IR 05000443/1986045

Insp Rept 50-443/86-45 on 860818-22.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Electrical Aspects of Emergency Procedures,Electrical Equipment & Resolution of Previously Identified Instrumentation Deficiencies

ML20215G629
Person / Time
Site:	Seabrook
Issue date:	10/03/1986
From:	Anderson C, Paulitz F NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20215G621	List: IR 05000443/1986045 ML20215G618
References
50-443-86-45, NUDOCS 8610210034
Download: ML20215G629 (9)

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J U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Report N /86-45 Docket No. 50-443 License N CPPR-135 Category A Licensee: Public Service of New Hampshire P.O. Box 330 Manchester, New Hampshire Facility Name: Seabrook Station, Unit 1 Inspection At: Seabrook, New Hampshire Inspection Conducted: August 18-22, 1986 Inspector: /o 3 PG ,

F. Paulitz, Reactor Engineer -

date Approved by: / /c PG C. J. gnderson, Chief, Plant Systems date Section, DRS Inspection Summary: Inspection on August 18-22, 1986 (Report No.50-443/86-45)

Areas Inspected: A routine unannounced f'acility inspection by one region-based inspector regarding the electrical aspects of emergency procedures, electrical equipment, and resolution of previous identified instrumentation, control, and electrical construction deficiencie Results: No violations were identifie %02(go G

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DETAILS 1.0 Persons Contac.ted _

1.1 New Hampshire Yankee (NHY)

• J.M. Grillo, Assistant Operation Manager '

• F.W. Laird, I&C Supervisor

• S.P. Buchwald, QA Supervisor

• R.R. Ferrell, Licensing Coordinator

• Mackensen, STD Staff Engineer S. . Dunphy, STD Supervisor R.W. Savage, Electrical Maintenance Supervisor 1.2 Yankee Atomic Electric Company (YAEC)

• V.W. Sanchez, Site Licensing Supervisor

• W.T. Middleton, QA Staff Engineer

• Monteith, QA Staff Engineer 1.3 United Engineers and Construction (UE&C)

• R.W. Gregory, Licensing Engineer

' U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)

• D.G. Ruscitto, Resident Inspector

• R.R. Temps, Reactor Engineer

• denotes those present at the exit intervie .0 Licensee Action on Construction Deficiency Reports (CDR)

2.1 (Closed) CDR (86-00-08) Cable Tray Attachment to Support Bolt Torque Requirement Omitted The licensee Interim Report, SBN-1163 dated July 18,1986, identified that the bolts used on clamps to secure the cable tray to the sup--

ports did not meet the vendors torque requirement The proposed corrective action was retorque all clamp bolts used in safety related areas. Also, the installation and inspection criteria would be revised to assure the torquing requirements for the clamp bolts are clearly identifie The licensee Final Report, SBN-1177 dated August 14, 1986, confirmed that the above corrective action had been complete _

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The inspector verified that 'the Cable Tray Installation Procedure, FEP-503, Revision 2, Interim Procedure Change (IPC) I paragraph 5.18 specified the cable tray clamp bolt torque requirement The Quality Control Engineers (QCE) were to perform a 10% torque verification in accordance with the disposition of Nonconformance Report (NCR) 54/7469 R/A. The instruction for determining the number of clamps for 10% torque verification of the cable tray hold down hardware contained in UE&C Memo, No. EQC # 118 dated July 23, 1986, was reviewed. In addition the inspector reviewed 20 QC In-Process Inspection Reports, documentation of the 10% torque verification. No deficiencies were identifie When the bolts were retorqued they were marked with paint. During the plant tour the inspector did not observe any cable hold down clamp bolts which did not have a paint mark on the The inspector concludes from the above that this CDR is close .2 (Closed) CDR (86-00-06) Westinghouse NAL Card W-24 Operational Amplifier Oscillation Caused Set Point Drift The licensee Interim Report, SBN-1092 dated June 5, 1986, identified that during testing excessive shift of calibrated trip set points occurred. This was attributed to oscillation of the W-24 operational amplifier associated with Westinghouse NAL cards. These amplifiers were date coded 8101. This was similar to the deficiency for W-24 amplifiers with date' code 8004 which were replaced by Westinghouse in 1983. The proposed corrective action was the replacement of the W-24 operational amplifiers with the date code 810 The licensee Final Report, SBN-1140 dated June 24, 1986, confirned'

that the above corrective action was completed. NCR 82-1381-C and associated work orders were reviewed by the inspector for proper dispositio The licensee personnel who completed the above corrective action were interviewed by the inspector. There were about 100 NAL cards that were inspected. Of the cards checked about 30 had W-24 operational amplifiers date coded 8101 that had been replaced. The inspector checked some of the amplifiers that had been replaced. The date stamp was clearly identifie The personnel who completed the corrective action were knowledgeable .

and understood the instrumentation systems and components. The inspector concluded from the review that this CDR is close z

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2.3 (Closed) CDR (86-00-02) Westinghouse Veritrak Pressurizer

. Pressure Transmitter Excessive Signal Drift The licensee's Interim Report, SBN-1000 dated April 10, 1986, identified that during testing that the calibration of the Veritrak 76PH2 Pressure Transmitters, calibration shifts-due to ambient temperature change Shifting in excess of the 1% per 100 degree F specified m'ximuma was recorded. The transmitters were returned to Westinghouse for determina-tion of the cause of the calibration shifting and repai The licensee's final report, SBN-1148 dated June 39, 1986, informed the NRC that the Westinghouse analysis was not completed. The corrective

&ction was the replacement of the four Veritrak pressurizer pressure transmitters with four Tobar pressurizer pressure transmitter Ambient temperature compensation tests were performed on the Tobar trans-mitter These test indicated that the ambient temperature compensation shifts were within the allowable Technical Specification limits. However, the licensee received additional information from Westinghouse that Tobar pressure transmitters have temperature compensation shift problems simi-lar to the Veritrak transmitter ~

The licensee telecon from J.0. Conner and W. Sanchez to D. Haverkamp dated August 5,1986 identified the above problem with Tobar Transmitters. This has been assigned a CDR number 86-00-09. Therefore, CDR 86-00-02 is closed and 86-00-09 will remain open until the licensee provides sufficient information to permit analysis and evaluation of the Tobar Transmitters deficiency and corrective actio .0 Containment Electrical Penetration During_the plant tour the inspector observed that the nitrogen pressure gage on the containment electrical penetration H-59 was reading zero pressure. There was a Non Conformance Report (NCR) tag attached with a statement that the pen was below 15 PSI. The NCR number was 82/1457 with a date of May 16, 198 Previous unresolved item 50-443/84-03-02 was opened because a program for

, surveillance / maintenance of electrical penetrations to assure that correct nitrogen pressure was not in place. This open item was closed in Inspec-tion Report 50-443/85-17 because the licensee revised the surveillance sheet with a note under special requirements stating that the minimum pressure is 15 psig and if the pressure drops below 15 psig, Westinghouse storage instructions should be referred to for further guidanc . Westinghouse instruction manual FP32363 requires repressurization after the pressure drops below 15 psi . . _ __ _ _ . _ _ - , _ _ _ .

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The licensee was questioned why the nitrogen pressure was zero for the three months and not repressurized, and if necessary repaired. The licensee furnished the inspector with the NCR disposition which stated that the minimum nitrogen pressure of 15 psig is required to maintain the penetration's leak rate qualification during accident conditions. There-fore, a penetration pressure of 15 psig is required when the containment pressure boundary is established. At other times pressure can drop below 15 psig prior to repressurizin The inspector was unable to conclude that the NCR disposition reflected the vendor's technical basis for requiring repressurization of the penetration en a timely basis. This is an unresolved item pending the receipt of additional information to support the licensee disposition of the NCR (86-45-01).

4.0 Electrical Equipment Space Heaters During the inspection, 50-443/86-21, cc.nducted fron March 27 through April 6, 1986 the inspector observed that the temperature on one side of the train A omergency diesel generator (EDG) alternator was significantly different from that on the other side. The licensee was informed of this

. condition. During this inspection the inspector again observed that there was a temperature difference on one side of the train A EDG alternator than the other side. This time the higher temperature was on the opposite side of the EDG alternato The licensee was asked about this temperature variation and what was being done about it since it was an indication of inadequate. heating. The inspector was given an Engineering Change Authorization (ECA) 98118124A approved August 19,1986. This ECA proposes to reconnect the heaters from a delta connection to a Y connection thus reducing the total heater wattage. The present heater wattage in the delta configuration is 6,000 watts which is reduced to 2000 watts in the Y configuration. Failed heater elements are to be replaced along with damaged wire The ECA was reviewed for technical, design control, and safety evaluation adequacy. The ECA stated that after the design change the generator enclosure temperature should be checked by NYH, MSD, and shall be reported to UE&C for further evaluatio The inspector stated the concern that the ECA did not appear to assure that the vendor's specifications for maintenance of the winding temperature would be satisfactor During the plant tour the inspector tried to observe if the space heaters were energized on a safety related auxiliary feedwater pump (AFP) moto This verification was by placing the hand on the enclosure and detecting heat. No determination of heater energization could be made by this method. The enclosure temperature and ambient temperature appeared to be the same. Name plate data indicated that the space heater was rated 1.99 ampere at 120 volts which is about 240 watts. Other safety related motors supplied by Westinghouse had similar sized space heater J

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The inspector performed a calculation of motor heater sizing based upon guidance given in IEEE standard 43-1974 for a total enclosed motor and AFP motor dimension This calculation resulted in a valve of 240 watt Since the AFP motor heaters are sized about 240 watts, but the motor .is open ventilated not total enclosed, a question.is raised about the ade-quacy of these heater This is an unresolved issue pending licensee review of the adequacy of the EDG and safety-related motors heater sizing (86-45-02).

5.0 Offsite 345KV Grid 5.1 Degraded Grid Voltage The following documents were reviewed to ascertain whether the alarm procedure provided sufficient guidance for operator action to pro-tect the Class 1E electric systems from the effects of a degraded grid voltage condition without a coincidence accident condition. Fur-ther, that these documents were consistent:

Alarm procedure F7301 Bus E5 voltage low

Alarm Procedure F7311 Bus E6- voltage low

Technical Specification (TS) Table 3.3-4

Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) Section Memorandum to D.E. Moody from J.W. Stacey, dated May23,1986, Subject: 4.16 kv Bus ES & E6 Degraded Grid Voltage Procedur *

Memorandum to D.E. Moody from R.J. DeLoach, dated August 28, 1984, Subject: Secondlevel Undervoltage Protection Procedures The low voltage alarm 3934 volts for more than 10 seconds causes the procedure to be displayed on the alarm cathode ray tube (CRT). The procedure contains the following information:

The PSNH dispatcher in Manchester will be contacted, if the grid ~

voltage is below 335 kv, to-determine the magnitude and expected duration of the grid disturbanc Unnecessary loads will be shed from bus 5 & 6 to increase the bus voltage above the setpoint. However, if the 3934 volts are not cleared in 15 minutes or the voltage decreases to 3600 volts the operator will start the emergency diesel generators (EDG).

The incoming bus supply breakers will then be put in the pull to lock positio This will result in a dead bus. The first level low voltage relays will then strip the bus and cause the EDG breaker to close, thus reenergizing the bus. The loads required for safe shut down will be energized from the bus in a timed sequenc ( .

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If the reactor has not tripped the operator will commence plant shutdown and be in Hot Standby Mode in 1 hou If conditions con-tinue to degrade the operator will trip the reactor and follow procedure E-0 reactor tri This degraded grid voltage procedure gives sufficient guidance to the operator to protect the Class IE electrical systems from a degraded grid voltage condition without a coincident accident condition. Hard copies of alarm procedures will be available in the control room in the near future. The inspector noted a minor difference of 1 volt between the procedure and TS voltage setpoint. The TS setpoint is 3933 volts. The licensee stated that all plant operating procedures would be checked against the TS for consistency of process value The inspector had no further concern about the degraded grid voltage procedure .2 Restoration of the Station to the 345 kv System During the loss of offsite power test all 345 kv power circuit breakers (PCB) open 15 minutes after the test starte The licensee determined that PCBs opening resulted from a protective trip associated with the SF6 gas used at 40 psig for dielectric insu-lation or 250 psig for arc extinguishment during PSB opening. The reduction in SF6 pressure was the result of the ambient temperature being below 40 degree F and the loss of SF6 heaters. This combination caused the gaseous SF6 to liquify resulting in a pressure reductio The electrical power for these heaters is from automatic throw over switches supplied power from redundant 480 volt non safety systems both of which are lost when the two off site 345 kv' sources are los Further, none of the 345 kv PCBs could be reclosed as the result of low SF6 pressur Power was restored to the PCBs SF6 heaters via a construction power source. The long term correction was to associate one of the power supplies to-the throw over switches from the A Class IE system. The inspector reviewed the Engineering Change Authorization (ECA)

03116789E for this modification which was approved June 18,1986. The inspector had no concerns about the control of the modification or the safety analysis.

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The inspector questioned the consequence of a loss of offsite power in addition to the loss of 1 EDG. Should this condition occur with the loss of an EDG there would be no power to the PCBs SF6 heater This condition coincident with the ambient temperature 60 degree F or lower could result in a repeat of the above PCBs tripping and not being able to reclose even if the 345 kv lines to the 345 kv switch-yard were reenergize The following procedures were reviewed for power restoration con-

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sidering the above design modification:

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ECA-0.0 Loss Of All AC Power, Rev. 00, 5/16/86 ECA-0.1 Loss Of All AC Power Without SI, Rev. 00, 5/16/86

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0S1246.01 Loss Of Offsite Power-Plant Shutdown, Rev. 00, 4/30/86 Each of the above procedures had a step to coordinate with the System Dispatcher and restore power to the 345 kv switchyard. Further, the offsite sources were reestablished to supply power to the Class IE electric systems. However, none of the procedures addressed the above issu Neither the modification to the SF6 heater supply nor the reviewed procedures address the above potential. problem of recovery of the off-site power source. This issue is unresolved pending the licensee review of the safety significance of this issue (86-45-03).

6.0 Electrical Independence During the plant tour the inspector observed that electrical cable tray, 29MIVC (blue), between nodes 2909 and 2911 was routed below containment electrical penetration, H-48 (red). The distance between the tray and penetration was about 8 inches, the tray did not have a cover attached to it and the penetration had an open bottom. However, it was determined that.the licensee's activities to install tray covers was incomplet The requirements for the independence of redundant systems are specified in the FSAR section 8.3.1.4, Appendix 8A and IEEE STD 384-1974. The re-quirement for vertical distance between the above penetration and tray is 3 feet or a barrie Solid bottom V-Level tray were to be installed with tray covers. This

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, design feature was to preclude electrical-magnetic interferences (EMI) from low-level instrumentation cables (V level). The exception'to the above r was in the cable spreading room. This was controlled by ECA 03116942B is-l sued July 3, 1986. Work Request 86-002991, issued June 14, 1986 was for l the installation of tray covers in the A&B electrical tunnels which would include the containment electrical penetration area. A review of the tray

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cover installation schedule indicated that all tray covers would be in-stalled by the end of Septembe The licensee Field Quality Assurance Group has verified by Surveillance j Report, Y-2197 issued August 29, 1986, that cable tray 29 MIVC between l nodes 2909 and 2911 had a cover as required by ECA 50/112487I. This cover

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provides the necessary barrier between the containment electrical penetra-l tion H-48 (red) and cable tray 29MIVC (blue). No deficiencies were

identified.

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7.0 Unresolved Items

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Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in-order to ascertain whether they are acceptable, violations or deviation Unresolved items are discussed in paragraphs 3, 4 & 5.2 of this repor .0 -Exit Meeting The inspector met with the licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on August 22,1986. The inspector summarized the purpose and the scope of the inspection and the finding At no time during this inspection was written material provided by the

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inspector to the license .

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