ML20235B857

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Application for Amend 9 to Cp,Answering Questions Set Forth in AEC to Util
ML20235B857
Person / Time
Site: 05000000, Bodega Bay
Issue date: 09/16/1964
From: Crane P, Sibley S
PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20234A767 List: ... further results
References
FOIA-85-665 NUDOCS 8709240256
Download: ML20235B857 (13)
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PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMP, DOCKET NO. 50-205 @{ *pM I'bs BODEGA BAY ATOMIC PANK)y 0 %?lJP'

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'y BEFORE THE UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION 1

l In the Matter of PACIFIC GAS Docket No. 50-205 AND ELECTRIC .COMPAN'l Amendment No. 9 l

l Now comes PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY (the Company) and amends its above-numbered application by sub-mitting herewith Amendment No. 9 This amendment is filed to answer the questions set forth in the Commission's letter to the Company dated August 26, 1964.

Question 1.

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l - The amendment states on gage 24 that

! "a detailed dynamic analysis will be made for certain vital pieces of equipment. The acceleration to be used for this analysis should be described fully. Although it is recognized that, as discussed in the amendment, the layer of sand beneath the reactor building would affect the transmission of horizontal forces to its base, various considerations suggest that the design of equipment vital to safety inside the reactor build-ing should, nevertheless, take into account accelera-tions of the maximum intensity postulated in my letter to you of July 8, 1964. On this basis, a motion of the base of the reactor building having maximum transient horizontal components corresponding to a maximum tran-sient acceleration of Ig, a maximum transient velocity I of 2-1/2 ft/sec and a maximum transient displacement of 3 ft, and vertical maxima of 2/3 of the preceding should be considered. With regard to the analysis of vital equipment, your response should indicate what ,

margins against failure to function properly would I exist in this equipment at various levels of accelera-tion up to 1.0g, especially for those items of equipment

- for which factors other than yielding, fracture, or structural failure acceleration, etc.) govern (e.g. clearance, displacement, l

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l For purposes of exposition it will be assumed that l-the base of the reactor structure experiences Ground motion more intense than that corresponding to the design spectrum 4, (33% g at zero period - see Amendment 8, Figure 1) without shearing in the sand layer. The design of the reactor struc-ture and the critical equipment and systems will be such that for the design spectrum the stresses would not exceed ordinary allowable working stresses. For double the design spectrum the stresses would not exceed yield point stresses (real or nominal) with the possible exception of some reactor system components which would, nevertheless, remain operable. For triple the design spectrum the stresses would be only slightly greater than for double the design spectrum and the maximum

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strain and displacement would be approximately 50% larger.

Displacement and strain of this magnitude would not produce collapse but might produce permanent strain. The precise nature of this permanent strain vould depend upon the type of material and the size and shape of.the equipment and systems, and it can be computed only after the equipment and systems have been designed and the size of all the component members specified. In general, those systems and items of equipment whose failure to function depends on structural failure would not be impaired by maximum strains and dis-placements that are 50% greater than the yield point strains and displacements.

For the reactor vessel, reactor internals and other 2

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critical reactor system equipment, the design will be checked to assure that this equipment will be capable of withstanding the earthquake acceleration conditions described in Question 1 above without failure or impairment of functions necessary for 1

reactor scram and shutdown. For example, preliminary analysis  !

of the control rod drive mechanisms indicates that the margin against failure to operate properly, considering the drive mechanisms alone, is approximately a factor of 20. That is, the frictional forces in a drive subjected to 1.0 g horizontal acceleration would be about 1/20th of the force available to insert the drive under scram conditions. Tests of control rod driveandbladeassemblieNsimilartothoseplannedforBodega "N Bay have shown that misalignments as great as 5/8 inch between

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the drive and core structure which guides the blade will not impair the ability of the drive to scram the blade. The re-actor internal structures will be designed to limit potential misalignments under earthquake conditions to a fraction of this amount and a Bodega Bay drive and blade assembly will be tested to assure the ability of the drive to scram under misalignment conditions greater than could occur under 1.0 g acceleration earthquake conditions.

Similarly, other equipment with a critical function during or following an earthquake will be analyzed to assure that its function is preserved for accelerations of up to 1.0 g taking into account the possibility of failure from 3

,' either structural or other causes, including clearance, 3

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. l, 'l displacement and acceleration.

As stated in Amendment 8, in those cases where a de-tailed vibration analysis will be made using the time history of the motions, the system under consideration will be repre- l sented by an equivalent lumped mass system whose response will be calculated by means of a digital computer. The input to the computer will be the suitably digitized ground accelera-tions recorded at El Centro 18 May 1940. To assure consistency between the lumped mass analysis and the modal analysis using the design spectrum, it will be verified that the value of the l

response spectrum of the digitized input will not be less than the value of the design spectrum for period and damping cor-S responding to those of the system under consideration.

2 In short, the Company's proposed design criteria for 1

critical structures, equipment and systems, which is based on the design spectrum and working stresses as detailed in the reply to Question 4 of Amendment No. 8, contains substantial margins of safety against failure and provides for containment and safe Plant shutdown in the event of earthquakes with ground accelerations up to 1.0 g (three times the design spectrum shown in Figure 1 of Amendment No. 8). However, neither the Company nor its consultants accept as credible the postulate of an j earthquake in the rock at Bodega Head whose ground acceleration would exceed 0.33 g, and they have previously presented their reasons for the conservativeness of this figure. In further support of this view, appended hereto as Appendix I is a paper 4

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n prepared by Dr. George W. Housner for the Third World Conference ,

on Earthquake Engineering to be held in New Zealand during 1 January-February 1965, in which an analytical study indicates that

". . . [ajn upper bound is indicated for the maximum acceleration during the ground motion on firm, deep alluvium of 50% g, and on rock of 25% g."

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In an unpublished report to tne Chief Engineer, Department of Water Resources of the State of California, dated November 19, .

1962, the Department of Water Resources Consulting Board for Earthquake Analysis, composed of Hugo Benioff, Chairman, George W. Housner, H. Bolton Seed, and Nathan D. Whitman, made the .

3 following recommendation:

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"on the basis of the foregoing, it would be reasonable to take for a large earthquake on the San Andreas fault a horizontal ground shaking that has in the vicinity of the fault a maximum acceleration of 50% g and a duration of 60 seconds. . ."

"The foregoing specification of ground shaking is for sites founded on relatively deep alluvium and for periods up to about 4 seconds. For sites founded on good rock the intensity of ground shaking used for design may be reduced, but each site should be considered a special case and reduction should be applied with caution. . ." ,

The answer to Question 4 in Amendment No. 8 to this application sets forth in detail the special consideration given by Dr.

George W. Housner in establishing the design criteria for the Plant.

Further support for this position is contained in a s

paper appended hereto as Appendix II entitled " Maximum 5

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Accelerations During Earthquakes", which was prepared by William K. Cloud, Chief, Seismological Field Survey, Coast and Geodetic Survey, U. S. Department of Commerce, and presented at the Con-ference on Seismology and Earthquake Engineering in Santiago, Chile, July 1963, in which the author concludes in part as follows:

"While the Survey has recorded maximum horizontal accelerations of approximately 35% of gravity with duration of strong motion lasting approximately 30 seconds, the data can be considered to indicate maxima only for earthquakes up to magnitude 7.1."

"For earthquakes of greater magnitude many estimates have been made, but to the author, those in the range of 50% of gravity for maximum acceleration and of 60 seconds for ns duration seem most likely for' engineering

_/ use. Should higher accelerations actually occur, it seems likely that they would be associated with such extremely small dis-placements as to cause little damage except to very brittle structures."

Question 2..

The design of vital piping connections to the reactor building, including the main steam piping, involves the dual requirement of flexibility to resist relative motions corresponding to a fault motion of up to 3 feet, and strength to resist the forces accompanying the dynamic response to the earthquake vibration. It has not been clearly shown in the amendment how the conflict-ing design requirements for these two sources of strain will be achieved. What methods are proposed to be used to avoid overstress in the piping, or if yielding is to be permitted, what significance will the yielding have on the performance of the piping, any isolation or other

, valves in the piping, the pipe anchors, and other features of the piping design.

s What arrangements will be made to prevent shearing or other failure of the main steam piping and 6

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-c i L other vital connections to the reactor building caused by l the. fault motion, specifically by. contact of concrete walls, rock, earth, etc. against the piping in the course of either '

-the fault motion or the earthquake vibration.

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i The preliminary design' of certain of the vital piping I J

systems to the reactor building, including the main steam line, assures that a practical design can be developed to protect the ,

piping against failure from both a 3-foot displacement through the site and the dynamic response resulting'from the accelera- )

tions postulated in_ Question 1 above. In the case of the main steam line, the adequacy of the design will be assured by:

(1) the ' inherent flexibility of the piping configuration; (2) the use of anchors at the containment penetration to limit stress on the penetration and isolation valves; (3) the use of- '

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-- both standard piping supports and special supports (such as long-travel shock suppressors); (4) the spacing of supports in the area of relative motion of the buildings so as to distribute the strain along a long length 'of piping; (5) the consideration of incorporating additional damping in the system; (6) the ac-ceptance of yielding in piping bends and elbows to limit stresses in straight runs. These features aid in limiting stresses in the piping.

For fault movement in the plane of the piping system yielding would occur at some piping bends and elbows. For fault ,

1 movement normal to the plane of the piping system strain would b'e distributed over the relatively long straight run of pipe ,

l between the reactor building and turbine generator. Yielding

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2 other vital connections to the reactor building caused by the fault motion, specifically by contact of concrete walls, rock, earth, etc. against the piping in the course of either the fault motion or the earthquake vibration.

The preliminary design of certain of the vital piping systems to the reactor building, including the main steam line, assures that a practical design can be developed to protect the piping against failure from both a 3-foot displacement through the site and the dynamic response resulting from the acce:. era-tions postulated in Question 1 above. In the case of the main steam line, the adequacy of the design will be assured by:

(1) the inherent flexibility of the piping configuration; (2) the use of anchors at.the containment penetration to limit stress on the penetration and isolation valves; (3) the use of m '

both standard piping supports and special supports (such as long-travel shock suppressors); (4) the spacing of supports in the area of relative motion of the buildings so as to distribute the strain along a long length of piping; (5) the consideration of incorporating additional damping in the system; (6) the ac-ceptance of yielding in piping bends and elbows to limit stresses in straight runs. These features aid in limiting stresses in the piping.

For fault movement in the plane of the piping system yielding would occur at some piping bends and elbows. For fault movement normal to the plane of the piping system strain would

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be distributed over the relatively long straight run of pipe between the reactor building and turbine generator. Yielding a

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piping making the system conform to the displacement and thereby limiting stresses elsewhere. The pipe would preserve its function and integrity throughout a 3-foot displacement. A 3 plane anchor at the containment wall will protect the isola-tion valves from excessive piping forces. Yielding in the system would have the effect of limiting the loads on the anchors. The design will avoid the placing of local discon-

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tinuities, such as taps or support lugs, in areas where high stress or local yielding would occur; or, when such location is unavoidable, the design of the attachment will be such as l

l to limit the local stress concentration. Since the yielding 1

i} is associated only with a single quarter-cycle of displacement, fatigue considerations are of minor concern only.

l Where reactor building piping conne~ctions vital to the safe shutdown of the reactor would be subject to shearing or other failure by contact with concrete walls, rock, earth, etc., clearance or restraints will be provided to eliminate the possibility of such failure. -

Question 3.

Since faulting may occur at other loca-tions than at the reactor containment structure, what provisions will be made in the design of vital piping connections other than those to the reactor building to insure the integrity of these connections in the event of fault motion up to 3 feet occurring in any location on the plant site.

3 As stated in Amendment 8, a mobile pumper and hose - '

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lCY J' arrangement will be provided at the Plant for the purpose of

.re-establishing water supply should the normal pipes carrying cooling water or make-up water be severed. Other vital piping connections in the Plant area necessary for a safe shutdown of the reactor'which might be subject to failure by fault motion of up to 3 feet occurring in any location on the Plant site ,

will have the flexibility and protection necessary to a'ecom-modate the motion.

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L Subscribed in San-Francisco, California, this 16th day of September, 1964.

Respectfully. submitted, PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY .

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' S. L. SIBIEY ]

By  !

S. L. Sibley j

' Vice President & General Manager <

RICHARD H. PETERSON PHILIP A. CRANE, JR. '

Attorneys for Pacific' Gas and Electric Company

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T.  !

PHILIP A. CRANE, JR.- ,

By Philip A. Grane, Jr. -j i

i Subscribed and sworn to before me this 16th day of September, 1964.

RITA J. GREEN (SEAL)

Rita J. Green, Notary Public in and for the City and County of i San Francisco, State of California j My Commission Expires July 16, 1967

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