ML20205J692
| ML20205J692 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 09/05/1984 |
| From: | Bernero R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Ogeka G ENERGY, DEPT. OF |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20205J677 | List: |
| References | |
| CON-FIN-A-3778, FOIA-87-7 NUDOCS 8704010388 | |
| Download: ML20205J692 (82) | |
Text
...
, i i 1
j l SEP 0 51984
! Mr. Gregory J. Ogeka, Chief ;
! Administrative Branch j
Brookhaven Area Office -
U.S. Department of Energy Upton, New York 11973
Dear Mr. Ogeka:
j' l
SUBJECT:
BNL TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO THE DIVISION OF SYSTEMS INTEGRATION,
- NRR, NRC, " Review of the Probabilistic Risk Assessment for the I I
Seabrook Nuclear Power Plant" (FIN A3778) ,
I I
The enclosed NRC Form 173 Standard Order for DOE Work (Enclosure 1), is hereby submitted in accordance with Section III.8.2 of the DOE /NRC Memorandum of Understanding, dated February 24, 1978.
a The enclosed order provides funding authorization in the amount of $50,000 to
{ begin preliminary work in accordance with the enclosed Statement of Work (Enclosure 2). Please submit a proposal to provide technical assistance to the Division of Systems Integration. - Enclosure 2 details the required work ,
4 and should be used as the basis for preparing the proposal for submittal to
! this office. I l \
- Standard Terms and conditions for NRC work, as provided in the D0E/NRC l l Memorandum of Understanding of February 24, 1978, and described in NRC Manual
, Chapter 1102, should be used as the basis for preparing a proposal. If a por-
! tion of this work is to be subcontracted, it is required that BNL have a pro-i fossional assigned to the contract who is qualified to defend the results.
Also, prior approval by me in writing is required before initiation of any
! subcontractor effort. Please submit a proposal containing, as a minimum, the I information set forth in Enclosure 2 in the format of the Statement of Work l within 30 days to:
i Mrs. Sybil M. Boyd, Program Assistant Division of Systems Integration, P-1102 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555
! This work is to be started immediately due to the need for a coordinated
! program with Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (NRR/ DST funding, FIN No.
A-3754-4), which provides the " front-end" portion of the evaluation.
{
l The balance of the funds for completion of the project will be provided incre-4 mentally.at a later date, F02 H 7 1 0704010388 870330
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Mr. Gregory J. Ogeka. _ SEP 0 51984
. 6 If you have any qu:sti:ns concerning the acczptance of this order, pleaso contact Mrs. Sybil Boyd on FTS 492-7685.
Sincerely.
Originstsigned byf Robert M. Bernero. Director Division of Systems Integration Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Enclosures:
- 1. NRC Fonn 173
- 2. Statement of Work '
1 cc: R. Bari. BNL T. T. Romano. BNL W. Kato BNL W. T. Pratt. BNL '
l',
Khatib-Rahbor. BNL H. J. Rauch. Of00-DOE R. Barber. DOE-HQ G. Grahn, BNL -
l DISTRIBUTION NRR Official Project File (LSolander)
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- PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE SHEETS ON FILE WITH RSB** I
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OFFICIAL RECORD COPY cc .stu sie no sci uncu eno
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- Mr. Gregory J. Ogeka If you have any questions co'ncerning the acceptance of this order, please contact Mrs. Sybil Boyd on FTS,492-7685.
'~
Sincerv1y, Original Signed By.s gRobert M. Bornero /
~- Robert M. Bernero, Director Division of Systems Integration
.[
, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
~'
Enclosures:
~
- 1. NRC Form 173 "' "
- 2. Statement of Work , .
~*
cc: R. Bari, BNL '
T. Romano, BNL -
~*
W. Kato, BNL '*
- Md.d/ 4 M."euer,
-0. Khatib-Rahbor.
0% GH C' !
A R. Barber DOE-HQ U V
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DISTRIBUTION NRR Official Project File (LSolander)
RSB R/F WLyon R/F SBoyd, DSI- ,
RBernero AD/RS Rdg.
BSheron JRosenthal WLyon l
- PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE ON FJkCWJM # /
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/
NRC FORM 173 U S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSON ORDER NUIASER
- 20-84-643 i
~
~
^
STANDARD ORDER FOR DOE WORK -
SEP 0 51934 l'SSUED TO: (DOE Office) ISSUED BY: (NRC Office) ACCOUNTING CITATig s APPRCPRIATION SYMBOL ~
Brookhaven Area Office Office of Nuclear Reactor 31X0200.204 Regulation, DSI gg,g,,,,
PERFORMING ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION 20~19-40-41-3 Brookhaven National Laboratory F g *8g Upton, New York WORK PERIOD - THl$ CRDER Te M of the Probabilistic Risk Assessment for the Seabrook NQ ESMATED,C 7
Nuclear Power Plant OT[63/84 ,88/30/85 OBLIGATION AVAILABILITY PROVIDED BY:
A THIS ORDER S 50,000 8 TOTAL OF ORDERS PLACED PRIOR TO THl3 DATE WITH THE PERFORMING ORGANIZATION UNDER THE
- SAME " APPROPRIATION SYMBOL" AND THE FIRST FOUR DIGITS OF THE "S&R NUMBER" CITED ABOVE. 7,212,000 C. TOTAL ORDERS TO DATE (TOTAL A & 8) $
7,262.000 ,_
D. AMOUNT INCLUDED IN "C" APPUCABLE TO THE " FIN NUMBER" CITED IN THIS ORDER. S 56,000 FINANCIAL FLEXI8ILITY:
[ FUNDS WILL NOT BE REPROGRAMMED SETWEEN FINS UNE D CONSTITUTES A LIMITATION ON OBUGATONS AUTHOF:lZED.
w FUNDS MAY BE REPROGRAMMED NOT TO EXCEED 210% OF FIN LEVEL UP TO &$0K. UNE C CONSTITUTES A LtWITATION ON 08UGATIONS AUTHORIZED.
STANDARD TERMS AND CONDITIONS (see NRC Manual Chapter 1102, Appendix Part 4) ARE PART OF THIS ORDER UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTEC ATTACHMENTS THE FOLLOWING ATTACHMENTS ARE HERE8Y MADE A PART OF THl3 SECURrTY; ORDER C WORK ON THIS ORDER INVOiVES CLASSIFIED X. STATEMENT OF WORK INFORMATION. NRC FORM 187 l$ ATTACHED.
C ADOITONAL TERMS AND OONDITIONS C WORK ON THIS ORDER INVOWLS UNCLASSIFIED C OTHER SAFEGUARDS. PROPRIETA RY. OR OTHE 4 SENSITIVE INFORMATION F LE K f WORK ON THIS ORDER IS UNCLASSIFIED AND NOT S"[SITIVE REMARKS (Reierence the proposal by number and date, and stMtoCete d the etteched statement et werer moddes the DOE proposal)
This order provides incremental funds for initiation of urgently needed work in accordance with the attached Statement of Work. BNL should provide a. proposal within 30 days to S. Boyd, DSI with a copy to T. DiGaloma, PPAS/NRR.
8/l / A D
/ / // W TH W9TY[ ACCEPTING ORGANIZATION
'ffM'eY ( N ner [ D 5 TITLE TITLE Division of Systems Integration <
ptRC FORM 173 11-84) DATE Fe28- 22: 7 d// y
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- ENCLOSURE TO SBN- 1146 -
Generic Letter 83 Summary Status NHY-Position Response Ref. Comments 1.1 Post Trip Review (Program Description and Procedure) 1.1 Licensees and applicants shall describe their SBN-576 Post Trip Review procedure-program for ensuring that unscheduled reactor Nov. 4, 1983 0S1000.08 was submitted in shutdowns are analyzed and that a determination SBN-ll37 SBN-ll37. This response 1
is made that the plant can be restarted safely. June 24, 1986 should close out item 1.1, ,
j A report describing the program for review and including 1.1.1 through 1.1.7, t
analysis of such unscheduled reactor shutdowns should include, as a minimum:
i 1.1.1 The criteria for determining the acceptability of restart.
, 1.1.2 The responsibilities and authorities of personnel who will perform the review and analysis of these events.
, 1.1.3 The necessary qualifications and training for the responsible personnel.
1.1.4 The sources of plant information necessary to
} conduct the review and analysis. The sources of '
information should include the measures and equipment that provide the necessary detail and i l type of information to reconstruct the event accurately and in sufficient detail for proper understanding. (See Action 1.2) l a
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Position Response Ref. -
Comments
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1.1.5 The methods and criteria for comparing the event information with known or expected plant behavior (e.g., that safety-related equipment operates as required by the Technical Specifications or other performance specifications related to the safety functions).
1.1.6 The criteria for determining the need for independent assessment of an event (e.g., a case in which the cause of the event cannot be posi- '
tively identified, a competent group such as the Plant Operations Review Committee, will be consulted prior to authorizing restart) and guidelines on the preservation of physical evidence (both hardware and software) to support independent analysis of the event.
1.1.7 Items 1 through 6'above are considered.to be the basis for the establishment of a systematic method to assess unscheduled reactor shutdowns.
The systematic safety assessment procedures compiled from the above items, which are to be used in conducting the evaluation,'should be in the report.
_ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _-, _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___i__ _ _ . _ . _ _
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, NRY Position Response Ref. Commente l 1.2 Post Trip Review - Data and Information Capability !
i 1.2 Licensees and applicants shall have, or have SBN-576 NRC's " Technical Evaluation planned, a capability to record, recall, and display Nov. 4, 1983 Report for Generic Letter-data and information to permit diagnosing the causes SBN-961 83-28 Item 1.2" was addressed of unscheduled reactor shutdowns prior to restart Mar. 6, 1986 in SBN-961. This response and fnt ascertaining the proper functioning of should close out Item 1.2, !
safety-related equipment. including 1.2.1 through 1.2.4, of Generic Letter 83-28.
Adequate data and information shall be provided to i correctly diagnose the cause of unscheduled reactor !
shutdowns and the proper functioning of safety-related equipment during these events using systematic safety '
! assessment procedures (Action 1.1). The data and information shall be displayed in a form that permits ease of assistlation and analysis by persons trained in the use of systematic safety assessment procedures.
A report shall be prepared which describes and justifies the adequacy of equipment for diagnosing an unscheduled reactor shutdown. The report shall describe as a minimum:
1.2.1 Capability for assessing sequence of events (on-off SBN-576 indications). Nov. 4, 1983 SBN-961 .
i
- 1. Brief description of equipment (e.g., plant Mar. 6, 1986 computer, dedicated computer, strip chart).
- 2. Parameters monitored. '
- 3. Time discrimination between events. '
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_I__-__________ ___ 4 _ _ _ _ .
__ _ .__ _ _ _ _ _ m _ _ _ __ _ _ _ ___ __ _- .
NHY Position Response Ref. Comments I
- 4. Format for displaying data and information.
- 5. Capability for retention of data and information.
- 6. Power source (s) (e.g., Class 1E, non-Class IE, noninterruptable).
4 1.2.2 Capability for assessing the time history of analog SBN-576 variables needed to determine the cause of Nov. 4, 1983 unscheduled reactor shutdowns, and the functioning SBN-961 of safety-related equipment. Mar. 6, 1986 i 1. Brief description of equipment (e.g., plant computer, dedicated computer, strip charts).
- 2. Parameters monitored, sampling rate, and basis for selecting parameters and sampling rate.
- 3. Duration of time history (minutes before trip and minutes after trip).
f 4. Format for displaying data including scale
! (readability) of time histories. ,
- 5. Capability for retention of data, information, .
and physical evidence (both hardware and software).
1.2.3 other data and information provided to assess the SBN-576 cause of unscheduled reactor shutdowns. Nov. 4, 1983 SBN-961
, Mar. 6, 1986 1.2.4 Schedule for any planned changes to existing data SBN-576 '
and information capability. Nov. 4, 1983 i
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' NNY '
t _ Position _ Response Ref. Commente i
4
{ _2.1 Equipment Classification and Vendor Interface i (Reactor Trip System Components)
}
2.1.1 Licensees and applicants shall confirm that all SBN-576
! In SBN-861, NHY stated that components whose functioning is required to trip Nov. 4, 1983 an engineering review of. '
i the reactor are identified as safety-related on SBN-861 applicable documents had been 4
documents, procedures, and information handling Aug. 22, 1985 performed and the reactor systems used in the plant to control safety-related trip system components had
- activities, including maintenance, work orders, and been identified and classifi '
{- parts replacement.
j as safety related. This response should close out !
j i Item 2.1.1 of Generic Letter 83-28.
I d
2.1.2 In addition, for these components, licensees and SBN-576 In SBN-576, NHY stated that
- applicants shall establish, implement, and maintain Nov. 4, 1983 this requirement is satisfied a continuing program to ensure that vendor informa- by existing provisions of tion is complete, current, and controlled throughout beabrook Station Administra-the life of the plant, and appropriately referenced tive and Quality Assurance 3 or incorporated in plant instructions and procedures. procedures. This response 4 should close out Item 2.1.2 of Generic Letter 83-28.
2.1.3 Vendors of these components should be contacted and SBN-576 In SBN-576, NHY stated that an interface established. Where vendors can not be Nov. 4, 1983 this requirement is satisfied identified, have gone out of business, or will not by existing provisions of supply the information, the licensee or applicant Seabrook Station Administre-shall assure that sufficient attention is paid to tive and Quality Assurance l
equipment maintenance, replacement, and repair to procedures. This response compensate for the lack of vendor backup to assure reactor trip system reliability. should close out Item 2.1.3 ;
1 of Generic Letter 83-28.
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. NHY I Position Response Ref. -
Comments -
j 2.1.4 The vendor interface program shall include periodic SBN-576 In SBN-576. NHY stated that 1 communication with vendors to assure that all appli- Nov. 4, 1983 this requirement is satisfied i
cable information has been received. The program by existing provisions of l should use a system of positive feedback with vendors Seabrook Station Administra-for mailings containing technical information. This tive and Quality Assurance could be accomplished by licensee acknowledgment for procedures. This response receipt of technical mailings. should close out Item 2.1.4 of Generic Letter 83-28.
2.1.5 The program shall also define the interface and SBN-576 i In SBN-576. NHY stated that i division of responsibilities among the licensees and Nov. 4, 1983 this requirement is satisfie,
, the nuclear and nonnuclear divisions of their vendors by existing provisions of that provide service on Reactor Trip System components Seabrook Station Administra-to assure that requisite control of and applicable tive and Quality Assurance
] instructions for maintenance work are provided. procedures. This response i
should close out Item 2.1.5 of Generic Letter 83-28.
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. NNY Position Response Ref. Comments 2.2 Equipment Classification and Vendor Interface (Program for All Safety Related Components) 2.2 Licensees and applicants shall submit, for staff review, SBN-576 NHY provided its original a description of their programs for safety-related equip- Nov. 4, 1983 response to Item 2.2.1.1, ment classification and vendor interface as described below: through 2.2 1.6 in SBN-576.
The NRC's Request for 2.2.1 For equipment classifications, licensees and applicants SBN-576 Additional Information shall describe their program for ensuring that all components Nov. 4, 1983 letter of June 18, 1985, of safety-related systems necessary for accomplishing indicated that in a required safety functions are identified as safety-related preliminary review of all on documents, procedures, and information handling systems of the 2.2 items, no further l used in the plant to control safety-related activities, information was requested including maintenance, work orders and replacement parts. and the original response This description shall include: ,
in SBN-576 was adequate. :
NRY assumes that all 2.2.1.1 The criteria for identifying components as safety SBN-576 Items 2.2.1 are acceptable related within systems currently classified as safety Nov. 4, 1983 and closed.
related. This shall not be interpreted to require changes in safety classification at the systems level.
2.2.1.2 A description of the information handling system used SBN-576 to identify safety-related components (e.g., computer- Nov. 4, 1983 ized equipment list) and the methods used for its development and validation.
2.2.1.3 A description of the process by which station personnel SBN-576 use this information handling system to determine that Nov. 4, 1983 an activity is safety related and what procedures for maintenance, surveillance, parts replacement, and other activities defined in the introduction to 10CFR50, Appendix B, apply to safety-related components.
4
NHY Position Response Ref. Comments
- 2.2.1.4 A description of the management controls utilized to SBN-576
- verify that the procedures for preparation, validation. Nov. 4, 1983 and routine utilization of the information handling system have been followed.
- 2.2.1.5 A demonstration that appropriate design verification SBN-576 i
and qualification testing is specified for procurement Nov. 4, 1983 j of safety-related components. The specifications shall include qualification testing for expected safety service
! conditions and provide support for the licensee's receipt of testing documentation to support the limits of life recommended by the supplier.
j 2.2.1.6 Licensees and applicants need only to submit for staff SBN-576 review the Equipment Classification Program for safety- Nov. 4, 1983
) related components. Although not required to be sub-mitted for staff review, your Equipment Classification 1 Program should also include the broader class of struc-i tures, systems, and components important to safety required by GDC-1 (defined in 10CFR50, Appendix A.
" General Design Criteria, Introduction").
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NNY I Position Response Ref. Comments 1
I i 2.2.2 For vendor interface, licensees and applicants shall SBN-556 IEIY stated in SBN-576 that l establish, implement, and maintain a continuing program Sept. 6, 1983 they would be participating
- to ensure that vendor information for safety-related SBN-564 in the program established by components is complete, current, and controlled Sept. 6, 1983 NUTAC. In SBN-676, NHY ,
j throughout the life of their plants, and appropriately SBN-576 reestablished this commitment i referenced or incorporated in plant instructions and Nov. 4, 1983 to be a full participant in l procedures. Vendors of safety-related equipment should SBN-676 the newly established Nuclear be contacted and an interface established. Where June 29, 1984 Plant Reliability Data Syster vendors cannot be identified, have gone out of business, (NPRDS) by commercial j or will not supply information, the licensee or appli- operation. This effort is i cant shall assure that sufficient attention is paid to ongoing and NHY fully intends equipment maintenance, replacement, and repair to to have this program in place
- compensate for the lack of vendor backup to assure by commercial operation. This reliability commensurate with its safety function response should'close out
} (CDC-1). The program shall be closely coupled with Item 2.2.2 of Generic Letter Action 2.2.1 above (equipment qualification). The 83-28.
program shall include periodic communication with vendors to assure that all applicable information has been received. The program should use a system of I positive feedback with vendors for mailings containing
- technical information. This could be accomplished by
] licensee acknowledgment for receipt of technical i mailings. It shall also define the interface and j division of responsibilities among the licensee and
! the nuclear and nonnuclear divisions of their vendors i that provide service on safety-related equipment to assure that requisite control of and applicable l instructions for maintenance work on safety-related
! equipment are provided.
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NRY '
) Position Response Ref. Commente i
3.1 Post-Maintenance Testing (Reactor Trip System Components)
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3.1.1 Licensees and applicants shall submit the results of their SBN-576 Procedures have been develeped 1 .eview of test and enintenance procedure and Technical Nov. 4, 1983 to provide the necessary guid-Specifications to assure that post-maintenance operability ance to perform post-maintenance i testing of safety-related components ir the Reactor Trip operability testing of safety System is required to be conducted and that the testing related components in the demonstrates that the equipment is capable of performing Reactor Trip System. This l its safety functions before being returned to service. response should close out I 1
{ 3.1.1 of Generic Letter 83-2s.
1 j 3.1.2 Licensees and applicants shall submit the results of SBN-576 A Westinghouse modification has
! their check of vendor and engineering recommendations to Nov. 4, 1983 been incorporated at Seabrook -
) '
ensure that any appropriate test guidance is included in Station for the Reactor Trip the test and maintenance procedures or the Technical System, and maintenance and
- Specifications, where required. post-maintenance procedures
. have been developed to i
incorporate these changes.
This response should close out jl Itsa 3.1.2 of Generic Letter 83-28.
l 3.1.3 Licensees and applicants shall identify, if applicable, SBN-576 Itse 3.1.3 was accepted by l
any post-maintenance test requirements in existing Nov. 4, 1983 the NRC in the SER letter of l Technical Specifications which can be demonstrated to December 24, 1985.
j degrade rather than enhance safety. Appropriate changes j to these test requirements, with supporting justification, shall be submitted for staff approval. (Note that Action l
4.5 discusses on-line system functional testing.)
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y l Position Response Ref. Commente j j
3.2 Post-Maintenance Testing (All Other Safety-Related Components) ;
- 3.2.1 Licensees and applicants shall submit a report document- SBN-576 In SBN-576. NHY stated that four
! ing the extending of test and maintenance procedures and Nov. 4, 1983 general procedures already in l Technical Specifications review to assure that post-.
place required a specific review t i maintenance operability testing of all safety-related for post-maintenance testing
] equipment is required to be conducted and that the requirements and that such ;
testing demonstrates that the equipment is capable of testing will be included in the performing its safety functions before being returned to individual procedures. All service.
Post-maintenance operability testing procedures for identi-fled safety related equipment i will be developed and in place as required. This response l' should close out Item 3.2.1 of l
1 3.2.2 Licensees and applicants shall submit the results of SBN-576 Procedures that have been l their check of vendor and engineering recommendations Nov. 4, 1983 developed for post-maintenance 3
- to ensure that any appropriate test guidance is included operability testing have been j in the test and maintenance procedures or the Technical reviewed to incorporate any '
- Specifications where required.
! vendor and engineering
- recommendations. This response i
should close out Item 3.2.2 of Generic Letter 83-28.
j 3.2.3 Licensees and applicants shall. identify, if applicable. SBN-576 Item 3.2.3 was accepted by-any post-maintenance test requirements in existing Nov. 4. 1983 the NRC in the Sgt letter of '
Technical Specifications which are perceived to degrade SBN-861 December 24, 1985.
- rather than enhance safety. Appropriate changes to these Aug. 22, 1985 test requirements, with supporting justification, shall l be submitted for staff approval.
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NHY
- Poeition Response Ref. Commente * '
- 4.1 Reactor Trip System Reliability (Vendor-Ralated Modifications) 4.1 All vendor-recommended reactor trip breaker modifica- SBN-576 In SBN-868, NHY provided i tions shall be reviewed to verify that either
- 1) each Nov. 4, 1983 information to the NRC about modification has, in fact, been implemented; or 2) written SBN-868 the reactor trip breaker evaluation of the technical reason for not implementing I
Sept. 9, 1985 modifications. This response a modification exists. should close out Item 4.1 of i
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Peetties Response Ref. !!aaments i
j 42 Reactor Trip System Reliability (Preventing Maintenance i
and Surveillance Program for Reactor Trip Breakers)
}
4.2.1 A planned program or periodic maintenance, including SBN-576 In SBN-855, NHY provided lubrication, housekeeping, and other items recommended by Nov. 4, 1983 additional information to the the equipment supplier. SBN-855 j NRC about Seabrook Station's ,
Aug. 5, 1985 Periodic Maintenance Program j
{
, for Reactor Trip Breakers.
This response should close '
j out item 4.2.1 of Generic Letter 83-28.
4.2.2 Trending of parameters affecting operation and measured SBN-576 l In SBN-855, NHY provided during testing to forecast degradation of operability. Nov. 4, 1983 additional information to the SBN-855 NRC about Seabrook Station's Aug. 5, 1985 trend information that will be '
used to forecast degradation of l operability. This response should close out Item 4.2.2 of Generic Letter 83-28.
j 4.2.3 Life testing of the breakers (including the trip SBN-576 In SEN-576, NHY stated that the 3
attachments) on an acceptable sample size. Nov. 4, 1983
) Westinghouse Cuners Group has a
( a contract with Westinghouse for ;
cyclic life and class IE que18-fleetion of shunt trip cycli ,
testing of undervoltage trip of >
j DS breakers.
i 4.2.4 Periodic replacement of breakers or components consistent ;
SBN-576 Dependent on the results of the l with demonstrated life cycles. Nov. 4, 1983
! Westinghouse report, periodic
} replacement of breakers or com- ;
ponents will be scheduled.
l j These responses should close out Items 4.2.3 and 4.2.4 of Generic '
l Letter 83-28.
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NNY Position Response Ref. Commento j 4.3 Reactor Trip System Reliability (Automatic Actuation of
- Shunt Trip Attachment for Westinghouse and B&W Plants) i 4.3 Westinghouse and B&W reactors shall be modified by SBN-576 In SBN-868, NNY submitted
! providing automatic Reactor Trip System actuation of Nov. 4, 1983 information to Item 4.3 and the breaker shunt trip attachments. The shunt trip SBN-677 additional information was attachment shall be considered safety related (Class IE). June 29, 1984 issued in SBN-967. This SBN-747 response should close out i Jan. 7, 1985 Item 4.3 of Generic Letter l SBN-868 83-28.
j Sept. 9, 1985 SBN-967 Mar. 17, 1986 3
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3 NHY 5 Position Response Ref. Commente 4.5 Reactor Trip System Reliability (Systen Functional Testing) 4.5.1 The diverse trip features to be tested include the breaker SBN-576 Testing procedures have been undervoltage and shunt trip features on Westinghouse, B&W Nov. 4, 1983 developed to independently (see Action 4.3 above), and CE plants; the circuitry check the shunt and the used for power interruption with the silicon-controlled undervoltage trips. These rectifiers on B&W plants (see Action 4.4 above); and the procedures will be available scram pilot valve and backup scras valves (including all to the NRC open request.
initiating circuitry) on CE plants.
4.5.2 Plants not currently designed to permit periodic on-line SBN-576 In SBN-956 NHY provided testing shall justify not making modifications to permit Nov. 4, 1983 additional information to such testing. Alternatives to on-line testing proposed SBN-956 address Ites 4.5.2. This by licensees will be considered where special circum- Mar. 4,1986 response should close out stances exist and where the objective of high reliability Item 4.5.2 of Generic Letter can be met in another way. 83-28.
4.5.3 Existing intervals for on-line functional testing SBN-576 In SBN-956, NHY stated that since required by Technical Specifications shall be reviewed to Nov. 4, 1983 Seabrook Station is an NTOL, determine that the intervals are consistent with achieving SBN-956 no on-line testing history is high Reactor Trip Systems availability when accounting for Mar. 4,1986 available. A review of Generic consideration such as: Letter 85-09 for on-line func-tional testing requirements has
- 1. Uncertainties in component failure rates. been conducted during the review
- 2. Uncertainty in common mode failure rates. stage of the Seabrook Statio
- 3. Reduced redundancy during testing. Technical Specifications.
- 4. Operator errors during testing. Changes resulting from this
- 5. Component " wear-out' caused by the testing. review have been discussed with the staff. Any changes result-ing from the WOG testing will be discussed with the staff as it becomes available.
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NRC STAFF REVIEW 0F SEABROOK EPZ STilDY -
, PURPOSE: IDENTIFY AND REVIEW THOSE AREAS OF THE STUDY THAT ARE MOST SENSITIVE TO ITS PRINCIPAL CONCLUSTONS REGARDING:
INDIVIDilAL RISK,0F EARLY FATALITY AT SEABROOK WITHIN THE NRC SAFETY G0AL, RISK 0F EARLY FATALITY AT SEABROOK WITH ONE MILE EVACUATION IS E0!!IVALENT TO THE WASH 1400 RESULTS J ASSUMING 25 MILE EVACUATION.
RISK 0F RADIOLOGICAL EXPOSURE AT 1 MILE FROM SEARR00K IS LESS THAN THE RISK SHOWN AT 10 MILES IN NilREG 0396. .
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NRC STAFF PEVIEW 0F SEARR00K EPZ STUDY (CONTINUED)
STAFF REVIEW WILL FOCUS ON THE FOLLOWING:
PHYSICAL FEATURES OF THE. PLANT: ,
STRENGTH OF CONTAINMENT STRUCTURE AND ITS PENETRATIONS.
BEHAVIOR OF CONTAINMENT STRUCTURE BEYOND GENERAL YIELD STATE (BEYOND A STRAIN LEVEL AT WHICH CONTACT
~
WITH ADJACENT STRUCTURES OCCUR),
RHR SYSTEM FLOW PATH FROM THE CONTAINMENT STRUCTURE TO THE RHR VAULT.
MATERIAL STRENGTH PARAMETERS (MEDIAN VALUE AND VARIABILITY ASSUMPTIONS).
SEISMIC FRAGILITY OF RISK SENSITIVE COMPONENTS (THOSE SEQUENCES THAT LEAD TO EARLY CONTAINMENT FAILURE),
CONTAINMENT LEAK PATHS (PUR"E AND VENT VALVES, EFFECT OF DOUBLE ENDED PIPE RUPTURE IN HIGH ENERGY LINES, POST ACCIDENT MALFUNCTION OF VALVES).
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t NRC STAFF REVIEW 0F SEABROOK EPZ STUDY (CONTINilED) -
FEATURES OF PRA MODELS:
CONTAINMENT BYPASS AS.SUMPTIONS - PREEXISTING LEAKAGE, JNTERFACTINGSYSTEM[0CAS,
- COMPLETENESS, CHECK VALVE FAILURE DATA, SOURCE TERM REDUCTION FROM SCRUBBING, PLANT OPERATION PROCEDURES:
OPERATOR PEC0VERY CREDITS (EVENT V, STATION BLACK 0UT),
- OPERATOR ERRORS, INFLUENCE OF CONTAINMENT PRESSURE CAPACITY ASSESSMENT
,FOR VARIOUS FAILURE MODES ON RISK RESULTS, j f IMPACT ON RISK FROM ACCIDENTS DURING SHUTDOWN AND REFUELING,
-l RISK COMPARISON:
DOSE RATE DISTRIBUTION WITH DISTANCE, l
i TIME DELAYS BEFORE RELEASE, t 4 RISK 0F EARLY FATALITIES, 1
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NRC STAFF PRESENTATION TO THE ACRS ON THE REVIEW PLAN FOR THE SEABROOM EMERGENCY PLANNING SENSITIVITY. STUDY Scope and Focus of Staff Review S. Long (NRR)
Comparison of PLG~O456 with NUREG-0396 D. Metthnws (IE)
Methodology and Status of Reviews Source Terms T. Pratt (BNL)
, Risk Analysis a a j
Containment Structure.1 Integrity C. Hoffmeyer (DNL)
Containment Bypass R. Youngblood (BNL)
Interfacing System LOCA a ."
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PURPOSE OF REVIEW TO IDENTIFY AND REVIEW ThE PORTIONS OF THE STUDY THAT ARE MOST SENSITIVE WITH RESPECT TO THE STUDY'S PRINCIPAL CONCLUSIONS , , , _ , , , , , , _ , , ,
INDIVIDUAL RISK OF EARLY FATALITY AT SEABROOK IS WITHIN SAFETY GOAL 1 MILE EVACUATION AT SEABROOK PROVIDES SIMILAR RISK OF EARLY FATALITIES TO THE WASH-1400 RESULTS WITH 25 MILE EVACUATION ,
RISK OF RADIOLOGICAL EXPOSURE AT 1 MILE FROM SEABROOK IS LESS THAN THE RISK SHOWN AT 10 MILES IN NUREG-0396 i
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CRITERIA FOR COMPARISONS WASH-1400 SOURCE TERN MCTHODOLOGY WHOLE DODY DOSES
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MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO RISK DIFFERENT CONTRIBUTORS FOR DIFFERENT RISK COMPARISONS:
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- PROBABILITY OF EARLY FATALITIES, GIVEN EVACUATION, ,
APPEARS TO HAVE CONTRIBUTIONS FROM SEVERAL RELEASE li CATAGORIES AND EVENT INITIATORS. - -
EVENT V WAS DOMINANT IN ORIGINAL PSA DOSE VS DISTANCE CURVES (NO EVACUATION) ARE DOMINATED BY
- SINGLE RELEASE CATAGORY AND SEISMIC EVENT INITIATORS.
THESE CURVES WERE NOT PRODUCED IN ORIGINAL PSA.
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FOCUS OF STAFF REVIEW EFFORTS PLANT DESIGN FEATURES:
CONTAINMENT STRUCTURE RHR VAULT MODELING FEATURES: 'l i
CONTAINMENT RESPONSE AT HIGH PRESSURE . ,
CONTAINMENT BYPASS ASSUMPTIONS INTERFACING SYSTEMS LOCAS COMPLETENESS CHECK VALVE FAILURE DATA SOURCE TERM REDUCTION FROM SCRUBBING OPERATOR RECOVERY CREDITS EVENT V STATION Bl.ACKOUT ,
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.L Distance of intake and discharge structures from Mass Coast
Reference:
NOAA chart 13274 MA/NH State boundary 'M Rt. 86 '(determined from the 2 mi.'
aerial photo of the SB EPZ). We extended the line per-pendicular to the coast at the high water mark.
Nearest intake (innermost) = 2.20 Statute miles or 11,610 ft. .
(+ 50 ft.)
Nearest discharge (or Nozzle #6, middle of diffuser)
= 2.08 Statute miles or 10,980 ft.
(+ 50 ft.)
, Info on C12 fcader line
Reference:
Spec. No. 9763-006-248-55 (C12 pipe) ~
Dwg. No. 9763-F-202484 (Schematic of Cl2 system) .
Dwg. No. 9763-F-103000 (Intake seabed elevations) .
Note: Copies of references enclosed.
Piping N
17000 ft. of 8" fiberglass pipe inbedded in tunnel lining 2-3" risers per intake riser shaft which is further subdivided into 3-2" feeders per shaf t (total of 18, or 6 per 'shaf t)
Design pressures 300 psi 1 3" lines Q (see pg. 4 of Spec.).
, 300 psi 4 4 lines J ,
Seabed Max. Water
- Min Water ** ,
Elevation Head 9 Head 0' ;
- l. ' Intakes MSL C12 Discharge Pt. C12 Discharge Pt.
- 1 (innermost) 52.4 ft. 49.4 ft. 39.4 ft.
- 2 53.1 ft.- 50.1 ft. 40.1 ft.
- 3 (outermost) 54.3 ft. 51.3 ft. 41.3 ft.
Obtained by adding 4 f t. to seabed elevations 'to get max. tide then subtract 7 ft for approximate distance of C12 discharge point from ocean bottom.
- Obtained by subtracting loft from max. heads. '
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' W 4.% 90CUMENTS SUBMITTED BY-SEABROOK TO UPDATE THE PSA[IN 1986 ' > '%e .
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~1?SEABROOK STATION RISK MANAGEMENT AND EMERGENCY PLANNING' STUDY -
PLG-0432 December, 1985 1
INCLUDES: Full risk requantifications with new data.
Reassessment of containment strength and failure modes. (Direct healing judged not to challenge integrity based on IDCOR approach.)
Operator recovery from Station Blackout and Event V Reduction of Event V frequency due to check valve failure data analysis.
Credit for submerged release in 99% of the Event V sequences.
Reduced source terms based on IDCOR and BMI 2104 Quantification of uncertainties.
Comparisons of protective action options on basis of risk.
Comparisons of risk for various protective action options against WASH-1400, NUREG-0396 and Safety Goal
- 2. SEABROOK STATION EMERGENCY PLANNING SENSITIVITY STUDY PLG-0465 April, 1986 INCLUDES: Reevaluation of risk parameters using WASH-1400 source term methodology.
/
Comparison of risk for various protective action
, options to WASH-1400, NUREG-0396 and Safety Goal
- 3. S ISMIC FRAGILITIES OF STRUCTURES AND COMPONENTS OF THE SEABROOK GENERATING f'TATION, UNITS 1 L2 NTS Engineering Technical Report No. 1589.01 NOTES: The results of this study have not yet been included in the risk analysis, but are being included in a PSA update currently planned for completion in 1987.
Estimated effects of reductions in the seismic fragilities are reductions in the dominant contributors to both the risk of early fatality curves and the probability of dose vs distance curves.
A relay chatter problem was also identified, which is conservatively assumed to fail both diesel generators.
Recovery of the D/Gs and other potential relay chatter initiated failures are being considered in the fault FA2'N-# 7- 7 tree requantifications for the PSA update, e/s
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DRAFT DRAFT
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TECHNICAL EVALUATION OF THE EPZ SENSITIVITY STUDY FOR SEABROOM D aft Com- le t e Contents , 6uthor at_(NL
- Summary Pratt Nov.,7
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- 1. Introduction Pratt Oct. 27 1.1 Background 1.1.1 Uniqueness 1.2 Scope and Focus of Review 1.3 Organi:stion of Report
- 2. System Evaluation 2.1 Interfacing System LOCA 2.1.1 Operator Actions Luckan Oct. 27
- 7 2.1.2 Break Location Be:1er 77 2.1.3 Event Tree Ouantification Bo:okt Oct. 27 2.2 Accidents During Shutdown and Refueling Conditions Chu D:t. 27
+ 2.3 Induced Steam Generator Tube Rupture Lyon Oc, t . 30
- 2.4 Containment Isolation Failure Lu.:kas Oct. 27 2.5 Completeness P. Davis Oct. 27
+3. Evaluation of Containment Behavior Hofmayer Oct. 31 3.1 Evaluation of Structural Strength 3.1.1 Capacity at General Yield 3.1.2 Capability of Penetrations 3.1.5 Behavior at Large Deformatton 3.1.4 Summary of Structural Findings
- 3.2 External Events ?? ??
- 3S Treatment of Preexisting Leats 77 7?
- 4. Containment Event Tree 4.1 Sensitivity to Containment Loads Chun Oct. 27 I
- 4.2 Sensitivity to Containment Performance Chun Ctt. 31 N '
- 4.3 Sonv i tivi ty to E>:ternal Events ?? ?? ,
- 5. Review of Source Terms Uhatib-Rahbar Lct. T/
5.1 Fidelity to WASH-1400 Methodology 5.2 Credit for Scrubbing of Submerged i 1
Releases 1
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HAFT DRAFT
- 6. Site 8 Consequence Model 6.1 NUREG-0396 Basis Tingle Oct. 27 6.2 Consequence Modeling , Tingle Oct. 27 6.2.1 Whole Body Dose vs-Distance 6.2.2 Thyroid Dose vs Distance 6.2.3 Risk of Early Fatalities .
6.3 Time Before Release Comparisons Tingle Oct. 27
- 6.4 Sensitivity Studies Tingle Nov. 7
- 6.5 Comparisons of Results Tingle Nov. 7 I. 6.5.1 Results of Seabrook Study 6.5.2 NUREG-0396 l, 6.5.3 WASH-1400 6.5.4 NRC Safety Goal l 07. F'o t ent i a l Improvements for Risk Reduction l # Hardware 7.1 ?? ??
i i 0 7.P.' Procedures 77 ??
i 0 7.3 Regulatory Limitations 77 ??
O indicates that date was changed br section was reistated by NRC 0 indicates NRC wants information to be changed or added i
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The NRC is concerned that containment leakage may be greater than Technical Specification limits (in the event of a design base acci-dent) because of penetrations being inadvertently lef t open to atmosphere.
o Technical Specification 4.6.1.1.a requires verification that all penetrations not capable of being closed by operable containment autocatic isolation valves and required to be closed during accident conditions are closed by valves, blind flanges, or de-activated automatic valves secured in their positions. The verification must be performed at least once per 31 days except .
l for valves, blind flanges, or deactivated automatic valves lo-cated inside containcent and which are locked, sealed, or other-wise secured in the closed position. These penetrations must l be verified closed during each cold shutdown not more of ten than once per 92 days. Note that the Technical Specification is en-titled containment integrity and the LCO is applicable in Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4.
o In addition to the above surveillance requirements, Technical Specification 3.6.3 requires that with one or more containment isolation valves inoperable (for maintenance, repair, replace-ment, etc.), at least one isolation valve must be operable in each affected penetration that is open and:
i
- a. restore the inoperable valve (s) to operable status within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />; or
- b. isolate each af fected penetration within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> by use of
. at least one deactivated automatic valve secured in the ,
isolated position; or
- c. isolate each af fected penetration within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> by use of at least one closed manual valve or blind flange; or
, d. be in at least hot standby within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in cold shutdown within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.-
[o Techni:a1 Specification 3.6.1 3 requires that both doors for each f contaiament airlock be closed except when the airlock is being used for normal transit entry and exit through the containment, then at least one airlock door must be closed. The LCO for this Technical Specification is applicable in Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4.
We contend that the above Technical Specification requirements pro-
. vide adequate controls to ensure the following:
- 1. Containment penetrations required to be isolated in the event of an accident will not be inadvertently left open.
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- 2. In the event a non-automatic penetration isolation device (e.g.,
manual valve, blind flange, or reactivated automatic valve) must be opened when containme.nt integrity is required (Modes I, 2, 3, and 4), adequate provisions are implemented to ensure that the penetration will be isolated should an accident occur. !
& TH E F~[h 3If';)L.,f f~/ QF d2> J Tid O Q J .S' ~ M TA s rJnig37 I1A M m -> d I T=>a-1 3 cr ib M Ec2 Ev'ALO R TMJ. 27 MMCA tL5 A.S IF' u)2 M AJ.E* Al l THE PROVIGio JJ Tc> pEffW TN)S /? [ L d iR S. m d d 7 E x c. Q W 1H C r.>t + J T O A & PA.n . Tbn Q D. Aad C e.,iu. 13. .
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h What do Technical Specifications require for containment pressure?
o Technical Specification 3.6.1.4 requires that primary contai nment internal pressure be maintained between 14.6 and 16.2 psia during Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4.
h Would we be able to maintain Technical Specification secondary con-tai nment requirements without primary containment integrity?
o No. A f unctional requirement of secondary containment is to '
maintain a negative pressure of at least 0.25" W.G. In all secondary containment areas / cubicles. If a blind flange term- l inating in secondary containment was lef t of f or a non-bypass penetration that does not have an ef fective water seal was not isolated following a LOCA, the negative pressure could not >
possibly be maintained in secondary containment.
h Do all blind flanges isolating containment penetrations terminate i n .
o No. A blind flange serves as a pressure boundary on the outside doors of the equipment and personnel vacches. The flange is re-j' ,
moved to leak test its respective airlock. However, a DCR is to be implemented which will provide a tap line of f the . flanged connection complete with its own isolation valve. Once this DCR is implemented, the blind flange will no longer be removed to perform the leak test. At this time, there are no other blind flanges which serve as isolation devices located outside of containment.
1 e
Do all penetrations without blind flanges have isolation valves, or valves and check valves? ,
o Ref erence Section 6.2.4 of the FSAR for a detailed description of the containment isolation system.
o In general, all piping lines penetrating containment which are not flanged off are designed with redundant Isolation valves (one inside containment and one outside containment). The valves are either automatic or locked closed. A check valve
,1 is only deemed acceptable as an automatic valve when located f inside containment. Exceptions to this design are as follows.
Lines which form closed systems inside containment =and do not communicate with the reactor coolant system or
! containment atmosphere in accordance with GDC 57 are designed with one isolation valve located outside con-tainment.
- Certain small instrument lines are isolated by a sealed bellows arrangement located inside containment and a di aphragm arrangement outside containment. The lines are sealed fluid tubes.
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- - The normal RHR suction lines are not designed with an iso-lation valve outside containment.
- The inlet lines to the hydrogen analyzers are designed with 2 manual isolation valves. However, the isolation valve inside containment is locked open to ensure system avall-ability following a LOCA.
- Only one isolation valve is provided outside containment on the lines from the containment sump to the suction of the RHR and CBS pumps.
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' s IV.1 ADEQUACY OF EMERGENCY PLANNING ZONE DISTANCES
- 1. Statement of the Issue Following the Chernobyl accident, the population from a zone having a radius of 30 kilometers (18 miles) was evacuated in stages. This has been contrasted with U.S. emergency planning, which involves planning for a plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone (EPZ) having a radius of .
10 miles. In' addition, concerns regarding contamination of food products extended over a wide region, including areas outside of the Soviet Union.
The iss'ue is, what are the implications of the Chernobyl accident with regard to the adequacy of the 10 mile plume exposure pathway EPZ and 50 miles ingestion exposure pathway EPZ, as used in the U.S.?
I
- 2. Current Regulatory Practice Emergency planning is currently required (10 CFR 50.47) for all U.S.
nuclear power plants for two concentric zones having radii of 10 and 50 miles (except for plants with power levels below 250 Mwt). The inner zone, referred to as the plume exposure pathway EPZ, is one where the principal exposure sources would be from"the radioactive plume and from materials. deposited on the ground. The outer zone, referred to as the ingestion exposure pathway EPZ, is one where the principal exposure would be from ingestion of contaminated water or foods such as milk'and fresh vegetables.
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( The sizes of these zones were determined from considerations given in NUREG-0396. These specifically included consideration of the accident l
risks from the complete spectrum of severe accident releases given in l
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p WASH-1400. In addition, a distance of 10 miles was also chosen for the inner zone based on the conclusion that " detailed planning within 10 l miles would provide a substantial base for expansion of response efterts in the event that this proved necessary." (NUREG-0654)
Approval of both on-site and oft-site plans are required for full power licensing. The plans are also required to comply with a detailed list of standards, as given in 10 CFR 50.47.
In practice, the 10 mile plume exposure pathway EPZ has become a source of considerable misunderstanding. Many people appear to believe that, in
- the event of an accident, a relatively hasty evacuation by everyone within this area would be the only effective protective action. This misconception may also be fostered by periodic exercises having scenarios which call for substantial evacuation of this zone, plus the requirement that licensees submit evacuation time estimates for various sectors of F
the zone. Hence, it is not surprising that this zone has come to be i
mistakenly referred to as the evacuation planning zone,
- 3. Work In Progress i
There has been significant interest in re-evaluating emergency planning.
this area began to be of interest shortly after the Three Mile Island accident when observers noted the relatively small amounts of iodine released compared to the amounts of noble gases. This led a number of observers to claim that severe accident releases or " source terms" were much inver than previously estimated. Since the severe accident releases i estimated by WASH-1400 provided the bases for the sizes of U.S. EPZ's, this had significant implications for emergency planning.
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',._ A major NRC research effort began.about 1981 and has been underway since j then to obtain a better understanding of fission product transport and release under severe accident conditions. This " source term" research has included a very large and extensive contractor effort, inc~1uding the development and application of new computer codes regarding core-melt phenomena and containment performance. It also included an extensive review effort by peer reviewers, industry groups, and an independent assessment under the auspices of the American Physical Society. The report explaining and detailing this revised methodology to calculate- .
accident source terms was recently published in July 1986 as NUREG-0956.
l Revised ' risk profiles for 5 representative U.S. LWR's are in preparation
. - which will apply this methodology. This effort is expected to be published as NUREG-1150, for comment, by January 1987.
While this research effort was in progress, the staff had identified emergency planning as an area to be re-evaluated, depending upon the F
outcome of the effort. Industry groups too, have indicated a strong interest in this area. Baltimore Gas & Electric.Co. (BG&E) has requested a reduction in the size of the plume exposure EPZ for the Calvert Cliffs site from 10 miles to 2 miles, based upon source tem research results.
In addition, both IDCOR and the. AIF have claimed that a two-mile EPZ l
would, in view of revised source term estimates, provide an equivalent or greater degree of protection than the ten-mile EPZ, given WASH-1400 source terms.
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l During this period, the staff also explored alternatives to the I
conventional emergency planning strategies, making use solely of j WASH-1400 source terms. This led to the assessment of a concept known j i
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l as " graded response" which called for a prompt response, such as l i
evacuation, within about two miles of the plant, to be followed by a continued assessrent of accident conditions, identification of any contamina'ted areas, and a relocation of affected populations from these areas. A staff conclusion that such an approach had merit has been held in abeyance pending the outcome of the source term effort.
- 4. Assessment .
4.1 Accident Response Assessment
- 1. The Chernobyl release occurred with essentially no warning time, a high initial energy of release (producing an initial plume height of about 1200 meters), and a release duration of about ten days.
While the release fractions are considered comparable to the more severe release categories of WASH-1400, and release durations of similer magnitude are also considered more realistic based upon recent research, the zero warning time is considered to be unique to the RBMK design.
- 2. Residents in the town of Pripyat (about 5 kilometers NW of the plant) were initially advised to minimize the time spent outside and to keep windows closed. (Testimony by M.E. Sanders, FEMA) At about 8 AM on April 26, all outdoor activities were banned and potassium l
iodide (KI) was administered to school children. Most of the initial releases were carried above and around Pripyat. The decision to shelter on the day of the accident, rather than evacuate, appeared I to have been based upon several factors. These include ~d relatively low
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. 5 radiation levels (the Soviet protective action levels are 25 and 75 rem to the whole body) measured in Pripyat, while at the same tire hiah levels were measured along evacuation routes. In addition, Pripyat contained many multi-story buildings which affordd e good shelter, and finally, mass transport for the approximately 45,000 residents was not imediately available. The Soviet report on the accident stated that the decision to shelter resulted in the people of Pripyat receiving gama radiation doses 2 to 5 times less than the levels measured in the streets. .
By 'early April 27, radiati6n conditions in Pripyat worsened. By then.
- arrangements had been completed for over 1000 buses to arrive from Kiev for transport. Evacuation of Pripyat was ordered to comence at about 2 PM (approximately 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> after the initial release) and was completed about three hours later. Residents of Pripyat were estimeted generally to have received relatively low doses of 1.5 to 5 rad of gama radiation exposure and 10 to 20 rad beta radiation exposure to the skin.
It is not clear whether this initial evacuation extended beyond Pripyat, out to a distance of 10 km (6.2 miles), or was confined only to Pripyat itself.
- 3. Some time later (perhaps a few days to a week after the initial
, release) an additional evacuation of all the residents within a 30-kilometer 'rone, except for those already evacuated, 'was ordered.
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i A delayed evacuation such as was carried out in this second stage is better deserving nf the name relocation, rather than evacuation. It i
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- is not known over what time period it occurred, but it appears to have required extensive resources, since a-considerable number of farm livestock as well as about 90,000 persons were also relocated.
Indications are that most residents within this area rece'1ved doses less than 10 rem, although indiviciual: in several communities could have received doses of 30 to 40 rem.
- 4. It is not clear over what distances the Soviets had pre-planning.
The Soviets indicated at the IAEA meeting in Vienna that their .
response plans had only limited value and that they had to resort to "ad hoc" response. This appears to have involved a very large effort
- utilizing the military as well as other centralized elements on a national level. The basis for selecting 30-kilometers as the area for these actions is not known. This distance appears to have been selected based upon observed contamination levels and may have combihed aspects of both the plume exposure and ingestion exposure -
e zones contemplated by U.S. criteria. It is important to recognize that protective actions were carried out in a staged or phased L fashion, both with respect to distance as well as time. Whether this was planned or merely occurred as part of the ad hoc response to the accident is not known. j 4
4.2 Assessment of' Implications
- 1. The specifics of the Chernobyl release are unique to the RBMK design, and represent a near " worst case" in terms of the risks of nuclear I
energy. Because of differences in reactor design, the' probability
, . g
. 7 of a severe accident is censidered to be lower at U.S. comercial nuclear power plants. In addition, severe accidents at U.S. plants would typically progress over a longer time period, resultirg in longer warning times, and the amounts of activity released would be generally considerebly less because of the substantial containments around each U.S. plant. Therefore, accidental releases for U.S.
reactors are expected to be no greater (and probably considerably less) with regard.to the amounts of radioactivity released, and to have considerably greater warning
~
' times. For these reasons, assessment of the adequacy of U.S. EPZ distances in tems only of-the Chernobyl release is unwarranted.
- 2. There are some useful implications that can be drawn from the Chernobyl accident and the response to it, however. It appears that relatively prompt protective actions (those taken within the first few hours),
such a~s evacuation and sheltering, may generally be adequate to avoid early health effects and achieve a good degree of dose savings within relatively short distances. Furthermore, sheltering may
! be preferable to evacuation under certain conditions, especially if
~
i an initially elevated plume occurs and good sheltering is available. ,
However, where an initial decision is made to shelter close to the reactor, a good monitoring capability plus the ability quickly to notify the populace of any changed conditions appears to be essential.
In one respect it is difficult to compare the effective ess of sheltering at Chernobyl and U.S. practices for protective actions because of the large difference in protective action levels between the two e
i
8 l
countries. However, it is recommended that the U.S. further explore l
the relative advantages and disadvantages of sheltering vs. evacuation 7
at close distances for a variety of accident release, meteorological and shelter conditions given our own protective action guides.
l l
i 3. For large releases, protective actions may be warranted ever significant distances and may possibly extend beyond areas originally designated for pre-planning. Such actions appear to have a reduced degree of urgency than those taken at shorter distances in that they .
can be carried out over a longer time period (of the order of one or l
more days) and still result in relatively low risk levels to the I
g
- public. Such actions are likely to consist of sheltering i
and/orrelocation(delayedevacuation). The possibility that protective actions may extend beyond the range of a pre-desigrated planning area should be recognized, but need not be a cause for undue concern if this is accepted as a possiblity, if the reduced urgency and longer time scale for response are acknowledged, and if a capability exists on an "ad hoc" basis to extend the range of accident
' response, as needed. 0ne of the bases for selection of the 10 mile
~
plume exposure EPZ was, as stated earlier, that " detailed planning
~
within 10 miles would provide a substantial base for expansion of response efforts in the event that this proved necessary."
Based on Conclusions 2 and 3 there is nothing in the Chernobyl accident l
and response that implies that the 10 mile plume expos re pathway EPZ in J
the U.S. is inadequate with regard to the ability to plan and carry out a
! full range of protective actions for the population within this zone, as l well as beyond it, if the need should arise. ,
1
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9
/ 4. For large releases, concerns over contaminated water and foods such as milk and fresh vegetables may extend over very large distances, well beyond the 50 mile ingestion exposure pathway EPZ. This would involve monitoring and control efforts by a number of states as w' ell as the federal government, and could have trans-national implications, as occurred for the Chernobyl accident.
Because of the existing infrastructure and close coordination among state and federal organizations involved in radiation protection and control, a*
high level of capability already exists to handle such a situation.
Nev'ertheless, the Chernobyl accident does carry an implication that the
- role intended by the 50 mile ingestion EPZ should be re-assessed in light
) of these considerations.
, a
- 5. Conclusions and Recomendations O
- 1. Assessment of the adequacy of U.S. EPZ distances in terms only of the Chernobyl release is unwarranted.
- 2. Additional research should further explore the relative advantages and disadvantages of sheltering vs. evacuation at
- close distances for a variety of accident release, meteorological and shelter conditions.
l l 3. Protective actions taken in response to an accident;can be expected to be carried out in a staged or phased fashion both with regard to distance and time. High priority actions may be
! adequate over relatively short distances, while lower priority actions could extend over significant distances, possibly beyond those designated for pre-planning.
y
- 10
- 4. There is nothing in the Chernobyl accident and response that implies that the 10-mile plume exposure pathway EPZ in the U.S.
is inadequate with regard to the ability to plan and carry cut a full range of protective actions for the populatidn within this zone, as well as beyond it, if the need should arise.
- 5. The role intended by the 50 mile ingestion pathway EPZ should be re-assessed.
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,3 .g (olt1[36 f IV.2.A LONG-TERM RELOCATION
- 1. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES The existence of a sophisticated and experienced Civil Defense Organiza-tion, coupled with a long-standing Soviet commitment to the capability for both offensive and defensive chemical warfarel placed the Soviets in a good position for management of long-tem relocation of evacuees and de-contamination of land, equipment, structures and personnel, following the accident at Chernobyl.
The Soviets have been prepared to relocate the worker and industry since World War II.2 They have, in place, the organization, criteria, attitude and experience to enable them to carry out massive evacuations and long-i tem relocation of whole industries. Although there were some problems in comunications and transportation resources, the Soviets were able to .
move, large populations of personnel and livestock to dispersive areas remote from the immediate hazards of the Chernobyl accident. Long stand-ing policy maintained the organization to comunicate with evacuees, main-I tain transportation, registration of evacuees, order and contact between family units, relocate, house and feed large numbers of people in a very short time. It appears that the attitude of the Soviet people enabled long-term relocation to be effected with little difficulty, including the removal and relocation to sumer camps and other facilities, en masse, the children of the city of Kiev.3 When the authorities decided to evacuate the Chernobyl area, 2,172 buses and 1,786 trucks were provided, nearly 4,000 drivers were mobilized, the .
reception of the evacuees in new places was organized and accomodations reservec in, hotels and boardino houses.4
' As a result, the 45,000 inhabitants of Pripyat, the town near Chernobyl, i were evacuated in about three hours. It took more time to evacuate the
{
people from nearby villages because the famers did not wish to leave at j the height of their spring work. However, an additional 90,000 people l IThe Soviets have more than 80,000 officers and enlisted specialists trained in chemical warfare. They have 20,000 special vehicles for reconnaissance and
- decontamination. Chemical warfare equipment and techniques are directly trans .
- ferable to radioactivity decontamination and control. S0VIET MILITARY POWER 1986, U.S.G.P.0., Washington, 1985, p. 71.
! 2GRAZHDANSKAYA OB0RONA (CIVIL DEFENSE), Yegorov, P.T., I. A. Shlyakhov, and N.
4 I. Alabin Vysshava Shkola (Publishing House for Higher Education), Moscow, 1970, p. 71.
! 3"There have been stories of families separated and unable to trace one anoth-er. And inevitably there have been people who tried desperately to return to their homes. Most were turned back." TheTimes(ofLondon), June 12, 1986, as indicated in World Press Review, August 1986, p. 61. ,
4SOVIETLIFE,No.9(360), September 1986,pp.34-41.
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, IV.2.A Long-Term Relocation were evacuated froir the villages within the 30 km zone.5 As people ar-rived in their assigned relocations they were provided with housing, three free meals a day, and a P200 allowance. Kitchen and garden plots were allotted in the villages. It is reported that most of the evacuees quick-ly assumed the new jobs provided by local authorities.4 Evacuation and relocation of personnel were triggered by rather high* (by U. S. criteria) dose action levels which, from the available information appear to be: ;
Lower Intervention Level (consideration) for Evacuation 25 REM /yr, Whole Body 6 Upper Intervention Level (mandatory) for Evacuation l 75 REM /yr, Whole Body 6 Although -- by Soviet Civil Defense policy -- large-scale evacuation plans were ir existence, these had to be modified to accomodate the distribu-i tion of radioactivity from the accident. Until public transportation **
could be deployed, evacuees were sheltered in their residences, and schools were not opened. Evacuation of the Pripyat area took place on 27 April (next day), after all the necessary transportation means, equipment, escorting personnel, were gathered and relocation areas defined, manned and equipped.
Long-tem relocation was accomplished through federal resources, although public contributions to the Chernobyl Fund, as of September 1986 have accumulated to P38.4 million.4
- 3. CURRENTRE5ULATORYPRACTICE,LONG-TERMRELOCATION l
To effect pre-planning for a large-scale, long-tem evacuation / relocation of the Chernobyl-related type is beyond the authority of the NRC. Unlike the Soviet Union, where a central government exerts control ell the way i
55anders, Marshall E., Testimony before the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Nuclear Regulation of the Comittee on Environments and Public Works, September 29, 1986, p. 4.
450VIET LIFE, No. 9 (360), September 1986, pp. 34-41
- These appear to be Civil Defense based levels rather than what would be ex-pected to be appropriate for use by U.S. civilian populations in peacetime.
6Konstantinov, Yu. O., " Criteria for Making Urgent Decisions on Measures of Protecting the Population in Case of an Accident at an AES, RADIATION SAFETY AND PROTECTION OF AES, Yegorov, Yu. A., Moscow Energostomtrat,1985,'
pp.
148-150.
l i
l i **The Soviets rely on public mass transportation. Private, low c'pacity a vehi-cles are insufficient in quantity to be significantly effective in mass evacua-tion in the Soviet Union.
l 1
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IV.2.A Long-Tem Relocation n
down to the " evacuation commission" of an individual industrial facility or town; in the U. S. there are many organizations to coordinate with:
utility, county, state Federal, each with their own prerogatives, inter- l ests and authority. l 1
- 4. ASSESSMENT The Soviets actively practice civil defense, supporting their efforts with organization, planning, personnel, equipment, supplies, and policy and authority from the very top of the government down to individual civil defense "comissions" within industrial complexes and villages. It would be useful to detemine the exact extent to which plans, organizations and resources exist in the U.S. to support a short-notice, long-tem reloca-tion effort such as was necessary of Chernobyl.
There is much involved in effecting a short-notice, long-tem relocation effort. Such a study could involve, among other things:
National Policy and Legislation on long-tem relocation Emergency Organization and its authority Transportation Resources Substitution Housing Resources Fiscal Support and Compensation Replacement Employment Accountability Mechanism s Public Attitudes
- 5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDA1 IONS Since it appears that there is uncertainty as to the preparedness of U.S.
- to effect a long-term relocations, it is recomended that the NRC in cooperation with FEMA and The Federal Radiological Preparedness Coordi-nating Comittee (FRPCC) review the issue. As part of the review, factors as outlined in Section 4 above should be taken into consideration.
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IV.2.B DECONTAMINATION
- 1. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 4
The accident at Chernobyl spread radioactive contamination over a wide
! area, with sufficient magnitude to require serious interdiction measures,
' including abandonment of property and massive evacuation and relocation of populations and livestock to dispersal areas remote from the hazards of the site.
Soviet commitment to the capability for both offensive and defensive chem-ical warfare has placed the Soviets in a good position for management of extensive decontamination of land, equipment, structures and personnel, following the accident at Chernobyl.1 The authorities quickly monitored the situation with aircraft, vehicle-mounted and foot teams and established an exclusion perimeter out .
to 30 km (18.6 mi.). Within this perimeter the area was divided into three sectors, based on the extent and magnitude of the contamination detected: a special zone -- some 4-5 km around the plant -- where ne re-entry of the general public is foreseeable in the near future, and where no activity beside that required at the installation will be pemit-ted; a 5-10 km zone, where partial reentry and special activities may be allowed after some time, and the 10-30 km zone, where the population may eventually be allowed in and agricultural activities may be resumed,Access but will be subject to a strict program of radiological surveillance.2 i
is controlled at each sector boundary, keeping contaminated vehicles and
- equipment within the area, and moving personnel through successive i less-conteminated areas.
The Soviets'are well equipped to handle large-scale decontamination of
- equipment, structures and areas. Media photographs of the area around Chernobyl reveal several kinds of sophisticated decontamination equipment which do not appear to have been hastily fabricated as a result of the accident. One particularly interesting unit resembles a " car wash" with decontamination solution sprayed from pierced vertical and overhead pipes, and drawn from a nearby water carrier.
i i
The Soviet military forces are known to possess the TMS-65 decontamination l j
i unit, consisting of a turbojet aircraft engine mounted on a swivel base on a truck chassis: it decontaminates vehicles as they drive past by direct-ing a decontaminating jet exhaust on the vehicles. A tank truck can be treated in about three minutes.3 IThe Soviets have more than 80,00 officers and-enlisted specialists trained in l chemical warfare. They have 20,000 special vehicles for reconnaissance and decontamination. Chemical warfare equipment and techniques are directly l transferable to radioactivity decontamination and control. S0VIET MILITARY POWER 1985, U.S.G.P.0., Washington, 1985, p.71.
1
( 21NSAG SUP94ARY REPORT ON THE POST-ACCIDENT REVIEWED MEETING ON T ACCIDENT, Vienna, 30 August - 5 September 1986, IAEA, p. 79.
3HANDB00K OF SOVIET GROUND FORCES, FM 30-40, Department of the Amy, 30 June 1975,Section XII, pp. 6-103 to 6-111.
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IV.2.B Decontamination The ARS-120 decontamination vehicle is more versatile, consisting of a 680-gallon storage tank mounted on a truck chassis. Water or decontaminants can be sprayed on roads, equipment, and vehicles. The ARS-12U can also supply water and chemicals to fill small decontamination devices or for showers, and water for steam cleaning of contaminated clothing. A newer ARS-14, with a larger tank on a heavier truck is also available.3 There are also various types of steam cleaning equipment, such as the truck-mounted DDA-53, for the decontamination of clothing and light equip-ment. Field showers can be set up for personnel. Hand-used equipment, such as the portable DKY, can be used with brushes and spray nozzles to clean vehicles and equipment.3 Soviet personnel utilized in the large area decontamination effort within .
the 30-km zone. appear to be from military units, and seem well equipped with respiratory protection, protective clothing, and well designed (from the field-use convenience aspect) radiation monitoring equipment.
In addition to the obvious buildings and other structures, roads and other paved areas, vehicles and other equipment -- including decontamination and reconnaissance vehicles -- the Soviets are decontaminating large areas of cropland, forest, orchard, etc., as well as taking preventative measures to prevent or minimize contamination of the watershed and the Pripyat River.
Decontamination techniques for most of the above, including those for personnel, appear to be similar to those used in the U. S. and other loca-tions in support of the nuclear weapons testing program, the TMI-2 acci-
, dent, as well as interdiction related to chemical spills, etc. Although related to the U. S. nuclear weapons testing program, desert areas and coral atoll environments have been decontaminated, but there is little U.S.
experience in the large scale decontamination of such terrain as forests and orchards or croplands with the purpose of restoring viability and productivity tn the land. The Soviets seem to be taking some novel ap-proaches to this problem, indicating that special agrotechnical and decon-tamination measures, designed to enable the reuse of contaminated lands for economic purposes, have been developed and are being implemented.
These methods include changing the traditional system of soil cultivation in the region, the use of special polymer dust-suppression compounds, changing the harvesting and crop processing methods, and so on.
Although extremely important in any large-scale decontamination effort, there does not appear to be any information on how the Soviets are han-dling their decontamination wastes associated with the "off-site" effort.
There are indications that the higher-level on-site decontamination wastes, together with the severely contaminated structures, etc., are being placed in a radioactive waste vault associated with oneeof the other Chernobyl reactors. For large-scale " environmental" decontamination ef-forts in U.S. testing programs, pits have been dug, lined, anp filled with 3HXNUEDDIGT3DVIIT"1RDUND FORCES, FM 30-40 Department of the Amy, 30 June 1975,Section XII, pp. 6-103 to 6-111.
IV.2.B Decontamination runoff solutions from decontamination efforts, then covered, and fixed against erosion. Also, in the U.S. the ultimate disposition of the wastes-would have a sociopolitical component as-well-as the technical component.
- 2. CURRENT REGULATORY PRACTICE Relative to large-scale decontamination of the environment, the NRC has no experience nor policy. On-site decontamination would be the responsibili-ty of the utility, using criteria established for decommissioning, if that were the direction, or established by the facility (approved by MRC) for continued operation. Off-site contamination criteria are the prerogative of the EPA. EPA has operational guidelines for external exposure and food pathways and is in the process of preparing guidelines for rentry. These have not yet been proposed by EPA as formal guidance for Federal agencies.
To date, large-scale environmental decontaminations of DOE facilities have been handled on an ad hoc basis. Decontaminations associated with trans-portation related situations have been essentially removal of all detect-able activity. The only real environmental decontamination effort near the magnitude of the Chernobyl situation was carried out by the Department of Energy, in conjunction with elements of the U. S. Army,-in the decon-tamination and " rehabilitation" of Bikini and Enewetok Atolls, in the Marshall Islands. The criteria were ad hoc, and based on economics and state of the art. The results are coliTroversial.
- 3. WORK IN PROGRESS:
Research on large-scale environmental decontamination efforts (actually results, with some spin-off on soil conditioning techniques) is currently
, being conducted in the Pacific in conjunction with the rehabilitation efforts for Enewetok Atoll, by LLNL, under contract with DOE.
Several efforts, and reports have been written focusing on decontamination limits, but no decision has been made establishing any criteria.
- 4. ASSESSMENT:
Large-scale environmental decontamination in the off-site area appears to be outside of the jurisdiction of the NRC in the area governed by the several states and the EPA. Capability for such decontamination does not exist as such at this time, although the expertise does lie within the Department of Energy, associated with the nuclear weapons testino program.
No specialized decontamination equipment exists similar to that employed within the Soviet military. Heavy equipment is available throughout the U. S. for earth moving, water spraying, etc., but none is equipped to
! operate in a contaminated environment and would require modification to l provide suitable protection of personnel. It would be useful,to determine the extent to which a compat able capability exists within the U. S. and worldwide under provisions of the recently signed international convention .
l ; on mutual assistance. The areas of trained and equipped pers,onnel, or the availability of predesignated equipment and supplies should be the primary focus. .
- o *.;
IV.2.B Decontamination
- 5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOP94ENDATIONS In the Soviet Union, large-scale decontamination capability rests with the military, because it supports many aspects of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical warfare. An open U.S. question is who should have the responsi-bility and authority for large-scale radiological decontamination. Should
- the focus for this capability be at the utility, local, state or Federal level? Advanced planning, on a contingency basis, could be effected.
Personnel with appropriate expertise could be identified. Equipment enuld be assessed, and plans to expedite necessary modification, if ever required could be prepared. With the economic and technical resources available in the U. S., pre-planning should provide any needed capability.
As a first step, it is recommended that the FEMA chaired, FRPCC review this issue and provide recommendations for further actions. ,
With respect to the disposal of the radioactive waste generated as a re-sult of decontamination, it is further recommended that NRC and EPA review this issue and provide an assessment and recomendations for any further actions.
0 1
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3 IV.3 USE OF POTASSIUM IODIDE PILLS i 1. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE l
Within hours after the beginning of the accident, volunteers were distrib-uting, door to door directly to individual residents, radiciodine prophy-lactic medications to children, young adults, and other members of the affected population in the Chernobyl area.1 Whether these pills were potassium iodide (KI) or potassium iodate, or other fonn of stable . iodide in solid (pill) form has not been confirmed. Since the Soviets were able to effect distribution of these prophylactics the morning of the accident it appears that they had stockpiles of the drug for insnediate issue, the organization to staff the distribution, and the policy for its use. There
- is no question that the Soviets are prepared to distribute radiciodine prophylaxis ati least in the vicinity of their nuclear power plants.
l That radiciodine prophylaxis was necessary is unquestionable. It appears
- that the triggering dose level for protective actions against radiofodine uptake (whether by ingestion - milk pathway, leafy vegetables, or by inha-
- , lation) is 300 mSV/yr (or 30 REM /yr) to the child's thyroid.2 This level is about 5 REM above the " break-even" point above which it is believed J
prophylactic doses of stable iodines should be administered. Current FDA Protective Action Guides for Ingestion of Contaminated Foodstuffs indicate preventive action when the projected thyroid dose exceeds 1.5 REM, and emergency action when the projected thyroid dose exceeds 15 REM.3 If timely, radiciodine prophylaxis can reduce the dose to the thyroid by as
! ; .much as 96%.4 i Available reports indicate that doses to the thyroids of individuals from inhalation.(and possible ingestion of contaminated foods) were estimated
- to be mostly below 300 mSv (30 REM), although some children may have re- ~
! ' ceived thyroid doses as high as 2,500 mSv (250 rad)5 [at these doses REM 1s somewhat undefined, and the term rad is used. . .at low doses. REM is il essentially equivalent to rad?.
i 2. CURRENT REGULATORY PRACTICE i There are no federal regulations requiring the use of potassium iodide
]
(KI) or other radiciodine prophylactic. There are, however, several fed-
- eral guidelines that have been published that relate to this issue. The
! TIN 5XB"THET1tTPORT ON THE POST-ACCIDENT REVIEW MEETING ON THE CHERNOBYL i ACCIDENT, Vienna, 30 August - 5 September 1986, IAEA, p. 77.
\
- 21NSAG SUNiARY REPORT, p. 85. .
! 3 Federal Register,1982, " Potassium iodide as a thyroid-blocking agent in a radiation emergency: final recommendations on use " FEDERAL REGISTER, 47,
- 28158-9, Washington, DC, USGPO.
!! 411'in, L. A., Arkhangel'skaya G. V., Konstantinov Yu. O. and Likhtarev I. A.,
1972, RADIOACTIVE IODINE IN THE PROBLEM OF RADIATION SAFETY, pp. 146-151, U. S.
A. E. C. Translation TR-7536, Springfield, VA, NTIS.
4 SINSAG SUNiARY REPORT, p. 85.
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r IV.3 Use of Potassium Iodide Pills NRC and FEMA issued CRITERIA FOR PREPARATION AND EVALUATION OF RADIOLOGI-CAL EFERGENCY RESPONSE PLANS AND PREPAREDNESS IN SUPPORT OF NUCLEAR PO PLANTS in 1980. This guidance specifies as_an evaluation criterion, the consideration of the use of radioprotective drugs (e.g., individual thy-roid protection). The criterion places the responsibility for the protec-tion of the thyroids of individuals remaining or arriving on-site during an emergency upon the licensee of a nuclear power plant.6 An NRC-sponsored study concluded that the use of KI for the general public would be marginally cost effective at best, but reconnended that stock-piles of the drug be available at or near reactor sites for use by site personnel,.off-site emergency response personnel and controlled popula-tions in the off-site institutions (e.g., hospitals and prisons).6 The U. S. EPA recommended the use of KI as a protective action for emer- .
gency workers but did not establish a similar policy for the general pub-lic. EPA's recomendations included the use of KI at a projected thyroid dose of 125 REM to emergency team workers.6 The FDA has recomended that doses of 130 mg KI per day for adults and 65 mg KI per day for children less than 1 year of age be considered for thy-roid blocking in radiation emergencies for those persons likely to receive a dose of 25 REM or greater to the thyroid from radiciodines. The implied initiation of KI prophylaxis ranges from imediately before radiciodine i uptake to 4 hr after acute exposure. The duration of such treatment is
. not expected to exceed about 10 days.6 FEMA, as Chair of the FRPCC, issued the Federal Policy on Stockpiling and Distribution of KI for use by the general public in a radiological
' emergency.7 This policy in essence states that, taking into account cost, risk and benefit, that State Health Officials should review the technical information provided and reach their own conclusion on Stockpiling and Distribution of KI.
. 3. WORK IN PROGRESS Although there may be on-going research on the effects of radiciodine prophylaxis in the U.S., no further regulatory interest in rulemaking, l
policy, etc., has been shown since the publication of the Federal Policy in July 1985.
j
- 4. ASSESSMENT There is no doubt that the Soviet radiciodine prophylactic response to the Chernobyl accident was necessary, nor is there any question that the time-ly issue of KI.by those authorities has resulted in a significant reduc-tion of dpse in the affected populations. With thyroid dose,s received in
. 6Meck, Robert A. , Chen, M. S., and Kenny, Peter J. , " Criteria for'- the Adminis-tration of KI for Thyroid Blocking of Radioiodine, HEALTH PHYSICS, Vol. 48, No.
2(February),PergammonPress,pp.I41-157,1985.
750 FR 30258, July 25, 1985. " Federal Policy on the distribution of KI around nuclear power plants as a thyroidal blocking agents."
I i
- 2.
. IV.3 Use of Potassium Pills the neighborhood of 250 rad, it is very possible that absence of radiciodine prophylaxis could have resulted in much higher doses, perhaps two orders of magnitude higher. (Although, there is no confirmation that those who received as much as 250 rad did not receive KI.)
The TMI-2 incident resulted in an inquiry into radiciodine prophylaxis using XI, and' FDA guidelines were issued. The Federal policy is that distribution of KI to.the general public is site-specific and a local decision.7 Other authorities have taken a different approach, with the Soviet Union successful in distribution and organization of radiofodine prophylactic.
measures at Chernobyl. The United Kingdom also has stocks of potassium iodate, and has had them for over ten years, in the areas of nuclear sub-marine bases, and other locations. (10,000 doses of potassium todate in .
pill fom in the U. K. costs about $150-200, hemetically sealed in plasti-foil packages of 5 doses, each. Shelf storage life appears to be greater than 10 years;)
- 5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS In light of the Chernobyl experience, the NRC and other cognizant Federal agencies should re-examine policy to detemine its adequacy in this area.
As part of this effort, additional information is needed regarding the radionuclide source tem at Chernobyl versus that expected from an acci- ;
dent at a U.S. facility and possible adverse reactions to iodine prophylaxis in Russia and other countries. l
' 750 FR 30258, July 25, 1985. " Federal Policy on the distribution of KI around nuclear power plants as a thyroidal blocking agents."
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IV.4 DATA ACQUISITION AND REPORTING '
I
- 1. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE l l
During the Chernobyl accident a great number of environmental radiation '
and radioactivity measurements were made. However, the systems used and l
formats for acquisition, presentation, and reporting of data lacked homo- '
geneity. It has been suggested that there is a need to establish national i
and international standards for such reports in order to facilitate rapid decisions about protective actions in emergency situations. In addition, there is concern that use of SI units caused difficulties because decision
- makers did not understand them.
- 2. CURRENT PRACTICE The vehicle for initiating a coordinated Federal response to Chernobyl was
" Federal Responses to Radioactive Contamination from Specified Foreign .
Nuclear Detonation: Multiagency Memorandum of Understanding among DAF, DOE, EPA, FAA, FDA, NOAA, and NRC." Many of the agencies responding turned however, to the structure and experience they had developed with the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FREPP) for the details and extent of their functions and interfaces. The MOU and the Plan were j not mutually exclusive but were complimentary. Future Federal response to j a major accident outside of the United States involving a potential for
! health effects within the United States should be carried out under the i Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP) published by FEMA on November 1985. The FRERP clearly establishes that DOE and EPA have the principal responsibility to coordinate environmental monitoring data.
The Department of Energy, during the initial phases of an emergency, and the EPA the'reafter, will work with the appropriate Federal, state and
. local agencies to coordinate offsite radiological monitoring and assess- ,
ment activities. DOE or EPA will compile and assess monitoring data and present them to the lead technical Federal agency (called the Cognizant FederalAgency[CFA))andappropriatestateagencies. The CFA will use this information, together with its assessment of the current condition and prognosis of the emergency on site, to develop or evaluate public protective action recomendations for the state (s). .It should be noted that DOE or EPA could be designated the CFA. It should also be noted that responding under the current method of DOE presenting field monitoring data and projection to the CFA and others involves faxing and phoning infonnation. Each group involved in has developed computer based systems that have not been fully coordinated with the agencies they would support (CFA or states). This could be a problem if large areas (several states) were involved, thus requiring a large number of interfaces.
- 3. WORK IN PROGRESS ;
The NRC has discussed with FEMA and DOE the need to develop at method to
. send DOE field monitoring data and projections from DOE to the CFA, other Federal agencies, and states. This effort is ongoing.
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- 4. ASSESSMENT Although during Chernobyl the FRERP was not directly followed. The NRC J s and other agencies carried out assessments of the data as it was' received) fi The NRC experience indicated that the major problems associated with as ' T ,
sessment of the environmental data were the result of the NRC being very \ 4 remote, the preliminary nature of the results and the many diverse source '
of information. All of the information received were in Becquerels (Bq) m that had to be converted to picocuries. This single process and did no+. + J
- present any problem. The picoeurie levels were compared to various'p m- ,
tective action guidance levels before being presented to a decision?N ker. % e Even if the measurements were reported in picoeuries, a technical, assess -,
ment would be required before presenting results to decision makers. '<
Therefore, the use of SI units did not appear to result in any s.problen. . ,, .
- 5. NEED FOR ADDITIONAL WORK "Ys s. s NRC, EPA, DOE, DOT, and FEMA must develop a standard efficient method to obtain and pass on to the states, as well as share amongst themselves, the results of the DOE efforts to monitor and project radiological conditicns.
It is reconsnended that this issue be reviewed by the FRPCC. '
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- IV.5 INGESTION PATHWAY MONITORING AND INGESTION OF FOODSTUFFS
- 1. STATEMENT OF ISSUE The Russian report emphasized the need for a single point or command to handle all of the decisions affecting the relocated population. The in-gestion pathway aspects extend to the relocated population and potentially far beyond. While FDA has published Protective Action Guides relative to protective action criteria for the ingestion pathway, it is not clear how they would be implemented when considerin jurisdictions and statutory authorities (g Federal, international, the large number 5 tate and of political local) that may be involved in data gathering, decision making aim imple-mentation of protective actions.
- 2. CURRENT AGENCY PRACTICE The NRC in response to a radiological emergency operates under the Federal .
Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP) published by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in November 1985. The FRERP clearly l . establishes a mechanism for a coordinated Federal assessment of the Theconse-quences of a nuclear accident occurring within the United States.
FRERP specifies authorities and responsibilities of each Federal agency that may have a significant role in a radiological emergency. The FRERP includes the Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Plan (FRMAP) for use by Federal agencies with radiological monitoring and assessment capabilities.
I In the United States, state or local governments have primary responsibil-ity for detemining and implementing any measures to protect the public.
Therefore, one of the primary areas where the Federal government may be able to assist state and local governments is in advising their on initial
- protective action recomendations for the public.-
Under the FRERP a Cognizant Federal Agency (CFA) has been specified for most types of radiological activities carried out/ licensed within the United States. The CFA is responsible f'or the technical assessment of the event and making recommendations to appropriate offsite authorities.
Under the FRMAP the Department of Enerpy, during the initial phases of the emergency, and the EPA thereafter, wil work with the appropriate Federal, l state and local agencies to coordinate offsite radiological monitoring and-assessment activities. DOE or EPA will assess monitoring data and present i l
them to the CFA and appropriate state agencies. The CFA will use this information, together with its assessment of the current condition and prognosis of the emergency on site, to develop or evaluate public protec-tive action recommendations for the states.
The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) EPA, DOE, and the U.S.
Department of Agriculture (USDA), after coordination with their state counterparts, will provide advice to the CFA, concerning possible public health impacts and associated protective measures for mitigating them.
The CFA will use this advice, as required, to develop for discussions with the state (s) decisionmaker(s) a coordinated Federal position on recommen-s dations for public protective action.
IV.5 Ingestion Pathway Monitoring and Ingestion of Foodstuffs The criteria for establishment of which agency is CFA is established in the FRERP except in the case of radiological events outside of the United States. The FRERP does have a general provision that covers such events.
In general, it says FEMA will consult with other appropriate Federal agen-cies regarding the CFA role. The result of such consultation will be either that a Federal agency assumes the CFA role, or that a decision is made that the CFA role is not appropriate.
- 3. WORK IN' PROGRESS' FEMA has proposed that the FRERP be reviewed and revised to assure it can most effectively address events impacting the United States to include a basis for selection of a CFA. FEMA has begun to coordinate with the agen-cies designated in the FRERP. .
- 4. ASSESSMENT The FRERP currently provides the mechanism for coordination of all Federal monitoring and protective action decision making in response to any radio-logical event. The plan does not specifically identify the Federal agency with the key role of CFA during an accident occurring outside of the United States which affects this country. However, the plan does provide a procedure for determining the CFA at the time of the accident when one is not immediately evident.
- 5. RECOtMENDATIONS It is recommended that NRC support the FEMA initiative to review and .
revise the FPERP.
Further, as part of this review it is recommended that the development of national standards regarding the radioactivity levels at which foodstuffs may be safely used, or are to be interdicted, should be considered. Such standards should be sufficiently stringent to demonstrate a high level of ,
health protection for the public, but one that would cause no undue alarm or needless economic loss. ]
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/0 g IV.6 MEDICAL SERVICES
- 1. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE During the Chernobyl accident 203 plant and emergency response personnel l ("onsite medical services") suffered acute radiation sickness. By the time of the August 25-29, 1986 meeting in Vienna, of these 26 had died and 30 remained hospitalized. The majority of these patients had made clini-cal recovery by the end of June. The Soviets attributed their success in
- diagnosis and treatment to previously acquired experience and recommenda-tions of international radiology centers. As an indicator of the speed -
and extent of emergency medical response, the Russians reported that by 6 !
a.m., April 26, 108 people had been hospitalized and an additional 24 were
< admitted during the day. After initial diagnosis in local or regional hospitals, 129 patients were sent to a specialized hospital in Moscow and 72 patients were sent to clinical institutes in Kiev. All of there In addition, a special- .
patients suffered from acute radiation sickness.
ized medical team arrived within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> of the accident and within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> had examined some 350 persons and perfomed about 1,000 blood analyses. (Reference'1)
To provide medical care for evacuees ("offsite medical services") during the first few days after the accident, 450 brigades, made up of a total of -
1,240 doctors, 920 nurses, 360 doctors assistants, and over 3,400 other personnel were mobilized. All evacuees (135,000) were examined after personal decontamination, and those showirig any irregularities were ;
hospitalized in central regional-hospitals. No persons from the general '
public were found to be victims of acute radiation sickness. (Reference 1)
,~
The International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group (INSAG) report (Reference 2) concluded that:
" Medical treatment of the acute radiation syndrome was effective within the limits imposed by the ' doses incurred. Severe skin burns induced by beta radiation added significantly to the difficulties of '
supportive and substantive treatment of the syndrome, and also affected to a significant degree the total outcome of the disease in 4
29 victims. Technical measures should be taken to prevent occurrence )
of extensive skin burns should an accident of a similar nature occur J in the future. Bone marrow transplants performed in selected cases did not appear to offer real therapeutic advantages in this group.
Internal contamination was inconsequential in the induction of acute radiation sickness. This experience should be carefully considered by the medical connunity...It is very important to enable physicians, such as specialists in various fields and general practitioners, t.o give appropriate advice to members of the public concerning health consequences of accidental radiation exposure of various magnitudes !
I and in various conditions. It appears an equally valid requirement that physicians who may be engaged in medical first aid:end early treatment of accidentally exposed persons should possest adequate '
' education and training. Therefore the IAEA should initiate, in collaboration with WHO, a study of which subjects shoulb be intro-duced, and to what extent, into the basic and postgraduate training of physicians to assure fulfillment of these specified needs and
! requirements."
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IV.6 Medical Services
- 2. CURRENT REGULATO.RY PRACTICE For onsite personnel and emergency workers, NRC licensees are required to provide for onsite first aid capability and to arrange for local (primary) and backup hospital having the capability for evaluation of radiation exposure and uptake, including assurance that persons providing these services are adequately prepared to handle contaminated individuals.
For offsite members of the general public, Comission Policy is contained in a recent statement published in the Federal Register (51 FR 32904) l titled, " Emergency Planning - Medical Services." The CommissTon stated !
that its regulation required pre-accident arrangements for medical servic-es for individuals who might be severely exposed to dangerous levels of offsite radiation following an accident at a nuclear power plant. In '
addition to the previously required list of medical facilities, such .
arrangements would include, (1) identification of the capacities, special capabilities or other unique characteristics of the listed medical facili-
- ties. (2) a good faith reasonable effort by licensees or local or State governments to facilitate or obtain written agreements with the listed medical facilities and transportation providers, (3) provision for making available necessary training for emergency response personnel to identify, 1
transport, and provide emergency first aid to severely exposed individu-als, and (4) a good faith reasonable effort for licensees or State or local governments to see that appropriate drills and exercises are con-ducted which include simulated severely-exposed individuals. FEMA and NRC staff are preparing guidance for implementation of this policy. The i
guidance should be implemented within about li years.
A national response to a Chernobyl type accident would be coordinated through the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan which has the resources of the Radiation Emergency Assistance Center / Training Site (REAC/TS) at Oak Ridge, Tennessee and the National Disaster Medical System
+
(NDMS)headquarteredinRockville, Maryland.
The REAC/TS has its own radiation emergency response team and maintains a computerized registry of approximately 1650 personnel that has been j trained at its center, including 650 physicians. The NDMS has 4 Medical Assistance Teams (MATS) which can respond to radiological emergencies j through being au Administration (gmented by health physicists from the Food and DrugFDA),
sources. Currently, the NDMS has enrolled in its program 76,478 hospital beds in 965 non-federal medical institutions. Its goal is to have 100,000 1 non-federal beds and 150 MATS enrolled in its program. The NDMS also has a goal to train all of its teams in the handling of patients exposed to
- radiological, biological or chemical contaminants.
- 3. WORK IN PROGRESS ,
Asnotedabove,theNRCandFEMAarepreparingguidancetoihlementthe i
Comission's policy on offsite medical services and the NDMS;is expanding j i its capabilities. The medical community is assimilating the lessons-learned from the Chernobyl experience through its traditional
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IV.6 Medical Services mechanisms. One example is the International Conference on Non-Military Radiation Emergencies to be conducted by the American Medical Association on November 19-21, 1986 in Washington D.C. NRC has provided financial and technical support for this conference.
i
- 4. . ACCIDENT RESPONSE ASSESSMENT As noted above, the Russians consider their medical services efforts successful. This is supported by the INSAG report.
- 5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMME.NDATIONS The medical services response to the Chernobyl accident was massive and effective. The U.S. is also prepared to mount response to a large radio-logical accident. The medical services capabilities both locally and .
nationally to deal with a radiation emergency are increasing. It is clear from the international offers of support to the USSR, that our own nation-al medical capability is backstopped by an international capability. For example, the U.S. has 1,347 " burn beds" of the type that would be useful for the treatment of the most severely exposed patients. In addition to domestic hospital beds that could be converted on short notice, patients could be evacuated to other countries.
The staff considers the present arrangement and future plans for onsite and offsite medical services around domestic commercial nuclear power '
plants to be adequate. Therefore, medical services should not be carried as an open item. However, it is recomended that FEMA monitor the imple-mentation of arrangements for local medical services in the vicinity of commercial nuclear power plants, and HHS should continue to upgrade the
- national response.
REFERENCES:
- 1. Statement by Marshall E. Sanders, FEMA, before the U.S. Senate Subcomittee on Nuclear Regulation of the Comittee on Environment and Public Works, September 29, 1986 which was based upon his atten-dance at the August 25-29 meeting in Vienna, Austria where the Russians reported on the Chernobyl accident and presented the report by the USSR State Comittee on the Utilization of Atomic Energy.
- 2. INSAG Sumary Report on the Post-Accident Review Meeting on the Chernobyl Accident Vienna, 30 August - 5 September, 1986. i
- 3. Policy Statement: Emergency Planning - Medical Services (518 32904) September 17, 1986.
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/ IV.7 ACCIDENT RECOVERY
- 1. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE Following the TMI accident, intense U.S. efforts have been expended to both reduce the likelihood of reactor core melt and improve protective measures to minimize population exposures should large scale core damage and large releases of radioactivity occur. However, accident recovery at reactor plants following a severe accident has not been considered in similar detail. These measures would have to be treated on an ad hoc i basis. The Chernobyl accident demonstrated the value of planning for severe accidents recovery beyond that considered by U.S practice. The range of severe accidents is broad and the possible variations among particular details vast. It seems prudent to extend the symptom based emergency operating procedures beyond degraded core conditions and into the mitigation of severe accidents. .
i Since national ~ resources are brought to bear on severe accidents, national policy is needed to provide a framework within which national resources can be directed. For' example, a national policy on entomba nt e.g.,
Chernobyl, versus clean-up e.g., TMI, may have direct implications in the early stages of accident mitigation.
- 2. CURREN1 AGENCY PRACTICE The operational procedures for recovering from severe accidents, such as 4
have occurred at TMI and Chernobyl, were dealt with largely on an ad hoc l [ basis. With few exceptions, the operator's emergency procedures for U.S.
V plants do not extend beyond degraded core cooling. Although ifcensees are well equipped and trained for more probable transients and accidents, severe accidents pose problems and issues and have not received the same j
level of operational attention. ;
- 3. WORK IN PROGRESS There are activities that address severe accident recovery to some degree. ;
One is Chernobyl issue III.2 venting. Another is the long term program ;
conducted by the Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (PES) to extend I emergency procedures beyond degraded core conditions.
~
4
- 4. ASSESSMENT The Chernobyl accident raises many ouestions about accident recovery that
- have not been thoroughly explored to date. Are all elements of the national resources, prepared to render assistance? Who will direct remedial actions and assume the liability for the collateral effects of remedial actions? Although some remedial actions may be indicated, i
liability or the complexity of technical issues may preclude non-governmental authorities from making a decision to use such measures.
Does the issue of potential entombment raise issues that need to be coordinated with state / local governments now? ,
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. ** 4 IV.7 Accident Recovery f
Peyond the national policy issues, questions of general guidance remain.
Should the licensee operations department have training in severe accident mitigation? Are there small changes to plants that should be made now that would greatly facilitate severe accident recovery? For example, a prefabricated flange that would permit mating a fire hose to portions of the reactor coolant system or containment would make available a seismic, ac independent source of cooling water, namely a fire truck. Would storing large quantities of crystalline boric acid on-site significantly improve severe accident recovery?
- 5. RECOMMENDAIIONS National policy guidance is needed to address the fiscal, technical, material resource and legal issues raised by severe accidents. The first step is to attempt to find an existing intergovernmental body to study this issue. The Federal Radiological Preparedness Coordinating Committee (FRPCC) should be asked if it has the capability to undertake this task.
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e DOCUMENTS FROM THE FILES OF WARREN C. LYON l
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Enclosure 7 l STATEMENT OF' WORK Ti tle: Review of the Probabilistic Risk Assessment for the Seabrook Nuclear Power Plant FIN No.: 'A3778 B&R No.: 20-19-40-41-3 NRC Project Manager: Warren C. Lyon (FTS 492-9405) ,
BACKGROUND The Reactor Systems Branch (RSB) has the responsibility to assist the Reliability and Risk Assessment Branch (RRAB) within the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) in review of Probabilistic Risk Assess-ments (PRAs) submitted to NRC by license Applicants and licensees. .A PRA has been submitted to NRC by Public Service Company of New Hamp-shire, an operating license applicant, pertaining to the Seabrook -
Nuclear Power Plant.
i OBJECTIVE The objective of the present task is to provide a limited review of those aspects of the Seabrook PRA leading to estimates of risk corres-ponding to various plant damage states to determine the accuracy of the estimates. The investigation will be directed toward differences i
between phenomenological behavior of the Seabrook plant and other large i
dry containment plants such as Zion and Indian Point. In addition,
{ unique features of the Seabrook PRA will be audited.
j WORK REQUIREMENTS Perform a limited review and evaluation of the risk assessment submitted by the licensee for the Seabrook PWR power plant to determine if esti-
'I mates of risk reflect appropriate use of risk assessment methods and plant / site information. Since the review is to be limited, maximum '
- utilization will be made of results from evaluation of other large dry j
containment plant PRAs, and emphasis will be placed on differe ces between those plant PRAs and the Seabrook PRA.
The defensibility of the licensee's submittal of the risk and associated uncertainty spread with respect to (1) use of state-of-the-art risk
- assessment methods (2) thoroughness and comprehensiveness of analysis, (3) availability and appropriate use of data, and (4) realism of model-
- ing assumptions, will be considered.
i l
i The review will focus on the calculation of risk given the frequencies of the plant damage states, including methodology, assumptions, data, )
information sources, models, plant understanding, completeness of the I 1
i qualitativeand analysis, any other area which could affect the quantitative or results. A limited sensitivity analysis will take alterna- i
) tives identified in the review in appropriate combinations and determine the incremental the dominant change in risk resulting from the use of alternatives in sequence.
! In general, these alternatives should be evaluated j by performing overall analysis. separate effects /phenomenological calculations within the i l I
I The werk te be performed in accord with tais Statement of K'ork is tc be c
based in part upon the " front-end' work to be performed by the Lawrence Livernore National Laboratory under NRR/ DST funding (F?N Uc. A-3754-4),
and is to be fully coorcinated with that effort.
ine work described herein consists of one task which is dividec into several parts to be censistent with tne A-375a-4 effort. These are:
- 1. Evaluation of Risk Dee to Internal Ever.ts
- 2. Evaluatit1 of Risk Eee to External Events
- 2. Draft rinal F.eports
- a. Final Reports
- 5. QJestions to Licensee -
Each iter is discussed below.
Contract Task- Perform "Back-end" evaluation of the Seabrook PRA.
Estimated level of effort FY S4 0.4 staff years FY E5 0.3 staff years Estimated completion date: Aug. 30,1985 -
ine following items are to be accomplished to complete the contract task (1) Evaluaticn of Risk Due to Internal Events (a) Ferform a limited review anc evaluation of tne scope, assump-tions, and systems analysis aspects of risk due to inter'nal event plant damage states, and other items identified as a result of tne initiating events review and provided to ENL by the NEC Prcgrar. Manager.
(b) Develop a tabie of assumptions used in the analysis and make a finding on the validity.
(c) Icer.tify omissions and deficiencies in the phenomenciogical analysis and estimate the impact where reasonable, considering the scope and depth of the Task effort. Include the technical basis for these estimates.
(d) Incorporate NRR technical review comments as provided by the n;C Program Manager.
(e) Perform a limited assessment of the uncertainty analysis.
Consider procagation and ccmpleteness in treatment cf uncer-tainty, data uncertainty, and modeling sensitivity /uncertaint;.. t (f) Maintain close cor.tset with Lewrence Livermere iaticnal Laboratcry in regard to the front-end analyses which serve as the startir.; peint fer the above work.
(1) Evaluation cf Eisk Dae to External Events (a) Ferform a limited reviev. of eacn type of external event considered and concur with or modify the risk infcrmation fcr i each review.plant damage state which is si nificantly affectec by ine 2
1
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-(b) Revicw and svaluate assumptions of the external events risk analysis.
(c) Identify omissions and, deficiencies in the external event risk analysis, and estimate the impact where practical with respect to the effort funded under this task. For omissions and deficiencies for which evaluation is believed to be beyond the state-of_the-art, provide a list and the basis for this belief.
(d) Assess the uncertainty analysis. Examine propagation and completeness in treatment of uncertainty, data uncertainty, and modeling sensitivity / uncertainty. .
(e) Maintain close contact with Lawrence Livermore Laboratories in regard to the front end analyses which serve as the starting point for the Item (2) work.
(3) Draft Reports A Draft Report is to be provided which covers the effort accomp- '
lished in FY84 and a second Draft Report is to be provided which covers the effort accomplished in this program. The reports are to include, at a minimum, the following:
(a) For each of the PRA areas reviewed, define the basis for acceptability and describe what was considered in the review.
WW The findings will include selected reestimates of g esd infor-mation corresponding to plant damage states, identification of areas which were not pursued, and identification of grey areas where sensitivity studies might be used to bound a central estimate.
(b) Describe areas of incompleteness determined in the review.
Quantify, where consistent with the funded depth of the review, the potential impact of these areas. Discuss the basis for quantification values.
(c) Based on reviewer audits, discuss the accuracy, uncertainty, and adequacy of the PRA author's risk quantifications.
(d) An approximate outline of the reports is given below:
- 1. Summary
- 2. Introduction
2.1 Background
2.2 Scope 2.3 Assumptions
- 3. Internal Events Risk 4 External Events Risk 3
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- 5. Summary and Conclusions ,
5.1 Dominant Risks Corresponding to Each Plant Damage State 5.2 Important Problems and Omissions 5.3 Treatment of Uncertainties 5.4 Overall Evaluation of Seabrook Risk Assessment
- 6. Appendices (as required) ,
This outline is similar to the outline to be followed by Lawrence Livermore in their accomplishment of FIN A-3754-4. Although the BNL and Lawrence Livermore reports are to be " stand alone" reports, the contents are to be coordinated so that complete coverage of the technical topic is provided if one has both the BNL and the Lawrence Livermore reports.
(4) Final Reports The final reports will take into account pertinent comments on the draft final reports by NRC and other interested parties. They will be published as NUREG/CR reports. The first final report is to be provided by November 30, 1984; and the second, which covers the entire program, is to be provided by August 30, 1985.
(5) Questions to Licensee Provide questions for forwarding to the licensee covering all aspects of the analysis on a schedule that is to be mutually agreeable between BNL and the NRC Project Manager.
LEVEL OF EFFORT AND PERIOD OF PERFORMANCE The estimated level of effort is 0.7 professional staff years with the effort
- to be completed by August 30, 1985.
TECHNICAL REPORTING REQUIREMENTS:
- All technical products which are required from this contract have been identi-fied specifically in the above discussion. BNL shall submit six copies of draft NUREG/CR reports to the NRC Project Manager, for staff review and appro-val. For NUREG/CR reports, within sixty days of receipt of the staff's comments i
on these reports, the contractor shall submit one (1) reproducible and six (6) .
I reproduced copies of the final reports in accordance with NRC Manual Chapter 3202, " Publication of Unclassified Regulatory and Technical Reports Prepared by NRC Contractors."
, BUSINESS LETTER REPORTS i
A monthly business letter report will be submitted by the 20th of the month to the NRC Project Manager with copies provided to the Director, Division of Systems Integration, ATTN: S. Boyd, R. W. Houston, B. Sheron, OSI, and Mr. L.
Solander, NRR. These reports will identify the title of the project, the FIN, the Principal Investigator, the period of performance, the reporting period and will contain 3 sections as follows:
07/18/84 4 Enclosure 2
-. ~.
Project Status Section .
For each task under this program, provide the following information:
- 1. A list of the efforts completed during the period; milestones reached, or if missed, an explanation provided.
- 2. Any problems or delays encountered or anticipated and recommendation for resolution. 1/ -
- 3. A summary of progress to date (this may be expressed in terms of percentage completion for each task).
- 4. Plans for the next reporting period.
Financial Status Section
- 1. Provide the total cost (value) of the project as reflected in the proposal and the total amount of funds obligated to date.
- 2. Provide the total amount of funds expended (costed) during the period and total cumulative to date as follows:
Period Cumulative
- a. Labor-related costs
- b. Computer services
- c. Travel
- d. Subcontracts
- e. Equipment Total ( %) 2/
- 3. Fee Recovery Cost Status Section Pursuant to the provisions of NRC Regulations,10 CFR 170, provide the total amount of funds expended (costed) during the period and cumulative to date for each task in the following format:
1/ If the recommended resolution involves a contract modification, i.e.,
changes work requirements, level of effort (costs), or period of performance, a separate letter should be prepared and submitted to the Director, Division of Systems Integration, ATTN: S. Boyd, and a copy provided to the Project Manager and L. Solander, NRR.
2/ Provide percentage against total funds oblicated to date.
1 07/18/84 5 Enclosure 2
FIN: A3778 TITLE: Review of the Probabilistic Risk Assessment for the Seabrook Nuclear Power Plant PERIOD:
Docket Costs Facility Name Number Period Cumulative Seabrook 50-443 MEETINGS AND TRAVEL The contractor may attend a 2-day visit at an unspecified site with the licensee to discuss questions on the analysis and may attend six 1-day meetings at NRC headquarters in Washington, DC. .
Two 3-day visits to the Seabrook site.
NRC FURNISHED MATERIALS The risk study has been transmitted to the contractor. NRC will provide addi-tional information as needed.
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07/18/84 6 Enclosure 2
V/7/7f TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM SUPPORT SYSTEMS PROJECT IDENTIFICATION
SUMMARY
(PIDS)
AS OF 08/06/84 FIN: A3778 TITLE: REVIEW OF THE PROBABILISTIC RISK ASSESS-MENT FOR THE SEABROOK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT DIVISION: DOSI B&R #: 20-19-40-41 NRR OPERATING PLANT INDEX NO:
BRANCH: RSB CONTRACT f: PROJECT MANAGER: W. LYON-CONTRACTOR: BNL CONTRACT ' METHOD (NON-DOE): DOE
. CITY, STATE (NON-DOE): SMALL BUSINESS / MINORITY SUB CONTRACTOR (S):- CONTRACT (NON-DOE):
PERIOD OF PERFORMANCE START DATE: 08/15/84 END DATE: 08/30/85 FINANCIAL DATA COMMITMENTS AS OF / / , OBLIGATIONS / COSTS AS OF '/ /,.
CARRY CURRENT CURRENT CURRENT CURRENT OVER FY BUDG FY COMIT FY OBLS FY COSTS ACTUAL PROJECTED 0 S0,000 0 0 0 TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL '
NEXT FY NEXT +1 VALUE OBLS COSTS BUDGET BUDGET
' ACTUAL PROJECTED 80,000 80,000 80,000 30,000 0
APPLICATION (RELATE THE PROJECT TO A SPECIFIC PLANNED ACC
- Seabrook PRA Study .
- Possible Seabrook Hearings WORK REQUIREMENTS (DESCRIBE WHAT IS TO BE PERFORMED)
This contract will provide support to RSB in the evaluation of the PRA submitted by the Public Service Company of New Hampshire pertaining to the Seabrook Nuclear Power Plant. The contractor is to perform a limited review and evaluation of the risk assessmen. to determine if estimates of risk reflect appropriate use of risk assessment methods and plant / site information, and is to compare the Seabrook containment and other severe accident nuclear power mitigation plants.' features to those at the Zion and Indian' Point The defensibility of'the licensie's submittal of risk and associated uncertainty spread with respect to (1) use of state of the art risk assessment methods, (2) thoroughness and comprehen-siveness of analysis. (3) availability and appropriate use of data, and (4) realism of modeling assumption, will be considered. Methodology, assumptions, data, information sources, models, plant understanding, i O
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WORK REQUIREMENT (continued) completeness of the analysis, and any other area which could affect the quantitative or qualitative results will be considered. A limited sensitivity analysis will consider alternatives identified in the review in appropriate combinations and determine the incremental change in risk resulting from the use of alternatives in the dominant sequence.
The work will be accomplished under the following categories:
- 1. Evaluation of risk due to internal events
- 2. Evaluation of risk due to external events
- 3. Draft report preparation
- 4. Final report preparation
- 5. Preparation of questions to the licensee and participation in a plant examination trip. -
MODIFICATIONS (DESCRIBE MAJOR CHANGES TO THE PROPOSAL)
APPROVAL (COMPLETE AS APPLICABLE) IST LINE: (INITIALS) 2ND RECOMMENDED: ENDORSED: ENDORSED: ENDORSED: ENDORSED:
PROJECT MANAGER SECTION LEAD BRANCH CHIEF ASST. DIRECTOR DIVISION DIR
/EY ,7>.r r/fAs 'r/74 V <
0FFICE DETERMINATION APPROVAL CODE:
DATE: / /
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Enclosure 2 s
STATEMENT OF WORK
Title:
Review of the Probabilistic Risk Assessment for the Seabrook
,, Nuclear Power Plant t t FIN No.: A3778 B&R No.: 20-19-40-41-3 NRC Project Manager: Warren C. Lyon (FTS 492-9405)
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BACKGROUND The Reactor Systems Branch (RSB) has the responsibility to assist the Reliability and Risk Assessment Branch (RRAB) within the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) in review of Probabilistic Risk Assess-ments (PRAs) submitted to NRC by license Applicants and licensees. A PRA has been submitted to NRC by Public Service Company of New Hamp.
j shire, an operating license applicant, pertaining to the Seabrook Nuclear Power Plant.
OBJECTIVE l
The objective of the present task is to provide a limited review of those aspects of the Seabrook PRA leading to estimates of risk corres-ponding estimates. to various plant damage states to determine the accuracy of the The investigation will be directed toward differences between phenomenological behavior of the Seabrook plant and other large dry containment plants such as Zion and Indian Point. In addition, unique features of the Seabrook PRA will be audited.
WORK REQUIREMENTS Perform a limited review and evaluation of the risk assessment subm by the licensee for the Seabrook PWR power plant to determine if esti-
- mates plant / of risk site reflect appropriate use of risk assessment methods and information.
Compare the Seabrook containment and other severe accident mitigation features to those at Zion and Indian Point.
Since the review is to be limited, maximum utilization'will be made of results from evaluation of other large dry containment plant PRAs, and Seabrook PRA. emphasis will be placed on differences between those plant PRAs an The defensibility of the licensee's submittal of the risk and associated uncertainty spread with respect to (1) use of state-of-the-art risk assessment methods, (2) thoroughness and comprehens'iveness of analysis.
i (3) assumptions, ing availability and appropriate will be considered.use of data, and (4) realism of model-r
The review will focus on the calculation of risk given the frequencies of the plant damage states, including methodology, assumptions, data, information sources, models, plant understanding, completeness of the analysis, and any other area which could affect the quantitative or qualitative results. A limited sensitivity analysis will take alterna-tives identified in the review in appropriate combinations and determine the incremental change in risk resulting from the use of alternatives in the dominant sequence. In general, these alternatives should be eval-uated by performing separate effects /phenomenological calculations within the overall analysis.
$$ The work to be performed in accord with this Statement of Work is to be based in part upon the " front-end' work to be performed by the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory under NRR/ DST funding (FIN No. A-3754-4),
and is to be fully coordinated with that effort.
The work described herein consists of one task which is divided into several parts to be consistent with the A-3754-4 effort. These are: *
- 1. Evaluation of Risk Due to Internal Events
- 2. Evaluation of Risk Due to External Events
- 3. Draft Final Reports
- 4. Final Reports
- 5. Questions to Licensee Each item is discussed belo'w.
Contract Task:
Perform "Back-end" evaluation of the Seabrook PRA.
Estimated level of effort FY84b.4staffyears FY 85 0.3 staff years Estimated completion date: Aug. 30, 1985 .
The following items are' to be accomplished to complete the contract task:
(1) Evaluation of Risk Due to internal Events (a) Perform a limited review and evaluation of the scope, assump-tions, and systems analysis aspects of risk due to internal event plant danage states, and other items identified as a result of the initiating events review and provided to BNL by the NRC Program Manager.
(b) Compare suc'h items as risk, methodology, assymptions, data, information sources, models, plant understanding, completeness of the analysis, and other areas which could affect the results. Provide a compilation of significant similarities and differences.
(c) Develop a table of assumptions used in the analysis and make a finding on the validity.
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(d) .ld:ntify omissions and. deficiencies in the phentmenological analysis and estimate the impact where reasonable, considering the scope and depth of the Task effort. Include the technical basis for these estimates.
(e) Incorporate NRR technical review comments as provided by the NRC Program Manager.
(f) Perform a limited assessment of the uncertainty analysis.
Consider propagation and completeness in treatment. of uncer-tainty, data uncertainty, and modeling sensitivity / uncertainty.
$$ (g) Maintain close contact with Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in regard to the front-end analyses which serve as the starting point for the above work.
(2) Evaluation of Risk Due to External Events (a) Perform a limited review of each type of external e 2nt '
considered and concur with or modify the risk information for each plant damage state which is significantly affected by the review.
(b) Review and evaluate assumptions of the external events risk analysis.
(c) Identify omissions and deficiencies in the external event risk analysis, and estimate the impact where practical with respect to the effort funded under this task. For omissions and deficiencies for which evaluation is believed to be beyond the state-of-the-art, provide a list and the basis for this belief.
(d) Assess the uncertainty analysis. Examine propagation and completeness in treatment of uncertainty, data uncertainty, and modeling* sensitivity / uncertainty.
(e) Maintain close contact with Lawrence Livermore Laboratories in regard to the front end analyses which serve as the starting point for the item (2) work.
(3) Draft Reports A Draft Report is to be provided which covers the effort accomp-lished in FY84 and a second Draft Report is to be provided which covers the effort accomplished in this program. The reports are to include, at a minimum, the following: ;
(a) For each of the PRA areas reviewed, define the basis for acceptability and describe what was considered in the review.
The findings will include selected reestimates of risk infor-mation corresponding to plant damage states, identification of areas which were not pursued, and identification of grey areas where sensitivity studies might be used to bound a central estimate.
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(b) -Describe areas of incompleteness detemined in the review.
Quantify, .where consistent with the funded depth of the review, the potential impact of these areas. Discuss the f
basis for quantification values.
(c) Basec on reviewer audits, discuss the accuracy, uncertainty, and adequacy of the PRA autnor's risk quantifications.
(d) An approximate outline of the reports is given below:
- i. Sumary
- 2. . Introduction 1
2.1 Background i 2.2 Scope i
2.3 Assumptions j 3. Internal Events Risk
- 4. External Events Risk
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- 5. Sumary and Conclusions i
5.1 Dominant Risks Corresponding to Each Plant Damage i
State I
5.2 Important Problems and Omissions 5.3 Treatment of Uncertainties 5.4 i Overall Evaluation of Seabrook Risk Assessment
- 6. Appendices (as required)
This cutline is similar to the outline to be followed by Lawrence Livermore in their accomplishment of F]N A-3754-4. Although the BNL and Lawrence I" Livermore reports are to be " stand alone" reports, the contents are te be j
coordinated so that complete coverage cf the technical topic is provided if one has both the BNL and the Lawrents Livermore reports.
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! (4) Final Reports i
i The final reports will take inte account pertinent comments on the craf t final reports by NRC and other interestec parties. They will be published 4
as NUREG/CR reports. The first final report is to be
! 1964; and the second, which covers the entire program,provided is to be by November 30, proviced
- by August 30, 1985. i i
(5) Questions to Licensee t
Provice questions f or forwarding to
- he licensee covering all aspects of '
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the analysis on a schedule that is to bs mutually agreeable between $NL j and the NRC Project Manaper.
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LEVEL OF EFFORT AND PERIOD OF PERF0PftANCE The to beestimated completed by level of effort August is 0.7 professional staff years with the effort 30, 1985.
i TECHNICAL REPORTING REOUIREMENTS:
All fiedtechnical specificallyproducts in thewhich aboveare receired from this contract have been ioenti-discussion.
%,s BNL shall submit six copies of draf vai. t NUREG/CR reports to the NRC Prcject Manager, for staff review and appre-For NUREG/CR reports. vithin sixty days of receipt of tne staff's comments on these reports, the contractor shall submit one (1) reproducible and six (6) reproduced copies of the final reports in accordance with NRC Manual Chapter 3202, by NRC " Publication Contractors.of" Unclassified Regulatory and Technical Reports Prepared EU53 NESS LETTER REPORTS A monthly business letter reocrt will be submitted by the 20th cf the menth to the Svs NRC t amt Project Manaper Integration ATTN: with ecpies provided ic the Director. Division ci S. Boyd, R. W. _
olancer. N E These reports will icentify Houston,(f. Sheron, Dil,l ancQMr.L , .'
the title of. theMet, the r 2N' e Principal Investigator, the periot of performance, the reperting perioI, and will contain 3 sections as follows:
Pro _iect Status Section .
For each task u'noer this program, provide the fc11owing infermation:
1.
A list of the if missed, anefforts dmoiette explanation curing the period; milestones reached, or provided.
2.
Any problems or delays encounterec or anticipated and recommendation fer resolution. J/
3.
A summary completion f orofeach progress tas k). to cate (this may be expressed in terms of percentage 4
Plans for the next reporting perioc.
- t / if the recommenced resciutier, inveives a centract mocification, i.e. ,
~
changes work recuirements, le'el cf effert (costs). or period of perfermance, a separate letter should be prepared and submitted to the Directer, Division of Syst. ems ]ntegrAlion , ATTN: 5. Boyd, and a copy provided to the prcject Manager an Solander, NRR.
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I financial Status Section 1.
Provide the total cost (value) of the project as reflected in the proposal and the total amount of funes obligated to cate. *
- 2. Provice the tetti amount of funes excenoec' (cested) during the period anc totai cumulative te date at follows:
Period Cumulative
- a. Labor-relateo costs
- b. Computer services
- c. Travel c: . Subcontracts
- t. Eouipment Totai
( %) 2/
- 3. Fee Recoverv Cost Status Section -
Pursuant to the provisions of NRC Regulations,10 CFR 270, provide the totai amount of funes expenced (costed) during the period and cumulative to date for each task in the followine format:
FIN: AI776 .
TITLE:
Revies of Nuclear the Probabilistic Power Plant Risk Assessment for the Seabrook PERIDD:
Docket Costs facility Name Number Fer10c Cumulative Seabrook 50-443 MEETINGS AND TRAVEL The contractor may attend a 2-day visit at an unspecified site with the licensee to discuss questions on the analysis and may attend six 1-da~v meetings at NRC headquarters in Washington DC.
Two 3-day visits to the Seatrook site. .
NRC FURN}SHED MATERIALS I,
ine ris k stucy has been transmittec' tc ine contractor. NRC will provice acci-tional information as neeced.
2/ Provide percentage against totti funds cblicated to date.
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