ML20128D056: Difference between revisions

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LaSalle County Station Unit 2 Facility Operating License NPF-18                                '
LaSalle County Station Unit 2 Facility Operating License NPF-18                                '
Condition No. 4 of Attachment 2 NRC Docket No. 50-374 References (a): License tPF-18, Attachment 2, Condition No. 4.
Condition No. 4 of Attachment 2 NRC Docket No. 50-374 References (a): License tPF-18, Attachment 2, Condition No. 4.
(b): August 25, 1983 letter from Cordell Reed to H. R. Denton.
(b): {{letter dated|date=August 25, 1983|text=August 25, 1983 letter}} from Cordell Reed to H. R. Denton.
(c): Decenter 15, 1983 letter from Cordell Reed to H. R. Denton.
(c): Decenter 15, 1983 letter from Cordell Reed to H. R. Denton.
(d): September 26, 1984 letter from J. G. Marshall to H. R. Denton.
(d): {{letter dated|date=September 26, 1984|text=September 26, 1984 letter}} from J. G. Marshall to H. R. Denton.
(e): April 1, 1985 letter from A. Schwencer to D. L. Farrar transmitting Draft SER.
(e): {{letter dated|date=April 1, 1985|text=April 1, 1985 letter}} from A. Schwencer to D. L. Farrar transmitting Draft SER.


==Dear Mr. Denton:==
==Dear Mr. Denton:==
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these items will be documented in a st:bsequent safety evaluation report.
these items will be documented in a st:bsequent safety evaluation report.
The revision of the PGP, and subsequently of the E0Ps, should not impact the schedule for the use of the E0Ps. The revision should be made in accordance with the licensee's administrative procedures.
The revision of the PGP, and subsequently of the E0Ps, should not impact the schedule for the use of the E0Ps. The revision should be made in accordance with the licensee's administrative procedures.
: 2. EVALUATION AND FINDINGS The licensee submitted its PGP in a letter dated September 26, 1984, from J. M. Marshall to H. R. Denton. The PGP contained the following five parts:
: 2. EVALUATION AND FINDINGS The licensee submitted its PGP in a {{letter dated|date=September 26, 1984|text=letter dated September 26, 1984}}, from J. M. Marshall to H. R. Denton. The PGP contained the following five parts:
: 1. LaSalle County Station Emergency Procedure Guideline Technical Guideline, Including Attachment A
: 1. LaSalle County Station Emergency Procedure Guideline Technical Guideline, Including Attachment A
: 2. Writers Guide for LaSalle General Abnomal (LGA) Symptom-Based l
: 2. Writers Guide for LaSalle General Abnomal (LGA) Symptom-Based l
Line 82: Line 82:
A. Plant-SpecificTechnicalGuidelines(P-STGs)
A. Plant-SpecificTechnicalGuidelines(P-STGs)
The P-STGs were reviewed to detemine if they previded acceptable' r:ethods to fneet the objectives of NUREG-0899. The licensee briefly described a method wherein they will use generic Emergency Procedure Guit:lir.cs (EPGs) ard, with appropriate char.ges, tnelcp EOFs for the LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2.
The P-STGs were reviewed to detemine if they previded acceptable' r:ethods to fneet the objectives of NUREG-0899. The licensee briefly described a method wherein they will use generic Emergency Procedure Guit:lir.cs (EPGs) ard, with appropriate char.ges, tnelcp EOFs for the LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2.
The Boiling Water Reactor Owners Group (BWROG) EPGs, Revision 3, dated Decernber 8,1982, was approved by the NRC staff in a letter dated November 23, 1983, from D. Crutchfield to T. Dente of the BWROG.
The Boiling Water Reactor Owners Group (BWROG) EPGs, Revision 3, dated Decernber 8,1982, was approved by the NRC staff in a {{letter dated|date=November 23, 1983|text=letter dated November 23, 1983}}, from D. Crutchfield to T. Dente of the BWROG.
The licensee's P-$TGs were generated from Revision 31 of the EPGs.
The licensee's P-$TGs were generated from Revision 31 of the EPGs.
Each deviation from Revision 3 of the EPGs is identified by a letter in the margin of the P-STGs. Attachment A to the P-5TGs describes the deviations and provides an explanation for each one. The staff's  ,
Each deviation from Revision 3 of the EPGs is identified by a letter in the margin of the P-STGs. Attachment A to the P-5TGs describes the deviations and provides an explanation for each one. The staff's  ,

Latest revision as of 23:04, 21 August 2022

Forwards marked-up Rev to Procedures Generation Package in Response to Draft SER Questions.Calculational Procedures & Derivations for Drywell Spray Initiation Pressure Limit Also Encl.Further Rev to Emergency Procedure Guidelines Expected
ML20128D056
Person / Time
Site: LaSalle Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 06/28/1985
From: Massin H
COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
To: Harold Denton
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
0315K, 315K, NUDOCS 8507050013
Download: ML20128D056 (200)


Text

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o Commonwealth Edison one First National Plazt, Chiefgo Ilknois Address Reply to: Post Office Box 767 Chicago. Illinois 60690 June 28, 1985 Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation g U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission \

Washington, DC 20555 k

Subject:

LaSalle County Station Unit 2 Facility Operating License NPF-18 '

Condition No. 4 of Attachment 2 NRC Docket No. 50-374 References (a): License tPF-18, Attachment 2, Condition No. 4.

(b): August 25, 1983 letter from Cordell Reed to H. R. Denton.

(c): Decenter 15, 1983 letter from Cordell Reed to H. R. Denton.

(d): September 26, 1984 letter from J. G. Marshall to H. R. Denton.

(e): April 1, 1985 letter from A. Schwencer to D. L. Farrar transmitting Draft SER.

Dear Mr. Denton:

Enclosed please find the revised LGA Procedures Generation Package (PGP) in response to the questions included in the Draft Safety Evaluation Report.

In addition to the PGPs, copies of the calculational procedures and derivations for the Drywell Spraf Initiation Pressure Limit are included as response to questions A.3 and A.4 (Attachments 6 and 7).

Please note that we expect further revisions to the Emergency Procedure Guidelines based on results of the actual Validation / Verification and Training Programs.

Please direct any questions you may have concerning this matter to this office.

8507050013 050620 PDR ADOCK 05000374 PDR

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H. R. Denton June 28, 1985 One signed original and fifteen copies, of this letter and the attachments are provided for your use.

Very truly yours, fM H. L. Massin Nuclear Licensing Administrator 1m Attachments 1: Technical Guideline - The technical basis for our Symptom Oriented Emergency Procedures (LGAs) 2: Writer's Guideline - Guidance for the LGA Writer.

3: Validation Description - LGA Validation Procedure 4: Verification Description - LGA Validation Procedure 5: Training Description - Description of Training Planned for the LGAs 6: Drywell Spray Initiation Pressure Limit 7: Primary Containment Pressure Limit cc: Region III Inspector - LSCS A. Bournia - NRR 0315K i

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June /S86

DRAFT SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT PROCEDURES GENERATION PACKAGE '.

LASALLE COUNTY STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2

1. INTRODUCTION Following the Three Mile Island (TMI) accident, the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation developed the "TMI Action Plan" (NUREG-0660 and c NUREG-0737), which required licensees of operating reactors to reanalyze transients and accidents and upgrade emergency operating procedures (EOPs)(Itec!.C.1). The plan also required the NRC staff to develop a long-term plan that integrated and expanded efforts on the writing, reviewir.g. and monitoring of plant procedures (Item I.C.9). NUREG-0899,

" Guidelines for the Preparation of Emergency Operating Procedures "

represents the staff's long-term program for upgrading E0Ps, and describes the use of a " Procedures Generation Package" (PGP) to prepare E0Ps. Submittal of the PGP is a requirement of Supplement I to NUREG-0737, " Requirements for Emergency Response Capability (Generic Letter 82-33)." The Generic Letter requires each licensee to submit to the NRC a PGP which includes:

(1) plant-specific technical guidelines (ii) writer's guide (iii) description of the program to be used for the validation of E0Ps (iv) description of the training program for the upgraded E0Ps This report describes the results of our review of Conmonwealth Edhon Company's response to Section 7 of Generic Letter 82-33 related to development and implementation of E0Ps for LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2.

j Our review was conducted to detemine the adequacy of the licensee's l

l program for preparing and implementing E0Ps. Criteria for the review of I a PGP are not currently in the Standard Review Plan (SRP). Therefore, i this review was based on NUREG-0899, the reference document for the E0P i

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l f upgrade portion of Supplement I to NUREG-0737 (Generic Letter 82-33).

Review criteria based on this guidance will be developed for the next SRP revision. Section 2 of this SER briefly discusses the licensee's submittal, the staff review methods, and the acceptability of the

[ submittal. Section 3 contains the conclusions of our review.

As indicated in the following sections, our review determined that the PGP for LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2, is acceptable with the i exception of the iters described in Section 2. The licensee should address these items in a revision to the PGP, or justify why such i revisier.s are not necessary. Our review of the licensee's response %

these items will be documented in a st:bsequent safety evaluation report.

The revision of the PGP, and subsequently of the E0Ps, should not impact the schedule for the use of the E0Ps. The revision should be made in accordance with the licensee's administrative procedures.

2. EVALUATION AND FINDINGS The licensee submitted its PGP in a letter dated September 26, 1984, from J. M. Marshall to H. R. Denton. The PGP contained the following five parts:
1. LaSalle County Station Emergency Procedure Guideline Technical Guideline, Including Attachment A
2. Writers Guide for LaSalle General Abnomal (LGA) Symptom-Based l

! Emergency Procedures

3. Validation Description for LaSalle General Abnomal (LGA) i Symptom-Based Emergency Procedures
4. Verification Description for LaSalle General Abnomal (LGA)

Symptom-Based Emergency Procedures i

5. Training Description for LaSalle General Abnormal (LGA) SymptomI Based Emergency Procedures A discussion of these submittals, with the Verification Program and Validation Program discussion combined, follows.

A. Plant-SpecificTechnicalGuidelines(P-STGs)

The P-STGs were reviewed to detemine if they previded acceptable' r:ethods to fneet the objectives of NUREG-0899. The licensee briefly described a method wherein they will use generic Emergency Procedure Guit:lir.cs (EPGs) ard, with appropriate char.ges, tnelcp EOFs for the LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2.

The Boiling Water Reactor Owners Group (BWROG) EPGs, Revision 3, dated Decernber 8,1982, was approved by the NRC staff in a letter dated November 23, 1983, from D. Crutchfield to T. Dente of the BWROG.

The licensee's P-$TGs were generated from Revision 31 of the EPGs.

Each deviation from Revision 3 of the EPGs is identified by a letter in the margin of the P-STGs. Attachment A to the P-5TGs describes the deviations and provides an explanation for each one. The staff's ,

review was performed by conducting a step-by-step comparison of the P-STGs with the NRC approved BWR0G EPGs, Revision 3. In addition, the staff reviewed each deviation including the justification for each deviation.

Revision 3 to the EPGs is generic to GE-BWR 1 through 6 designs in that it addresses all major systems which .nay be used to respond to an emergency. Because no specific plant includes all of the systems in these guideline, the guidelines were made applicable to LaSalle by deleting statements which address systems not installed at the LaSalle plant. Except for the following items, the licensee's P $TGs are acceptable because our review determined that (1) they are mostly

4 consistent with the generic guidelines and (2) the deviations 'from the EPGs provide acceptable means for mitigating the ' consequences of accidents and transients. These items should be addressed in a revision to the P-STGs.

1. The deviation notation "A" on the introductory page adjacent to '

the third paragraph appears to be misplaced. It should be adjacent to the second paragraph. This placement should be corrected since the explanatice of the "A" deviation in Attachment A corresponds to the entry condition for the RPV Contrc1 Guideline.

2. On page RC-6, the EPG indicates that "other steam driven equipment" (plant specific) should be listed for Step RC/P-2.

The LaSalle P-STG should list this equipment.

3. For procedural step DW/T-3, page PC-5 of the Technical Guideline, a discussion of the bases for the drywell spray initiation pressure limit-rated spray and the derivation of Figure 4. should be provided.
4. In order for us to determine if the value for the " Primary E Containment Pressure Lin.it" shown in Figure C14-1 is acceptable, a discussion of the basis should be provided. The discussion should include consideration of structural analyses and tests, purge valve operability, automatic depressurization system operability, vent capacity requirements, and limitation of offsite release rates.
5. IC and HPCI systems are not installed at LaSalle. Therefore, reference to these systems should be lined out in the bottom line of the first paragraph in the Contingency #6 technical guideline -

RPV Flooding.

6. Provide a description of the process for using the EPGs anil background information to identify control room operator tasks and information and control needs. This process can be described in either the revised PGP or in the Detailed Control Room Design Review (DCRDR)ProgramPlan. ,

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With satisfactory resolution of the above items, the licensee's P-STGs will provide an adequate technical basis for developing plant E0Ps.

B. Writer's Guide The writer's guide was reviewed to determine if it provided acceptable methods for accomplishing the objectives stated in NUREG-0899. The licensee stated that the purpose of the writer's guide is to provide administrative and technical guidance on the preparation of the LGAs. The writer's guide provides instructions for writing LGAs, including format, instructional steps, mechanics of .

style, flow charts, symbols, graphs, place-keeping aids, logic terms, and examples. The writer's guide states each LGA shall provide the basic purpose for the procedure, list the entry conditions, and in the body of the procedure, contingent operator actions based on interpretation of parameters and conditions., Our review of the  ;

writer's guide identified the following items that should be addressed in the PGP:

1. To minimize confusion, delay, and errors in execution of LGA steps, the LGAs should be structured and written so that they meet the following objectives. The PGP should be revised to include instructions which will ensure that the LGAs meet these objectives: (1) the LGAs can be encuted by the minimum shif t and control room staffing as required by Technical Specifica-tions,(2)theoperatorrolesspecifiedintheLGAsandthe training program are consistent with pre established leadership roles and division of responsibility (3) action steps minimize

6-movement and physical conflict between personnel needed for carrying out the Steps, and (4) unintentional duplication of tarks is avoided.

2. The writer's guide should provide instructions for the use of tables in the LGAs including when tables should be used, how they should be fematted and where in the LGAs they should be located.

1, The writer's guide should provide instructions for including location information in the LGAs for instrumentation and controls that are infrequently used or located outside the control room.

4, the writer's guide or other administrative procedures should address maintenance, accessibility and copy quality of the LGAs.

5, To avoid confusion in component identification, the writer's guide (Section4.9)shouldbeexpandedtoaddressconsistentuse of nomenclature on equipment labels, on control room labels and in the LGAs.

With the exception of the above items, the writer's guide provides acce ptable methods for accomplishing the objectives stated in ~

NURIG-0899.

Use of the writer's guide should help ensure that the LGAs are useable, accurate, complete, readable, convenient to use and acceptable to centrol rt,em operators.

C. Validatit.n and Verification Programs The dct:riptions cf the validation and verification programs were reviewed to determine if they address the objectives stated in NUREG-0699, i.e., to establish the accuracy of infornation and/or instructions to determine that the procedures can be accurately and efficiently carried out, and to demonstrate that the procedures are adequate to mitigate transients and accidents, t

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The licensee's LGA Validation Program describes a method for determining that the actions specified in the LGAs can be followed by f control room operators to manage emergency conditions. The

licensee's method is to walkdown the procedure at the plant and at i

the BWR simulator. The walkdown will also verify that the equipment I

which is referenced is physically installed and useable as described e

! in the procedures, and will assure understanding and useability of 4

the procedures as written. Coments accumulated from the walkdowns i and the operator tr61ning course will be evaluated and incorporated in the procedures as deemed necessary.

The licensee's LGA Verification Program describes methods for detemining that the actions specified in the LGAs are technically correct and accurately reflect the technical guidelines. To assure j that the new/ revised LGA meets the guidelines established by the BWR0G and that the revisions to the source documents have been properly reflected in the LGAs, the licensee will review the reference documents used in preparing / revising the particular LGA.

] To ascertain that changes to the LGAs do not affect the intent of the LGAs, the licensee will check that the calculations sumery page was

completed and reviewed by two people and, if more recent data could

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affect the calculations, have new calculations completed. The -

i licensee stated that individuals chosen as verifiers w111 be based on familiarity of the LGAs and general plant knowledges licensed I individuals are preferrable. The verification description states that a biannual review is to be conducted to assure that any changes 1

in the source documents, plant systems, etc., are reflected in the calculations and the procedures. i The licensee's PGP described methods to be used to accomplish most of

! the objectives of NUREG-0899. However, the licensee should address

) the following items in the validation / verification program:

! (1) Indicate that the full complement of the LGAs are to be exercised I

(including multiple failures, both simultaneous and sequential) on i

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the simulator and/or in combination with other methods. (EfState the criteria for selecting scenarios to be used in simulator exercises for verification / validation. (3)Indicatethatareasnot covered by simulator exercises will undergo validation / verification by other means. (4) Explain the method by which multiple units will be handled in the process to account for unit differences.

(5) Indicate the type of individuals, e.g., plant operators, subject matter experts, and procedure writers, who are involved in the validatior./ verification process. (6) Describe the roles played by the participants (i.e., how will operators, subject matter experts, etc. participate ire the validation / verification prccess. (7) Discuss your intent to establish a process to validate / verify revisions to the LGAs.

Inclusion of the above items should result in validation and verification programs that provide assurance that the LGAs will adequately incorporate the guidance of the writer's guide and the P.STG and will guide the operator in mitigating the consequences of accidents and transients. We find that with exception of the above items, the descriptions of the validation and verification programs provide acceptable methods for accomplishing the objectives of NUREG-0899. Therefore, with the exceptions noted, we conclude that-the validation and verification programs are acceptable. The staff will confim that the licensee adequately addresses these items and will report its review in a subsequent safety evaluation report.

D. Training Progran The licensee's description of the training program on revisions to the LGAs was reviewed to detemine if it addresses the objectives stated in NUREG-0899. The description includes a list of training program goals and indicates that the training program consists of classroom training sessions and practical training on the simulator.

The licensee stated that the classroom training session will be

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considered complete when the licensed operator scores 80 percent or above on the written examination, that additional training will be' required if the trainee scores below 80 percent on the written examination, and that each license operator shall receive practical training on using the LGAs. The licensee stated that the practical training will include a simulation of postulated transients which will require er}try into each LGA and that training will nomally be conducted on the LaSalle simulator. Under special circumstances, an actual control room walkthrough may be substituted for the si'nulator training to fulfill the practical training requirements. The iicensee stated that this ,special substitution must be approved by the training supervisor before it will be allowed.

Our review of the trainine program description identified the following items that should be addressed in the PGP: (1) simulator training should include team training so that individuals will learn .

to perfom the LGAs as individuals and teams, (2) training the operators on their roles and team work for portions of the LGAs which cannot be fully exercisett on the simulator, and (3) the operators should be evaluated on the simulator portion of the training.

Inclusion of the above items should result in a training program that meets the guidance of NUREG-08g9 and should provide assurance that the LGAs will adequately guide the operators in mitigating the consequences of accidents and transients. Therefore, with the

! exceptions noted, we conclude that the training program is acceptable. The staff will confirm that the licensee adequately ,

I addresses these items and will report its review in a subsequent safety evaluation report.

l 3. CONCLUSIONS Based on our review, we conclude that, with the exceptions noted in l Section 2 of this SER, the Connonwealth Edison Company PGP for the LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2 meets the requirements of 1

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Supplement I to NUREG-0737 and provides acceptable methods for accomplishing the objectives of NUREG-0899. The PGP should be revised to address the items described in Section 2 and re-submitted.

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PREPUBLICATICW DRAFT c

EMERGENCY PROCEDURE OUIDELINES i' Revision 3 1

BWR 1 throuah 6 December 4. 1982 I

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LASALLE COUNTY ETATICW EMERGENCY PROCEDUEE GUIDELINE 8

TECHNICAL GUIDELINE ,

This Technical Guideline has been generated from revision 31 of the Emergency Procedure Guideline. Any differences between revision 3I and revision 3 of the EPG has been designated by a letter in the margin.

Attachment A consists of a description of the change and the appropriate reason. Each change is noted every time it appears throughout the Technical c Guideline.

All parameters have been changed to comply with LECE physical characteristics.

The following systems are not installed at LaSalle and all references to them are lined out without comment.

1. Ic
2. HPCI
3. 90c III containment
d. Heated Reference Legs .
5. sec I containment
6. SPMS

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Snorgency Procedure cuidelines Brr900UCTItai i .

Based on the various RWR system desiyts, the following generic symptomatic emergency procedure guidelines have been developed:

RPV control cuideline

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  • Recondary containment control cuideline
  • Radioactivity Release control cuideline c

The RPV control Guideline maintains adequate core cooling, shuts doun the reactor. and cools down the RPV to cold shutdoun conditions. This guideline ,

is entered whenever low RPV water level, hip RPV pressure, or hi$ dryuell

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pressure occurs, or whenever a condition dich requires reactor scram exists and reactor power is above the APRM downscale trip or cannot be determined.

The Primary contairment control cuideline maintains primary contairment integrity and protects equipment in the primary containment. This guideline is entered whenever suppression pool temperature, drywell temperature,

containment temperature, drywell pressure or suppression pool water level, is
above its high operating limit or suppression pool water level is below its l low operating limit.  !

The secondary enntairunent control cuideline protects equipment in the t

secondary containment, limits radioactivity release to the secondary containment, ara either maintains secondary containment integrity or limits

radioactivity release from the secondary containment. This guideline is entered whenever a secondary containment temperature, radiation level, er water level is above its maximum normal operating value or secondary containment differential pressure reaches sero.  ;

The Radioactivity Release control cuideline limits radioactivity release into l

areas outside the primary and secondary containments. This guideline is ,

entered whenever offsite radioactivity release rate is above that edite .- l l requires an Alert.

I the entry conditions for these emergency procedure guidelines are symptomatic l of both emergencies and events which may degrade into emergencies. The l guidelines specify actions appropriate for both, therefore, entry into l procedures developed from these guidelines is not conclusive that an amer 0ency '

has occurred.

- , - - - - ...- - . _ . - - - ,- . , - - - - ~ - . - -

amargency procedurO Ouidentaes Table I is a list of the abbreviations used in the guidelines.

Brackets [ ] enclose plant wilgue setpoints, desipi limits, pusy shutoff pressures, etc. and parentheses ( ) within brackets indicate the sousse for the bracketed vartable. Illustrated in these guidelines are vartables for a typical sta/4 or WWE/6 as appropriate. ,

At various points throuWmut these guidelines, precautions are noted by the symbol:

O C The manber within the hos refers to a numbered " Caution" contained in the operators precautions section. These " Cautions" are brief and succinct red flags for the operator. ghe basis for each caution as well as for every step is provided in Appendia B.

ghe emergency procedure guidelines are generic to es-sla 1 throudi 6 designs in that they address all major systems which may be used to respond to an emergency. mecause no specific plant includes all of the systems in these guidelines, the guidelines are applied to individual plants by deleting statements which are not applicable or by substituting equivalent systems where appropriate. For exaspie, plants with no low pressure injection system will delete statements referring to isC1, and plants with Eme pressure core Flooding will suhtitute 17CF for l#CI.

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At various points within these guidelines, limits are specified beyond entich certain actions are required. Idhile conservative, these limits are derived from engineering analyses utilising best-estimate (as opposed to licensing) andels. consequently, these limits are not as conservative as the limits specified in a plant's gechnical specifications. ghts is not to taply that operation beyond the Technical specifications is recousanded in an emergency. .

Rather, such operation may be required under certain degraded osnditions in order to safely mitigate the consequences of those degraded conditions. Tae . -

limits specified in the guidelines establish the boundaries within enticii continued safe operation of the plant can be assured. gherefore, conformance with the guidelines does not ensure strict conformance with a plant's

! Technical specifications or other Itcensing bases.

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Emergency Procedure Suidelines s

TABLE I .

EPS ABBREVIATIONS ADS - Automatic Depressurization System hRM - Average Power Range Monitor c CRD - Control Rod Drive SCCS - Emergency Core Colling System HCU - Hydraulic Control Unit M*C?

"!:' * :::u : C: ?::t inj::tir-HPCS - High Pressure Core Spray HVAC - Heating, Ventilating and Air Conditioning .

. :C *::::ti:n C nd:n :-

LCO - Limiting Condition f or Operation LDCA - Loss of Collant Accident LPCI - Lew Pressure Coolant Injection LPCS - Low Pressure Core Spray MSIV - Main Steamline Isolation Valves NDTT - Nil-Ductility Transition Temperature NFSH - Net Positive Suction Head RCIC -

Reactor Core Isolation Cooling RHR - Residual Heat Removal (

RPS - Reactor Protection System ..

RPV - Reactor Pressure Vessel RSCS - Rod Seguence Control System RWCU - Reactor Water Cleanup SDGT - Standby Ses Treatment 3-4 e

O Emergency Procedure Guidelines TABLE I(continued)

SLC - Standby Liquid Control SORY - Stuck Open Relief Valve W ;; L;;. :::icn P :1 "Mrg 9/-*-

SRV - Safety Relief Valve 4

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l Emergency Procedure Guidelines '

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DPERATOR PRECAUTIDNS l l

SENERAL '

This section lists " Cautions" which are generally applicable at I all times.

_____.________________. .__________________________. t t CAUTIDN 81 general state of the plant. If an entry I I Monitor the i condition for a (procedure developed from the Emergency i i

occurs, enter that procedure. When I I Procedure Guidelines 3 exists, enter I 1 8 it is determined that an emergency no longer 3 t [ normal operating procedure 3. ___

1 CAUTION G2 I I

RPV water level and pressure and primary containment It 4

I Monitor I temperatures and pressure from multiple indications.

Q.. ...___. ..__..______________ _______._____..___.____..__-_ I i CAUTIDN G3 I If a safety function initiates automatically, assume a true i t initiating event has occurred unless otherwise confirmed by i I at least two independent indications. .....__________________ 3

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CAUT1DN G4 RHR is in the LPCI mode, inject through the heat i 8 Whenever I i exchangers as soon as possible.

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- CAUTION 95 i

i Suppression pool temperature is determined by Cprocedure temperaturefor 3. I i determining bulk suppression pool water is determined by (procedure for ! .

. I Drywell temperature j

drywell atmosphere average temperature 3. t t determining " ;.- I gg gg

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! ;; tere;n;n; F.;r a  !!! ;enteir nt etee spr.;.  ; 2.e, _;; -t .g1

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_=____.m..._________.____.__ _ __.

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' Emergency Proc'Edure Butdelines CAUTION 96 I I legi I Whenever Ctemperature near the instrument reference I vertical runs 3 exceeds the temperature in the table and the t I instrument reads below the indicatet level in the table, the  !

I I actual RPV water level may be anywhere below the elevation of I I the lower instrument tap. I C I See Atinck+1 g I Indicated i Temoerature Level Instrument I

617 in. Shutdown Range Level ( 500 t in.33 I I Can I I

I C107*F -107 in. de Range Love (-150 to +60 in. 3 3 I -

l I C310*F 19 in. Nar an vel ( 0 to +60 in.3 3 i I C545"F ang Fuel Zone Level ( 500 f r. ) 3 i

  • I I ,

I in order of increasing temperature.3

\ f CAUTION 97 8 i Cheated refere 6- '=a instrument 3 in evels are not  !

during rapid RP ritation below 500 psig. I I reliable leg 8 these s, utilize forence I For I I in to monitor RPV water level. ,

Meded cakeewet hgs watIwt M ek. ,

l l

l l

l i

e I .

1 i

I l e f

l I-7 l

i

CAUTION *&>

LCWCL .T. A).1 TR U M ENT TfmMRATUff .TAIMCATfD Lf vfl 1

ANY I 4 & in U-I .5HurDowN RANGE ANY 150 in U-2 3HUTDou)N AAIUGE l80" l 95 in U-/ URSCT RANGE

\ ,- , go* j go in 0-1 UPSET RA AIGf i

l l

l l

l

s O

Emergency Procedure Guidelines B

~

__--.----~~------_---- --..--------

CAUTION 03 1

NPSH requirements f or pumps taking suction from t i I serve 8 I su ression pool. I I I I I i 10 psige (

8 i f................

i 8 . I t 4 I . 240 + 5 psig .

t................ I I I I I .

t................ . I Suppe sien 8

0 psig I I Pool 220 + .

I t Temperat e t .

I i I (*F) I 2 + RHR NPS imit t I

I t -

g g

--+- ---+--.+--.+-__

- 2 4 6 8 10 1 RHR mp Flow (X1000 gpm)

8. i I I 8

10 p ige t t I t t......... ........

+ 5 psig I I 2 .

I i 1............ .....

f .

I I .

0 psig i I Suppres on 1 I

t Poo 220 +................ .

i I Temp sture i . ,

2 i F) I I

I I I 200 + I

! t

+-----+-----+-----+----- t I i 4 I 2 & 8 LPCS Pump Flow (X1000 gpm) t l

t i t t

t ,

I  !

I uppression chamber pressure  !

! Suppression pool at normal water level i

l l'

I-5

i . .

Emergency Procedure Guidelines

_. ---------.--.---------._--.-----_-._ _- _ ._ I t CAUTION 09 43 gg, 0;. t i If signals of high suppression pool water level ::" 70.storage i i

8 (high level sucti interlock)3 or low condensate I tank water level C '.*(low level suction interlock) 2 occur, t of or manually transfer -NPet, 8 I confirm automatic transfer RCIC suction from the condensate storage tank to I c I MPCS, and 8 I the suppression pool.

)

EPEC1EIC This section lists " Cautions" which are applicable at one or more specific points within the guidelines. Where.a -

" Caution" is applicable, it is identified with the symbol 88 8.

I CAUTION 910 t I

i Do not secure or place an ECCS in MANUAL mode unless, by in misoperation at I 8

indications, til t least two independent

(,

8 AUTDMATIC mode is confirmed, or (2) adequate core cooling is  !

I assured. If an ECCS is placed in MANUAL mode, it will not tt I initiate automatically. ,

g,gg I i CAUTION 911 i

initiation signal Cert psig_4 t If a high drywell pressure ECCS exists I pressure which initiates ECCS)2 occurs or l

I (drywell t while depressurizing, prevent injection from those LPCS and i l

I LPCI pumps not required to assure adequate core cooling prior 8 8 i to reaching their maximum injection pressures. ------------.....--

- _ - - . - - - - . . . . . - - . - - - - - - - - - - - - . . . . . - - - - - - - - - - - - - . - - - . . . . . . . . .I - -

t CAUTION 912 4 l00

, turbine $ below EGG 99 rps t I Do not throttle .NPG4 -ee RCIC t t (minimum turbine speed limit per turbine vendor manual)3.

3 t

CAUTION 013 may 1 8 Cooldown rates above (100=F/hr (RPV cooldown rate LCO) 2 I

.I be required to accomplish this step.'

l I-9

Emergency Procedure Guidelines CAUTION 914g '8 I psig t h RCIC low I I Do not depressurize the RPV below C

_h::hcr:r 0; h! ;he.-0 3 unless t I pressure isolation setpoint, 8 motor driven pumps suf ficient to maintain RPV water level are i8 t running and available for injection. c

.------_-_-__.--__---------------_------._-.__-..-__ I t

CAUTION 015 possible: CSRV i I Open SRVs in the following sequence if t i opening sequence 2.

CAUTION 016 i t MSIV i i Bypassing low RPV water level Cventitation system and3 t f isolation interlocks may be required to accomplish thir. step.

_ _ - . - - - - - - . - _ - - _ _ _ - - - - - . . . - - - - - - - _ _ - - - - - . . - _ _ _ . . _ _t _ _

CAUTION 917 .

8 (RPV cooldown rate LCO)2 may i i Cooldown rates above C100=F/hr protect primary i I be required to conserve RPV water inventory, I containment integrity, or limit radioactive release to the !t I environment.

I CAUTION 019 8 If continuous LPCI operation of any RHR pump is required' to i do not divert that pump from i t assure adequate core cooling, I I the LPCI mode.

- - - - . - - - . - - - . . . - - - - - - - - - _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - * -p - - - - . -t - - - - - - - -

CAUTION elf t We Avte Teip, g r- 1$-- -..---+1e

+-# =-am manually trip SLC pumps at COE (Iow I t

I level trip)3 in the SLC tank. .


~~---------------------

g


.--------------------------- CAUTION 020 t i Defeating RSCS interlocks may be required to accomplish this II i step.


_--_.-----------------....------------~~._-

I-10

Emergency Procedure Guidelines

_ . - 1 CAUTION 821 pressure may trip the RCIC II 8 Elevated suppression chamber I turbine on high exhaust pressure. .__._.___..-___________

.____________ 8 CAUTION 022 accomplish I I

i Def eating isolation interlocks may be required to t i this step.

__ ___ ____ __ __ _ __ ____ __ _.t u I.e E W ___________ _ ___ _ ___ _____ I _

CAUTION 823 t '- Il sprays if on pool water 8 t Do not init as.

vation of bottom of Mark I t 8 level is above C17 f t. amber to drywe breakers less !

i internal su t Iv a er opening pressure in feet of water .

8 CAUTION e24

. I 8 Dypassing high drywell pressure and low RPV water level I interlocks

  • any be t

% t secondary containment HVAC isolation t I required to accomplish _this step.

. . . . . _ _ _ . . . . _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - . _ _ _ - -t a t

CAUTION 825 i A rapid increase in injection into the RPV may induce a large.t .~ t I power excursion and result in substantial . _ ._

core damage.

f _ _ . . . . . . _ _ _ _ ___._____..._.._________--

8 i

CAUTION 026

- t I Large reactor power oscillations may be observed while !I f i executing this step.

j t

\. .

1-11 i

- - - - - , _ _ - , _ , _ _ _ _ _ '~~~""*cw->,y ., __

Emergency Procedure Guidelines .

i i RPV CONTROL GUIDELINE ,

PURPOSE The purpose of this guideline is to: C o Maintain adequate core cooling, o Shut down the reactor, and 90 o Cool down the RPV to Id shutdown conditions (Ce@$*F < RPV water temperature < *F (cold shutdown conditions) 3).

. ENTRY CONDITIONS The entry conditions f or this guideline are any of the following:

13 5 1

o RPV water level below C+ 41b in. (Iow level scram setpoint)3 1643 .

L o RPV pressure above [6949 psig (high RPV pressure scram setpoint)3 1.M o Drywell pressure above teve psig (high drywell pressure scram setpoint)3 .

and reactor power, I o A condition which requires reactor scram, above CST (APRM downscale trip)3 or cannot be determined 0 .

DFERATOR ACTIONS RC-1 If reactor scram has not been initiated, initiate reactor scram.

our ute CSteps RC/L, 8

.I Irrespective of the entry conditions,

  • t I MC/F, and RC/03 concurrently.

RC-1

Emergency Procedure Guidelines

~

RC/L Monitor and control RPV water level.

RC/L-1 Initiate each of the following which should have initiated but did not:

o Isol ation e o ECCS to Emergency diesel generator 3 t t If while executing the following step: I I

h Inj ection is required or boron has been I 8

3 to Baron l '

. I injected into the RPV, enter tprocedure developedI I p I from CONTINGENCY 473. 8 E

Io RPV water level cannot be determined, RPV FLOODING I i 15 REQUIRED 3 enter Cprocedure developed from i I

, i CONTINGENCY *S&3. t i (procedure t is re quired, enter

(, Io RPV Flooding developed from CONTINGENCY #63. t i

t RC/L-2 Restore and intain RPV water level I #9 i l ow level scram between C+ in.

I #10 i setpoint)3 and I in. (high level trip setpoint)3 with one or more of the t #1A L*

following systems:

1694 i

l o Condensate /feedwater system C+tte - O psig (RPV pressure range for system operation)3 solk o CRD system C&&&O - O psig (RPV pressure range for system o,eration>3 o RCIC system th 0-50 psig (RPV I #12 I pressure range f or system operation)3 l

o :TC* ;,;t;; !:100 - IS^ ;;ig '""" ? retu r range f or system operation)3 o HFCS system C 60 - O psig (RPV pressure range f or system operation) 3

- y%o .

o LPCS system C+95 - O psig (RPV pressure range s

f or system operation) 3 RC-2

Emergency Procedure Guidelines * '

MO o LPCI system (GG6 - O psig (RPV pressure range for system operation)3 If RPV water level e not be restored and maintained above C+ in. (low level scram gg setpoint)3, maintain RPV water level above C-644 in. (top of active fuel)3.

If RPV water level can be maintained above E h in. (top of active fuel)3 and the ADS timer has initiated, prevent automatic RPV depressurization by resetting the ADS timer.

I If p water level cannot be maintained above t I C-664 in. (top of active f uel)3, enter tprocedure i I developed from CONTINGENCY G13. t i i If Alternate Shutdown Colling is rectuired, enter i g 8 Eprocedure developed from CONTINGENCY e5.3 1 RC/L-3 When tprocedure for cooldown to cold shutdown conditions 3 is entered from CStep RC/P-53, proceed to cold shutdown in accordance with Eprocedure for cooldown to cold

  • shutdown conditions 3. _

l .

RC-3

l l

I I

I l l

\

Emergency Procedure Guidelines 1 RC/P Monitor and control RPV pressure.

while executing the following steps: t t If I I A- t

. Io Emergency RPV Depressurization is l

I anticipated and Soron Injection is not t #13 I I t

I required, rapidly depressurize the RPV --

I I with the main turbine bypass valves.

i I is !

to Emergency RPV Depressurization or RPV Flooding requi red and less than E7 (number of SRVs I I

t dedicated to ADS)3 SRVs are open, enter Cprocedure !

8 I developed from CONTINGENCY G23. ,

I I

8o RPV Flooding is required and at least C7 (number t i SRVs dedicated to ADS) 3 SRVs are open, enter i I of I

! Cprocedure developed from CONTINGENCY 863.

RC/P-1 If any SRV is cycling, ;..;;;;te :C and manyg11y open SRVs until RPV pressure drops to C9567sig (RPV pressure at which all turbine bypass valves are fully open)3.

e en W

RC-4

F l

1 Emergency Procedure Suidelines I If while executing the following steps! --

'I I

I I 8 I t's Suppression pool temperature cannot be I #13 I I I maintained below the Heat Capacity I G14 I I

. I Temperature Limit, maintain RPV pressure - - - t I

  • below the Limit. See Attuked I 8 .

I

! 197 + .

I I I .

188 + . I i t i

I Sup sion I .

Poo 8 . I I I I Temperatur 60 + .

I I W) at .

I I

apacity .

! T erature . I

! I I 122 + Limit* .

t I g o +____+ ___+_____ _+ _ g ,

0 135 240 1 I t RPV Pressure (psig) i I

I I Io suppression pool water level cannot be I #13 I I 3

I maintained below the Suppression Pool Load Limit, maintain RPV pressure below the t #14 I I I ---- t the Limit. .h. A nd,f I .

I I !_

I 20 + .

I b~

! t I I .

I  !

t I

! Suppres t .

I Pool I I Nater I ression i

! Level Poo ad . I I (ft.)

.I Limit i I I t .

I, --+-- t i 12.5 +---------+-------

O 400 t I RPV Pressure ipzig) i t

I I

! enter (procedure t Steam Cooling is required, Io t I developed from CONTINGENCY 633.

RC-5

'*~=ww--.- - , - ,.-. ,

)

I '

LGA - GI HEAT CAPACITY TEMPERATURE LIMIT  :

230 230 c

220 220 E ' E

\

=

g 210

\- --

210 a

g 3

5 A H e

s T g 200 \ 200 g i 2 \' E E N i M  %' .

U g 190 , 190 g l

a. \ a

_., N m, s S 180 N g

~

18 0 l

i 170 170 135 200 400 600 800 1000 1076 REACTOR VESSEL PRESSURE (psig) 1 . - - - - - _ . . . .

LGA-G5 SUPPRESSION POOL LOAD LIMIT 1250 1250

\

\ '

\

1000 1000

  • \

a X t 23 g  :

lE

= \ c e \ l

= \ s i

e X 1: T i p i

! 500 500 i a .

O L

0 O 25 0 5 10 15 20 SUPPRESSION POOL LEVEL 1

704'10" 709'l0" 714'10" 719'l0" 724'10" 699'10" CONTAINMENT FLOOD LEVEL

(

Emergency Procedure Guidelines

~.

't I If while executing the following steps:

I i I Io Baron Injection is required, and i t I I o The main condenser is available, and I I

1o There has been no indication of gross fuel failure t I I or steam line break, -- I I i 416 8 I I open MSIVs to re-establish the main condenser - -- 8 I as a heat sink. _ _ _ -

RC/P-2 Control RPV pressure below C psig (lowest ERV lifting pressure)3 with the t 414 I

-~~

main turbine bypass valves.

RPV pressure control may be inugmented by one' or .

more of the following systems:

l o SRVs only when suppression pool water' level --

is above t'4"ft. W (elevation of top

. of SRV discharge device)2. If the t #15 t l continuous SRV pneumatic supply is or -- -

l becomes unavailable, place the control switch l

' for each SRV in the [4it:GGE3 position.

AUTO _ ,

.Z;; I #12 r o RCIC o 3 57km ret AwI t;gtotg g,am y tydriven aequipmegam, ygi tew.o. a. sus.asw. a.wi..,% lad =t,'T o RWCU (recirculation mode) if no boron has been injected into the RPV.

o Main steam line drains .

. o RWCU (blowdown mode) if Refer no boron has been to Csampling injected into the RPV.

procedures 3 prior to initiating blowdown.

RC,-6

- - - - - , . . - . , . - , - , - - - - , . - , , - - - , - - , . , . , - . . --,,,.,--- _ - ,_ ,,.,--,.---vr------------. - - - - - - , - - - - - - - - - - . - - - - - - - - -

f Emergency Procedure Guidelines l ..

I If while executing the following steps the reactor is i 8

I not shutdown, return to EStep RC/P-23.

RC/P-3 When either:

o All control rods are inserted to or beyond position t06 (maximum subcritical banked withdrawal position)3, or Jn3S gal Ve%

o (200 p _.. :- (Cold Shutdown Soron L.e.J 3 of boron have been injected into the RPV, or o The reactor is shutdown and no baron has been injected into the RPV, i 914 i i

  • depressurire the RPV and mair)tain cooldown 't 817 !

rate below C100*F/hr (RPV cooldown rate ___ ,

LCO)3.

If one or more SRVs are being used to depressurize 4

q, the RPV and the continuous SRV pneumatic supply is l s

or becomes unavailable, depressurize with sustained 1 ERV opening. ,

t RC/P-4 When the RHR shutdown cooling interlocks I als I >

l clear, initiate the shutdown cooling moce - -- *

' of RHR.

If the RHR shutdown cooling mode canno; be established and f urther cooldown is re stuired, continue to cool down using one or mor e of the systems used for depressurization.

____________ RPV cooldown is recquired

_________________but cannot be t I accomplished and all control rods are inserted to I l

! If 8 or beyond position t06 (maximum subcritical iG I banked withdrawl position)3, ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN 8 enter (procedure developed I

~

. I COOLING 15 REQUIREDs I

- I from CONTINGENCY e5.3.

RC/P-5 Proceed to cold shutdown in accordance with

--- t: : ?? bt2: -

p:::::. :  :: ::: .
..di tie .; . Lt.P a-t N#AmAL UMT sum wp RC-7 l

l

Emergency Pr ocedure Guidelines 1

RC/G Monitor and control reactor power.

t If while executing the following steps: - 8 o All control rods are inserted to or beyond position 1 8 C06 (saximum subcritical banked withdrawal t ,

position)3, terminate boron injectier. and enter i I

  • I I , tscram procedure 3. 8 t

1 8o The reactor is shutdown and no boron has been II I injected into the RPV, enter [ _scram procedure 3.

i RC/Q-1 (Confirm or place the reactor mode switch in

. SHUTDOWN.3 RC/Q-2 If the main turbine-generator is on-line tend the MSIVs are open3, confirm or inititate recirculation flow runback to minimum.

, y, RC/Q-3 If reactor power is above CJ1 (APRM downscale trip)3 or cannot be determined, trip the recirculation pumps.

8 Execute CSteps RC/Q-4 and RC/Q-53 concurrently. 8 o

G e

e 9

6 O

e O

Emergency Procedure Suidelines RC/G-4 If the reactor cannot be shutdown before suppression pool temperature reaches (the,7 -~~

Boron Injection Initiation Temperature 3, 8 ett I DDRON INJECTION 15 REQUIREDI inject boren into the RPV with SLC and prevent '

automatic initiation of ADS.

y l Boron I 130 + Injection I t...... Initist i Suppressi 8 . To ture i Pool 12 . I Temperature t . I I

W) I .

I 110 .........

! I i  !

g goo +-_+ __4.__+-_+-_+__

O 1 2 3 4 5 6 1

- Reactor Power (X)

\ If boron cannot be injected with SLC, inject boron into the RPV by one or more of the following alternate methods:

Co CRD 3 Co HPCS 3 Eo RWCU 3 Eo Feedwater 3 I: . C; 3 Co RCIC 3 Co Hydro pump 3 .

RC/O-4.1 If boron is not being injected into the .

RPV by RWCU, confirm automatic isolation of or manually isolate RWCU.

RC/G-4.2 Continue to inject boron until C pounds (Cold Shutdown Boron Weight)3 of baron have been injected into the RPV.

RC/O-4.3 Enter tscram procedure 3.

l RC-9

(

4 1

i t

i Emergency Procedure Suidelines

RC/O-5.1 If any scram valve is not open:

o CRemove:

,E C,S, e H11-P609 C71-F M11-P&11 C71-F ,F.D H i

(f uses "eN de-energite RPS scram

! solenoids)3.

C L,os t s(p)I A S*8- 3u'am A'v- .___ . .. _ - - _ ,_____ .,_ &_-s__

{_'{j'j((.;';[j';Ej;{j7'ib;-!v;!:. ':7@

l haJer iff lyI6.p a4 Rtmovf

.;..t the Se.ca m Aie u Aw 3*spplig t;. ;; 2. .- 7.; _ d ; .-

( n e .- q.)m-too 6 j

When control rods.are not moving inward:

o' CReplace:

r M11-P&O9 C71-F184 E C,S

.l I

l L H11-Pett C71-F1BB,F,D H (fuses N de-energize RPS scram i

solenoids)2.

INSTAu.ib* 34.c=> Air 14enA** O O!::: !CI! 005 ': ^rcr2dr 5::dcr ICII ~5

- --t ^J2!7 ?? nf -

5.pp13 Cdber :(p)< it.beod. e.vwl. -

5 222^  ;"t ;-se i l

Meu g(a)t h &ob 3<.etw As, ,

N-

~*~'"

25.2f l

M.A., SQ 34 p.

RC/O-5.2 Reset the reactor scram.

l l

If the reactor scram cannot be reset:

1. Etert all CRD pumps.

I If no CRD pump can be started, continue in this procedure at .

CStep RC/G-5.6.13.

' 2. Close CC11-F034 (MCU accumulator j

charging water header valve 13.

3. Rapidly insert control rods manually until the reactor i #20 8 scram can be reset.

RC-10 4

. - --,~ _,--- - - . . . . - - _ . . _ . . , _ _ . . - . _ . _ _ -

r Emergency Procedure Guidelines

. i e

4. Reset the reactor scram.

- 5. Open EC11-F034 (HCU accumulator charging water header valve)3.

RC/Q-5.3 Drain the scram discharge volume and ,, c initiate a manual reactor scram.

1. If. control rods moved inward, return to CStep RC/Q-5.23.
2. Reset the reactor scram.

If tha reactor scram cannot be reset,

continue in this procedure at CStep J

RC/Q-5.5.13. .

Open the scram discharge volume vent 3.

and drain valves.

RC/Q-5.4 Individually open the scram test switches for control rods not inserted to or

' ' beyond position C06 (maximum subcritical banked withdrawl position)3.

When a control rod is not moving inward, close its scram test switch.

  • RC/Q-5.5 Reset the reactor scram. .

If the reactor scram cannot be reset:

1. Start all CRD pumps.

If no CRD pump can be started, continue in this procedure at EStep RC/Q-5.6.13.

2. Close EC11-F034 (HCU accumulator charging water header valve)3.

RC-11

1 Emergency Procedure Guidelines 4

RC/Q-5.6 Rapidly insert control rods manually--

untti all control rods are 8 #20 t inserted to or beyond position -- -

t06 (maximum suberitical banked withdrawal position)2.

If any control rod cannot be inserted to <

or beyond position C06 (maximum '

suberitical banked withdrawl position)3:

1. Individually direct the affluent from CC11-F102 (CRD withdraw line vent valve) 3 to a contained radweste drain and open EC11-F102 (CRD withdraw line l vent valve) 3 f or each ontrol rod not G inserted to or beyond position C06 (maximum subcritical banked withdrawal position)3. .
2. When a control rod is not moving inward, close its CC11-F102 (CRD I withdraw line vent valve)3.

\..

o O

RC-12

"* - - ' ~ --"r . - . . . _ _ - _ , , _ _ _ _ , _ _ , _

Ensegency Procedure Guidelines t

PRIMARY CONTAINMENT CONTROL GUIDELINE PURPOSE c

The purpose of this guideline is to:

o Maintain primary containment integrity, and o Fratect equipmand in the primary containment.

ENTRY CONDITIONS The entry conditions f or this guideline areI any of the following:

We o Suppression pool temperature above [4taF (most limiting suppression pool temperature LCO)3 Drywell temperature above C135=F (drywell temperature LCO or

~

o maximum normal operating temperature, whichever is higher)3 Mk II e 0;nt;irc:nt t;;;;retur; ;t;r; "?O-r ';;nteir;;r.t t;;;;r;tur;

  • *If i.;;; ; -

i 1.49 o Drywell pressure above [SeG psig (high drywell pressure -

scram setpoint)3

+ 3 :n.

o Suppression pool water level above [-;;

.t. i en. (maximum suppression pool water level LCO)3 st.$ en' Suppression pool water level below C 2 't. O in. (minimum o

suppression pool water level LCO) 3 i

OPERATOR ACTIONS 1

_--------_---------------------------------------CSteps Irrespective of the entry condition, execute SP/T, t 3 g

! DW/T, 4mw1*, PC/P, SP/L, gonc urr entl y.

PC-1

l

- l Emergency Procedure Suidelines .

SP/T Monitor and control suppression pool temperature.

SP/T-1 Close all SORVs.

If any 50RV cannot be closed Cwithin 2 minutes (optional plant-specific time interva13 3, scram the reactor.

SP/T-2 n suppression pool temperature exceeds g[95=F (most limiting suppression pool I #10 t temperature LCO)3, operate available suppression pool cooling.

he SP/T_3 Before suppression pool temperature reaches Baron Injection Initiation Temperature 3, scram the

- reactor. ,

I 1

I - ', Soron i Injecti I 130 +  !

f...... Initi Cuppress t . Y erature 8 3

Pool +

  • 8 Temperature
  • 1

(*F) I .

+ ......... I I

i I

8 goo +___+ _ _+___+___+ , + 4 2 3 4 5 6 . t 0 1 t

Reactor Power (10 ,

l l

1 i

I l .

t PC-2

-.-------.,.,-..-.,,-,...-------,w,- -

w.,---- - - - , - - - - - - - - - , , , - - - - . - - - - - . , - - , - - - -. - - - ---,w--,- . - - - - , - - . - - , - , - ,--y- --,w,,-.----

Emergency Procedure Guidelines SP/T-4 If suppression pool temperature cannot he ~~

maintained below the Heat Capacity iMB Temperature Limit, maintain RPV pressure l below the Limit 8 enter (procedure developed I #13 1 j from the RPV Control Suideline3 at CStep i 814 i ,

RC-13 and execute it concurrently with this i procedure. $,, ggg 8 .

)97 + .

t .

ISS + .

Suppresto 8 .

Pool I .

Temperature 16 .

W) I at ity .

I Ca 8 Tempe ure .

122 + Limit .

. g.

o + e - - - - + - . . _ . . --

O 135 240 1090 RPV Pressure (psig)

C If suppression pool temperature and RPV pressure l

cannot be restored and maintained below the Heat Capacity Temperature Limit, EMERGENCY RPV DEPRESSURIZATION 15 REQUIRED. .

[

i r

i l

l l

s l -

i PC-3 .

i

LGA - Gl HEAT CAPACITY TEMPERATURE LIMIT s

230 230 220 220 <

E 1

t E'

\

g 210 3' '

210 g E \; E E r 5 \ 5 s

s T g 200 \ 200 g, 2 \ E E \  !

= N N w 190 N 190

  • E E \

Ns $

a  % a f '

NN $

j 180 18 0 g 170 170 135 200 400 600 800 1000 1076 REACTOR VESSEL PRESSURE (psig)

I Emergency Procedure Guidelines DW/T Monitor and control drywell temperature. ,

DW/T-1 When drywell temperature exceeds C135-F

  • (drywell temperature LCO or maximum normal 1 06 I operating temperature, whichever is higherl3, ----

. operate available drywell cooling.

C


....------------------------- ......---------- ------ t l Execute CSteps DW/T-2 and DW/T-33 concurrently.

DW/T-2 If drywell temperature "n:;r th: ::!d r:fer:n :

nt ; rtice! runt? reaches the RPV

, n.,g}*}[*""'*4"I n4 wash" 3 ; dn:tru Saturation Temperature, RPV FLOODING IS REDUIREDI S '"MN ' enter (procedure developed from the RPV Control l

Suideline3 at CStep RC-13 and execute it concurrently with this procedure. See Atlad**A-f g

550 + .

t .

Temper ce t .

(

/

1-n i .

Cnear cold I .

reference .

leg i instrument . Saturation vertical i . erature

  • runs t *

, l. -

212 +---------------------

. 0 1000 RPV Pressure (psig)

I w

e PC-4

LGA - G2 RPV SATURATION LIMIT 550 e 550 s /

500

/ 500 g c

/

450

/ 450 k

400 400 l 5 / i E /  !

a 350 350 g

Y h 300

/

7

[ 300 250 250 200 200 100 300 500 700 900 1076 RPV PRESSURE (psig)

,,,na u.., _a, o a Ja- + = - --4 .a-mm.h. . _ m --d -- 1 =----J--a-.-a- A-a.-i.a.As4-s-.4 s

_ - _ _ _ - . _ m l

Emergency Procedare Guidelines .

DW/T-3 Bef ore drywell temperature reaches C340*F (maximum temperature at which ADS qualified or drywell .

design temperature, whichever is l'ower)3 but -- only if Csuppression chamber temperature and -

drywell pressure are below the Drywell i etS t Spray Initiation Pressure Limit 3, tshut - - - -

down recirculation pumps and drywell cooling fans and3 initiate drywell sprays.ter trictir.; f!:n rat:

A NP Mutdim c3 '

t: !::: ther 720 ;; M : ::: 0,, ;;; Op.e,.";;

Mete'iMt - - S.. A W.A . I.

N 400 +

t Drywell Spray i Initiation Pr ure 300 + Li Suppression .

l 1 Chamber 200 .

Temperatur  ! .

(*F t.

  • 100 +

. g I

- 0 + ---+-  :-  : --

3

! 0 10 20 30 40 Drywell Pressure (psig)

If drywell temperature cannot be maintained below C340=F (maximum temperature at which ADS qualified .

i or drywell design temperature, whichever is

  • lower)3, EMERGENCY RPV DEPRESSUR12ATION IS REQu1REDI enter Eprocedure developed from the RPV .-

i Control Suideline3 at (Step RC-13 and execute it l

i concurrently with this procedure.

l I

PC-5 .

l

\ - _ --..- -- _ _ _ _

i LGA - G3 D/W SPRAY INITIATION PRESSURE LIMIT 30 60 90 12 0 150 350 - e 350 y

. d #

,/

J 300 j / 300

/

/

/

250 j/ 250 5

/ 5 i

200

/

) 200 8

= I z o j o i 8 .I E j g 150 7

150 g i E 8 5 E

10 0 100 50 50 0 30 60 90 12 0 150 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT PRESSURE (psig)

Emergency Procedure Guidelines M K III. o " W /

/T Monitor and control containment temperature.

CN/T-1 When containment temperature exceeds E9D*F --

(containment temperature LCO) 3, operate t# I available containment cooling.

_________________________________________________ ___.  : y I while executing the following steps suppressi pool I t sp ys have been initiated, when suppression , amber 1 I pre ure drops below 0 psig, terminate suppres on pool  !

I spray . I a..

3 CN/T-2 Be ce containment temperature reac s C195*F (con inment design temperature) 3, ut only -----

if Es pression chamber pressure a above t #1B I 1.7 psi (Mark III Containment S ray Initiati Pressure Limit)3, *i tiate suppression

  • pool spra . .

CN/T-3 If containee temperature annot be maintained below C185=F ontainment esign temperature)3, EMERGENCY RPV D PRESSURI TION IS REDUIREDI enter y* Cprocedure devel ed fr a the RPV Control' Guideline 3 at CSte R 13 and execute it concurrently with t pr ocedure.

I CN/T-4 If containment tem era ure Enear the cold reference 1eg instrument v tical uns3 reaches the RPV

  • l Saturation Temp ature. V FLDODING 15 REDUIRED. -

1 550 + .

t .

Tempe ature t .

( F) i Cn r cold I .

r forence t .

1eg 1 . ,

l instrument t . RPV Satura ion vertical 8 . Temperatu .

. runs 3 1 1.

212 +---------------------+ -

0 1 RPV Pressure (psig) l PC-6.

. _ .-r----- - - . , , - . . , , - - - . . - - - - - ,y , , , . _ - . _ _ . _ _ - . -. , , _ - _ - - _ _ _ - - . . -_-- - - - - - - . -- - __ ___

Emergency Procedure Guidelines PC/P Monitor and control primary containment pressure. -

PC/P-1 Operate Cthe following systems, as required:

o Containment pressure control systems. Use containment pressure control system operating procedure.3 Co3 SBST Cand drywell purge 3, only when the temperature in the space being --

evacuated is below C212*F (Maximum i #21 i Noncondensible Evacuation -----

Temperature)3. Use CSBGT and drywell purge operating procedures 3.

, t _____________________ _______________________________ 3  :

C t If while executing the following steps suppression 1 3 i C  ! pool sprays have been initiated.,when suppress,1on I 3 C 8 chamber pressure drops below 0 psig, terminate t 3 C t suppression pool sprays. t 3 1 g ____________________________________________________ )  :

I PC/P-2 Before suppression chamber pressure reaches C4be J7 jus)

!w, t i t - t ic Pressure Suppression Pressure J C 17. ' ;;i g Lt.t esis (Suppression Chamber Spray Initiation -----

l Pressure)3, but :-!y 12 Cer;; :::d :n Id>HD-t 05:mbe- p :: u : i :t: c; '.7 p;ig i #18 8

' 17..c k ::1 Centair .;at Cpc. , :n;t..ti.n -----

! .reee r; Limitt3 Csuppression pool water level is

^

i below g }.g e-tvr. (elevation of suppression pool ,

spray no.. m es) 3, initiate suppression pool sprays. -

t i

I t .

l 1 -

l l

PC-7

/. ,

Emergency Procedure Guidelines d 8 '

?

psig: l' If suppression chamber pressure exceedsandCtion Pressure PC/P-3 (Suppression Chamber Spray Initia -

but only if Couppression chamber temperature I 815 1 drywell pressure are below the Drywellinitiation -

c 3, ,, bel Spr s Attu down recirculation pumps and 0; * * # drywellcoolin

'*~" '

'_f rf t4.

'** M rr- fr , .:r!! !;- r, '"I r" a

" rte .

c.1<.,%t A c t JA Ee 400 +

t Drywell Spray

3. Initiation Pressu Limit 300 + .

I .

. Suppression Chamber 200 .,

Temperature l.

(*F

  • 100 + .

t -

,. I -+ + +-- -

Oe -+

20 30 40

( 0 to Drywell Pressure (psig) i If suppression chamber pressure cannot g$pgg .

be~;.t.. .. _c PC/P-4 15 maintained below.a ; r 2, EMERGENCY RPV DEPRESSU REQUIRED.

See.At.t Id .A.

I 56.0 +

1 I

ion  !

Suppr .

Chambe 42.5 + . -

i .

Pressure 34.

(psig) t sure Suppression i

8 essure I ..

o 4 +.- +-

34.

0 12.5 17 Primary Containment Wa Level (f t.)

e PC-8 .

LGA - G3 D/W SPRAY INITIATION PRESSURE LIMIT 150 30 60 90 IPO 350 ,./ 350

/

y/

/ ,

/ j 1

300 '

g/ 300 ,

/ '

\

/

/

250 250 j/

5

/ 5 5 ) E' g 200 200 g 7

5 I E 7

a i e

! N I 150 g 5:

g 150 r it t E'

E .

l 100 100 l

50 50 i

' 0 0 0 30 60 90 12 0 150 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT PRESSURE (psig) l ,

e.

Emergency Procedure Guidolines PC/P-5 If suppression chamber pressure cannot be maintained below ;;c.; Triz , 0;nt;i . :nt 0;;i;;5 4/ps/3

-Tc;;;..; , RPV FLOODING 15 REQUIRED.

See A t i.e. d e d I

t .

. 56 +......

I .

l .

46.5 + ..........

Suppres  !

Chamber Primary Containment Pressure Design Pressure

,(psig) I t

i o +-___+-_____ _______

0 12.5

  • 34.

Primary Containment ter

- Level (ft.)

PC/P-6 If suppression chamber pressure cannot be maintained below iM {"-i :-, 52-t:f- : t " c;Q;u _sig then irrespective of whether adequate core cool ng is assured:

3e a AE6 c{.4 ,

t .

+ ~

8.....

t .

Suppre ton I ...... ..........

l Chamber  !

Pressure + ary Containment (psig) Pressure Limit l

I o +____+-__ ____#____+-__ ,

I O 10 20 30 40 Primary Contai ont Mater

' Level (ft.

PC-9 L -

. Emergency Procedure Suldelines o CIf suppression pool water level is below G4 723 (te.l.

44. h. (elevation of suppression pool spray nozzles),3 initiata suppression pool sprays.

o If (suppression chamber temperature and drywell pressure are below ine Drywell Spray Initiation Pressure Limit 3, tshut do.an recirculation pumps and drywell cooling fans and3 initiate drywell sprays r;;t.-::tir.; f!:r 4.*. c.e r:t: :: :::: th - ? e ;; t== d r- &, ::!!

84. p r C d e.\ ;t: '  ::ti:.

% i r1;_ _

I Se. Ahbl.

400 +

t Drywell Spray -

1 Initiation Press 300 + Limit i

  • Suppression I .

Chamber .

Temperature I

- W) .

M+ ,

( I I

O+----+---+---+----

0 to 20 30 40 Drywell Pressure (psig)

PC/P-7 If suppression chamber pressure exceeds 4he- /,Opsl $f l

T.- ? 2. y "": .t e d r r t " :: r e e L! -! t , vent -----

the primary containment in accordance with I #22 I Cprocedure f or containment venting 3 to ----

reduce and maintain pressure below the Primary Containment Pressure. Limit.

e PC-10

LGA - G3 D/W SPRAY INITIATION PRESSURE LIMIT 30 60 90 12 0 150 350 e 350 s

li

. J Y y/

J 300 j [ 300 J'

/

/

250 250

>/r 5

5 g

200 j 200 i i i x I a o i s N I 150 E

g g 150

& t E  ?

100 100 50 50 0 30 60 90 12 0 150 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT PRESSURE (psig)

Emergenqy Procedure Guidelines SP/L Monitor and control suppression pool water level.

SP/L-1 Maintain suppression pool water level between --

  • C'O 't ?#E i . (maximum suppression pool water level LCO)3 and [M ."t. i n . -4 8 8 "  !-#8-8 I 89 I

. (minimum suppression pool water level LCO) 3.

Refer to tsampling procedure 3 prior to ---

discharging water. 'O.-;;re ;;i en ;;;! ::L::; ::, 5:

nted t,- CF702.

I' ?""? '?: 5re- initisted, :: int ir zu;;-;;;i r.

pre! -ete- 1ere! 5 0t::: r O! 't. ? in. OF .

MKE + ie4et4 -

I; OI i O;02 tret=1 ;: : ; ;;. ;;; ; . em: . . ;.

-;;"II; I ; II'"O ?O 2tfO'?2 O N LVi end 0
7 ,*t- '.: 1... ',inic_ e ;;. ; :
: art:r lev : .00 If suppression pool watate maintained above C"2 't. g_yel _ r. cannot

. (minimum besuppression l pool water level LCO)3, execute CStep SP/L-23.

l If suppression pool wategevel cannot be maintained below Ci: 't. .1."t. (maximum suppression,

'*F 0 pool water level LCO)2 25  ? in.

MM driti: tier ::tprint ;:u: ; ;;.;;;ien ;;;; _; t ; .-

!cc 3 in :::: &.i ch .::g!t: ' ;; Or".C ;;;.;;i;n!!

O N Ly -i' W E 52: 5: r ini'___i 4;, execute EStep SP/L-33.

e l

1 .

PC-11

Emergency Procedure Guidelines

. -M.E nm SP/L-2 SUPPRESSION PDOL WATER LEVEL BELOW Ct: ' t . C :.;.

(minimum suppresion pool water level LCO)2

  • Maintain suppression pool water level above the Heat Capacity Level Limit. {

5eek % %ek t .

  • 1 12'2" +. Heat Capaci I. Level L t t . .

Suppression  ! .

Pool Water O'2" + ............

Level (f t.-) i I . ,

t 5' +--------+------ -

0 27 T (*F)

Where T a = Heat Capacity Temperature Limit minus suppression pool temperature If suppression pool water level cannot be maintained above the Heat Capacity Level Limit,

  • EMERGENCY RPV DEPRESSUR12ATION IS REQUIREDI enter Cprocedure developed from the RPV Control -

Guideline 3 at CStep RC-13 and execute it _-

concurrently with this procedure.

e PC-12

_ LGA - G8 HEAT CAPACITY LEVEL LIMIT (HCLL) 4 -

SUPPRESSION POOL TEMPERATURE 210 20 1908 18'O O i i i i

_, I I i /

I I / /

.g I

(  ! / d

) / /

~3 I / / ,

s / /

/

/ e, 2 .4 I / s g l l / -

Cy llo ,j

$ .3 / / / / i

, I ( / / i 2 ., I J / / i

= { / / / 1 8 ~7

)" , / / /

is / / / 0 i'

t R -8

( / / $i j p 7 j f60 0

@ / / / / l'

~8  :

E / / / / ~

I ~IO

/ / / /

( / / / b,

/ / / 150

-Il p 7 Ig ./ ./ .

/ _/~

SLA 6' b" i

i 135 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1076 RPV PRESSURE (psig) .,

NOTE: MAINTAIN LEVEL ABOVE EXISTING PRESSURE TEMPERATURE POINT cht

i .

j 4

Emergency Procedure Guidelines i .

I

. P

+3in.

SP/L-3 SUPPRESSION POOL WATER LEVEL ABOVE E : f t . 1 17. .

(maximum suppression pool water level LCO)2

-f!2? ft. ? in_ ?? MS tritirtir- rrtprint ;'"-

M rrr!- prr! rrt:r ::v:! 17.:.;;;; c.ieh r;; !t; 5;; t;;.. tr.it;;ted 4e* : OF""  ;;. tim;;: ; f Or."

i Execute  : tr;= SP/L T ? .... sr/L-3.23 I t t conene-rr.t;,.

I SP/L-3.1 Maintain suppression pool water level below the Suppression Pool Load Limit.

Sea u w k.L t

20 + .

- t .

t .

I Suppres t .

  • Pool Water I Le I Sup salon t.) t Pool Lo .

t Limit l t --

12. 5 +------+

O 400 1200 .

t RPV Pressure (psig) t If suppression pool water level ----

t #13 i cannot be maintained below the Suppression Pool Lead Limit, t #14 8 maintain RPV pressure below the Limit.

If suppression pool water level and RPV pressure cannot be maintained below the Suppression Pool Load Limit but only if adequate core cooling is assured. .

e.

PC-13 r---- .___m, - - - . - _ - . - . ..-c...-,_____,,---..,,,.m__,_,m_

LGA - G5 SUPPRESSION POOL LOAD LIMIT .

e I

1250 g

\ <

\

\

\ 1000 1000 g w N .

=

E g a

=

\ E

\ .

8 \ E g __

g g -

g , . =

g v -

5 500 5 h

a 500 ._

t l

l

! l-0 0 15 20 25 l 0 5 10 SUPPRESSION POOL LEVEL 709'l0" 714'10" 719'10" 724'10" 699'l0" 704'10" CONTAINMENT FLOOD LEVEL l

l t

I Emergency Procedure Guidelines

  • l If suppression pool water level and RPV pressure cannot be restored and maintained below the Suppression Pool Load Limit, EMERGENCY RPV ,

J DEPRESSURIZATION 15 REQUIREDI enter Cprocedure developed from RPV Control i

Guideline 3 at (Step RC-13 and execute it y concurrently with this procedure.

L-3.2 Defore suppression pool water lov reaches C17 f t. 2 in. (Maxim rimary i

tainment Water Level Li er elev of bottom of I internal amber drywell vacuum ygy suppressi breakers less v breaker opening pressure in fe of r, whichever is O f9 L.g ly if adequ core cooling lower)3 bu is assur , terminate injecti to the RPV a sources external to the pr c ainment except from boron injection l

y' stems and CRD.

l

\

t m

9 6

PC-14

Emergency Procedure Guidelines Mk I on4 ,

1. When suppression pool water level reaches (17 ft. 2 in. (elevation f bottom of Mark I internal suppre sion

] chamber to drywell vacuum break es less vacuum breaker opening pr ssure in feet of water)3 but only c tsuppression chamber -----

r temperature and drywell I ett I pressure are below the -

  • Drywell
  • Spray Initiation ressure Limit 3, Eshut down rect culation pumps and drywell cool ng f ans and3 initiate drywell spr s trestricting flow rate to less t n 720 gpa (Maximum Drywell ay Flow Rate mit)3.

400 + -

  • I Drywell Spray i Initiation Pressure

- 300 Limit

' I .

k- -

Suppression Chamber I

+ .

Temperature I .

(=F) .

100 +

i 8 .

l t 0 +---- ----+----+----+- -

0 to 20 30 40

  • Drywel Pressure (psig)

. If suppression pool wat r level exceeds C17. ft. 2 in. ( levation of bottom of Mark I internal suppression chamber to drywell vacuum bretkers less vacuum breake I #23 I opening pressure in feet of -----

water) 3, continue to operate ywell sprays tbolow 720 Opm (Maximum Drywell Spray Flow Rate Limit) 2.

PC-15


,-.--.c- . . , , _ . , - - , , - - - - - - - - - -

y---,--,

T Emergency Procedure Suidelines U-I k.oA .c.m.o a 3. When primary. containment water level reaches t'a*t. (Maximum Primary u.t tio Ct de in el. g. E nflinminU Water Level Limit)3 terminate injection into the ftPV from sources external to the primary

  • containment irrespective of whether adequate core cooling is assured. c e

o l

I l

l l

l PC-16 r--..

l I

l I

f .

ETEP:

C7-4 When (procedure for cocidown to cold shutdown conditions 3 is entered from Cprocedure developed from the RPV Control Guideline 3 at CStep RC/P-R3, proceed to cold shutdown in <

accordance with Cprocedure for cooldown to cold shutdown conditions 3.

DISCUSSION:

After RPV pressure has been reduced to below the shutdown cooling interlocks and the shutdown cooling mode of RHR has been established, normal operating procedures provide the appropriate

/' instructions for continued control of RPV water level while proceeding to cold shutdown conditions. .

O D

L WRITER'S OUIDE FOR LASALLE GENERAL ABNORMAL (LDA) SYMPTOM-BASED EMERGENCY PROCEDURES C00900NWEALTH EDISON COMPANY LASALLE COUNTY STATION JUNE 5, 1985 i (

l i

f i

I i

1 DOCUMENT ID 0064d/

l i-

TABLE OF CONTENTS section 1 INTRODUCTION 1.1 Purpose 1.2 Scope section 2 EOP DESIGNATION AND WUMBERING 2.1 Procedure Designation 2.2 Procedure Numbering Section 3 PORMAT 3.1 LGA Sections <

3.2 Procedure Heading and Page Identification 3.3 Instruction Step Numbering 3.4 Page Format 3.5 Type size 3.6 Tabs and Binding section 4 WRITING LGA's 4.1 Writers Introduction 4.2 Relationship of LGA's to other procedures 4.3 Instructional step Length and content 4.4 If/Then Logic 4.5 cautions and Notes 4.6 Graphs, Tables, and Attachments 4.7 Use of Underlining 4.8 Referencing and Branching to Other Procedures -

4.9 Component Identification 4.10 Units of Measure 4.11 Concurrent Actions / Overriding Instructions 4.12 Connectors (AND, OR) Lists 4.13 Checkoff Blanks 4.14 Capitalization 4.15 Unit Designation 4.16 Use of Verbs 4.17 Flow Charts Table 1 - LGA Acronym List Table 2 - Definitions DOCUMENT ID 0064d/

Soction 1 INTROD WTION 1.1 PURPOSE The purpose of this procedure is to provide administrative and technical guidance on the preparation of 14A's. ,

4 1.2 SCOPE This procedure applies to the writing of all of LaSa11e's symptom-based emergency procedures.

Section 2 EOP DESIGNATION AND NUMBERING 2.1 PROCEDURE DESIGNATION Designation of the emergency procedures will be 14A - LaSalle General Abnormal.

2.2 PROCDURE NUMBERING o The emergency procedure numbering system is divided into two components - the procedure designator,14A, and a serialized two

digit number which identifies the 144.

The actions required for an ATVS (Anticipate Transient Without scram) are significantly different and more complex than the actions required for a non-ATWS situation. Although these procedures are to be written so they are symptom oriented, they will be event specific to the extent of ATWS or non-ATWS events. Thus, two sets of procedures will be generated. One for the ATWS case and one for the non-ATWS case. They will be differentiated in the procedure i

numbering system by inserting "ATWS" between "1AA" and the two digit number. The same two digit number may be used twice - once for the non-ATWS procedure, and once for the corresponding ATVS procedure.

Example: 14A-01 14A-ATW3-01 o Graphs shall be labeled by "14A-GX" where "X" is a sequential number.

o Tables shall be labeled by "1AA-TX" where "X" is a sequential i number.

Examples: lAA-G3 or 14A-T1 1

l

! DOCUMENT ID 0064d/

l Section 3 FORMAT 3.1 LGA SECTIONS .

Each LGA shall be divided into four sections (in order):

A. PURPOSE - defines briefly the basic purpose for the procedurey l B. ENTRY CONDITIONS - lists the entry conditions for the procedure.

C. OPERATOR ACTIONS - the body of the procedure.

D. REFERENCES - lists procedural references from the LGA's.

Procedure layout will place all conditions and actions on the right hand page. The left hand page only contains graphs, tables, everriding instructions (explained later), reminders, and any other supporting information that applies to the facing right-hand page. If no information is to be placed on a left-hand page, it should state: "This page inter.tionally blank".

3.2 PROCEDURE HEADING AND PAGE IDENTIFICATION Each page of the LGA's will be identified by the procedure number, the revision number, the revision date, and the page number. Page identification shall be located at the bottom of the page in the following format:

1. The procedure number will be centered left to right on the page two lines above the bottom margin.
2. The page number will be centered lef t to right on the first line above the bottom margin in the format of "Page 1 of 15".
3. The revision number will be justified to the unbound edge margin on the same line as the procedure number in the format of "Rev 0".
4. The revision date will appear under the revision number on the same line as the page number and be justified to the unbound edge margin -

~

in the format of "12/19/84".

Example (for right hand page)

LGA-01 Rev 0 Page 1 of 15 12/19/84 All right hand pages will have odd page nusbers and left hand pages 4 will have even page numbers.

DOCUMENT ID 0064d/

l l

t

3.3 JNSTRUCTION STEP NUMBERING o Instruction steps will be numbered and identified as follows:

A.

1. ,

s.

(1)

(a) o The first step on a page should have a complete step number. For example - step a. of the second step in section A. If this step heads the page, it shall be labelled step A.2.a. instead of just a.

o In general, at least 2 blank spaces should follow the step number.

3.4 PAGE FORMAT o Margins shall be as follows:

Page (inches)

Marcin Left hand Right hand Left 3/4 1 Right 1 3/4 Top: Page 1 1 1 Top: Other 1/2 1/2 Bottom 1/2 1/2 o see the example below for proper alignment. Space 4 times after

" g" and 2 spaces after "7AfD".

C. OPERATOR ACTIONS

1. R X (start typing here) -

I!!en X .

a.

(1)

(a) o Boxes enclosing overriding steps, caut!ons and notes shall extend I from margin to margin in width to allow them to stand out on the

' page.

l l

l DOCUMENT ID 0064d/

l

l i

o sinca some ctcps cf the LGA procedurcs eill be long and involved,  !

and to positively separate steps, asterisks will be used as follows: i

1. After major steps, 5 asterisks unless a sub step immediately follows, in which case no asterisk will be used.
2. After sub steps, 3 asterisks unless it is the last sub step in which case use 5 asterisks or unless it also has a sub step in which case no asterisk will be used.
3. Asterisks will be centered left and right and will be preceded and followed by a blank line. A blank space will separate each asterisk from another.

Example: (

22. RESET the reactor scram.
a. R The reactor scram cannot be reset, ZheD:

(1) START hgih CRD pumps per LOA-RD-07, (a) g No CRD pump can be started, Ih1D EXIT this step, AND 00 TO step 23.a.(1).

eee (2) CLOSE 1(2)C11-F034 (HCU accumulator charging water header valve).

eeeee ,

23. RAPIDLY INSERT control rods manually....

o As an aid to the operator, a short descriptive title may be placed in the right column of the right-hand page. This title may be an abbreviated version of the procedure title or it may describe the steps next to it such that their intent is conveyed to the operator. This title lettering should be 2 to 3 times the size of the text lettering for ease of recognition. t DOCUMENT ID 0064d/

3.5 TYPE WIEE Use pitch 10 type size so that the procedure is readable under low light conditions.

3.6 TABS & BINDING o To minimize tabs as much as possible, place the referenced ste'p number in the upper right hand corner and clip that corner of the preceding pages such that the step number appears while reading the '

step which references it. This need only be done on the control room LOA's. Through proper placement of referenced step numbers, several levels of referencing is possible in one corner. This must be manually done on each copy made from the master. A procedure assembly check off list is to be maintained with and copied with the master to facilitate and document accurate and consistent assembly (

of the procedure for the control room LOA copies.

o Rach control room copy 14A procedure will be separately bound in a manila folder which is clearly marked with the procedure number and title. It will be multiply stapled along the lef t hand edge such that it can easily be folded open from right to left . It will be punched to fit into a 3-ring binder where it will be maintained along with all other LGA procedures, list of general precautions, flow charts, and supporting laminated graphs.

o To allow easy differentation between ATVS and non-ATVS procedures, the folders containing ATWS procedures will be a color distinctly different from folders for ncn-ATVS LOA's. The selected colors will be consistently used (all ATWS procedures same color, and all non-ATWS procedures same color).

o A checkoffs list to facilitate and document proper preparation of the LOA procedures will be maintained and revised as necessary when the LOA is revised.

o The completed, signed, and dated Master LOA preparation checklist and LOA procedure checklists will be transmitted to the procedure manager and will be maintained as documentation of proper completion.'

DOCUMENT ID 0064d/

I I

section 4 ElIING IAA's j

4.1 WRITER'5 INTRODUCT20W l

The IAA procedures esist as an aid to the operator to provide accurate, usable direction to his actions so that he may best cope with degraded conditions that have potential to threaten the plant and the public. The 14A writer aggi keep this in mind whenever the 144's are being draf ted or revised. The LOA's are a tool for the operator and as such they must be '

usable by the operator. of course, technical content is entremely importants but exactitude in the technical content of a procedure is of little value if it is not written in a manner that can be understood and followed by an operator during accident conditions. The 1AA writer is tasked with turning a technical document (ie - Emergency procedure Guidelines) into a functional operator's tool. To accomplish this goal '

he must approach this translation task from the operator's viewpoint.

The writer has to ensure that the intent of the Technical Guideline is maintained, while at the same time the " usability" of the procedure is maximized.

The guidance provided by this procedure will help maintain the clarity and consistency of the 14A's. The rules set forth here are generally applicable throughout the procedure; however, there may be exceptions.

If careful analysis reveals that a particular principle may not be the best rule to use for a certain circumstance, then that rule may be violated. Even though a rule may be bent to fit a special situation, it will only be intentionally violated when it promotes the overall effectiveness of the procedure.

The major task for the 14A writer is not to produce a product with absolute engineering perfections it is not to blindly follow the writing .

guidance contained in this guidelines but his task is to produce a -

procedure that can and will be used by the operator whenever the levelu of plant safety are degraded.

The 14A writer must keep in mind that these procedures may have to be performed with the minimum crew complement provided for in the technical o

specifications. Therefore, the 14A's should be written such that the actions can be performed by the minimum crew complement while maintaining **

established leadership and division of responsibility within the crew.

care also must be taken to ensure that movement and physical interference is minimized between individuals performing the 144 actions. Unnecessary duplication of tasks is also to be avoided as much as possible.

These requirements ensure the 14A procedures can be adequately performed at any time. They do not prohibit other qualified individuals from assisting the on-shif t crew in the performance of the IAA procedures. i DOCUMENT ID 0064d/

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4.2 pBLRT10NSHIP OF. lAA's TO prHER. PROCEMRES During normal large scale plant evolutions the plant's operation is governed by the lap's. More detailed, system-specific instructions for operation are provided by the IAp's. Alarm information is provided by the annunciator IAA's. Instructions for testing equipment is provided by the IAs's. Abnormal operating instructions for specific events aret provided in the Lon's. All of these operating procedures are used in conjunctton with the ethersI sometines more emphasis is placed on one type of procedure than anothers other times a certain type of procedure may not even apply. The crun of the matter is that all of these operating procedures have the normal function of guiding the operation of the plant safely within the bounds of the license. Whenever conditions degrade to the point where the safety of the plant is diminished, entry into another type of procedure, the t44, is required. The IAA entry c conditions do not necessarily indicate that an emergency esists but are degraded parameters which may lead to en emergency. When an IAA is entered, it will be the governing procedure. The operator will follow the directions given by the IAA. He will be using the other station procedures to support the IAA direction. por example, the operator will still be responding to annunciators and the IAA annunciator procedures.

In general, when an lAA is entered, all evolutions will cease and the plant will be returned to a safe condition untti all lAA's are esited.

During this time, the plant will be stabillied and will continue to be operated using the appropriate lap in such a manner as to prevent a worsening of the then existing conditions (ex. do not raise pressure, shift RR. with draw control rods, etc.). No new evolutions are to be started unless directed by the 144. When the IAA's are esited, the operator will return to the normal operating procedures or to special operating instructions written for recovery.

4.3 pfRTRUCT1QMAL STEP l.ENGTH AND CONTBff Instruction steps will be concise and precise, conciseness denotes brevitys preciseness means enactly defined. Thus, instructions should be short and enact. This is easily stated, but not so easily achieved.

General rules to be used to meet these objectives are as follows: ,

o Instructional steps should deal with only one idea, o short, simple sentences should be used.

o compten evolutions should be broken down into a series of stapler steps.

o The action the operator takes should be clear. <

o Espected results of routine tasks should not be stated, o operator actions should be related to observable plant parameters.

When possible, avoid using time as a key to operator actions.

DocunuNT ID 00444/

e Cive the operctor enough inftreation to accomplich the task but don't give him too much information to read. Don't clutter the procedure up with too much verbiage. There will be times when identical series of steps will be repated. Inclusion of these same steps at every point in the procedure would make the procedure harder to follow. In these cases, the procedure will work better if the repeated steps appear at the back of the procedure book clearly identified with a tab. Whenever a conditional statement calls for taking the action, the operator will go to the tabbed section. When he has taken the required action, he will return to the procedure from which he came, o unless otherwise directed by specific steps in the tAA procedure, perforaance of the procedures will be atrictlv seeuential. Actions ,

which have been completed or have been passed over are not to be <

performed later in the procedure, unless specifically directed.

Likewise, steps that have not yet been reached will not be esecuted until preceding steps have been performed. The only esception to this will be special steps (overriding steps) that may apply at any time during performance of a step or steps. These will be set off from normal steps by being enclosed in a boa. teording will also be included to esplain to what part of the procedure it applies.

If the operator looses his place or feels that a step earlier in the procedure should be accomplished, he has the option of starting at the beginning of the procedure and working forward seguentially until the desired step is reached or the appropriate place in the procedure is regained. This ensures that proper conditions and sequence is verified prior to taking an action.

o Lists in general will imply no special order or prefererce, and no seguence will be required unless specifically stated. This does not mean that the items in a list can not be logically ordered depending on the intent of the writer. Since these procedures are symptom oriented rather than event specific, the operator makes the final judgement depending on the esisting conditions as to what items to use or what order to follow.

o To minimise the possibility of producing event specific procedures, I actions or conditions may be referred to by general rather than specify words. por esemple, *1nitiate reactor scram

  • rather than

' Ara and Depress all scram switches". This a11ews the operator to accomplish the stated goal by means available to his during the

- event rather than restricting him to actions that may not be allowable or successful in a specific event. care must be taken to ensure the intent is clear from the wording of the step. It is then up to the operator to determine during the event which systems or <

indications are available to accomplish that intent.

DOCUMart 30 0064d/

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4.4 IF/THEN LOGIC o Whenever a condition appears in the procedure that will require prescribed operator action, the If/Then logic style should be used if it will make the procedure more clear.

o The words "g " or "Mil2n" or "Before" will normally precede the conditional statement.. The word "Illgfl" will precede the action statement.

o g , 21133. MtigD, and Before shall be underlined when they are used to begin conditional logic statements.

o The 1AA's shall be written so that the g/IlltD logic is used consistently. The procedure shall be constructed so that the ,

operator will take the correct actions if he enters the procedure at the proper point and follows the logic given the following guidelines.

"1E" - The operator reads the condition which follows. If the condition applies, he takes the action which follows in the related "IlltD" statement and goes on to the following step. If the condition does Dgt apply, he does not have to even look at the "IlltD" statement, but continues on at the following step of same or higher level in the step numbering scheme, sub-steps (subordinate steps) to a step where the condition was not met will also be passed over without examining or executing. Por example C.10. E suppression Pool water level is sistgg 6 f t.,

1111D OPEN g l ADS valves,

s. g gly ads valve cannot be opened, 1111D OPEN other SRVs until 'l SRVs are open.

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c.11. g kill lhAD 3 SRVs are open, If suppression Pool level is above 6 ft, the operator takes the action of step C.10., then goes on to step C.10.a.

Then if any ads valves can not be opened, he does the action of step C.10.a. Otherwise, he skips the action of C.10.a. and goes to the next step of higher or equal numbering level. He goes to step C.11. in this example - ,

He could also go to C.10.b. if it existed, but he could not go to step C.10.b.(1) because it is a sub step of C.10.b.

whose condition for action was not met. However, if suppression Pool level is not above 6 ft, the operator skips the action of step C.10. as well as the entire step C.10.a.

DOCUMENT 10 0064d/

1 The t:ritor must farmat th2 ctsps cerofully to cinimiz2 operator confusion. The writer may also give specific direction to the operator concerning which step is to be executed next although this reduces the concept of brevety and lengthens the procedure considerably.

"IlltD" - The action statement which follows the "IhgD" will be taken by the operator if the condition (the " g", "gggn", or "Before" statement) applies to the plant condition. If the conditional statement does not apply, the operator does not even have to read the action statement, but goes on to the next step of same or higher level in the numbering scheme as discussed above.

"gggD" - The "ElfD" conditional statement is to be used whenever it is desired that the operator stop at some point in the procedure and wait for a specified condition to occur. This statement will generally be used for steps that give action

- for situations that are continually degrading, requiring more severe actions determined by the extent of degradation. The operator will examine the condition (s) of the "M1tD" statement and will not continue further in that procedure path of execution, but he will continue to do what he had been directed to do by the preceding step (s) or other procedures until the condition (s) of the "gigD" statement is met. He will then perform the "IbfD" statement and go to the next step.

The "$13D" statement does not imply that this step may be done at some later point in the procedure when the associated condition (s) is set. As discussed in 4.3. above, step execution is strictiv seeuential.

"Before"- The "3gigLt" statement is used when an action is required to be accomplished prior to the occurrence of the specified condition. It is -

~

left up to the operators judgement of the actual situation as to when he should start the action.

His judgement should be based upon how fast the specified condition is changing and upon how long it will take to perform the specified action under the current situation. Use of the "Before" statement should be minimised as it places a burden on the operator to make a complex (

decision. The purpose of using "Before" is to accomplish an action timely but to also delay, if conditions permit, taking an action that may have severe consequences. Thus, that action may not need to be taken at all if the event turns around in a favorable direction, and the severe consequences are avoided.

DOCUMENT 3D 00644/

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o Gen:rclly, the further the opercter getc into th2 proc:duro, tha l more degraded the conditions are; hence the actions become more  !

drastic. These procedures are to be written such that if the l operator finds that he is unable to accomplish the required action, l he can continue on in the procedure and obtain proper results although the actions may be more severe than they would have been if he could have accomplished the required action.

  • o No step will be divided between two pages. Both the condition and the action are to be included on one page. It is also preferable to have sub steps, supporting cautions, notes, and lists also on the .

same page, and as a general rule, they will only be separated from a step when they are too long to fit on a single page. It is likely there will be pages containing only one step to accomplish this goal.

4.5 CAUTIONS AND NOTES o step specific cautions and notes should precede the steps to which  ;

j they apply.

o procedure specific cautions should precede the procedures to which

they apply, o General precautions apply at all times during the operation of the plant, and are heavily stressed during operator training. They are to be included in a table maintained in the same binder as the LGA
procedures for reference by the operators, if needed. In general, '

4 they will not be included in the specific 1sA procedures.

o CAUTIONS and NOTES shall be emphasized. The heading shall be all

' caps and centered over the statement. The heading shall be i underlined. The cautionary statement or note shall be conventionally typed using both upper and lower case letters to make it easier to read. The entire note or caution shall be fully enclosed by a box. See the example below:

i CAVTIN .~.

Cooldown rates above 100*F/hr may be required to accomplish this step.

' E213: The word processor printer is unable to print vertical lines, thus the writer will have to ensure vertical lines are drawn in by hand on the master copy of the procedures.

l o CAUTIONS and g2133 should not contain action steps. They should be informational or warning devices only. In rare cases a CAUTION or NOTE may have to contain an action or inferred action. This shall

. only be doen after a very careful assessment of alternatives.

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_-. -_ ,_~ - -___.__ __.__ _,m__

,,..__,___m_ , , - _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . , . . _ .

O CAUTIONS and E EES Eh311 not be ov3ru24d. If too many CAUTIONS cr
g gg}S,are used, the importance of the message may be diluted.

cautions may be minimized through training or by writing the information into the procedural step itself.

o CAVTIONS and E g[1 should appear in their entirity on a single

  • page. Do not split CAUTIONS and Eggg between pages. .

c The step to which a step specific caution applies should appear on the same page as the caution.

i 4.6 GRAPHS. TABl.ES AND ATTACIDEDrFS o Oraphs, Tables and Attachments should be easy to read and easy to use by the operators. <

o Units should be the same as those in the control Room.

i o Graphs, Tables, and Attachments shall be labeled clearly. Graphs shall have a noun na t- and sequential number. An abbreviation for the noun name may alu be included (ex.,14A-G10, Boron Injection

Temperature, BIT).

! o The use of graphs shall be minimixed. When a single value can be used, it is better than using a graph.

o Graphs will normally appear on the left hand page facing the page

! where that graph is referenced. An exception may occur if an overriding Instruction carried forward from preceding pages applies to the same page that references a graph. When an overriding Instruction appears on the face adjacent page, the graph may be -

included on a foldout page to the left.

F o Where possible, use a full page for the graphs.

o The maximum number of divisions per inch for the axes of graphs should be 10.

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) o An abbreviation or acronym for a graph or table may be used in a step instead of the full noun name and sequential number if the following rules are followed:

1. The first time the graph is referenced on each page where used, 4

the full noun name and sequential number will be used followed l

by the abbreviation in parenthesis. All subsequent references *

to the graph on that page may simply use the abbreviation only.

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DOCUMENT ID 0064d/

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2. Th3 gr ph till be Icbe11cd with the cbbrGviction clong tith the noun name and sequential number.

The purpose of this is to streamline steps such that it takes less time for the operator to read and comprehend without also creating confusion. For any given page of 1AA instruction there should be a ministan of curves that apply and since they ti.41 be located on the facing page, there should be no confusion. Also with exposure to these curves and their abbreviations, the operators will come to recognize them at a glance, o As an aid to the operators, laminated full page graphs will be maintained with the LGA procedures to aid the operator during execution. This applies only to the control room 14A copies. Upon actual execution of the LGA, the operator can spread these graphs on -

a table, and keep track of trends and overall big picture.

o specific direction is much preferable to the use of tables, and their use should be minimized. If tables are used, the following guidance should be followed:

1. Tables should be fully enclosed in a box. The column heading should be at the top and row heading should be on the left of the box. Lines to divide rows and columns may be used if needed for separation. .
2. Tables that are specific to a single step should be incorporated into the step. In this case, no table title or number is regaired.
3. Tables that are specific to a procedure will be contained after the last action step of the procedure, and will require a title as well as a table number. (Note: the Reference section of the 14A will always be on the last page of the procedure - in this case after the tables).

o All numbers on the graphs should be at least 4 mm high.

o All exes of the graphs shall be clearly labeled and include the  !

units of measure.

4.*l USE Ol' UNLERLINING o Underlining will be used for special emphasis, o The headings for "gZ[g" and " CAUTION" shall be underlined.

1 o Underlining shall be used to emphasize negatives, o Underlining shall be used to emphasize the logic terms "I(",

"Ihg11", "Mll1D", and "Before".

DOCUMENT 10 0064d/

l 0 Underlining may be used t3 emphasita connectcrs and limits such cs gd, RI., Ak2 Lee Ely, etc., when it will increase ef fectiveness.

o Underlining may be used to emphasize other words in the procedure; however, the use of underlining should be limited so that the emphatic value is maintained.

4.8 REFERENCING AND BRANCHING TO Or.4ER PROCEDURES OR STEPS When the term " referencing" is used in connectior with another procedure, it implies that the referenced procedure will be 6 sed as a supplement to the procedure presently being used.

o Referencing other sections, pages, or steps within other procedures can result in error. 4 o Excessive forward and backward referencing within the same procedure can be confusing and can lead to skipping of steps, particularly since the referenced steps may not return the operator to the directing step. Also, important information preceding a referenced step can be missed.

o If operators are required to use many procedures at the same time, there is a possibility that the referenced information may not be obtained and used or the exit point from the original procedure might be forgotten. Important steps might be missed and operator delay might result.

When the term " branching" is used in connection with another procedure, it signifies that the procedure being used is to be exited and the new procedure is to be used in its entirety. Branching is an acceptable method of entering another procedure and eliminates most of the problems associated with referencing.

In determining whether to reference another part of the procedure for instructions or to repeat the instructions within the procedure, consider the following factorst o If the referenced instructions can be repeated without greatly ,,

increasing the length of the procedure, repeat them.

o Tabbing referenced sections too long to repeat would assist the operator in locating the information quickly.

o If the procedure splits into two or more optional paths, references to other steps may be unavoidable, o When multiple paths are taken from a single step, a matrix can be made that refers the operator to a procedure step tabbed with the same color as the matriz box.

DOCUMENT ID 0064d/

Two types of proceduro r';ferencing cro used in the LOA's.

o one type of procedure referencing requires the operator to get out the referenced procedure, observe the precautions and limitations in the procedure, and to follow it step by step. When it is required that the operator follow the procedure this closely, he will be directed to take the action *10 pecordance with" or "per" the',

referenced procedure. An example of this kind of reference would be 1[ Drywell Pressure exceeds 45 psig, BIG!

containment Radiation levels indicate 10CFR100 11mits will not ,

be exceeded thgD VENT the Drywell through valve 1(2)V9035, Drywell Vent / purge outlet Downstream Isolation to stofs in accordance with 1AA-VF-03.

In this case, if the conditional statements were satisfied, the operator would go to 1AA-VP-03, follow the procedure through (even though he is atill in the IAA) unt11 he has vented the erywell la accordanctwith LOA-VP-03, then he would return to the 144 from which he came and find the correct steps to take nest.

o The other type of procedure referencing is just that - a reference.

It is an aid to the operator giving him a reference for more detailed itiformation on the task. This type of referencing is done by placing the referenced procedure in parentheses, por example -

3130 the RNR Shutdown Cooling interlocks clear, Ibag INITIATE the Shutdown Cooling mode of met (IAP-RN-07) o since the LAA procedures each contain a reference section where the procedures are listed by number and title, unty the procedure neber

  • need be used elsewhere in the procedure. The use of the procedure .

title adds little to the understanding, and usually complicates the steps by making them wordy which detracts from the desired impact of the action step. If out of curiosity or during training the operator wishes to know the title of a referenced procedure he need only to look in the reference section.

o Other types of referencing must give emplicit direction to the operator. The following esemples are given to provide consistency ,

1. When it is desired to leave a step and not to return to that step, the words, "tX1T this step
  • should be used.

DOCUMENT 10 00644/

f 2. When branching to another Ctep in the same procedura. the i following format should be used:

EXIT this step.

E .

00 To step C.11.

n This causes step C.11. and all steps subsequent to step C.11. to be executed sequentially without return to the branching step.

l 3. When branching to another step in a different procedure, the i following format should be used:

EXIT this step, M

00 to LOA-AtwS-04, step C.6.

l Alternatively, if the procedure is to be executed in its entirety, the step number may be omitted:

EXIT this step, M

00 TO LAA-ATW5-04.

4. When concurrent action is required, the verb to be used is "ptaroRM" and the word " concurrent" should be used.
5. There is specific instances where one procedure directs another procedure to be enited and imediately re-entered at a different point. This is accomplished by the format:

' Jump in LOA-A1WS-04 to Step C.6.* ,

! 4.9 COMPOWENT_IDENfillCATIQW l o Components identified in the LOA's shall be identified by coanon l usage terms. The components shall be identified in the " language of the operator". When confusion may be a problem, use the nameplate terminology on the control room labels.

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I DocunsNT 10 0064d/

o physical loc 0 tion cf components id:ntif t:d in th) 14A is not nec ssary if o newly trcined operctcr is capected to know the location through trcining or cespon usage, cr if the name, number, or description also identifies the location. Otherwise, the specific location must be described for both units. In many cases, elevation and plant grid coordinates are sufficient. Instrument rack number, panel number, etc. are also specific enough if the operator is expected to know the locatic,n of that rock or panel.

o In general, when referring to specific switch positions or annunciator windows or other labels'to be identified, the procedure should specify the label in the exact wording, spelling, and use of' capitalization as it appears on the label and enclose it in quotation marks.

o Acronyms may be used in the LOA's when they are universally understood by the operators. A list of acronyms used in the 1AA's '

shall be included in Table 1 of the IAA Writer's Guide. The Training Department shall be provided a copy of the Table 1 whenever the list is revised.

4.10 UNITS OF JE&E RE o guantitative values should be stated within the range and accuracy of the instruments. An exception to this rule can be made when the common usage term does not fall within the accuracy of the instrumentation. An example of an exception would be the Tech spec value for high drywell pressure, 1.6g psig. 1.4g psig is the setpoint the operators are trained on and is the comunon usage term for the high drywell pressure scram and isolation setpoint.

4.11 CONCURRENT ACTIONS /DVERRIDING INSTRUCTIONS o There may be events which will require the operators to be in more than one 14A at the same time. Care must,be taken to write the procedures such that the concurrent operator actions will not conflict.

o When it is very important that the operator execute a previous step upon meeting a specified condition, this step is made an " overriding -

Instruction". Overriding instructions will be set off from other ~

steps by enclosing them in double bones. The portion of the procedure over which that step is valid will also be stated as shown by the following examplet While esecuting the following steps:

1[ It is determined that the reactor 1300g1 be shutdown beIQLa suppression pool temperature reaches the Boron Injection Temperature, LAA-010 ZhtD ptRponM step C.11. concurrentiv with the following steps.

DocVMENT 10 0064d/

ov:rriding in:tructions eill appe:r on the right-hand p ge uith the procedural steps the first time it becomes a valid and desired action. On subsequent pages, it will appear on the left-hand page only if it applies during execution of the right-hand page. When it no longer applies, it will cease to be carried on the left hand page.

The use of overriding instructions can severly tax the memory'.of the operator and during a stressful event he is not likely to remember that instruction as he continues in the procedure. Therefore, it is imperative that the writer reduce the number of overriding instructions as much as possible. The goal is to place no reliance on the operators memory to obtain the desired actions. Placing overriding instructions on the left hand page will keep them before the operator as long as they are still valid. Placing them on the right hand page where they first appear in the procedure should c ensure that he considers them in detail at least once. Thus he won't have to thumb back through the procedure to see which (if any) overriding instructions apply.

4.12 CONNECTORS (AND, OR) LISTS o When a step contains more than three objects of an action, list thea rather than imbedding them in a sentence.

o When three or more conditions are associated with an action, list -

them separately ahead of the action statement.

o When more than four items are contained in a list, the writer may single space between items of the list. Otherwise, place a blank line between the items of a list. .

o When it is very important to connect two statements it may be best to separate the two statements vertically with 832 emphasized by capitals and underlining. For Example --

1[. the suppression Pool water level can not be maintained below 26' 10" (+3"),

83E -

adequate core cooling is assured, Ih1D TERMINATE injection into the reactor, o When " ands" and " ors" are mixed, care must be taken to ensure that the proper combinations are understood. Use of " ands" and " ors" is easiest to demonstrate by example. Assume there are three items A, <

a, and C. If we either wanted "A" or else both "B" and "C" it should be written: "A" QE

  • s" nug "C" DOCUMENT ID 0064d/

If we w:ntsd "A" cnd cloo w:ntsd eithzr "B" cr "C" it thould be written: "A"

..M og .C" o Conditional connectors such as " Big" or "UNTIL" may be used in the same format as given for " g " and "QR" above if it adds to the clarity or to provide desired impact.

4.13 CHECKOFF BLANKS o checkoff blanks shall be provided in the left hand margin where a check might help keep track of where the operator has been in the 4 procedure. These checkoff blanks are not mandatory for the operator to complete, but are there for convenience if he thinks they will .<

keep him on track.

As a general rule of thumb, checkoff blanks will be provided in front of esch verb to allow the operator to check them off as the action is performed. This does not preclude the use elsewhere in the procedure where they could be useful to the operator.

4.14 CAPITALIZATION o conventional rules for capitalization shall be used except when special emphasis is warranted.

o Action verbs shall be capitalized.

o Acronyms shall be capitalized.

o Words with a special meaning may be capitalized. An example would be NORMAL INJECTION SYSTEM.

o Headings for CAUTIONS and NOTES shall be capitalized but the body shall use conventional upper and lower case letters.

o connectors that are used to vertically separate items shall be capitalized. I o The first letter of major systems or major component names will be capitalized (ex. Suppression Chamber).

4.15 UNIT DESIGNATION Because of the identical nature of the two units at LaSalle, the procedures shall be written to provide guidance for both units. y o When equipment is identified by EPN and the components for both units have identical EPN except for the unit number, the EPN will be given in the following format:

1(2)G33-F001 DOCUMENT ID 0064d/

r if

o WhInivar cn op3rcti:nni difference betw.tsn Units 1 cnd 2 offsets thz emergency procsdure, thtt differsnes chall be clearly cddrezzcd in the M A. Thtt differsnca shall be brought to th2 cttsntion of tha Training Supervisor for inclusion in the IAA training.

4.16 USE OF VERBS o Verbs shall be used consistently throughout the 14A's.

o REFER to TABLE 2, definitions, for definitions of commonly used verbs, o If a word is used in the Inh procedure that takes on a special meaning, it should be included in TABLE 2.

4.17 FLOWCHARTS o Accurate, detailed flow charts of each M A procedure will be generated. These flow charts are mainly for training purposes, but they are to be accurate enough to provide operators executing the W A written procedure an overall view or big picture of where he has been and where he is going.

o The flow charts will be maintained in the 14A binder with the procedures.

o In all control room copies of the LGAs, at least two sets of flow charts will be included and easily removeable from the binder of which at least one set will be laminated.

m M

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-. , - - . . - . . - - - - . , - , , -- -- ,,----n. -- , - , , - ,- - - - . - . . - - - - e - - - . -

TABLE 1 L_GA Acronym List.

ADS - Automatic Depressurization System CRD - Control Rod Drive CY - Cycled Condensate ECCS - Emergency Core Cooling System FW - Feedwater GSEP - Generating Stations Emergency Plan HPCS - High Pressure Core Spray LGA - LaSalle General Abnormal LGP - LaSalle General Procedure LOA - LaSalle Operating Abnormal LPCI - Law Pressure Coolant Injection LPCS - Low Pressure Core Spray MSIV - Main Steam Isolation Valve RCIC - Reactor Core Isolation Cooling RHR - Residual Heat Removal RPV - Reactor Pressure Vessel _'

RWCU - Reactor Water Cleanup SBGT - Standby Gas Treatment SBLC - Standby Liquid Control SRV - Safety Relief Valve

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T.A.F. - Top of Active Fuel DCCUMENT ID 0064d/

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l TABLE 2 l

Definitions l l

l Approach - to continue on a trend such that a ILmit will be exceeded if,more  :

action is not taken to dampen the trend. l Avoid - to take action to prevent something from occurring.

Assure - to make certain.

Before - to wait, but the actions must be completed prior to reaching the stated condition. Do not advance to the next sequential step until the action is completed.

Check - to confirm that the desired condition or indicatica does exist.

Change - to shift from one condition to another.

Close - to change the physical position of a. mechanical device to the CLOSE position so that it prevents fluid flow or permits passage of electrical current.

Concurrently - to do prescribed action (s) concurrently. Operator has option of determining which action requires most attention Continue - to maintain without interruption.

Control - to regulate conditions such that a given parameter is maintained.

Cooldown - to reduce temperature by removing heat. -

Decrease - DO NOT use the word " decrease". It may become confused with

" increase". " Reduce" or " lower" is preferable.

Defeat - Prevent a function from occurring.

Determine - to obtain definite first hand knowledge.

Depress - to push in an inward direction.

l Depressurize - to reduce pressure.

Direct - to guide such that a specific path is obtained.

Divert - to change from one path to another.

Enter - Go to the referenced procedure. Follow the applicable steps of the reference procedure.

Evacuate - to remove persons from a given area.

Exceed - to surpass a given limit.

I DOCUMENT ID 0064d/

Exit - Letva this procsdure. Go to referanctd proc 2 dure.

Go to - to proceed as directed. Usually used in conjunction with " exit".

Increase - DO NOT use. It may be confused with " decrease". " Raise" is preferable.

  • Individually - one at a time.

Initiat'e - to start actions to achieve a given end by whatever means availab1'e .

Isolate - to position a mechanical device to a position that will stop flow from one place to another by whatever means available.

Lower - to reduce the value of a parameter or to decrease the physical height <

of an object. Usually used instead of " decrease".

Maintain - to keep in existing state or specified state.

Jump - used to cause path of execution in a different procedure to discontinue execution and resume execution at another step within that same procedure.

Monitor - to repeatedly check item of interest. The item should be checked often encagh to notice significant changes.

Notify - to ensure that another person receives given information.

Occur - to take place.

Open - to change the physical position of a mechanical device to an unobstructive position that permits access or flow, or prevents passage of electrical current.

Operate - to perform a manipulation or a series of manipulations such that a desired end is achieved.

Perform - to carry out a prescribed action or step.

Place - to put in a prescribed position or mode. _

Prevent - to take action to ensure that a given condition will not occur.

Proceed - to go on to a desired state.

Raise - to increase a parameter.

l Rapidly - as quickly as possible. t l

Reach - to achieve a given level or magnitude.

Reduce - to make smaller or decrease.

Refer - to look to another source for guidance to accomplish a particular tasP..

DOCUMENT ID 0064d/

I

l l

Rasst - to pitc3 in normal cr stcndby condition. l l

Restart - to reenergize a piece of equipment or again place into operation.

Restore - to put back into original state. ,

Return - to go back to a given point; this implies exiting the current :

procedure step if applied to a procedure.

Reverse - to change direction.

Scram - to rapidly insert all control rods simultaneously.

J Shutdown - to Stop, to deenergize a piece of equipment.

d Stabilize - to hold steady.

Start - to energize a piece of equipment or place into operation.

sustained - to perform continuously without interruption.

Terminate - to stop a function by whatever means is appropriate. This may include placing in standby or altering its function.

Transfer - to switch from one place to another.

Trip - to activate a semi-automatic or automatic feature which will take a component out of its operating status.

Vent - to permit a gas or a liquid confined under pressure to escape the confining volume.

Verify - to check to ensure that the status of equipment / parameters is as indicated. If not, make it so.

When - to wait until the prescribed condition occurs before performing the action. This causes procedure execution to stop until the condition is set.

D e

DOCUMENT ID 0064d/

4 LGA REVISION PROGRAN LGA .

Remsten A)eeded l

Y CQ 9 e {Reusse ProceAurt 1 r LGD UGRIFICATicN s r

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i v.,

V LGA ~

VALIDRTION I

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lC%9esired va v

1 Subit PaceJur<

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, 4.A P - 820-2)

It,A VALIDATION PROGRAM A. PURPOSE The purpose of the validation program is to assure that new/ revised it.A's function as required and are easy to use/ understand. -

B. REFERENCES Draft Safety Evaluation Report Procedures Generation Package; LaSalle County, Units 1 and 2. April 1. 1985.

C. PRERPOUISITES Personnel involved in the validation program will be qualified in their respective positions in which they would respond in the case of it.A event. (Licensed or certified when the position requires a license.)

D. PRECAUTIONS Slight differences between units requires that the validation take place on both units for events which cannot be simulated at the Simulator.

E. LIMITATIONS AND ACTIONS Events which cannot be simulated at the simulator will be walked down on the respective units of the plant.

Scenarios for simulation will be selected such that minimal automatic actions will occur thereby encouraging the use of all sections of the procedures. Failures of components and/or operator errors will be used to drive the events.

Formal validations will be required only after major changes to the philosophy or format of the procedures. Annual licensed training will provide a regular informal validation of the procedures.

F. PROCEDURE

1. Simulator validation
a. A normal complement of control room personnel will assume the duties of evaluations at the simulator:
1) Shift Engineer
2) Shift Control Room Engineer (
3) Unit NSO
4) Extra NSO (typically Center Desk)
b. Selected scenarios will be introduced into the simulator to cause various entry conditions to be met. The procedures will be followed verbatum to the completion of the event. (Scenarios will be identified in the Training Program.)

DOCUMENT 1407r

c. After/during th> validation conumente/ditercpinciss will be notsd in Attachment A Simulator Validation and will be signed by all participants.
d. Resolutions will be made to those comments and may be incorporated into procedure revisions and noted on Attachment A.

. l

2. Local (Unit) Validation
a. A normal complement of a shift crew will be selected to walkdown the procedures to sssure the following at a minimum:
1) Proper equipment labeling / locations
2) Consistent parameter units between the procedure and instruments <
3) Accessability / mobility of necessary equipment in a timely fashion
b. During/after validation, comments / discrepancies will be noted on Attachment B, Walkthrough Validation and participants will sign the Attachment (requi.ed whether or not discrepancies are noted).
c. Comments / discrepancies will be resolved and noted on Attachment B.
3. Validation attachments will be maintained with the applicable procedure approval.

1

(

DOCUMMT 1407r

ATTACWEENT A j SIMULATOR VALIDATION

! Procedure Number Title Revision Date of Validation Page of 4

P - nts/ Deficiencies Identified By/ Resolutions Resolved By/

Date Changes Made or Reason for not Changing Date l

J l 1

1 i

signature Date shift Engineer: /

Shift Control Room Engineer: /

Unit NSO: /

Extra NSO: /

l i

i DOCUMENT 1407r

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de et va f l D o o s

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T e I

N d U a M / / / / / /

B s N e g

T O N I n E T a I

A h S C I

C D I

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/ el et 7 s eo pt 0 uof t nr OA 4 dio n i t  : 1 es e m gn:Ot t cie u r. o O S n n T ovt m ECSNee N rea o N appmm E PRD C t t M fft rii U iiit uu C hhnxqq O SSUEEE D l

LGA VERIFICATION PROGRAM A. PURPOSE The purpose of the Verification Program is to assure that new/ revised LGA's meet the guidelines established by the BWR Owners' Group and that the source documents are provided with the most recent data.

B. REFERENCES

1. LSCS BOP Technical Guidelines
a. Calculation Input Data
b. Limiting Data Calculations
c. Basis for Symptom Oriented Emergency Procedures )
2. LSCS BOP Writers Guidelines
3. BOP Verification Guidelines; INPO-83-004 C. PREREOUISITES
1. Personnel conducting the Verification Program will be familiar with the concepts of the 14A's (licensed or otherwise trained on the use of the 14A's) and/or technically qualified to review the engineering calculations / concepts.

D. PRECAUTIONS

1. Changes to equipment, operating limits, experience data, etc. can effect calculations and/or validity of the procedures.

E. LIMITATIONS AND ACTIONS

1. The LGA's will be reviewed every 2 years if not revised within the last 2 years and each time source documents are revised to assure that any changes in the source documents Plant Systems, etc. are reflected in the calculations and procedures.
2. Changes to the LGA's which deviate from the approved source documents ,

must be justified with the justifications approved by the Director of Licensing and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

F. PROCEDURE

1. Review Calculation Input Data to assure that data is still accurate.

Changes to the inputs will affect the calculations thereby requiring calculation revisions.

(

a. Calculations will be conducted in accordance with instructions provided in the calculations portion of the Technical Guidelines. Attachment "A" will be completed by the two engineers designated to do the calculations.
b. Attachment A will be filed with the calculation Package.

DOCUMENT ID 0554r/0008r

c. New recults will be incarporctcd into o rcvision cf tha It.A Cs soon as possible after the verification in accordance with
1AP-820-2. (See calculation summary to determine procedures affected.)
2. Review the procedure for general written correctness, format, ,

branching and general understandability as outlined in the LaSa11e Writers Guidelines (LWG's).

3. Conduct a step-by-step review of the procedure to assure it meets the requirements of the LaSalle Writers and Technical Guidelines,
a. Entry conditions and symptoms,
b. Proper component / instrument identification. ~
c. Quantitative units with tolerances which are obtainable on Control Room and plant instruments.
d. Equipment required is available for use (Modifications have not eliminated).
e. Calculations to be done by operators have proper equations provided.
f. Deficiency sheets documenting deviations from guidelines are provided and are adequately resolved.
4. Sign and Date the Verification Completion Form Attachment B and forward the procedure and verification package to the Procedure Manager for tracking.
5. The Procedure Manager records the procedure status and forwards to the Department Head.
6. The Department Head reviews the package to assure resolutions to discrepancies and required actions from the verification process hase been completed. He signs and dates the Verification Form and the on .

Site Review portion of LAP-820-2 and forwards to the next person on -

On Site Review.

  • l . When the Station Superintendent signs for Final Approval, he also signs the 14A Verification Approval.
8. Attachments from this procedure will be filed with the respective procedure approvals.

4 i

1 DOCUMENT ID 0554r/0008r i

.-. _ . - . - . _ _ _ . . __,, __m._,__ _ _ _ . - . . . . _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ , _ _ _ _ . _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ , _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . . . _ _ , _ _ _ . . , _ _ _ _ , _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , _ _ _ _ , _ _ , , ,

ATTACHMENT A CALCULATION NUMBER:

1 TITLE:

Reference Documents:

c calculation completed By / -

Signature Date -

Calculation Reviewed By /

signature Date

(

This form, along with the actual calculation will be maintained with the Technical Guidelines Calculations Package.

DOCUMENT ID 0554r/0008r

ATTACHMENT B Page of LGA VERIFICATION s

L4A NUMBER REVISION TITLE Scope of verification:

Reference Documents Assigned Evaluator (s)

LVR STEP DESCRIPTION ACCE.PTABLE (V) DISCREPANCY SHEET #

2 Reference Document Review 3 Written Correctness Legibility Format Identification

(

This document will be maintained with the central File copy of the procedure package and the applicable procedure.

DOCUMENT ID 0554r/0008r

IAA VERIFICATION 1AA

- PAGE of Step by Step Review

  • step Written Correctness Technical Correctness caution, or Acceptable Discrepancy Resolved Acceptable Discrepancy Resolved Mote 5 (v) Mumher Date/ Initial (v) Number Date/ Initial DOCUMDfT ID 0554r/0008r

LGA VERIFICATION Required Actions:

s C

Conducted BY /

/

/

NAMES DATE Deficiences and Required Actions are adequately resolved and procedures are acceptable for use ,

/

DEPARTMENT HEAD DATE

/

SUPERINTENDENT DATE (

DOCUMENT ID 0554r/0008r

l I

TRAINING DESCRIPTION FOR LASALLE GENUtAL ABNORMAL (IAA) SYMPTON-BASED EMERGENCY PROCEDURES i

CXMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY i

j d LASALLE COUNTY STATION JUNE 15, 1985

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1 i

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,,---r,- -----. ,n. , - , e-,------,---- , - . . - - ,-a, ,--_ e--------,-----.--m- - - , , - - - -

Trcining Description fcr LaSalla Genercl Abnormal (LGA) Symptom-btsed Emergency Proc;durcs -

< PORWARD - The following text describes the training process LaSalle Station plans to use for implementing a revision to the 14A's. It is important to realize that symptom-based emergency procedures are not new to the LaSalle licensed operator; LaSalle was the first plant to implemerti emergency procedures based upon the symptom-oriented Emergency Procedure t Guidelines published by the BWR Owners Group. During 1981, LaSalle licensed personnel and license candidates were given one week of concentrated training on the new, symptom-oriented emergency procedures (14A 's ) . LaSalle Unit I has been safely operated using the upgraded 14A's since the operating license was' received in April of 1982. Unit 2 has been safely operated throughout the startup test program using the 144's. 14A training was included in the License Requalification Program in both 1983 and 1984. The LaSalle licensed operator has already been trained on, and is using the symptom-oriented procedures mandated by NUREG 0731. The guidelines on which the 14A's were based have been revised to incorporate reactivity control, secondary containment control, and radioactive release control. consequently, the 14A procedures are being revised to reflect these changes. Since the reactivity coatrol changes increase the complexity of the procedures, a significant training effort is planned. The following text describes the training program

! which LaSalle plans to use to train licensed operators on the revised procedure. It should be noted that this training description is as we plan it in September 1984. There may be content or structure changes to the program if these changes will further our goal towards safe and practical operations of the LaSalle county Units 1 and 2.

INTRODUCTION
  • i The revised 14A training will consist of a Classroom Training session and a Practical Training session. The two sessions together should provide the trainee with the information necessary to obtain the objectives. The training will be provided for Ro and sRo licenseholders at LaSalle. The operating crew members shall receive the training before performing licensed shift duties under the revised procedures.

2 IAA LEARNER OBJCCTIVES State from memory the entry conditions for 14A-01 (Level / Pressure control),

14A-03 (Containment control), and conditions whir.h require exit from non-ATWS 14A's to ATWS 14A's.

Locate control Roce instrumentation that monitor parameters which are 14A entry conditions.

Determine when the 14A's may be exited to normal operating procedures.

Given the graph, discuss the basic reasons for takites actions when any of the parameters reach limits defined by graphs in the 14A's. f i

f I

DOCUMENT ID 00671/0206A t l

Civen th2 cppropricto graph cnd cppropricto plcnt parametora, ditsrmin? wh3thar limito d2 fined by graphs in th? LGA'O cro being Cpproached cr cxescdsd.

Define any acronyms used in the 14A's.

Discuss any instrumentation / procedure differences between U-1 and U-2 that impact upon the LGA's.

Discuss the alternate methods for shutting down the reactor, s Using the LGA's and referen:ed support procedures, simulate the operator's actions required to shutdown the reactor given a failure to scram.

Using the LGA's, simulate the operator's actions required to maintain adequate core cooilng given a postulated transient with coincident equipment failure.

Discuss each General Precaution outlined in LGA-T1.

Discuss selected cautions using the LGA procedures.

Using the LGA's, simulate the operator's actions required to maintain primary or secondary contanment parameters within limits.

LGA TRAINING SESSION The LGA Training session will consist of a four day course combining the classroom and practical training function. Half of the day will be spent in the classroom session and the other half in the simulator.

CLASSROOM TRAINING SESSION Each licensed operator shall receive classroom training on the LGA's.

This classroom training will be considered complete when the licensed operator scores 80% or above, on the written LGA examination. Additional training will be required if the trainee scores below 80% on the written examination. The test questions should reflect the intent of the LGA learner objectives.

~

The classroom training session should take approximately three days. A ~

typical day would be comprised of four hours of lecture, two hours of discussion an.1 two hours of self study. Two hours will be allotted on the final day of training for the LGA examination.

The student materials for the course shall include:

LGA Student Handout LGA procedure available for reference I LGA Flowchart available for a graphic representation of procedural flowpath.

The LGA student handout will contain two major sections - an introductory section and a procedural step explanation section.

DOCUMENT ID 00671/0206A

s Dmt000CTION - Will includ2 cn ov3rview cf the rGviesd procsdurcl otructure 2 cnd a rcview cf how to follow the LGA's. This introduction will cncompass thi l following topics:

i i '

- General Procedure Layout

- logic Terms

- Use of General Precautions i - Use of Step Specific cautions .,

l

- Use of Procedure specific Cautions

- Action Verbs '

! - special Definitions

! - Entry and Exit of the 1sA's j

- Use of Accompanying Support Procedures PROCEDURAL STEP EXPLANATION - will cover each procedure and explain why operator actions are taken. This will be accomplished by dissecting the '

procedures into major subsections and explaining each evolution.

{

i PRACTICAL TRAINING Each licensed operator shall receive practical training on using the 14A's. The practical training will include a simulation of postulated transients which will require entry into each LGA. This training will normally be conducted on the Lasalle simulator. Four 4-hour shifts will be scheduled for LAA simulator training for each license holder. Each 1

licenseholder will be evaluated on his performance on the simulator. The j evaluation shall include safe use of the procedures as well as an j

evaluation of communication skills during casualty situations. The scenarios will be run for a group of license holders functioning as a team to best develop communication and team work skills. Under special circumstances, an actual control roce walkthrough may be substituted for j

the simulator training to fulfill the practical training requirement.

j This special substitution must be approved by the Training Supervisor before it will be allowed.

FEEDBACK 1AOP Each trainee shall be provided with a feedback form as a means of l

l collecting input from the license holders not only on the course but on l

the procedures themselves. This feedback will be considered for changes - ~

l to the lesson plans and appropriate connents will be forwarded to the operating Department procedure writers.

l DOCUMENT ID 006"ll/0206A

APPENDIX C CAlfULATIONAL PROCEDURE i 9.0 DRYWELL SPRAY INITIATION PRESSURE LIMIT

  • l 9.1 APPLICABLE GUIDELINE STEPS Before drywell temperature reaches (340*r (maximum temperature DM/T-3 ,

at which ADS qualified or drywell design temperature, whichever is lower)) but only if (suppression cha.aoer temperature and drywell pressure are below the Drywell Sprag Initiation Pressure Limit], (sbut down recirculation pumps and drywell coolln; fans and) initiate drywell sprays (restricting flow rate to less than 720 gpm (Maximum Drgwell Sprag Flow Rate Limit)).

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ORYWsLL WRAY soffeATs086 maswns une T

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DR1mitsLLmessunt W Revision 3A 3/1/84 C9-1

1

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FC/F-3 If suppressior. chamber pressure exceeds [17.4 psig (suppression Chamber Spray Initiation pressure)) but only it (suppression chamber temperature and drywell pressure are below the Drywell Spray Initiation pressure Limit), (shut down recirculation pumps and drywell cooling fans and) initiate drywell sprays (restricting flow rate to less enan 720 ppm Maxinun Drywell spray view Rate Linit)).

(

FC/F-4 If suppression enaaber pressure cannot be maintained oelow ene primary Containment pressure Limit, then Artespective of wnether adequate core cooling is assuredt e It (su;; tession caanber tenperature and digwell pressure are below the Drywell Spray Initiation pressure Limit), (shut down recirculation pumps and drywell cooling fans and) initiate drgwell sprays (restricting flow rate to less than 720 ppa (Maximum Drywell sprag riow Race Limit)).

.t gpfy.3,2 1. Wnen suppression pool water level reacnes (17 ft. 2 in.

. (elevation of botten of Nark I internal suppression f chanber to drywell vacuun breakers less vacuun bresser i opening pressure in feet of water)) but enig if (suppression cnanber temperatute and drywell pressure are, below sne Drywell sprag Znitiation pressure Limit), (shut ~

down recirculation pumps and drywell cooling fans and)

Anitiate drywell sprays (restricting flow race to less taan 120 ppe (Maxine Drywell spray plow Rate Limit)).

t I

i Revision 3A G-2 3/1/04

9.; INPUT DATA AND P..YSICAL CONSTAh7S Wote Some input parameters must be obtained from the calculated procedure of Section 8.0 in Appendia C. It is therefore necessary to coeplete that section prior to calculating the Dryvell Spray Initiation Pressure Limit.

TDS Lowest erpected drywell spray temperature

  • J /ff/ 'T P Containment negative design CND pressure (values greater than design may be used if justified by design margin) { = [ paid Tgy Temperature of the re' a ctor building during normal operation Tgy = 'T Ypy Total free volume in drywell and 22.9% D ,

vents E= DW ft Vyy Total airspace voluee in 'wetwell .

at normal operating suppression ,1 k f /

= 3 pool level V g, ft DWSL Reduced drywell spray flow rate from Appendir C. Section 8.0 if rate spray appropriate, no entry is required) DWSL =3 N[' spe j

l Revision 3A c9-3 3/1/s4 l

hy,gp De mass flow rate of the drywell sprays at rated conditions (,, g, = M spe ,

I kW.SP Se mass flow rate of the wetwell ,

sprays at rated conditions (,gp = spe r; 6 AF V30 .D' differ *Dtf 81 pressure for ,

the watwell-to-reactor building jI, vacuus breakers at which the vacuum breaker is fully open APygg -

y b'0 paid j 4h 'd])U <

AV Pc .g 140 area of the containment-to-

'/

reactor building vacuus breakers AVF * #*

C-R I,oss coefficient of each ,,-

KVBC -R containment-to-reactor buildinP vacuum breaker KV8 C-R 3 bf-f t

{ Gas constant for containment

~

atmosphere, escluding water vapor (=CIfbibr*P*

lh(Tg) f y Specific enthalpy of satutated 11guld at 7pg DS) =84 7 Stu/lbe hf (T

~

Specific volue of saturated t,8 fc3 v f(Tyg) "' 1*

liquid at 7 pg Vf fh5)

P,,g(TDS) Saturation pressure of steam at 7pg 7,,,(Tyg) = . h psia

(

Revision 3A C9-4 3/1/84

u,(7,3) Specific internal energy of air at u,(TDS) = f ' Stu/lbe ID6"

/

v,(Tgg) Specific internal energy of air at

u,(Tgy)'

= 62,k' Stu/lbe 733*

v

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f '

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(b

  • Reference internal energy to 0.0 stu/lbe at a temperature of 0.0%.

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Note that u a =h a - Pv er u a =h a -RTa 4777.66 f t-lbf j where h, is the specific enthalpy of air.

For esemple, at 80'r = 540%, h, = 129.06 Stu/lbs

(

I 8' "

Therefore au = 129.06 stu/lbe - 53.34 Ibe%

lbf-ft

  • 540%777.66z f t Ibf

= 92.02 Revision 3A C9-3 3/1/84

9.3 TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION AND DTRIVATION OF TPE CAlfUIATIONAL, PROCEDURE 9.3.1 Introduction .

Appa.ndia C. Sections 8.0 and 9.0 contain the calculational procedures which restrict the operation of Drywell sprays in Ma'rk 3/II c ontainments. The procedures are 8.0 Mazieue Drywell Spray Flow Rate Lir.it 9.0 Drywell Spray Initiation Pressure Limit for A. Rated drywell spray flow B. Mazieun drywell spray flow rate limit.

The plant unique implementation of the drywell spray restrictions will include either

- 5 pray at rated flow and a single limit ' curve which results from calculation 9.4A, or

- Spray at a restricted flow *as esiculated in Section 8.4 step 9 and a single limit curve which results from calculation 9.4[.

9.3.2 containment-to-Reactor Pu11 ding AP Limit for A. Rated Drywell Spray Flow '

3. Mazieus Drywell Spray Flow Rate Limit Under certain conditions the drywell and wetwell sprays could lower the total containment pressure such that the containment-to-R5 negative design pressure differential limit is escoeded. The contan.aent-to-RB vacuus breakers estigate this effect and are factored into this 1

Revision 3A i c9-4 3/1/84 l l

calculatienal procedure, n is procedure calculates the initial conditions, such that after the sprays cool the entire containment to the spray temperature the containment negative design pressure is not exceeded.

The calculational proedure assumes the following (1) Initially the wetwell is saturated and the drywell is full of steam.

(2) There are no contatteent-to-RB vacuum breaker failures.

(3) When the containment-to-RB vacuum breakers open, the drywell is full of saturated air.

We final condition is defined by Pf = 14.7 - P CND (15) and the air partial pressure is (16)

P,,f =Pf-Psat(Tpg) ,

or .

- P,,g(Tpg) (17)

P, , f = 14.7 - Pg Free the ideal gas law, the air mass is

, IfsIYDW + YM (18) 4 a,f Ra IIDS + 460)

Revision 3A C9 7 3/1/84

The final air mass, M,,g, that is distributed between the drywell and wetwell at the final condition, was originally in the wetwell or was added to the containment thru the wetvell-to-RB vacuum breakers If the total flow thru the vacuum breakers is Qt, then the initial air pressure is (M g - kB* a i+ (19)

P, , g = y And the initial total pressure is Pg = P, , g + P,,, (Tg ) - 14 .7 (20 where Pg is in psig.

The ters %.Bt is the vacuum breaker flow times the time to depressurize the containment from the vehell-to-RB vacuum breaker full open pressure to the negative design pressure. Note that the time, t, is inversely proportional to the vacuum breaker flow times internal energy plus the spray flow times enthalpy. Therefore, the calculation is performed twice; for rated spray flow and reduced spray flow.

An approziastion is used for %3twherekB I" f

  • C'"**I""*** ~_

pressure at its design value as defined in equation (21) and t is approximated by equation (22). The appromination was developed such that this hand calculational method matches the results from the more sophisticated computer calculation which was performed by General Electric in the development of this limit. It is not intended that t e an exact ana ytic derivation, but rather that it conceptually kB models the phenomena and gives reasonable results.

t Revision 3A C9-8 3/1/84 i

I l

The vacuum breaker flow is l A .  !

s yg =g Y2 s c I where p . !! . ats J v R, (Tg + 460) and CP = P CE A Ic CND ata

    • E,=y y g R, % + 460) 01)

The time is approximated by M,,f (u ,(TVB0 ~ "a ( DS (22) t=6 93 u, (TRB} * *D+W SP hg (TDSI i ,-

where u,(T) = the specific energy of the air at temperature T and 5 is ~

referenced to 0.0 Btu /lba at 0*R. Note that if data is available for specific enthalpy, h,, the relationship u, = h, - Pv or u, = h, - R,7 may be used to determine u,,

(

Revision 3A c9-9 3/1/84

l l

l 1

(i or i k+wsp = The drywell and wetwell spray flow rate DW*SP 1 DWSL plus ag,$p), and F a atmospheric pressure = 14.7 psia.

ata ,

o Revision 3A G~10 3/1/84

9.4 CALCULATIONAL WORKSHEET

1. Determine the final air mass

- t.,e

. . \ ', Y

\a i?*.

=h. M-

  1. a,f "1* ~# CND -Psat (TDS)

,n--

,.-fgP,,f

$ f . k,(lb T,bY

~

P, f

  • 144 (V , + Vg) a,f R, (Ip + 460) _

M ,g =14@[ lba sbf c gff' )

5, s ge

2. Calculate the vacuum breaker flow AVB * *

, C-R CND "VB " Y KVB C-R a kB + 60)

  • - = lbs/sec N

jdC YS t l ri .- !, II%

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c

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\ Y v)V J

c5

3. Determine the total spray flow rate p. N A. Rated flow '

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($ 7d@ TY*l}$f f"'\ Y ' '13 f.f

( Sp + ( ,,3p)

  • 0.13368 "D+W SP ( ated) = 60
  • vg (TDS} s

L' ? Y . Y> \ {,8 b (ygp(Rated) = i9!Ludibs/sec ,

Revision 3A C9-11 3/1/84

- - - - - - , - _ , _ - . . . _ . _..._z

_ . _ , , -, .... ,-,_ . , - - _ . _ _ - _ . _ . - _ . - - - _ . _ , , . _ .,__,.m- _ _ .

\

B. Reduced flow , g.

M _

(DdSL + (Sp)

  • 0.13368 ,

(7 y D+W SP 60 a y, \

(ySp(Reduced) = 3- . Ibs/see s

4. Determine the conditions when the wetwell-to-RB vacuus breakers are full open P

VB0

= 1 .7 - AP VB0 P

VB0 -

Psia g hI' From steam tables determine ,

f o C- ~

T,,g(PVB0 " kB0 7

VB0

=id "F /

/

From air tables determine f d  :

u,(kBO) = Btu /lba

5. Calculate the depressurization time M,,g (u,( k o - "a ( DS k B "a U
  • b W SP f DS>

Revision 3A c9-12 3/1/s4

A. For Rated flow t (Rated) =

fI see B. For Reduced flov lt (Reduced)l = !V see ,

6. Select values for the initial wetwell airspace temperature and enter in Tables C9-1 or C9-2. The values should range '

from normal operating pool temperature to wetvell design ,

temperature and be sufficient to define a locus of points to be plotted on Figures C9-1 or C9-2 for rated or reduced spray flow respectively. ( )

in

7. Calculate the initial pressure, P,,g, for Tg Tables C9-1 or C9-2 m

(M,,g -gd R, (Tg + 460) a,1 144

  • Vg - fg

\Y' . .

I,lr(; g w , ,.'.

g 4 <.

5 + f ,b -3

' G M.I 690 6 ' p

- 6#p3.:.%h T.6 o/l where _

l 1, .p s*

.. j 3 e rp .

(

t = t (Rated) for rated spray floit in Table C9-3, and t = t (Reduced) for reduced spray flow in Table C9-4.

8. Determinethesaturationtemperature,P,,g(T),foreachj g initial temperature and enter in Tables C9-1 or C9-2. ( v) _

C Revision 3A c9-13 3/1/84

9. Calculate the initial total pressure in the suppression chamber, gP . from the following equation and enter in Tables C9-1 or C9-2. (j[)

Pg = P ,,g + P,,g(Tg ) - 14.7 ,

10. Plot T andg P from g

Table C9-1 on Figure C9-1 or from Table C9-2 on Figure C9-2. This is the Drywell Spssy Initiation Pressure Limit for rated or reduced drywell spray flow rates respectively. (__)

. Revision 3A C9-14 3/1/84

Table C9-1 (RATD FLOW)  :

(6) (7) (8) (9)

Tg F g (psia) + P (Tg ) (psia) i ~ . Pg (psis)

( F) 4

. . y

- ,\^~' c'

.c ., c

. e.

~. ,. . c, ., .

j ,, .

c

,3. r p T

5. .
'; (p 'F '

er .

'. ll ,5 , ~

, (f G

,< C. G: ,' , .

g-, C . ,-

9s ( ., ., < ,. .

3J t.n- ., ..

. - e. .

$ q rflr  :.J' Table c9I 1 I' c o<~ ~' ~'

(Reuc a Flow)

(6) (7) (8) (9) y (psis)

Tg ('F) P,,,(psia) P ,(T g) (psia) d

/., , <

-- I Revision 3A C9-15 3/1/84 a

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.. e es as as as as as as as e e to 1s so e .e e surensasm cmAmou Pmtasuna heel Figure C9-1. Dryvell Spray Initiation Press'ure Limit (C9.A Containment-to-R.B 6P Limit for Rated Spray)

Revision 3A 3/1/84 C9-16 e e

APPECU C CALCULATIONAL PRXED'.715 W.0 FRIMARY CONTAINMDIT PRESSURI LIMIT

. . . . 14 2 AFFLICABLE CUIDELINE STEPS FCIP-6 If suppnosion chamber pnesun osmot be naintained belev the Prin1ry Containment Pressun Limit, then irnspective of whether c adequate con cooling is assured ...

N I

a.

[

'// /

//

G 'N m

contabser::

,.- ews 't b

ll.,

a a fak si., u. ,

% centafeest earter Invet (fs.J FCit-1 .if suppression ch:her preneurc a::eeds the Prin:r eCor.tcinnen:

Pressure Lieit, ve'.t the pr.*n1ry cmtainne'.: in a:c:rdan:e vi:h t fprocedure for containment ventir.p] to nduce and mintair. pres-sure belo'.' the Primry Coe.sainnee.: Pressure Lixd:.

fatw 3 {L$G g,,$ t)

C14-1 E^E~ ? "

-44 #8

14.3 ic c m ' c. ' Di > c e : r t ien and Di

  • i s e.: i s - . * :-( ( . ' c u l.' t i c c ' F r e: c c e s-Tr.c Fri-c y Containment Prc5surc LPit re,,re sent s t he su of t*,c nost liriting values of 3 separate curves, each a function of p/inary containment water level. Refering to Figure C12-1, curve A defines the primary containment limiting pressure for the suppression chamber access hatches. Curve B defines the primary containment limiting pressure for the limiting vent path. Curve C defines the primary containment limiting pressure for the SRV actuating cylinders.

Calculation of the limit is based on the same considerations discussed in the Primary Containment Design Pressure calculational procedure. #

Appendix C, Section 13 If the maximum allowable pressure is substituted for design pressure, the curve A procedure is identical. The same is true when using the SRV operating pressure limit and the Vent Path Pressure limit.

l O

Sp

Th2 criginal calculctions perfct:2d to d2termint th? Primary Contcinm2nt Pressure Limit were done using EPG calculational procedure Appendix C Section

14. This calculational procedure a=suces that the liciting component in the primary cor.taintent st r ucture is be low t he norr:41 su;tr ess io:. pcol level .

Subsequent to the PGP subrittal, it har been discovered that this is not the case. It was also realized that the instrumentation (Suppression Chamber Pressure per the EPG) installed did not have adequate range to indicate above 60 psig.

No valve operability had been considered because that was not addressed or within the scope of EPG Rev. 3 to which LaSalle was commiitted. Since this point was mentioned by the NRC's SER of April 1,1985, and since it does have a great effect on the PCPL, it is being addressed at this time.

By AE calculational analysis, it has been determined that as suppression -

pool water level is raised, the limiting structural component is the suppression pool hatches (el. 713 ft.) which can withstand a maximum pressure of 151 psig.

SRVs at LaSalle require 88 psid (design value) across the pneumatic cylinders to open and hold open the SRVs. The pneumatic supply to the ADS

!4 n ha c l e. ; :i r : at t 6 ; c t i. ( : p. In: of I ta ; : b,. . i t..a , 6 con:.e r vct ive maximun. drywell pressure (at the ShV pneumatic cylinder approximately 612 f t, el.) can be determined by subtracting the required pressure differential from the minimum normal pneumatic supply pressure. This leaves 63 psig. It can be noted that pneumatic supply pressure can be easily adjusted upward (in the reactor building) until its' reliefs lif t (approximately 200 psig), and is normally set at about 170 psig.

The limiting vent path of sufficient size to pass decay heat (26 inch motor operated butterfly valve located at approximately 810 f t. el.) has a name plate AP of 68 psid.

It is evident from this graph that the limiting component will be the SRVs. A number of other vent paths for the primary containment exist, but they are of reduced capacity, lower in the containment or have lower operating pressure capability. The site specific venting procedure will prioritize the vent paths based upon their operability during the event and primary  ;

containment / suppression pool pressure and water level relative to the specific penetrations location. Preference will be given to suppression chamber venting first to reduce radioactivity release rates.

DOCUMENT 1409r

la.? Inr.? rper e t r e s and Pt s. ic al Co-' t.99t

  • ltgr,ttl Licsa: Ic9 te**et.pondinc t e t he tiprerstfe-c'ta ?ct ac cc b s hatchotr ESP,LC = 40.67 fit

[PSC.LC Maximum pressure at which the suppression .

char.ber access hatches are expected to fall P SC,LC = 151 psig ESCPI Elevation of the suppression chamber pressure instrument tap * ~

E$cpg = 49.67 ft

~~

p, Os-:c- ;: s tntial r'it s ' t . . : rs e to open and hold open the SRV's N ;'

.l Fog,Agp Drywell pneu-atic air supply low pressure alarm setpoint P

ADS. AIR = 151 psig DPVENT Design differential pressure required to open the valve in the limiting vent path PADS. AIR = 151 psig DPyggy Design differential pressure required to open the valve In the limiting vent path

[DPventl=68psid E$ ny Elevation of SRV pneumatic cylindere ESRV 138.67 ft EVENT Elevation of limiting vent path valve * ,

137.25 ft CElevation 0.0 is defined to be the botto. of the suppression pool 1

I l

ti.L Cr'co l.:lemel V.eLorrt 1

.L.1 C c' .< 4 Ficues C11-1

1. Calculate P'llmt.scpl the prir.ary containment pressure Ifnit at Esp = Escpl P' LIMIT,5 CPS = PSC,LC - 0.433 (ESCPl-ESC,LC)

PLIMIT,5 CPI "b7 + I Ih P' LIMIT,5 CPI = 151 - 0.433 (49.67-40.67) ,

= 151 - 0.433 (9) = 147.1

2. Complete curve A fiv: pu e r. : I or, figott (1-1 c; ca.*einett4 ([$p,Lt,P$t,gg'

/

.it.c:t (L 5F ,bl L 6

  • .: 61: , i ..: t , -14 : .

s Layout 12 /

Layout lines parallel to the x-axis to the left of point 1 and the right of point 2 on figure C14-1 14.4.2 Curve B .

1. Calculate Pvent Ilmit, the primary containment pressure limit for operability of the limiting vent line valve PVENT LIMIT " POV, AIR - DP vent lFVEt4T LIMilj" 03 PSI 9 P 151 - 68 VENT LIMIT-= 83 psig
2. Calculate P' vent limit, the primary Contalnment pressure l ir.l t for operability of the liriting vent line value corresponcing to Event.

P'VEriT LIMIT = PVEt," tie'T + 0.433 (EVE f;T *ISCPl)

(

F'ygg,y Lggitja 120.92 psig P'ygp;T L IP*lf = 83

  • 0.L33 (137.25 49.67)

- il  : -::- !.;

a 12. 9 * ;. . ' 9

3. Co plete curve 8 Plot potrit 1 on Figure C14-1 at coordinate IISCPI, PVENT LIMIT) /

PI 1 r

. fll-t

.. .9 : (.

'. ' t .' t ' ( ! ';[ *. . ""[.- Ln-

/

Layout 5 W ,

14.4 3 Curve C

1. Calculate Psrv limit, primary containment pressure limit for operability of the SRV pneumatic cylinders PSRV LIMIT = PDW AIR - DP SRV PSRV LIMIT = 63 psig P$ gy Liggy = l$1 - 88 63
  • i.*:.prir.., u ,: tin ..s: pw n lir :i 5.,
2.  : < 16. :. ;1 - .

operability cf the SRV pneur,atic cylinders corresponding to E (e if P'5RV LIMIT

  • P5RV LIMIT + 0.433 (L $gy - ESPCI)

P'5RV LIMIT = 101 54 psis P'5RV LIMIT = 63 + 0.433 (138.67 - 49.67) 63 + 0.433 (89) 101.54 3 Complete curve C Plot point 1 on (Igure C14-1 at coordinate (ESCPlePSRV LIMIT)

/

Plot point 2 on Figure Clk-l at coordinate (E gy, $ P'5RV LIMIT)

Layout E /

Layout lines parallel to the X-amis to the left of point I an: the right of point 2 on Figure Clk-1

/

14.4.4 Prir.or y Contain-(nt Pressure Limi t

l. Using Figurc Clk-l determine the nost lir I t ing

.- - p, '

.: *. . , ,. . .. r p c , , , c

. (3 psig because the Suppression Chamber Pressure instrument Indicates a naminum of 60 psig the Primary Containment Pressure Limit is set at 60 psig

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! CH-

Emergency Procedure Guidelines SECONDARY CONTAINMENT CONTROL GUIDELINE PURPOSE The purpose of this guideline is to:

o Protect equipment in the secondary containment, o Limit radioactivity release to the secondary containment, and either:

o Maintain secondary containment integrity, or ,

o Limit radioactivity release from the secondary containment.

ENTRY CONDITIONS

o Dif f erential pressure at or above O in. of water o An area temperature above the maximum normal operating temperature .

o A HVAC cooler dif f erential temperature above the maximum -

normal operating differential temperature o A HVAC exhaust radiation level above the maximum normal -

operating radiation level o An area radiation level above the maximum normal operating radiation level '

e o A floor drain sump water level above the maximum normal operating water level ,

o An area water level above the maximum normal operating water level SC-1

Emergency Procedure Guidelines OPERATOR ACTIONS t If while executing the following steps secondary containment I (secondary I HVAC ewhaust radiation level exceeds (20 '#

mr/hr containment HVAC isolation setpoint) 3: #

1 t of secondary i 8o Confirm or manually initiate isolation I

containment HVAC, and I

8 initiation of or manually initiate SBGT Conly I Io Confirm l i when the space being evacuated is below 212-F3.

I t If while executing the following steps:

I I I Io Secondary containment HVAC isolates,* and, 1 t

1o Secondary g containment HVAC exhaust radiation level is i I below Cee ar/hr (secondary containment HVAC isolation 8 I

t setpoint:3, ----- I i 1 #24 I I s I restart secondary containment HVAC. ----- t t ._....... ._____.

C$teps SC/T, l 3 Irrespective of the entry condition, execute

,8 I SC/R, and SC/L3 concurrently.

s O

e SC-2

Emergency Procedure Guide 1&nes SC/T Monitor and control secondary containment temperatures.

O SC/T-1 Operate available area cooters.

SC/T-2 If secondary contqinment HVAC exhaust radiation level is below (War /hr (secondary containment -

HVAC isolation setpoint)3. operate available secondary containment HVAC.

SC/T-3 If any area temperature exceeds its sautmum normal operating temperature, isolate all systems that are discharging into the area except systems required to shut down the reactor, assure adequate core cooling, or suppress a working fire.

SC/T-4 If a primary system is discharging int,o an area, then before any area temperature reaches its maximum safe operating temperature, enter -

Cprocedure developed from the RPV Control Guideline 3 at Estep RC-13 and execute it concurrently with this procedure.

t

' SC/T-5 If a primary system is discharging into an area and

' _* an area temperature exceeds its maximum safe operating temperature in more than one area.

EM.ERGENCY RPV DEPRESSUR12ATION 15 REQUIRED.

l

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e

' 9 BC-3

Emergency Procedure Guidelines SC/R Monitor and control secondary containment radiation levels.

If any area radiation level exceeds its SC/R-1 maximum normal operating radiation level, isolate all systems that are discharging into the area except systems required to shut down the reactor.

assure adequate core cooling, or suppress a working fire.

SC/R-2 If a primary system is discharging into an area, then bef ore any area radiation level reaches its sawimum saf e operating radiation level, enter (procedure developed f rom the RPV Control Guideline 3 at CStep RC-13 and execute it concurrently with this procedure.

SC/R-3 If a primary system is discharging into an ares and an area radiation level exceeds its maximum safe operating radiation level in more than one area, EMERGENCY RPV DEPRESSUR11ATION 15 REQUIRED.

o 4

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SC-4

Emergency Procedure Outdelines ,

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SC/L Plonitor and control secondary containment water levels.

i SC/L-1 If any floor drain sump or area water level is ,

  • above its maximum normal operating water level, i operate available sump pumps to restore and --

I

. maintain it below its maximum normal operating water level.

If any floor drain sump or area water level cannot be restored and maintained below its maximum normal operating water level, isolate all systems that are discharging water into the sump or area except systems required to shut down the reactor, assure adequate core cooling, or suppress a working fire.

SC/L-2 If a primary system is discharging into an area, then bef ore any floor drain sump or area water level reaches its maximum saf,e operating water level, enter Cprocedure developed f rom the RPV Control Guideline 3 at C5tep RC-13 and execute it (

concurrently with this procedure.

( SC/L-3 If a primary system is discharging into an aren and a floor drain sump or area water level onceeds it s mawamum safe operating water level in more than one area, EMERGENCY RPV DEPRE55URIZATION IS REQUIRED.

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S SC-5

Emergency Procedure Guidelines TABLE 1 OPERATING VALUES OF SECONDARY CONTAINMENT PARAMETERS I I I MAX NORMALS I MAX SAFE 8 I I ALARN 1 OPERATING l DPERATING l .

I SECONDARY CONTAINMENT I VALUE I I I VALUE I PARAMETER / LOCATION .........l..._......g i..... ._ .................l.........l...IN. WATER I IN. WATER I i DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE IIN. WATERI I I I I I I I I (Reactor Building / I I i 0 I i 3I I outside air 31 0 t i I (Refuel Floor /outside air 1


l---------l-------------l----------

I RCA TEMPERATURE Le s i E i g i g i 1

Atlubb i 1 1 i 3I I

I (RW "A" pump room 150' i 130 t pump room 150' i 130 t i 3I I CRWCU "B"

  • I 3 I I CRWCU room 158' at Hw. I 130 1 I .

om 158' I I I (RWCU Hn i 3 I I disch-H. I 130 t I CRWCU phase s . roca 150'l 130 t i 3 I mp room i I i i g I (RWCU holding 3i 130 t i i 185

  • 8 I I I I i 3I I (NE Diagonal i 175 8 8 i 175 1 3 I I CSE Diagonal I l i I I 3 I .

I CHPCI room, area A 17 8 8 I CHPCI room, area 3 1 1 I i 31 i CHPCI room, area C I 75 I i 3I I I I I I 3I I CTorus room, westwall 200 t i i 200 8 3 I I ITorus room, eastwall I CTorus room, northwal i 200 t i 3 I I CTorus room, southw ( 200 t i 3 I I I I I I <

i 160 t i 31 I (Main steam tunn l i l i I I I I I I (SE, Reactor 30 elev.,

I 200 t i 3 I .

I area A I I I 1 (SE, Rea or 130 elev.,

200 I I 3 i area 1 I I I I 1

200 i 3 I I (NW 1 agonal, area A I t i 31 IC Daagonal, area D I 200 t NW Diagonal, area C i 200 l i 1 1

  • Typical values not available. ,

EC.-6

Area W Max Wormal Man safa Altre CP Op Steam Pipe Tunnel 176 212 130'F Best squipment Room 1 206 212 120'F RNR squipment acom 2 206 212 120'F .

BCIC Pipe Route 206 212 190'r acIc aquipment Area 206 212 120*F NWCU Pump Room A 186 212 110'F Irdcu Pump Room B 166 212 110'F NWCU Pump Room C 166 212 110'F NWCU Ma Room A 199 212 130*F NWCU Hs Room B 199 212 130'r 0

J 9

Emergency Procedure Guidelines ,

. i TABLE I CFERATING VALUES OF SECONDARY CONTAINMENT PARAMETERS tcontinued!

__ _ _ . ..._ __...._ _1u _B.hh d... ____.______________.. ____

i i MAX NORMALS I MAX SAFE 8 8 i I ALARM i OPERATING l OPERATING i SECONDARY CONTAINMENT l VALUE i 1 PARAMETER / LOCATION l i VALUE


l---------l-------------l-------- --I 1 -------------- FERENTIAL l l t i I AC COOLER DIF i ERATURE I E I g i f, I I i i l I i 3I I (RWC "A" Pump Room I 75 I

" Pump Room I 75 I i 3I I (RWCU 3I I (RWCU Ha com 150' at Hus I 75 8 '

om 158' disch. I I i l CRWCU Ma I 3I I to Hotwel 8 75 I I CRWCU phase e arator' I i i a I 75 i 8 38 i room 150' ,

i I

i CRWCU holding pu I i I 75 i I 31 I rsom 185' I I I 1

1 1 50 I i 3I i (NE diagonal 38 I tSt diagonal I 50 1 I I i i I i 3I I (HFCI Room, Cooler A 40 I I CHFCI Room, Cooler 3 8 I I 3I I I I I

I I (NW Diagonal, Cooler A I O I I 38 I (NW Diagonal, Cooler D i 4 I l 31 i CNW Dtagonal, Cooler C 40 I i 31 -

I I

! I 40 1 3I I CTorus Room, NW . I 1 i 3 I CTorus Room, West i 40 t I I I I

1 40 t i 3i I CTorus Room, NW I i 31'

! CTorus Room, Wes i 40 I i  ! I I

I 40 I i 3i e i tTorus Room, i 3i

! CTorus Room, est i 40 t i 8 i

i 40 t i 3I .

I i CTorus Ro m. NW i 40 t i 3l I CTorus om, West i 1 1 I l i l i I (Mai Steam Tunnel, I 3I olor A i 70 1 1 I l in Steam Tunnel, i i 1 l t i I Cooler e  ! 70 t l

  • Typical values not. available.

SC-7

Citt:renti:1 Temperctures nas more nas sata Attra 9 9 Rteam F1pe Tunnel 96 132 20'F RMt Reuipment Room 1 126 132 20'F RNR Rguipment Room 2 126 132 20*F RCIC Pipe Route 126 132 40'F RCIC Squipment Area 126 132 20'F RWCU Ptap Room A 106 132 34*F WWCU Ptap Room R 106 132 34'F RWCU Pump Room C 106 132 34'F RWCU Ms Room A 119 132 34'F RWCU Ma Room a 119 132 34'F l

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Emergency Procedure Guidelines TABLE 1 OPERATING VALUES OF SECONDARY CONTAINMENT PARAMETERS (Continued)

I I I MAX NORMALS I MAX 5AFES I I SECONDARY CONTAINMENT I ALARM l OPERATING I OPERATING I PARAMETER / LOCATION I i VALUE I VALUE l-I ..........g gs. ..._ ..... _ ........___l.........l._ ....... _.I i l i I HVAC EXHAUST RADIATION 8 I LLVEL APOVE I tB/EE I NR/HR I tE/g6

  • I I i I I I 5, I CReactier Building I .30'10 8 i,g, ,, 3 I i : f.; 4 8 30 so i So I 38

.......__I

$g ,

i._";......s__ON i AREA RADIAT LEVELM MR/H6 8

eer QI gs_t{*__._I_...____.i__..__._

tE/JE BS/ES I i 15 3 I (158' Southea Area 8 8 I

I C150' Northeast rea i 15 I . 3 i 15 I 3 I I C150' Northwest A ea I I i 3 i I (130' Northeast Wo Area i 15 I I I 3 i i [130' Southeast Work en I tu i i I CDecontamination Pump I I l Equipment Room 1 20 t i 3 I s 3I I C5outh CRD Hydraulic Unit i 15 8 i I I I C5 pent Fuel Fool 3I I Passageway I 3 I I I (195' Operating Floor 1 5 I I 3 i i t135' Sample Panet Ares t Q l I 3I

  • I CCRD Repair Area i 20 I I 3 i i I l I C185' RWCU Control Panet Area i 15 8 3i l

i CRCIC Egunpment Area i 20 I i 3 I I (CRD Fump Room SW I 20 I i 3 I l [RHR & Core Spray R m I ,

i I i Northeast i 20 t i 3 I i I i CRHR & Core Spra Room i I I c

I Southeast i 20 t i 3 I n F'anet I i i I CFuel Fool De  !

i 3I i Area i 20 I I I I I

I i i 1 -

l .I I I I I 1

I i' I I I I I I I I

I I I I I

i i l i l i I . I i i

  • Typical values not available.

SC-3 f ,

L _ _ - ------

882$ ,.

D18 Inst (PT) , BQ eg er/hr er/hr MPL alare Isol Service bound Upscale man max ar/hr ar/hr Red Red Reading Normal Safe sbOT ,

820' E1. K602A 108 PWCU Phase e sep K6028 10 -- 2s6 E7 108 108 10' RB Sample K6010 25 2s6 E7 108 250 10' (832) station ,

As Cont. K6011 10 --- --- 108 108 10' Purge RB HCU K601C 3.5 2t6 E7 10' 35 350 Module W.

RB HCU K601D 3.5 256 E7 10' 35 350 Module 5.

T1P Room K602D 100 2s6 E7 108 10' 108 TIP Drives K6015 7.5 256 57 108 15 750 CRD K601T 10 2s6 E7 108 108 10' storage &

Repair WW RHR Ha K602F 100 SES E7 108 10' 10*

Rooms St RHR Hz 602E 100 SES E7 108 los 104 Rooms 45 SES E7 108 450 4$00 RCIC Room K6020 3.5 555 57 10' 35 350 HPCS Room K601H MSL Tunnel K610A/D 3000 1500 6E6 E7 10' C

r

bel D18 Inst (PT) 30 up ar/hr ar/hr ML alare Isol service Bound Upscale man max ar/hr ar/hr med and needing Normal safe r_ -._3 320' E1. K602A 10' ihu.n=di3WCU Phase 10' map K6023 10 --

2s6 E7 108 10' in sample K6010 25 2s6 E7 108 250 10'

. . . (832) station _

~

- " n cont. K6011 10 -- - 108 los 30s

... .... egg,,

K601C 3.5 2s6 57 10' 35 350

- HCU M ule M.

K601D 3.5 2s6 E7 10' 35 350

-== HCU

.. ........ M ule E.

K602D 100 2s6 E7 108 108 10*

1 2 Room 7.5 2s6 E7 10' 75 750 x 2 Drives K601E en K601T 10 256 E7 108 108 10'

............ etorage &

m - mepair m=d.assains; ant RHR Hz K602F 100 SES 57 108 10' 108 E7 108 108 10*

- RHR Hz 602E 100 SES

- . annem

  • IC Roon K6020 45 5ES E7 10* 450 4500 3.5 SES E7 10' 35 350

= - - - 1EPCs Room K601H m L Tunnel K610A/D 3800 7500 6s6 E7 108 e

Emergency Procedure Guidelines TABLE 1

. DFERATING VALUES OF SECONDARY CONTAINMENT PARAMETERS (Continued) be ANc.a.h k ,

I I -

1 MAX NORMALS I MAX SAFd* I OPERATING t OPER T'ING I t CONDARY CONTAINMENT I ALARM t

! P RAMETER/ LOCATION I I VALUE I V UE I g_____ __-__-____________-__g_____.-__g_____________g___ _______g i FLOOR RAIN SUMP WATER t i I I I LEVEL I E I INa , 8 IN ,  !

1 I I I I ESump A (S E. Diagona!) 1 47 I 8 3 I I CSump B (S. Diagona!)  ! 52 8 I 3 I t------------- -----------l--------l------- ---l-----------I t AREA WATER LEV I E I N t }&, I t  !  !  ! I I CCRD Compartment t 7 8 8 3 t I [RCIC Compartment t 7 I ,

8

~

3 I I CRB NE Corner RM t 7 t I 3 I I CRB SE Corner RM i 7 I I 31 I CHPCI Compartment  ! 7 . 1 3 I I CTorus Compartaent NW I 7 I t 31 t CTorus Compartment NE '

7 1 8 3 I I CTorus Compartment SE I I I 3 t I [ Torus Compartment SW t 7 I I 3 I I I I i t t t  ! I I t . 8 I I t

  • t  ! I I  !

I I I I I I I I I t i  !  !

I I I t t .

I  ! I t t t I i  ! I I I I I t i I  !  ! I g

! I I I I

!  ! I I i

' I i  !

I  ! I I t .

t . I I t t t I  !  ! I t  ! I  ! I t  !  ! I t

! I  !  ! I I I 1

  • Typical values not available.

SC-9 l

RB Banement water 10 velo Ht. from floor Area Limiting component (Inches)

NR RCIC Inst. rack elect. 25 conn. box ,

SE RHR B&C Inst rack elect. 25 Conn. box SW HPCS Suction P.S. R22- 31 N015 & 14

~

W RHR A Inst. Rock Elect. 25 conn. box Raceway MSIV-II elect. conn. 35 boxes O

t d

~

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Emergency Procedure Guidelines RADIOACTIVITY RELEASE CONTROL GUIDELINE PURPOSE _

The purpose of this guideline is to limit radioactivity release into areas outside the primary and secondary containments.

ENTRY CONDITIONS The entry condition for this guideline is:

. o Of f site radioactivity release rate above the of fsite release rate which requires an Alert.

OPERATOR ACTIONS RR-1 Isolate all primary systems that are discharging into areas outside the primary and secondary containments except systems required to assure adequate core cooling or shut h_ down the reactor. ,

RR-2 If offsite radioactivity release rate approaches or exceeds the of f site release rate which requires a General Emergency I

~

and a primary system is discharging into an area outside '

the primary and secondary containments, EMERGENCY RPV DEPRESSURIZATION IS REQUIREDI enter Cprocedure developed .

f rom the RPV Control Guideline 3 at CStep RC 13 and execute it concurrently with this procedure.

e O 9 9

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RR-1

~ .

- Emergency Procedure Guidelines CONTINGENCY #1 LEVEL RESTORATION t If while executing the f ollowing steps: I I o Boron Injection is required or boron has been injected i I into the RPV, enter Cprocedure developed from I

! CONTINGENCY 973. I Io RPV water level cannot be determined, RPV FLDODING IS I t REQUIRED; enter [ procedure developed from CONTINGENCY I

  1. 63. I t

I I

RPV Flooding is required, enter Cprocedure devel oped i io I

I from CONTINGENCY #63. ,

Ci-! !niti;te :C. .

C1-2 Line up for injection and start pumps in 2 or more of the

' f ollowing injection subsystems:

o Condensate o HPCS o LPCI-A o LPCI-B ,

o LPCI-C ,

o LPCS-A e L"CS ?

If less than 2 of the injection subsystems can be lined up, commence lining up as many of the following alternate injection subsystems as possible:

d to RHR service water crosstie 3 to Fire system ,

3

[o Interconnections with other units 3

[o ECCS keep-full systems 3 SLC (test tank) 3 Co to SLC (boron tank) 3 C1-1 I

Emergency Procedure Guidelines g

_______________________________________________________________I a I If while executing the following steps: 1 i or RPV pressure !

Io The RPV water level trend reverses I

I changes region, return to CStep C1-33. I . -

I gag I water level drops below t-t46 in. (ADS initiation I to RPV I I i setpoint)3, prevent automatic initiation of ADS.


t C1-3 Monitor RPV pressure and water level. Continue in this procedure at the step indicated in the following table.

q% RPV PRESSURE REGION 57

[4E5 psig3* E M psig38 I INTERMEDIATE I LOW I t HIGH L I C1-6 i E I INCREASING t C1-4 I C1-5 V

E I DECREASING t C1-7 i C1-8 I l . g ________________________________________________

s *(RPV pressure at which LPCS shutoff head is reached)

  • (; ;."C : a RCIC low pressure isolation setpoint, dich;ver -

d e M 'r '

C1-4 RPV WATER LEVEL INCREASING, RPV PRESSURE HIGH .

Enter tprocedure developed f rom the RPV Control Guideline 3 i

at CStep RC/L3.

C1-5 RPV WATER LEVEL INCREASING, RPV PRESSURE INTERMEDIATE If n^O: cnd RCIC e\5ne not available and RPV pressure is increasing, EMERGENCY RPV DEPRESSURIZATION IS REQUIRED.

When RPV pressure is decreasing, enter (procedure developed "

from the RPV Control Guideline 3 at CEtep RC/L3.

15 If HF : en: RCIC ese not available and RPV pressure is not increasing, enter (procedure developed from the RPV Control Guideline 3 at CStep RC/L3.

l 12.S I

! Otherwise, when RPV water level reaches C+>P in. (Iow level scram setpoint)3, enter (procedure developed from the RPV Control Guideline 3 at CStep RC/L3.

s C1-2 F

l Emergency Procedure Guidelines C1-6 RPV WATER LEVEL INCREASING, RPV PRESSURE LOW *

\

If pressure is increasing, EMERGENCY RPV DEPRESSURIZATION IS REQUIRED. When RPV pressure is decreasing, enter .

l tprocedure developed from the RPV Control Guideline 3 at l

- CStep RC/L3.

Otherwise, enter Cprocedure developed from the RPV Control Guideline 3 at [ Step RC/L3.

l l

C1-7 RPV WATER LEVEL DECREASING, RPV PRESSURE HIGH OR '

INTERMEDIATE RCit ,

If TC: - RCIC is not ' operating, restart .

operating. ,

If no injection subsystem is lined up for injection with at least one pump running, start pumps in alternate injection subsystems which are lined up for injection.

41 .

s When RPV water level drops to C-M4 in. (top of active' fuel)3:

o If no system, injection subsystem or alternate injection subsystem is lined up with at least one pump running, STEAM COOLING IS REQUIRED. When any system, injection subsystem or alternate injection subsystem ,

is lined up with at least one pump running, return to CStep C1-33. .

o Otherwise, EMERGENCY RPV DEPRESSURIZATION IS REQUIRED.

When RPV water evel i s increasing or RPV pressure

- RCIC low pressure drops below C psig ( * *~

isolation setpoint, e.ich:cc- d e M ;;5 .-) 3, return to e

[ Step C1-33.

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C1-3

Emergency Procedure Guidelines C1-B RPV WATER LEVEL DECREASING, RPV PRESSURE LOW CIf no HPCS or LPCS subsystem is operating,3 start pumps in alternate injection subsystems which are lined up f or injection. _

If RPV pressure is increasing, EMERGENCY RPV DEPRESSURIZATION IS REQUIRED.

~~~~~~~~~

l When RPV water level drops to C-b64T~~~~~~~~~~~~~f in. (top o active I t f uel) 3, enter (procedure developed from CONTINGENCY 443. l O

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C1-4

Emergency Procedure Guidelines CONTINGENCY S2

. EMERGENCY RPV DEPRESSURIZATION I G13 e14 I C2-1 When either: _________

o Boron Injection is required and all inj ection into the RPV except from boron injection systems and CRD has been terminated and prevented, or a Boron Injection is not required, C2-1.1 Initistr 10.

4 C2-1.2 If suppression pool water level is above Ca& ft.

JN-w+. (elevation of top of SRV discharge devi,ce) 3:

o Open all ADS valves.

o If any ADS valve cannot be opened, open cther SRVs until C7 (number of SRVs dedicated

( to ADS)2 valves are open.

C2-1.3 If less than C3 (Minimum Number of SRVs Required f or Emergency Depressurization) 3 SRVs are open~~~Gead i " ; 2 r ; II It I"""' "^ ^2i" ~i-I 2^

y- dM II^

_Cn'.' O. ep;nin; " cr r 2 e4 above suppression I-- e22 1 -

chamber pressure 3, rapidly depressurize the

  • * *t twsM d RPV using one or more of the following systems (use in order which will minimize radioactive release to the environment):

o Main condenser o RHR (steam condensing mode) o COther steam driven equipment 3 o Main steam line drains .

MPC! eter- S in o RCIC steam line o Head vent I

6 IC IC'! OId? .inI C2-1

Emergency Proceduro Guidelines

__ _ ___ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ __ __ _ _ ___ ____ __enter

_ ___ _ Cprocedure

_ _ _ _ __ __ _ _ ___d e v e l op ed i 1 If RPV Flooding is required, I I from CONTINGENCY #63.

Enter (procedure developed from the RPV Control Guideline 3 -

C2-2 at CStep RC/P-33.

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C2-2

Emergency Procedure Guidelines 9

l CONTINGENCY 03 l STEAM COOLING l

)

l C3 C rfirr initieti;n ;f "C. _

1 If while executing this step Emergency system, RPV injection !

I 3T I Depressurization is required or any i subsystem, or alternate injection subsystem is lined up i I f or injection with at least one pump running, enter i t Cprocedure developed f rom CONTINGENCY #23. I If !C --aaa& h- 4 itict:d:

2,75 When RPV water level drops to C-291 Fin. (Mini mum Zero-Injection RPV Water Level)3 or if RPV water level cannot be determined, open one _ SRV.

______________________________ u___________________________

- t When RPV pressure drops below [700 psig (Minimum Single i

! SRV Steam Cooling Pressure)3, enter Cprocedure developed i I

I from CONTINGENCY #23.

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Emergency Procedure Guidelines i

CONTINGENCY 94 CORE COOLING WITHDUT LEVEL RESTORATION j

~

! #13 8 C4-1 Open all ADS valves. _____

If any ADS valve cannot be opened, open other SRVs until C7 (number of SRVs dedicated to ADS)3 valves are open.

C4-2 Operate HPCS and LPCS subsystems with suction from the suppression pool.

hhenatleastonecorespraysubsystemisoperatingwith suctQn from the suppression pool and RPV pressure is below

[Ete Tsig (RPV pressure f or rated LPCS or HPCS flow, terminate injection into whichever pressure is lower) 3, the RPV f rom sources external to the primary containment. *

\st C4-3 When RPV water level is restored to C->6+ in. (top of active fuel)3, enter [ procedure developed from the RPV

- Control Guideline 3 at [ Step RC/L3.

l l

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C4-1

i Emergency Proceduru Guidelines .

I CONTINGENCY 85 '

  • i C5-1* Initiate suppression pool cooling.

C5-2 Close the CRPV head vents,3 MSIVs, main steam line drain valves, and HPC-t-end RCIC isolation valves.

C5-3 Place the control switch f or tone %um (Minimum Number of SRVs Required f or Alternate Shutdown Cooling)3 SRVEs3 in the OPEN position.

C5-4 Slowly raise RPV water level to establish a flow path through the open SRV back to the suppression pool.

C5-5 Terminate and prevent all injection into the RPV except s u from CRD.

C5-6 Start one LPCS or LPCI pump with suction from the suppression pool.

M.

C5-7 Slowly increase LPCS or LPCI injection into the RPV to the maximum.

C5-7.1 If RPV pressure does not stabilize at least C94 75 psig (Minimum Alternate Shutdown Cooling RPV ,

Pressure >3 above suppression chamber pressure, ,

start another LPCS or LPCI pump.

US C5-7.2 If RPV pressure does not stabilize below C+99 psig (Maximum Alternate Shutdown Cooling RPV Pressure)3, open another SRV.

C5-7.3 If the cooldown rate exceeds [100*F/hr (maximum RPV cooldown rate LCO)3, reduce LPCS or LPCI injection e into the RPV until the cooldown rate decreases below C100*F/hr (maximum RPV cooldown rate LCO) 3 Ta.,getfed Er ""' ' p . ;;; . . p. s c r r t: withi.. ,0 ,,.;g

!=i-in _ ; V C. ep;ni..; " r- u r? e2 r;; r--i;mgggs o t e - 0 ;. prw....;, ' i c h e t'r " -"- -

- C i . ;t !. ggf C5-B Control suppression ol temperature to maintain RPV water temperature above C F (RPV NDTT or head tensioning limit, whichever is higher)3.

s C5-9 Proceed to cold shutdown in accordance with Eprocedure f or cooldown to cold shutdown conditions 3.

C5-1

Emergency Procedure Guidelines CONTINGENCY #6 RPV FLOODING C6-1 If at least C3 (Minimum Number of SRVs Required for -

Emergency Depressurization) 3 SRVs can be opened or if HPCS or motor driven f eedwater pumps are available f or i nj ec t i on , close the MSIVs, main steam line drain valves, C, ' '"C I , RCIC and RHR steam condensing isolation valves.

C6-2 If any control rod is not inserted to or beyond position CO6 (maximum subcritical banked withrawal position)3:

C6-2.1 Terminate and prevent all injection into the RPV except from boron injection systems and CRD until RPV pressure is below the Minimum Alternate RPV Flooding Pressure. .

,-  :  : Minimum Alternate RPV  :

' Number of open SRVs  : Flooding Pressure (psig):

4.  :----------------------:----------------3
C 7 or more  : +te \RO  :
es 3 a.it  :  :
[ 6 C5  : 445 3 ab2.  :  :

l

.:: C4 340 3'530 -

GSO 3 %%0  : 7

C3  :
[ . . 454 36.f.5  :  : .
430- 3 IW 2.%  :  :
[ 1 1

't.

J If less than [W (minimum number of SRVs for which the Minimum Alternate RPV Flooding Fressure is  !

- below the lowest SRV lif ting pressure) 3 SRVCs3 can

~

be opened, continue in this procedure.

1 r

I C6.-1

Emergency Procedure Guidelines I If while executing the f ollowing step, RPV water level I I can be determined and RPV Flooding is not required, I t enter Cprocedure developed from CONTINGENCY #73 and i I Cprocedure developed from the RPV Control Guideline 3 at i I CStep RC/P-43 and execute these procedures ! -

I concurrently. I C6-2.2 Commence and slowly increase injection into the RPV with the fo!!owing systems until at least C4 2.

(minimum number of SRVs for which the -

Minimum Alternate RPV Flooding Pressure is t #25 I below the lowest SRV lif ting pressure)3 ----

SRVCs3 are open and RPV pressure is above the i Minimum Alternate RPV Flooding Pressure:

a Motor driven feedwater ppmps ,

o Condensate pumps o CRD to LPCI3

2.
  • If.at least C4 (minimum number of SRVs for which 1 the Minimum Alternate RPV Flooding Pressure is below the lowest SRV lifting pressure)3 SRVCs3 are i not open or RPV pressure cannot be increased to
  • above the Minimum Alternate RPV Flooding Pressure,,

commence and slowly increase injection into the RPV with the f ollowing systems until at least Dt'l (minimum number of SRVs for which the Minimum Alternate RPV Flooding Pressure is below the lowest SRV lif ting pressure) 3 SRVCs3 are open and RPV t pressure is above the Minimum Alternate RPV Flooding Pressure:

l o HPCS o LPCS Co RHR service water crosstie 3 to Fire System 3 to Interconnections with other units 3 ECCS keep-full systems 3 to .

C6-2

  • t i

l J

Emergency Procedure Guidelines  !

I i

9 C4-2.3 Maintain at least Et (minimum number of SRVs f or  !

which the Minimum Alternate RPV Flooding Pressure '

is below the lowest SRV lif ting pressure)3 SRVCs3 open and RPV pressure above the Minimum Alternate RPV Flooding Pressure but as low as practicable by throttling injection. -

C4-2.4 When:

o All control rods are inserted to or beyond  %)

position CO6 (maximum suberitical banked withdrawal position)3, or o The reactor is shutdown and no baron has been injected into the RPV, continue in this procedure.

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C6-3

?

i i

Emergency Procedure Guidelines <

1 I

C&-3 If RPV water level cannot be determined: l Commence and increase injection into the RPV with C6-3.1 the following systems until at least C3 (Minimum 1

Number of SRVs Required f or Emergencyen and RPV pressure Depressurization)3 SRVs are sig (Minimum RPV ,

is not decreasing and is C7f  : )

Flooding Pressure)3 or more above suppression chamber pressure:

o HPCS o Motor driven feedwater pumps o LPCS o LPCI .

o Condensate pumps a CRD 3

((1 to RHR service water crosstie

' L. 3 to Fire System 3

to Interconnections with other units .

3 ECCS keep-full systems Co 3

to SLC (test tank) 3 Co SLC (boron tank)

C6-3.2 Maintain at least C3 (Minimum Number of SRVs Required for Emergency Depresgerization)3 SRVs open e psig (Minimum RPV and RPV pressure at least C7f Flooding Pressurel 3 above suppression chamber ,

pressure but as low.as practicable by throttling injection.

S

' C6-4

Emergency Procedure Guidelines C6-4 If RPV water level can be determined, commence and increase injection into the RPV with the following systems untti RPV water level is increasing:

o HPCS _

o Motor driven feedwater pumps o LPCS o LPCI o Condensate pumps o CRD

[o RHR service water crosstie 3 Fire System 3 to .

- Eo Interconnections with other units 3 ECCS keep-full systems 3 3 [o 3

to SLC (test tank) 3 to SLC (boron tank) & Q.f.%

L g Go 4t C6-5 If RPV water level cannot be determined: msbu.A g at C6-5.1 Continue injecting water into the RPV until

[ temperature near the cold reference leg instrument vertical runs 3 is below 212*F and RPV water level instrumentation is available.

!________________________________________________________l If while executing the following steps, RPV water leve  ! ,

can be determined, continue in this procedure at CStep !

C6-63.

C6-5.2 If it can be determined that th RPV i s fill ed or sig (Minimum RPV if RPV pressure is at least [ff Flooding Pressure) 3 above suppression chamber pressure, terminate all injection into the RPV and reduce RPV water level.

s C6-5

,,_4 -. __-...,_,___-_r __,__,___.,__,---__-,.-___-..m, -

Emergency Proceoure Guidelines C4-5.3 If RPV water level indication is not restored within the Maximum Core Uncovery Time Limit after

  • commencing termination of injection inte the RPV, return to CStep C6-33. 3,, g w& A N o.

I Maximum Core Uncov 30 + Time Limi I .

Core t 20 + .

Uncovery Time .

(min.)  ! .

10 + .

l .

l.

0+-------+--,---+--------+

1 min. 10 min. 1 hr. 10 hr.

Time After Reactor Shutdown 7"

C4-6 When suppression chamber pressure can be maintained below T/prih th: "-i c:-,- Crnt:i n :nt C::i;; * :::u , enter [ procedure developed f rom the RPV Control Guideline 3 at CSteps RC/L and RC/P-43 and execute these steps concurrently.

56 +......

. t .

I .

+ ..........

Suppression Chamber 1 im Containment Pressure I ign Pressure a

(psig) I t

0 +----+--------+------

- 0 '12.5 34.5 Primary Containment Water Level (f t. )

Cb-6

i 1 l LGA - G9 hrs. min. MAXIMUM CORE UNC0VERY TIME LIMIT min. hrs.

100 6000 x 6000 100

' s N

50 3000 N 3000 50

\

N 20 \ 20 1000 \ 1000

~

's 10 600 \ 600 10

\

300 T'

300

\

$ 1 I 8

g2 \g 2g 8

g 100 y 10 0 g I 60 g 60 1

< \ <

E \ E p 30 g 30 g

\

10 10 s -

6 [ 6 3 3

[

I I 40 30 20 10 0 1 MAX CORE UNC0VERY TIME (min.)

l i

i

~-. -. - . . - - . , . _ _ - _ , _ . . . . _ . - _ - ,- _ _ - - - - . . - - - . - - _ - - , , ,

Emergency Procedure Guidelines CONT 1NGENCY #7 LEVEL / POWER CONTROL .

I I I If while executing the f ollowing steps: I I IS I Io RPV water level cannot be determined, RPV FLOODING I REQUIREDI enter Cprocedure developed from CONTINGENCY fI a I #63. I I

i Io RPV Flooding is required, enter Cprocedure devel oped 1 I I f I from CONTINGENCY #63. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

C7-1 If:

5 o Reactor power is above t$*/. (APRM downscale trip)3 or cannot be determined, and '

tto* F o Suppression pool temperature is above Cthe Boron Injection Initiation Temperature 3, and 1 I I I Ser I 130 + 1 - etiian i 1...... nitiation i ion I Temperature J Suppe Pool 120 + .

Temperature .

(*F) I .

l ......... t

. . 110 +

t I I I t goo + _ _+___+___+___.+_ +___+ g l  !

i 0 1 2 3 4 5 Reactor Fowar (7.)  !

! e I

l

. o Either an RV is open or opens or drywell pressure is above C psig (high drywell pressure scram setpoint)3, lower RPV water level by terminating and preventing -----

all injection into the RPV except from boron I #26 I injection systems and CRD until either:

I

\

i C7-1 l

Emergency Procedure Guidelines o Reactor power drops below [ X (APRM downscale trip) 3, Dr

-luo o RPV water level reaches C-444 in. (Flow Stagnation Water Level)3, or

~

o All SRVs main closed and drywell pressure remains below C psig (high drywell pressure scram setpoint)3.

executing the following steps Emergency RPV i

! If while I Depressurization is required, continue in this procedure at !

I I CStep C7-2.13.

I I If while executing the fo11owing step: . ,

trip)3 or .

o Reactor power is above L X (APRM dowescale I I cannot be determinkd, and I

! -p is above C-+64 in. (Flow Stagnation i to RPV water level 8

! Water Level)3, and I j I tO* V I above Cthe Boron i Suppression pool temperature is Io i I Injection Initiation Temperature 3, and I

I pressure is t

! o Either gg SRV is opendrywell or opens or drywell I above [G94rpsig (high pressurs scram setpoint)3, fI f t ,

I return to CStep C7-13.

O 5

C7-2

l l

Emergency Procedure Guidelines f

I #9, #10, ett, #25 I C7-2 Maintain RPV water level either:

o If RPV water level was deliberately lowered in CStep C7-13, at the level to which it was lowered, or o o If .RPV water level was n $ deliberately lowered in i CStep C7-13, betwggg C+ in. (low level scram setpoint)3 and C M in. (high level trip setpoint)3, with the following systems:

to%

o Condensate /feedwater system'CHie - O psig (RPV pressure range f or system operation) 3 ten

- O CRD system Et+to - O psig (RPV pressure range for system operation 33 ~~

1o% S7 -

t 012 I o RCIC system C+444 - Se psig (RPV pressure - - - ,

range for system operation)3 tw = 2 . ret.- C;;;0 100 p;'s O.~.' pr;;; r; . ;r.;: fr ?

3 C  :;:t== ;:r:ti=r?3 24.0 3 to LPCI system CSS 6 - O psig (RPV pressure range for 3 C system operation)3 If RPV water level cagrjot be so mainssined, maintain RPV j

water level above C- W in. (top of active fue133 with .

l . these systems.

1.

(

l c l . .

l C7-7

Emergency Procedure Guidelines WI If RPV water level canr.ot be maintained above C-M4 in. i (top of active f uel) 3, EMERGENCY RPV DEPRESSURIZATION 15 REQUIRED

  • l C7-2.1 Terminate and prevent all injection into the RPV _

except from boron injection systems and CRD until RPV pressure is below the Minimum Alternate RPV i Flooding Pressure.

I Minimum Alternate RPV I .

I  !

t Number of open SRVs t Flooding Pressure (psig)I

!-----------------t------------ 110 3 lifo I I C 7 or more I. 1 t I ,

t 135 3 2 17 1 I ,

! C6 1 t

t .

I '

! C5 t l 165 3 242. t t C4 . I 210 3 330 t t t I I

290 3 440 t i

! E3 1 t

I t I

430 3 (= 8.5 t I I C2 t I I 870 3 1442.% i  :

1 C1 1

2. 8 If less than C&" (minimum number of SRVs f or which the M2nimum Alternate RPV Flooding Pressure is i below the lowest SRV lifting pressure)3 SRVCs3 can be opened, continue in this procedure.

C7-2.2 Commence and slowly increase injection into - - - -

the RPV with the following systems to i #25 I res ce and maintain RPV water level above e C- in. (top of active fuel)3:

o Condensate /feedwater system I e o CRD i,

o RCIC I

Co HPCI 3 Co LPCI 3 C7-4 l

Emergency Procedure Guidelines .

If RPV water level e not be restored and maintained above t- in. (top of active fuel)3, commence and slowly increase injection into the RPV with the following syste to restore and maintain RPV water level above t- in. (top of active fuel)3: .  ;

o HPCS o .LPCS ,

i to RHR service water crosstie 3 to Fire System 3 to Interconnections with other units 3 l'

to ECCS keep-f ull systems , 3

' If while executing the following step reactor power commences !

. I and continues to increase, return to CStep C7-13. I W% @ 9.b%

C7-3 When 02S+ prund: (Hot Shutdown Boron Weight) 3 of boron have _l l

l been injected or all control rods are inserted to or beyond y f position CO6 (maximum suberitical banked withdrawal poggion) 3, restore and maintain RPV water lyy,gt between C+& in. (Iow level scram setpoint)3 and C 6 in. (high .

level trip setpoint)3. _

If 'y water level cannot be restored and maintained above an. (Iow level scram setpoint)3, maintain RPV water

[+

level above t->dM in. (top of active fuel)3.

wi If RPV water level cannot be maintained above C-t*4 in.

(top of active fuel)3, EMERGENCY RPV DEPRESSURIZATION IS REQUIREDI return to CStep C7-2.13. g

! If Alternate Shutdown Cooling is required, anter I I

! Cprocedure developed from CONTINGENCY 953.

C7-4 When tprocedure for cooldown to cold shutdown conditions 3 is entered f rom [ procedure developed f rom the RPV Control Guideline 3 at (Step RC/P-53, proceed to cold shutdown in .

accordance with [ procedure f or cooldown to cold shutdown condi ti ons 3.

C7-5 l

l _

s e

ATTACHMENT A i

d i

l i

h i

A Since the Technical Spectittations permit MSIV toolation in hot standby, this should not require entry into the RPV Control Suldeline and a subse went scree per Step RC-II the entry condt-tien needs to be Itatted to isolations seich respaire a scree.

Resolved entry c edt-f-

tions deleted as it is no longer rewired eith Radte-activity Release Control kideline.

l e

B LSCS-UFSAR 4

s I

6.3.2.2.6 ECCS Pumps NPSil. , ,

The ECCS pump specifications are such that the NPSB requirements for EPCS, LPCS and LPCI are set with the containment at atmospheric pressure and the suppression pool at saturation temperature. The NPSB available and required for all pumps in the ECCS are shown in Figures 6.3-3, 6.3-6, and 6.3-9. Vendor i

tests on ECCS pumps show that I foot NPSB is required for the LPCS pump and 6 feet NPSE is required for the LPCI pumps. The IPCS pump requires 12.5 feet NPSB. Available NPSE is determined assuming suppression pool suction strainers are 50% clogged.

e 6

y

! e l

i e-1 l

l

196X6WDanOdDSWOn Suvut 4 3 8 d Ni M5d%

. . . R C i e e 2 i e a i g i i i d -

1 ~ w . .

I .=

dh 2g j

IE 'c e es- IX - -

e

  • 9 V

e W o

! .b ~ *

-t i

?

r 5

a a h

- p i

8 8

)......

2 S S S R R 2

, su oN3 cess 3 e l e i e e a e a e 800lxl133dNICv3M17101 LA S ALLE COUNTY ST ATION UPDATED FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT FIGURE 6.3-9 LPCI PUMP CHARACTERISTICS (SHEET 1 of 6)

REV. 0 - APRIL 1984

4004NlODanOW95%04 0vvE8 a 3Is Na m5dh

! 2 3 C2 : 2 . R 2 2 . e g i I 3 a 4 4 4 4 i i I e i t s n

Il

. :: = .

I Jon ag

- u= g,

  • E

<- IN '

m ti IR " '

= e V

sw h

O 1  :

. I m e E

E

= , i E

t E

S

t C

= n s

= n

= +

1 i f 1 I I I I I o 8 8 R 8 8 9 R R  ?

t%)J" N Jd3 e e _; h ., a _to t a y '

e e n o 6AlldNtOVEM19101 l

LA SALLE COUNTY STATION UPDATED FINAL' SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT i

FIGURE 6.3 6

, LPCS PUMP CHARACTERISTICS (SHEET 1 of 2) i REV. 0 - APRIL 1984

C .

It may eet be possible to restore CS er LPCS to the AUTonATIC/sTANDSY eode ashen the ECCS initiation signal clearsi the step needs to include the "14 possible* phrase f rom Caution 810.

Resolved cautien changed by deletion of rewire-ment to restore systees to to AUTurtATIC/5TAMDSY es thie may precipitate suboewent MPV levst contret problemol Caution #10 changed similarly.

C e

C MCIC turbine not systee $s throttled to maintain turbine speed above the etnimuel the tore systee needs to be

~

thenged to tur bine Resonved Caution thanged by substitution of turbine for system O

cd

D .

CAUTION etB continuous LPCI operation of any RHR pump is required to If assure adequate core cooling, do not divert that pump from the LPCI mode. .

DISCUSSION:

LPCI injection is not required to assure adecuate core If cooling. It is permissible to utt11:e FHR pumps for cther functions such as suppression pool cccling or containment

~

scrav.

If adequate core cooling recuires continuous LPCI However.

operation with a particular F.HP pump. at shculd not be divertec from the injection mode. Caution #18 provides the flenibility o8 using one PHR loop to inject into the RPV (LPCI mode) and the other RHP loops to operate in some other mode (e.g., suppression pool cooling) if single loop LPCI operation is sufficient tc, assure adequate core cooling.

" Continuous" as used in Caution #18 permits intermittment simul-of all RHR pumps in modes of operation other than taneous use e

adequate core cooling is not lost in the interim. B y-LPCI if of RHR operation. assuring adequate core alternating modes cooling and protecting containment integrity need not be mutually l exclusive.

t i

f L.

l l

l

\

1s applicable to steps of the EFGs where the RHR Caution e18 System is to be operated in a mode other than LFCI and contain-integrity is not immediately threatened. Where diverting ment RHR System from the LPCI mode is absclutely required to o the ,

protect containment integrity. the wording " irrespective of adequate core cooling" is included in the EFG step to specificells highlight the non-coplicabilltv cf Cauticn #18, O

e

(

p 6

d

  • e e

o

I E .

The present step could be accomplished by initiating only one of the listed f unctions /systeest a t needs to be rowded to require conf arsation or initiation of all functions /systees which should -

I have int tleted.

,- Resol ved atop changed by deletion of second sen-tence and substitution of "Inttiste each of the fol-3outng enh!ch shoutd have initiated but did pott' .

for first sentence.

e

i i

F Contingewy 97 should be entered eAenever baron has been injected snto the MeVI the entry condition needs to be empended ~

free 'Soron Injection is required" to "Soron Injection is resguired or has been inttleted."

t

/ Resel vee bones changed by addgtten of "a baron has been inf ected into into the frV*.

o

G __________ ___ ____ _ _________

STEP:

RC/L-3 When [ procedure f or cooldown to cold shutdown conditions 3 as entered from [ step F.C/P-53, _

proceed to cold shutdown in acccrdance with

[ procedure for cooldown to ccid sh.ttcwn conditions 3.

DISCUSSION:

Af ter RPV pressure nas been reduced to below the shutdown cooling interlocks and the shutdown cooling moce of RHR has been established, normal operating procedures provice the appropriate a, instructtons for continued control cf RPV water level while proceeding to cold shutdown conditions.

o d

m ,

O oo

  • 1-1 -

, 7.4.2 Doerator Actions (RC/P)

STEP: ,

RC/F Monitor and control F.FV pressure.

If while e::ecuting the f ollowing steps:  :

o Emergency FFV Depressurt:ation is -----

l l > anticipated and Boren Injection.is not  : #10 :  :

l required. rapidly depressuri:e the TU:1v' ~ ----- l with the main turbane bypass valves.

  • l DISCUSSION:

f ailure to ter minate and prevent injection into the RFV

( e n c er.t t rom borore 3 :ejet.t a ore s yst enis end CRD) may result an the eepic a nj ect i o.i. of 1erge volumes of rel ati vel y cold. unborated water trom low pressure systems as RFV pressure decre&ses and drops b el ow the shutoff he+cs of the pumps in these systems.

i bucle are occurrenct could da lute boron coricentret t ore end reduce water temper +t ur e in the cur e r egier., thereby adding suff2ctent siet posit 2ve reactavaty to anduce e yeector power encursson

~

which could deniege the core.

l

I Loss of the contanuous SRV pneumatte supply

  • limits the number of times-that an SRV can be

. cycled since pneumatic pressure as required

'for valve operation. Even though the SRV accumulators contain a reserve pneumatic supply, lesl age through in-line valves and fattings may deplete this supply. Thus, subsequent to the loss,cf the continuous SRV pneumatic supply. there is no assurance as to the number of SRV operating cycles remaining.

For these reasons, if SRVs must be used to augment RPV pressure control end if t h'e con-tinuous SRV pneumatic supply is or becomes unavai l abl e, the valve should be closed to Izmit the number of cycles on the valve and conserve pneumatic pressure so that if I

Emergency Depressurt:ation is subsequently [

required, the valve will be available for this purpose. If other pressure control systems are not capable of maintaining RPV pressure below the lowest SRV lif ting pressure, the SRV e will still open when its lifting pressure is ,

reached.

Nof.c ; Lohn h R Ts O.f f. hed i Wd he ress urise , 4.h Udi si \e M o P**J-i I

l i

l i

J .

. pied insertion criteria should be "..rede at er berend (M..=,

not ". .r ode beyond t oe. . =,

I phesolved alI references to red insertion criterie

  • thenged to "..at er beyond (M..".

i D

Af p\ .

STEP:

RC/O-4 If the reactor cannot be shutdown before ----

suppression pocl temperature reaches the  ! #19 :

Bo-en Injection Initsatzen Temperature, ---- -

BORON INJECTION 15 REQUIFED: inject beron into the RFV wl'h SLC and prevent automatic initiatton c4 kD5.

. . . Loron l'O + . Injection' Inst 1ation Sup;ressten  : . Temperatdre Fool 120 + .

Temperature  : ,

("F)  : .

110 + .......

10.:, .___.___.___.___.___.___.___.

0 1 2  !. 4 5 e 7 Reactor Fower ( *d )

DISCUSSION: ,

So long as the cere remains summerged (the pref erred metnec et adequate core cocling). fuel Integrity and RPV Integrity are not directly challenged even under scram failure conditions. A scram e

failure coupled with am MSIV isolation. hcwever. results an a rapid heatup of the suppression pool due to the steam energy discharged frem the RFV via the SFVs. The ch#11enge to contein-ment thus becomes the limiting factor which defines the require-ment for bcron injection.

If the suppression temperature enc FFV pressure cannot be re-stored and mainte1ned below the Heet Capacity Temperature Limit, e

Emergency RFV Depressurl:atten is required (Step SF.T-43 Tc evcad depressurizing the RPV with the reacter at pcwer. It 15 -

desirable to shut down the reactor through boron injection prior to reaching the Heat Capacity Temperature Lamat. Tne Eocen Injection Initiation Temperature as defined so es to echieve this when practicable.

AD5 Inatletion may result in the anjection c4 large sclumes c4 relettvely cold, uncoreted water fecm low pressure injection systems. With the reacter either critical or shutdcwn on solutle ron. the pcsttive reactivity additacn due to boron olluticn enc temperature r e.d u c t i on may result in e react or power e.. cur si cr.

leading to substantial core damage. Defeating ADS is therefere appropriate whenever Beren Injection is required.

Step RC/O-4 does not limit the operator to resetting the 4L5 i timer es was the limited acticn specified an Ster RC/L-Ot otner methods are to be employed here to permanently de4eet the auto-metic fusectioning of AD5 at leest as long as reactor shutdown is centingent upon in-core boren concentration.

The applicabillty of Caution #1C is indiceted et th15 step te

(

l preserve the SLC pumps should they subsequently be needed.

l

i l

I L .

The manual scree should be initiated only after t w M hae W e chance to drains the step needs to reflect this matting period.

Reselved changed ete, te read " Brain the scree dio- -

charge volume and initiate a manual reactor scrael" util-Att es to discuss proposed l

change with operators and pre-pare f or discueelon at nest e EPC aceting.

l Resolved 3/10/S48 etop changed as proposed.

l I

l STEP:

SF/T-4 If suppression pool temperature cannot be maintained below the Heat Capacity  : # 8 i ~

Temperature L1 mat, maintain RFV pressure  : #13 :

below the Limiti enter (procedure  ! #14 i developed froni the RFV Control Guideline 3 at [ Step RC-13 and enecute at concurrently with this procedure.

m, 4

,._..u.....,._, g t

e e e au w. .

s' - w ,

! olscuss10N:

Continued heatup cf the suppression pool may ultimately result in exceeding pri mar y containment design temperature limits or in c:

reducing suppression pool heat capacity below that required to assure stable steam condensation. The Heat Capacity Temperature Limit (HCTL) defines the operating regame wh1ch assures continued operation within these limits. Exceeding primary containment design temperature limits may result in containment failure due

i l

to excessive thermal loads on the containment shell or to failure

, of equipment located within the containment. Unstable steam condensation produces e>:tremely high dynamic pressure loads on the containment she11 and submeged structures, generally -

resulting in f ailure of the containment and loss of the containment function. Step SP/T-4 specifies the action required to adequetely address these concerns.

If the actions performed under Steps SP/T-1. SP/T-2, and SP/T-3 ,

are ansufficient to maintain suppression pool temperature below HCTL, control of the other parameter, RPV pressure, is the effected through entry into the RPV Control Guideline and

{ of the P.PV pressure control steps specified therein.

execution The instruction specif y1ng entry into the RPV Control Guideline is enplicitly stated here because conditions requiring entry into the Primary Containment Control Guideline do not necessarily also require entry into the RPV Control Guideline. Entry at Step RC ' concurrent control of the three interrelated RPV assures parameters (RPV water *1evel, RPV pressure, and reactor power).

Caution #8 a s identified as being applicable at this step because e of the relationship between high suppression pool temperature and pump NPSH.

  1. 13 is identified as being applicable at this step to Caution highlight the possibility that the rate of RPV pressure reduction

required to remain below the Heat Capacity Temperature Lamat may result in er.ceeding the Technical Specification limit for cooldown rate.

Caution #14 is identified es being applicable at this step to assur e th et proper consideration is given to maintaining adequate core cooling. .

[

k O

l l

D l-

STEP:

SP/T-4 .

If suppression pool temperature and RFV pressure cannot be restored and maintained below the Heat Capacity Temperature Limit, EMERGENCY FFV DEPRES-SURIZATION IS REOUIRED.

DISCUSSION:

Once it is concluded that the precedang actions are insufficient to restore and maintain suppression pool temperature and RFV

' pressure below the HCTL, depres'surization of the RPV is manually snitiated while the heat capacity of the suppression pool remains sufficient to safely accommodate the blowdown. As, discussed earlier, the consequences of not depressurt:ing the RPV when required may include f ailure of equipment important to safety,,

loss of containment integrity, loss of the pressure suppression function of the primary contaanment, and loss of the water supply to the ECCS pumps, all of which may also lead to inadequate core cocling.

-- - , ._. --.--._..____._,__,,,,_y.

1

. O.

STEP: -

! -------------------------------------------------------1 If while executing the f ollowing steps suppressien poc m l

l spravs have been initiated, when suppression chamber :

pressure drops'below 0 psig, terminate suppression poc! !
sprays.

DISCUSSION:

suppression pool sprays have been initiated. convective Once its cocling may gr adual l y depressuri:e the containment to below pressure even though containment pressure was design negative above the Mark III Containment Scray Initiation Pressure Limit This is the result of the event-when sprays were initiated.

specific criteria employed to sice the atmosphere-to-containment vacuum breal.er s , if any. Terminating suppression pool sprays suppression chamber pressure drops below 0 pstg terminates-when before the design negative pressure as the depressurt:stion e.;ceeded. -

i I

l C

t I

f l

l

{

l l

10.2 Ettict, The entry condition for this guideline is:

o Of f site radioactivity release rate above the of f site release rate which requires an Alert.

DISCUSSIDN: -

The entry condition f or the Radioactivity Release Control Guide-line directly relates to the purpose of the guideline and pro-vides the vehicle for coordinated execution of emergency operating procedures and the emergency plan. The specific value selected for this entry condition corresponds directly to an action level in the emergency plan. It is 'sufficiently high that it is not expected to occur during normal operation but sufficiently low that, of and by itself, it does not threaten the, health and safety of the public.

c

i STEP:

RR-2 If offsite radioactivity release rate approaches or exceeds the offsite release rate which requires a General Emergency -

and a primary System is discharging into an area outside i the primary and secondary containments, EMERGENCY RPV DEPRESSUR12ATION IS REQUIREDI enter Cprocedure developed from the RPV Control Guideline 3 at CStep RC-13 and execute it concurrently with this procedure.

DISCUSSIDN:

Depressurizing the RFV immediately reduces the driving head and flow from primary systems that are discharging outside the primary and secondary containments.

The instruction to enter the RPV Control Guideline provides the mechanism by which Contangency #2 (Emergency RPV Depressuriza-tion) as reached. Refer to Section 7.4 for a discussion regarding entry to Contingency #2 f rom the RFV Control Guideline.

Entry at Step RC-1 ensures that a reactor scram is initiated and ,

assures concurrent control of the three interrelated RFV parameters (RPV water level, RPV pressure, and reactor power). e O

9

R .

The bom f ollossing the table should precede it (or else

'following" should be changed to " preceding *3 and should include the step recgutring prevention of automatic initiation of AOS.

mesolved hem moved to I precede stop C1-38 bem in- ~

cludes step reepatring prevention of automatic inttletten of AOd.

c

S STEP: .

l If RPV Flooding a s required, enter (procedure developed I

+ rom CONTINGENCY #63. I, _

~

CO-O Enter Eprocedur e developed 4 rom the RFV Control busdeline3 et L5tep RC/F-33.

DISCUSSION:

Watn FFV depres sura::stion compl ete, Contirigency #2 is e::ited. If plant c ondi t t ores eusst which require RFV Flooding (entry to C,ont a nger cy #2 w+s t equi red af FFV Floodirig was required and the r iu n.b er of op er e SFVs wek twsk there the reun ber of SRVs dedaceted to ADS). turther t ristr ucti ores, + or RFV pr essur e contr ol are specified ise Cont a reuefie v #e. Otherwise, tiee RPV pr essur e control steps of ,

tiew RF v Constr ol Gu a del i ne, prov1de the oppropr1+te instr uctions f or cor ll eius tig cositrol of RFV pressure.

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The lenguage in the first bon ref ers to the "the f ollousing steps," but there le only one stop in this contingencyl this lenguage needs to be changed to "this step."

gio ,elved * . changed as propened+

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AlI ether pumps lescapt 040 and heren inJectien systsee (733 shouta be secured prier to thie stop.

Resolved new step CS-S edded.

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. STEP:

C6-2 If any control rod is not inserted beyond position CO6 (maximum suberitical banked withrawal position)3: ,

C6-2.1 Terminate and prevent all injection into the RPV except from boron injection systems and CRD until t RPV pressure is below the Minimum Alternate RPV Flooding Fressure.

!  : Minimum Alternate RPV  !

Number of open SRVs t Flooding Fressure (psig) I i  ! I t----------------__--_-:---_---_------_------_-----:

t C 7 or more i 110 3

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i 135 3  : l 1 C6 I  :  !

165 3  :

I C5  !

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! 210 3  !

! t4

! I i i I3  : 280 3 1

I i 430 3  :

I C2

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I t I 1  ! B70 3 I If less than C1 (minimum number of SRVs f or which -

the Minimum Alternate RPV Flooding Pressure is .

below the lowest SRV lifting pressure)3 SRVCs3 can -

be opened, continue in this procedure.

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DISCUSSION:

If any control rod is not inserted'beyond the Maximum Subcritical Banted Withdrawal Position, the reactor may become critical the flooding evolution. The consequences of a return to during

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f criticality during plant cooldown are generally manageable but

. here, where the-cooldown may be very rapid and the criticality may occur with the.RPV solid, these consequences could include signifacant damage to both the core and the RPV. Thus RPV flooding under these conditions must be accomplished in a manner which carefully controls the rate at which positive reactivity is added to the core.

Peiere the RPV is flooded it should, if at all possible, be depressuri:ed. Thas increases the number of systems which mey be used for flooding,and decreases the pressure at which the SRV.

and associated discharge piping must accommodate the flow of two-phase and subcooled water. Howsver, a rapid depressori:ation of the RFV may result in the rapid injection. of large volumes of rel ati vel y cold, unborated water f rom low pressure injection systems as RPV prekture decreases and drops below the' shutoff heads of the pur..ps in these systems. Thus all injection into the ~

RPV must be terminated and prevented price' to commencing,.the -

rapid depressuri:ations this sequence of actions is speciited by l .

this step in conjunction with Step C2-1 of Contingency #2 (Emer-gency RFV Depressuri:ation). Injection froF boron injection systems and CFD as not terminated here because boron injection systems add negative reactivity and CRD is re, quired to manually I

insert control rods.

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So long as RPV pressure remains above the Minimum Alternate RPV Flooding Pressure, the core is adequately cooled by a c'ombination of submergence and steam cooling irrespective of whether any water is being injected into the RPV. This is so because the -

Minimum Alternate RPV Flooding Pressure is defined f or a given number of open SRVs to be the lowest RPV pressure at which steam flow up through,a completely uncovered core and out the SRVs can adequately cool the core by heat transfer to the steam alone. Of course if this steam flow e>:ists and the core is also partially submerged. which would be necessary to maintain this steam flow and a constant RPV pressure, the entire core is that

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  • much cooler. .

4 Once RPV pressure drops below the Minimum Alternate RPV Flooding Pressure, the rate of depressuri:ation is small and injection into the RPV must be re-established in order to adequately ccol the core and ultimately flood the RPV. If less than the minimum number of SRVs for which the Minimum Alternate RPV Flooding Pressure is below the lowest SRV lif ting pressure can be opened, then injection into the RPV must be re-established without delay d

for the same reasons.

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STEP:

C6-0.3 Maintain at least [1 (minimum number of SRVs for which the Minimum Alternate RPV Flooding Fressure _

is below tl.e lowest SRV lifting pressure)3 SRV[s3 open and RPV pressure above the Minimum Alternate RPV Flooding Fressure but as low as practicable by throttling injection.

DISCUSSION:

l As discussed under Step C6-0.0, throttling injection to maintain RFV pressure above the Minimum Alternate RFV Flooding Pressure

, assures that either the RPV will flood to the main steam lines or, if the reactor returns to criticality, the core will be ade qua t el y cool ed by a combination of submergence and steam cooling. RPV pressure should be maintained above the Mintmum Fressure but as low as practicable to minimize the flooding rate and accompanying thermal and hydraulic 1 cads on the RPV as well as the dilution of any boron in the core region.

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O STEP:

C6-0 If RPV water level cannot be determined:

C6-3.1 Commence and increase injection into the RPV with the following systems until at least E3 (Minimum Number of SRVs Required for Emergency Depres-surization) 3 SRVs are open and RPV pressure is not decreasing and is C77 psig (Minimum RPV Flooding Pressure)3 or more above suppression chamber pressure.

o HPCS o Motor driven feedwater pumps o LPCS gr- LPCI f

o Condensate pumps o CRD

[o RHR service water crosstie 3 to Fire System 3

[o Interconnections with other units 3 -

to ECCS keep-full systems 3 to SLC (test tank) 3

[o SLC (boron tank) 3

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DISCUSSION: .

If RPV water level can be determined, Step C6-4 specifies the l

l appropriate actions for RPV flooding and Step C6-0 is bypassed.

For plant conditions where RPV water level cannot be determined,

  • RPV pressure indication is utili:ed to confirm that sufficient water is being injected into the RPV to flood it. The Minimum RPV Flooding Pressure is defined to be the lowest differential pressure between the RPV and the suppression chamber (and thus across the open SRVs) at which steam flow through the Minimum Number of SRVs Required for Emergency Depressuri:ation is sufficient to remove all decay heat generated within the core with no steam superheat (i.e., by boiling heat transfer alonel.

The decay heat generation rate used in mating the determination of this Minimum Fressure is that which corresponds to core condi-tions ten minutes after a scram from full power. Since ten minutes is the earliest RPV Flooding could reasonably be expected to be required, establishing and mainteining R?V pressure above the Minimum RPV Flooding Pressure assures that more than enough steam flown through the SRVs to carry away all core decay heat.-

This in turn requires that more than enough water to carry away decay heat by boiling reaches the core, and this requires that -

RPV water level increases. Maintaining this Minimum Pressure (and thus steam flow) thereby assures that the RPV will e ultimately flood to the main steam lines.

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r-e Therefore, three conditions must be satisfied to verify RPV Flooding without direct indication of RPV water level:

1. RPV pressure must be greater than suppression chamber ,

pressure by at least the Minimum F.PV Flooding Fressure.

This ensures more than enough steam is flowing through the SRVs to remove all decay heat.

2. RPV pressure must not be decreasing. This ensures that the requisite steam flow will be maintained.
3. At least the Minimum Number of SRVs Required for Emer-f gency Depressuri:ation must be open. This ensures that the requisite steam flow will eaist when the RPV is above the Minimum RPV Flooding Pressure.

This step requires that injection into the RPV be increased until .

all three of the above conditions are satisfied.

The list of injection systems identified in Step C6-3.1 contains all of the motor-driven systems which may be used f or injection snto the RPV. As many of these systems as necessary should be e used to establish and maintain the three conditions required for verification of RPV Flooding.

l 17.3 Doerator Actions STEP:

If while executing the f ollowing steps:  :

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o RPV water level cannot be determined. RPV FLOODING IS :
REQUIRED: enter [ procedure developed from CONTINGENCY #63. :

! o RPV Flooding i s required, enter [ procedure developed from :

. CONTINGENCY #63.  :

DISCUSSION:

The actions specified in Contingency #7 require the ability to determine RPV water l evel . When RPV water level cannot be deter-eined. RPV Flooding is required to assure continued adequate core cool i ng . RPV Flooding is also required for the plant conditions listed in Table 16-1 in Section 16. If RPV Flooding is required,-

the appropriate steps to accomplish this evolution are contained an Contingency #6.

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The means by which RPV water level is deliberately lowered is the

. termination and prevention of injection into the RPV. With the reactor at power, coolant inventory is lost by steam flow through

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one or more open SRVs (or through a break). If the inventory loss is not made up. RPV water level will decrease by boiloff.

Injection f rom boron injection systems and CRD is not terminated here because boron injection systems add negative reactivity and CRD is required to manually insert control rods. Further, the flow rates from these systems are small compared to the boiloff rate with the reactor at power.

RPV water level is allowed to continue to decrease until either:

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1. The suppression pool heatup is terminated or reduced to near that which results from absorption of decay heat, or
2. RPV water level has decreased to the Flow Stagnation ~

Water Level, defined to be the higher of either the top of the active fuel or the elevation at which natural ,

circulation flow in the RPV stagnates.

If the suppression pool heatup i s terminated or reduced to near that which results f rom the absorption of decay heat, as in-dscated by reactor power below the APRM downscale trip setpoint or the combination of all SRVs closed and drywell pressure below the high drywell pressure scram setpoint, the potential for ee

l The portson of the stop which directs the operator to maintain MPV water level above tar needs to restrict him to the use of the I

systems 18 sted earlier in this step.

Resolved step ChangeMS by addition of *mith the*e s y s t.ses. "

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