DPR-56,respectively ML20096C9541996-01-11011 January 1996 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 211 & 216 to Licenses DPR-44 & DPR-56,respectively ML20094B1041995-10-17017 October 1995 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 215 to License DPR-56 ML20092D7501995-08-30030 August 1995 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 210 & 214 to Licenses DPR-44 & DPR-56,respectively ML20087A7931995-07-18018 July 1995 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 211 to License DPR-56 ML20086Q0701995-07-10010 July 1995 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 210 to License DPR-56 ML20085M9541995-06-19019 June 1995 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 207 & 209 to Licenses DPR-44 & DPR-56,respectively ML20087G0101995-06-13013 June 1995 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 206 to License DPR-44 ML20086E0481995-06-13013 June 1995 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 205 & 208 to Licenses DPR-44 & DPR-56,respectively 1999-09-24
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEAR05000278/LER-1999-005-03, :on 990920,uplanned Esfas During Planned Mod Activitives in Main CR Were Noted.Caused by Inattention to Detail by Individuals Performing Work.All CR Mods Were Ceased to Allow Review of Mod Work Packages.With1999-10-20020 October 1999
- on 990920,uplanned Esfas During Planned Mod Activitives in Main CR Were Noted.Caused by Inattention to Detail by Individuals Performing Work.All CR Mods Were Ceased to Allow Review of Mod Work Packages.With
ML20217K9931999-10-14014 October 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 234 to License DPR-56 ML20217B4331999-10-0505 October 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 233 to License DPR-56 05000278/LER-1999-004-03, :on 990901,3A RPS Bus Was Inadvertently Deenergized,During Planned Mod Activities on Main CR Panel. Caused by Electrician Failing to Self Check Work.All CR Work Was Ceased Immediately & Shutdown Meeting Held1999-10-0101 October 1999
- on 990901,3A RPS Bus Was Inadvertently Deenergized,During Planned Mod Activities on Main CR Panel. Caused by Electrician Failing to Self Check Work.All CR Work Was Ceased Immediately & Shutdown Meeting Held
ML20217G3541999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1999 for Pbaps,Units 2 & 3. with ML20216H7091999-09-24024 September 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 229 & 232 to Licenses DPR-44 & DPR-56,respectively ML15112A7681999-09-20020 September 1999 SER Accepting Revision 25 of Pump & Valve Inservice Testing Program,Third 10-year Interval for Plant,Units 1,2 & 3 ML20212D1281999-09-17017 September 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Proposed Alternatives CRR-03, 05,08,09,10 & 11 05000278/LER-1999-003-03, :on 990814,HPCIS Was Declared Inoperable Due to Erratic Behavior Resulting in Loss of Single High Train Safety Sys.Caused by Weakness in Procedural Guidance. Readjusted Hydraulic Governor Needle Valve.With1999-09-13013 September 1999
- on 990814,HPCIS Was Declared Inoperable Due to Erratic Behavior Resulting in Loss of Single High Train Safety Sys.Caused by Weakness in Procedural Guidance. Readjusted Hydraulic Governor Needle Valve.With
ML20212A5871999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1999 for Peach Bottom,Units 2 & 3.With ML20211D5501999-08-23023 August 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 228 & 231 to Licenses DPR-44 & DPR-56,respectively ML20212H6311999-08-19019 August 1999 Rev 2 to PECO-COLR-P2C13, COLR for Pbaps,Unit 2,Reload 12 Cycle 13 ML20210N7641999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Jul 1999 for PBAPS Units 2 & 3. with 05000277/LER-1999-005-01, :on 990616,failure to Maintain Provisions of FP Program Occurred.Caused by Less than Adequate Engineering Rigor in Both Development & Review Analysis.Fire Watch Immediately Established.With1999-07-16016 July 1999
- on 990616,failure to Maintain Provisions of FP Program Occurred.Caused by Less than Adequate Engineering Rigor in Both Development & Review Analysis.Fire Watch Immediately Established.With
ML20209H1121999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for June 1999 for Pbaps,Units 2 & 3. with ML20195H8841999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for May 1999 for Pbaps,Units 2 & 3. with 05000278/LER-1999-002-02, :on 990406,safeguard Sys to Unrelated Door Was Inadvertently Disabled by Security Alarm Station Operator. Caused by Noncompliance with Procedures & Less than Adequate Shift Turnover.Briefed Personnel on Event.With1999-05-0606 May 1999
- on 990406,safeguard Sys to Unrelated Door Was Inadvertently Disabled by Security Alarm Station Operator. Caused by Noncompliance with Procedures & Less than Adequate Shift Turnover.Briefed Personnel on Event.With
ML20206N1661999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1999 for Pbaps,Units 2 & 3. with ML20206A2921999-04-20020 April 1999 Safety Evaluation Concluding That Proposed Changes to EALs for PBAPS Are Consistent with Guidance in NUMARC/NESP-007 & Identified Deviations Meet Requirements of 10CFR50.47(b)(4) & App E to 10CFR50 05000278/LER-1999-001-03, :on 990312,ESF Actuation of Rcics Occurred Due to High Steam Flow Signal During Sys Restoration.Temporary Change to Restoration Procedure Was Initiated to Open RCIC Outboard Steam Isolation Valve in Smaller Increments1999-04-0808 April 1999
- on 990312,ESF Actuation of Rcics Occurred Due to High Steam Flow Signal During Sys Restoration.Temporary Change to Restoration Procedure Was Initiated to Open RCIC Outboard Steam Isolation Valve in Smaller Increments
ML20205K7411999-04-0707 April 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 227 & 230 to Licenses DPR-44 & DPR-56,respectively ML20205P5851999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1999 for Peach Bottom Units 2 & 3.With ML20207G9971999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1999 for Peach Bottom Units 2 & 3.With 05000278/LER-1998-009-01, :on 981227,unplanned Esfa Were Noted.Caused by Transformer Insulator Failure.Replaced Failed Insulator. with1999-01-20020 January 1999
- on 981227,unplanned Esfa Were Noted.Caused by Transformer Insulator Failure.Replaced Failed Insulator. with
ML20199E3471998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Dec 1998 for Peach Bottom,Units 1 & 2.With ML20206P1651998-12-31031 December 1998 Fire Protection for Operating Nuclear Power Plants, Section Iii.F, Automatic Fire Detection ML20205K0381998-12-31031 December 1998 PECO Energy 1998 Annual Rept. with ML20206D3651998-12-31031 December 1998 1998 PBAPS Annual 10CFR50.59 & Commitment Rev Rept. with ML20206D3591998-12-31031 December 1998 1998 PBAPS Annual 10CFR72.48 Rept. with 05000277/LER-1998-008-01, :on 981130,circuit Breaker SU-25 Tripped.Caused by Less than Adequate Procedural Guidance.Operators Verified Sys Integrity & Successfully Returned Sys to Svc.With1998-12-30030 December 1998
- on 981130,circuit Breaker SU-25 Tripped.Caused by Less than Adequate Procedural Guidance.Operators Verified Sys Integrity & Successfully Returned Sys to Svc.With
05000277/LER-1998-007-02, :on 981107,failure to Meet TS & Associated LCO Requirments of Absolute Difference in APRM & Calculated Power of Less than 2% Was Noted.Caused by Substitute Valves Being Used.Removed Substitute Valves.With1998-12-0404 December 1998
- on 981107,failure to Meet TS & Associated LCO Requirments of Absolute Difference in APRM & Calculated Power of Less than 2% Was Noted.Caused by Substitute Valves Being Used.Removed Substitute Valves.With
ML20196G7021998-12-0202 December 1998 SER Authorizing Proposed Alternative to Delay Exam of Reactor Pressure Vessel Shell Circumferential Welds by Two Operating Cycles ML20196E8261998-11-30030 November 1998 Response to NRC RAI Re Reactor Pressure Vessel Structural Integrity at Peach Bottom Units 2 & 3 ML20198B8591998-11-30030 November 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Nov 1998 for Pbaps,Units 2 & 3. with 05000278/LER-1998-005-03, :on 981025,inadvertent Unit 3 Electrical Bus E33 Trip (Esfa) During Performance of Unit 2 Electrical Bus E32 Surveillance Test Was Noted.Caused by Personnel Error. Sp S12M-54-E32-XXF4 Was Completed.With1998-11-20020 November 1998
- on 981025,inadvertent Unit 3 Electrical Bus E33 Trip (Esfa) During Performance of Unit 2 Electrical Bus E32 Surveillance Test Was Noted.Caused by Personnel Error. Sp S12M-54-E32-XXF4 Was Completed.With
ML20206R2571998-11-17017 November 1998 PBAPS Graded Exercise Scenario Manual (Sections 1.0 - 5.0) Emergency Preparedness 981117 Scenario P84 ML20198C6751998-11-0505 November 1998 Rev 3 to COLR for PBAPS Unit 3,Reload 11,Cycle 12 ML20195E5341998-10-31031 October 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Oct 1998 for Pbaps,Units 2 & 3. with ML20155C6071998-10-26026 October 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 226 to License DPR-44 ML20155C1681998-10-22022 October 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Proposed Alternative Plan for Exam of Reactor Pressure Vessel Shell Longitudinal Welds ML20155H7721998-10-12012 October 1998 Rev 1 to COLR for Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Unit 2, Reload 12,Cycle 13 05000277/LER-1998-006-02, :on 980915,automatic RWCU Isolation Occurred While Placing RWCU Sys in Svc.Caused by Unexpected Surge of Water.Procedure Change Was Initiated to Open MO-2-12-74 & RWCU Sys Was Successfully Returned to Svc.With1998-10-0909 October 1998
- on 980915,automatic RWCU Isolation Occurred While Placing RWCU Sys in Svc.Caused by Unexpected Surge of Water.Procedure Change Was Initiated to Open MO-2-12-74 & RWCU Sys Was Successfully Returned to Svc.With
ML20154J2401998-10-0505 October 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 224 & 228 to Licenses DPR-44 & DPR-56,respectively ML20154H4771998-10-0505 October 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 225 & 229 to Licenses DPR-44 & DPR-56,respectively ML20154G6821998-10-0101 October 1998 SER Related to Request for Relief 01A-VRR-1 Re Inservice Testing of Automatic Depressurization Sys Safety Relief Valves at Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station,Units 2 & 3 ML20154G6631998-10-0101 October 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 223 & 227 to Licenses DPR-44 & DPR-56,respectively ML20154H5541998-09-30030 September 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1998 for Pbaps,Units 2 & 3. with 05000278/LER-1998-004-03, :on 980820,automatic RWCU Isolation Occurred While Placing B RWCU Sys Demineralizer in Svc.Caused by less-than-adequate Control of Equipment.Isolated B Demineralizer & Returned RWCU Sys to Svc1998-09-18018 September 1998
- on 980820,automatic RWCU Isolation Occurred While Placing B RWCU Sys Demineralizer in Svc.Caused by less-than-adequate Control of Equipment.Isolated B Demineralizer & Returned RWCU Sys to Svc
05000277/LER-1998-005-02, :on 980824,noted Failure to Meet TS Actions for Suppression chamber-to-drywell Vacuum Breaker Not Being Fully Seated.Caused by Personnel Failing to Take All TS Required Actions.Temporary Procedure Changes Were Made1998-09-18018 September 1998
- on 980824,noted Failure to Meet TS Actions for Suppression chamber-to-drywell Vacuum Breaker Not Being Fully Seated.Caused by Personnel Failing to Take All TS Required Actions.Temporary Procedure Changes Were Made
ML20153B9651998-09-14014 September 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 9 to License DPR-12 1999-09-30
[Table view] |
Text
",. '
)
l p*"c oq\\
UNITED STATES 4"
g
.g.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
't WASHINGTON, D.C. 20665 0001 os...../
SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NOS. 229 AND 232 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NOS. DPR-44 and DPR-56 4
PECO ENERGY COMPANY PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY l
i DELMARVA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY ATLANTIC CITY ELECTRIC COMPANY l
PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION. UNIT NOS. 2 AND 3 I
DOCKET NOS. 50-277 AND 50-278 I
1.0 INTRODUCTION
By letter dated March 29,1999, as supplemented July 21,1999, the PECO Energy Company (the Licensee) submitted a request for changes to the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station,
(
I (PBAPS) Unit Nos. 2 and 3, Technical Specifications (TSs). The requested changes would
. delete the requirement associated only with the refueling platform fuel grapple fully retracted position interlock input, which currently is required by TS Surveillance Requirement -
(SR) 3.9.1.1. The proposed change will remove the fuel grapple fully retracted position (not fully up) interlock input, and the plant will also be modified to remove this position from the plant design.
The objective of the refueling interlocks in combination with the refueling procedures is to prevent an inadvertent criticality during refueiing operations. The refueling operations include the removal of reactor vessel upper internals and the movement of spent and fresh fuel assemblies between the reactor core and the fuel storage pool. The refueling platform and the
. equipment-handling hoists on the platform are used to accomplish the refueling task.
The July 21,1999, letter provided clarifying information that did not change the initial proposed no significant hazards consideration determination.
. 2.0 EVALUATION Ths FBAPS refueling interlocks are active when the reactor mode switch is in the shutdown or the refueling position. These interlocks, in combination with the refueling procedures, ensure safe movement of fuel.
9910010447 990924
q PDft ADOCK 05000277 F
F PD0t 7
<a Q.
-1
r 2-The current refueling equipment interlocks are required in TS 3.9.1, and inputs are identified in SR 3.9.1.1, which include the following:
e All-rod-in, Refuel platform position, Refuel platform fuel grapple, fue! loaded, e
i Refuel platform fuel grapple fully retracted position, e
Refuel platform frame mounted auxiliary hoist, fuel loaded, and e
i Refuel platform monorail mounted hoist, fuel loaded.
l e
These interlock conditions are combined in the logic circui! of the reactor manual control system j
(RMCS) to determine if all restrictions on refueling equipment operations and control rod
)
insertion are satisfied. This circuitry senses the con'.iiiions of the refueling equipment and the control rods, and depending on the sensed conditio is, interlocks are actuated to prevent the operation of the refueling equipment or the concurrant withdrawal of control rods.
As discussed in the PBAPS Units 2 and 3 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Section 14.6.4, Refueling Accident, the refueling interlocks are not used to prevent or to mitigate the fuel-handling accident. These interlocks are not assumed as an initial condition in the control rod drop accident, which is the most limiting condition during the normal power operating condition. They are designed to reinforce administrative procedures for moving fuel during refueling outages. These interlocks monitor the main, auxiliary, and monorail hoists conditions on the refueling 1.: ridge, and prevent the refueling bridge from moving toward the core if there is a control r-J withdrawn, and any of the hoists are loaded with fuel or the main hoist fuel grapple is not in the fully up position. This action prevents a fuel bundle from being inserted into a core location with a control rod withdrawn. This action also prevents a potential i
inadvertent criticality of the reactor.
Additionally, a rod block signal will be sent to the RMCS if any of the hoists are fuel loaded or the bridge is over the core. This action prevents a control rod from being withdrawn while fuel is being inserted into the vessel.
The licensee states that when the control rod drives (CRDs) are being replaced during an outage, the main hoist, which includes the fuel grapple, is used to perform CRD blade guide movements in the vessel. The CRD mechanism located under the vessel cannot be removed because of the rod block signal associated with the fuel grapple fully retracted position.
Therefore, CRD removal activities must be stopped whenever the main hoist is being used to perform the CRD blade guide movements. This interruption in the refueling operation unnecessarily increases personnel exposure and affects outage critical path activity. The licensee states that preventing work activities associated with CRD removal was not the intent of this rod block, in its submittal, PECO Energy states that the refueling platform fuel grapple fully retracted interlock is redundant and diverse to the fuel grapple fuel-loaded interlock. The main hoist uses a telescoping boom, which consists of several sections that are supported by cable and monitored by a load sensor. As each section of the boom is fully extended, its weight is no longer supported by the cable, but by tM section above it.
., l The weight sensed by the load sensor is the total weight of the fuel bundle, plus any sections of the boom that have not fully extended. A combined weight of the fuel bundle and the bottom section of the boom is more than 600 lbs, and the current fuel grapple fuel 'oaded setpoint is set at 550 lbs. This setpoint, in combination with the refueling procedures, ensures that a rod block signal would be provided to prevent a control rod from being inadvertently withdrawn
)
concurrently with fuel movement. In the event that a rod block signalis not positively verified by the operators, the refueling procedure would prohibit continued operation of fuel movement.
Therefore, the refuel grapple fully retracted position is not needed. The fuel grapple limit switch-associated with this position will continue to stop its upward motion, and will also continue to provide the full up position indication. However, its fully retracted position interlock signal will be removed from the RMCS, and a 7-day SR will no longer be required.
The staff has reviewed the information that the licensee has provided and considers that the
{
fuel grapple fuel-load interlock in conjunction with the existing administrative controls are sufficient to prevent control rods from being inadvertently withdrawn during fuel movement and will provide adequate protection from inadvertent reactivity addition accidents. The removal of the fue! grapple fully retracted position will not affect the fuel-rnoving operation and will enhance j
the CRD removal and maintenance processes. In addition, the refueling administrative procedur6s will continue to prohibit concurrent withdrawal of control rods e-d fuel movement in the vessel. Therefore, the proposed deletion of the fuel grapple fully retracted interlock and its associated SR is acceptable.
l
3.0 STATE CONSULTATION
in accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Pennsylvania State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendments. The State official had no comments.
4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION
The amendments change a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and change j
surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendments involve no i
significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (64 FR 43774). Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.
p...
4 5.0, CONCLUSION The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that (1) there
. is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Principal Contributor: D. Diec
. Date: September 24,1999