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CCN 9314149 PHILADELPIIIA ELECTRIC COMPANY e.8% ode PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION R.D.1. Box 208 g Delta, Pennsylvania 17314 GARREIT D. EDWARDS (717) 456-4244 runwwn October 22, 1993 Docket Nos. 50-277 50-278 License Nos. DPR-44 DPR-56 Document Cnntrol Desk U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 | |||
==SUBJECT:== | |||
Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station - Unit 2 & 3 Special Report for a Valid Failure of the E-2 Emergency Dies 91 Generator on 10/12/93 | |||
==REFERENCE:== | |||
Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Technical Specification (Tech Spec) 4.9.A.1.2.L and M This Special Report is submitted pursuant to the requirements of Tech Spec 4.9.A.1.2.M. | |||
This Surveillance Requirement requires reporting of all Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) failures, valid or non valid, within 30 days. This report is required to include the information recommended in Regulatory Position C.3.b of Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.108 Periodic Testing of Diesel Generator Units as Onsite Electric Power System at Nuclear ! | |||
Power Plants", Revision 1, August 1977. | |||
On 10/12/93 at 0116 hours with Unit 2 at approximately 72% power and Unit 3 shutdown for a refueling outage, a fuel oil filter high differential pressure alarm was received during the performance of a monthly Routine Test (RT)-O-52-202-2 *E2 DIESEL GENERATOR SLOW START". The E-2 EDG was shutdown and at 0155 hours, the Nuclear Plant Operator swapped to the other fuel oil filter. The EDG was re-started and loaded but the high pressure alarm condition annunciated again. The EDG was shutdown and | |||
, troubleshooting was immediately conducted to determine the cause of the high differential pressure condition. The E-2 EDG was declared inoperable. | |||
26008a 9310270142 931022 PDR S | |||
ADoCK 0500o277 PDR s[ | |||
La )AF l | |||
o ij. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 E-2 EDG fuel oil filters were replaced and the EDG fuel oil pump was run to prime the filters and lines. The E-2 EDG was successfully tested and returned to an operable status at approximately 1100 hours. The cause of the high fuel oil differential pressure condition on the E-2 EDG has not been determined yet. The filters have been sent off site for ; | |||
failure analysis and corrective actions will be implemented as appropriate pending the ; | |||
results of the analysis. The fuel oil filter pressures were verified to be satisfactory on the other EDGs during diesel operation following discovery of the event. Considering the ; | |||
EDG inoperable is based on a review of the Electrical Loading Studies for this EDG which could not guarantee that the EDG would maintain the maximum design bases loads as specified in the SAR. [ | |||
The E-2 EDG failure was classified as a valid failure using the guidance of RG 1.108, ; | |||
Revision 1,1977. Because this occurrence was classified as a valid failure and was the ! | |||
second valid failure in the last 20 valid tests, the current surveillance testing interval will be reduced to once per 7 days which is in conformance with Tech Spec 4.9.A.1.2.L l During the course of this event, the E-2 EDG was available but considered administratively inoperable. When the EDG was available but administratively inoperable, it would have ; | |||
started if an initiation signal occurred. However, if a design bases Loss of Coolant Accident / Loss of Offsite Power condition occurred with the high fuel oil filter differential pressure condition, the E-2 EDG may not have been able to maintain the necessary electrical parameters as described in the SAR. The remaining EDGs were operable and would have provided adequate AC power to safety related loads in the event of an actual loss of offsite power. | |||
If you have any questions or require additional information, please do not hesitate to contact us. : | |||
i Sincerely | |||
/ ,, k cc: R. A. Burricelli, Public Service Electric & as W. P. Dornsife, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania T. T. Martin, US NRC, Region i R. I. McLean, State of Maryland W. L. Schmidt, US NRC Senior Resident inspector ! | |||
H. C. Schwemm, Atlantic Electric C. D. Schaefer, Delmarva Power I | |||
l l}} | |||
Latest revision as of 03:54, 1 April 2020
| ML20059A827 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Peach Bottom  |
| Issue date: | 10/22/1993 |
| From: | Geoffrey Edwards PECO ENERGY CO., (FORMERLY PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| CCN-9314149, NUDOCS 9310270142 | |
| Download: ML20059A827 (2) | |
Text
_ _ _ _ _ _
CCN 9314149 PHILADELPIIIA ELECTRIC COMPANY e.8% ode PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION R.D.1. Box 208 g Delta, Pennsylvania 17314 GARREIT D. EDWARDS (717) 456-4244 runwwn October 22, 1993 Docket Nos. 50-277 50-278 License Nos. DPR-44 DPR-56 Document Cnntrol Desk U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555
SUBJECT:
Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station - Unit 2 & 3 Special Report for a Valid Failure of the E-2 Emergency Dies 91 Generator on 10/12/93
REFERENCE:
Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Technical Specification (Tech Spec) 4.9.A.1.2.L and M This Special Report is submitted pursuant to the requirements of Tech Spec 4.9.A.1.2.M.
This Surveillance Requirement requires reporting of all Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) failures, valid or non valid, within 30 days. This report is required to include the information recommended in Regulatory Position C.3.b of Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.108 Periodic Testing of Diesel Generator Units as Onsite Electric Power System at Nuclear !
Power Plants", Revision 1, August 1977.
On 10/12/93 at 0116 hours0.00134 days <br />0.0322 hours <br />1.917989e-4 weeks <br />4.4138e-5 months <br /> with Unit 2 at approximately 72% power and Unit 3 shutdown for a refueling outage, a fuel oil filter high differential pressure alarm was received during the performance of a monthly Routine Test (RT)-O-52-202-2 *E2 DIESEL GENERATOR SLOW START". The E-2 EDG was shutdown and at 0155 hours0.00179 days <br />0.0431 hours <br />2.562831e-4 weeks <br />5.89775e-5 months <br />, the Nuclear Plant Operator swapped to the other fuel oil filter. The EDG was re-started and loaded but the high pressure alarm condition annunciated again. The EDG was shutdown and
, troubleshooting was immediately conducted to determine the cause of the high differential pressure condition. The E-2 EDG was declared inoperable.
26008a 9310270142 931022 PDR S
ADoCK 0500o277 PDR s[
La )AF l
o ij. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 E-2 EDG fuel oil filters were replaced and the EDG fuel oil pump was run to prime the filters and lines. The E-2 EDG was successfully tested and returned to an operable status at approximately 1100 hours0.0127 days <br />0.306 hours <br />0.00182 weeks <br />4.1855e-4 months <br />. The cause of the high fuel oil differential pressure condition on the E-2 EDG has not been determined yet. The filters have been sent off site for ;
failure analysis and corrective actions will be implemented as appropriate pending the ;
results of the analysis. The fuel oil filter pressures were verified to be satisfactory on the other EDGs during diesel operation following discovery of the event. Considering the ;
EDG inoperable is based on a review of the Electrical Loading Studies for this EDG which could not guarantee that the EDG would maintain the maximum design bases loads as specified in the SAR. [
The E-2 EDG failure was classified as a valid failure using the guidance of RG 1.108, ;
Revision 1,1977. Because this occurrence was classified as a valid failure and was the !
second valid failure in the last 20 valid tests, the current surveillance testing interval will be reduced to once per 7 days which is in conformance with Tech Spec 4.9.A.1.2.L l During the course of this event, the E-2 EDG was available but considered administratively inoperable. When the EDG was available but administratively inoperable, it would have ;
started if an initiation signal occurred. However, if a design bases Loss of Coolant Accident / Loss of Offsite Power condition occurred with the high fuel oil filter differential pressure condition, the E-2 EDG may not have been able to maintain the necessary electrical parameters as described in the SAR. The remaining EDGs were operable and would have provided adequate AC power to safety related loads in the event of an actual loss of offsite power.
If you have any questions or require additional information, please do not hesitate to contact us. :
i Sincerely
/ ,, k cc: R. A. Burricelli, Public Service Electric & as W. P. Dornsife, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania T. T. Martin, US NRC, Region i R. I. McLean, State of Maryland W. L. Schmidt, US NRC Senior Resident inspector !
H. C. Schwemm, Atlantic Electric C. D. Schaefer, Delmarva Power I
l l