IR 05000443/1998006
| ML20195E029 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 11/06/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20195E027 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-443-98-06, 50-443-98-6, NUDOCS 9811180219 | |
| Download: ML20195E029 (23) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l
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REGION I
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Docket No.:
50-443 i
License No.:
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' Report No.:
50-443/98 06
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Licensee:
North Atlantic Energy Service Corporation Facility:
Seabrook Generating Station, Unit 1
Location:
Post Office Box-300 Seabrook, New Hampshire 03874 l
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Dates:
August 23,1998 - October 3,1998 l
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l Inspectors:
Ray K. Lorson, Senior Resident inspector l
Javier Brand, Resident inspector Antone Cerne, Senior Resident inspector, Millstone 3 Laurie Peluso, Radiation Specialist
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Approved by:
Curtis J. Cowgill, Chief, Projects Branch 5 I
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Division of Reactor Projects
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9811180219 981106
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PDR ADOCK 05000443 G
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Seabrook Generating Station, Unit 1 NRC inspection Report 50-443/98-06 This integrated inspection included aspects of licensee operations, engineering, maintenance, and plant support. The report covers a 6-week period of resident and
. specialist inspection.
Operations:
The operators performed routine activities safely during the period. The licensee e
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appropriately addressed several minor material deficiencies identified by the inspectors (Sections 01, and 02).
The main steam isolation valve testing and troubleshooting of the 'C' main steam e
isolation valve were performed well. The nuclear systems operator responded well
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to prevent the 'C' main steam isolation valve from closing when the B train slow speed solenoid failed to fully retract during the test (Section 04.1).
Several adverse condition reports were not promptly initiated to review required e
plant conditions including: an out of specification condition on a charging pump, an unplanncd entry into the fire main break procedure during the fast fill of the service water cooling tower, and a potential procedural deficiency involving the application of grease to service water pump flanges. (Section 04.2 and E2.1)
Maintenance:
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e Mechanical maintenance activities during inspection, removal and replacement of the "A" and "B" SW pumps were performed well. Adequate briefings, including the j
use of operating experience were performed. A minor maintenance planning weakness was observed which delayed the service water pump inspections (Section M 1.1 ).
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e The solid state protection system testing was performed well. The licensee is i
currently evaluating corrective actions for the spurious alarms observed during this test (Section M1.2).
- The corrective measures to address unresolved issues associated with the
l deficiency tagging program were adequate. UBI 97-04-01, and, IF 97-05-01, are i
closed (Section M8.1).
Enaineerina:
e The root cause analysis and proposed corrective actions for the degradation of the service water pump SW-P-41B were found to be adequate. The interim pump vibration monitoring will provide additionalinformation regarding the service water pump condition.
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The licensee responded well to identify the source of leakage from the primary e
component cooling water system, and developed an adequate plan to correct this leakage (Section E2.2).
Plant Supoort:
The licensee effectively maintained and implemented a radiological environmental e
monitoring program in accordance with regulatory requirernents (Section R1.1).
The licensee effectively maintained and implemented a meteorological monitoring e
program in accordance with regulatory requirements. The licensee's performance regarding the calibration methodology was very good (Section R1.2),
The licensee met the QA audit requirements. The audits were of sufficient depth to e
assess the implementation of the radiological environmental monitoring program (REMP) (Section R7.1).
The contract laboratory continued to implement excellent QA/QC programs for the e
REMP, and continued to provids offective validation of analytical results and the programs were capable of ensuring independent checks on the precision and accuracy of the measurements of radioactive materialin environmental media (Section R7.2).
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TABLE OF CONTENTS i
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EX E C UTIV E S U M M A RY.............................................. il
- TA BLE O F C O N TE NTS.............................................. ' iv 1. Operations
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Conduct of C perations..................................... 1 '
01.1 General Co m ments.................................. 1
Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment................... 1 02.1 Fa cility Tours..................................... 1
Operator Knowledge and Performance......................... 2 04.1 Main Steam Isolation Valve Testing...................... 2
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04.2 Operator Response To Plant Conditions................... 3 -
Miscellaneous Operations issues............................. 4 08.1 Eve nt Reports..................................... 4 11. M ainte n a n ce................................................... 5
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Cond uct of M aintenance................................... 5 M 1.1 Service Water Pump Replacement Activities................ 5 M 1. 2 S S PS Testing...................................... 6 L
M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance Issues............................ 6
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M 8.1 (Closed) URI 50-423/97-04-01 and IFl 50-423/97-05-01
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M8.2 (Closed) LER 5 0/44 3/9 8-00 9........................... 8 i
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i 111. E ng i n ee ri n g................................................... 8 j
E2 Engineering Support of Facilities and Equipment.................. 8 E2.1 Investigation of "B" Service Water Pump Failure............. 8 L
E2.2 Primary Component Conling Inventory Loss............... 10
l-IV. Plant Support
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R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls.................. 11
P.1.1 Implementation of the Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program l
( R E M P)......................
..................11 R1.2 Implementation of the Meteorological Monitoring Program (MMP)
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R6 RP&C Organization and Administration........................ 13 l
R6.1 Organization and Responsibilities....................... 13 i
~R7 Quality Assurance in RP&C Activities......................... 13 R7.1 Quality Assurance Audit Program
......................13 R7.2 Quality Assurance of Analytical Measurements............. 14 i"
F8 Miscellaneous Fire Protection Issues
.........................15 F8.1 Use of Damming Boards in Fire Seal Design............... 15 i
S1 Conduct of Security and Safoguards Activities.................. 15 S1.1 General Comment.................................15
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V. M anagement Meeting s.......................................... 16 X1
. Exit Meeting Su m m ary................................... 16
- PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED.................,,,,.,,,,,,,,,,17 INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED..................................... 17 ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED,' AND DISCUSSED.....................,,,.,,,,,17 LIST O F AC RO NYM S U S E D.......................................... 18
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Report Details Summarv of Plant Status The facility operated at approximately 100% of rated thermal power throughout the inspection period with routine minor power reductions performed to support instrument calibrations and testing, l. Operations
Conduct of Operations 01.1 General Comments (71707)
Using Inspection Procedure 71707,the inspectors conducted frequent reviews of ongoing plant operations. In general, routine operations were performed in accordance with station procedures and plant evolutions were completed in a deliberate manner with clear communications and effective oversight by shift supervision. Control room logs accurately reflected plant activities and observed shift turnovers were comprehensive and thoroughly addressed questions posed by the oncoming crew. Control room operators displayed good questioning perspectives prior to releasing work activities for field implementation. The inspectors found that operators were knowledgeable of plant and system status.
O2 Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment 02.1 Facility Tours (71707. 62707)
The inspectors routinely conducted independent plant tours and walkdowns of selected portions of safety-related systems during the inspection report period.
These activities consisted of the verification that system configurations, power supplies, process parameters, support system availability, and current system operational status were consistent with TS requirements and USAR descriptions.
Additionally, system, component, and general area material conditions and housekeeping status were noted. The inspectors identified some minor material deficiencies including:
external surface corrosion in multiple locations on safety-related primary
component cooling water (PCCW) system piping.
minor spent fuel pump seal and safety injection valve packing leakage.
- a lanyard and clate that could have interfered with the proper operation of a
limit switch on a service water and on a component cooling water system valve.
The licensee corrected or developed a plan to correct the above material deficiencies. ' The licensee indicated that the service water piping would be preserved and painted in the beginning of calendar year 2000in accordance with the long-term plant painting schedul Operator Knowledge and Performance 04.1 Main Steam Isolation Valve Testina a.
Insoection Scooe The inspector observed main steam isolation valve (MSIV) testing performed on September 23,1998 in accordance with operations procedure, OX1430.02," Main Steam isolation Valve Quarterly Test".
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Ohsprvations and Findinas The testing demonstrated that the valve could operate in the closed direction, and also verified proper operation of a portion of the engineered safeguards actuation system (ESFAS). The operators performed the testing well and in accordance with the operating procedure. An adequate number of personnel were involved with the test, and were well briefed prior to the test. The MSIV components were properly restored at the completion of each section of the test procedure.
j Each MSIV properly stroked in the shut (safety) direction as expected, however, the
MSIV continued to travel in the shut direct on after the B train slow flow j
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i sulenoid valve control switch was placed in the " retract" position. The nuclear systems operator (NSO) immediately recognized the problem and isolated the B train hydraulic fluid return flowpath which stopped the MSIV inward movement. The licensee remained in Technical Specification (TS) action statement 3.7.1.5 which required the condition to be corrected or to cornmence a shutdown within four hours.
The system engineer assisted with the troubleshooting activities and determined that the slow speed solenoid valve did not properly position to block the hydraulic
fluid return path when its solenoid was de-energized. The apparent cause for the solenoid problem was attributed to internal wear residue interfering with the proper operation of the solenoid valve. The licensee cycled the solenoid valve three timos to displace the wear products, and successfully completed the test. The licensee's j
long-term plans included replacement of this actuator during the next refueling outage. The licensee appropriately treated this event as a MSIV functional failure per the maintenance rule since the solenoid valve position would have prevented the MSlV from shutting within the required five seconds on a B train isolation signal.
The inspector considered the safety significance of this functional failure to be minimal since the 'C' MSIV functioned properly (i.e. shut during the initial test), and also since the slow speed solenoid valve is retracted from the hydraulic fluid path during normal operations.
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Conclusions The main steam isolation valve testing and troubleshooting of the 'C' main steam isolation valve were performed well. The nuclear systems operator responded well to prevent the 'C' main steam isolation valve from closing when the B train slow speed solenoid f ai!ed to fully retract during the test.
04.2 Operator Resoonse To Plant Conditions a.
Insoection Scone The inspector reviewed the operator response to two plant conditions. The first involved a high oillevelin the 2A charging system (CS) pump outboard motor bearing sightglass, and the second involved a decreasing fire main header pressure while filling the service water cooling tower.
b.
Observations and Findinas 2A Charaina Pumo Motor Bearina Oil Level Condition:
On September 10,1998, an NSO observed a high level (i.e. > 3/4 level) in the 2A CS pump outboard motor bearing oil reservoir sightglass. The NSO discussed the condition with a shift mechanical maintenance technician, and a decision was made to turnover the condition to the dayshift staff. The dayshift operations staff decided to inform the system engineer of the problem, however, a communications mis-understanding resulted in the system engineer not being informed of the condition until September 16.
The system engineer then reviewed the pump operating parameters, and concluded that the pump was operable, and scheduled a maintenance activity to confirm the pump motor oil quantity. An adverse condition report (ACR) was subsequently generated to review this event on September 25. The inspector noted that this condition did not result in an actual plant safety problem, but was concerned with the time delays associated with the notification of the system engineer, and the initiation of the ACR.
Decreasina Fire Main Pressure Condition The operators entered operations procedure, OSO243.02," Fire Main Break", on September 11, based on a decreasing fire main header pressure and repeated starting of the B diesel fire pump. This event occurred while the fire main system was being used to supply makeup inventory to the service water cooling tower.
i The inspector reviewed the event with operations and engineering personnel and
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noted that this event appeared to be the result of several contributing material and operational procedural deficiencies including:
The B diesel fire pump pressure sensing start switch was out of calibration.
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The procedural and fire system configuration restrictions did not ensure that
the cooling tower fill rate would not exceed the capacity of the running fire system pumps.
The fire system jockey pumps were in a degraded condition and scheduled to
be replaced per minor modification 98-0586.
The inspector was concerned that this planned evolution resulted in a minor fire main system pressure transient, and also that the operators were unnecessarily challenged by the entry into the fire main break procedure. The inspector questioned an operations supervisor and learned that an ACR had not been generated to review and preclude this event from recurring. The licensee subsequently generated an ACR for this event.
The inspector did not consider these examples where an ACR was not generated promptly as required by the corrective action program to be indicative of a programmatic breakdown, noting that approximately 3500 ACRs will be generated this year. These f ailures to promptly generate an ACR, along with another example discussed in Section E2.1, are considered a violation of minor significance and not subject to formal enforcement action. Failure to promptly initiate ACRs was considered a weakness.
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Conclusions Operator failed to promptly initiate ACRs for necessary plant conditions. While the conditions were minor in nature, these issues are evident of improper use of the corrective action process, which has been a recent adverse performance trend.
Miscellaneous Operations issues 08.1 Event Reoorts The licensee issued a four-hour, non-emergency event report on August 28, per 10 CFR 50.72 to report a condition involving an inoperable spent fuel pool building air ventilation system during crane operations over the spent fuel pool. The licensee also reported on September 12, and September 21, the discovery of dead seals in the plant intake structure. The licensee retracted the August 28 report after determining that the crane was equipped wlth a mechanicalinterlock to prevent the handling of loads over the spent fuel storage area. The inspector performed an in-office review of these event reports and concluded that the reports, including the retraction were appropriat.-.
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.5 11. Maintenance M1 Conduct of Maintenance M1.1 Service Water Pumo Replacement Activities (62707)
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Insoection Scone The inspector observed' portions of the mechanical maintenance activities during replacement of the "A" and "B" service water (SW) pumps.
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Observation and Findinas The "B" SW pump was replaced due to an unexpected failure which occurred during a routine surveillance test on August 27. The inspection of the "B" SW pump.
revealed loose bolting on five of the seven column flanges. Additionally, a complete
- loss of the hardfacing (chromium oxide coating) from the pump line shaft sections j
at the journal areas was identified. The "A" SW pump was also removed from service and inspected on Septembar 11, as a preventive measure since it had been
in service for approximately the same duration as the "B" SW pump. The "A" SW pump inspection revealed similar damage but to a lesser amount. The main i
difference was that the botting on the "A" SW pump column flanges was tight i
except for the third flange where several bolts were loose. The root cause for these failures is discussed in Section E2.1.
The inspector noted proper control and coordination during the pump removal and inspection activities. Also, adequate system engineering involvement and management oversight was observed. The licenseo's decision to remove, inspect, and replace the "A" SW pump was prudent, and prevented a potential failure of this j
pump.
A minor maintenance planning weakness was observed involving transfer of the plant heat loads from the SW system to the SW cooling tower to support the pump inspections. The inspections had to be aborted when the cooling tower basin
. temperature increased faster than anticipated. No temperature limits were exceeded. The licensee then revised their plan to include better control of the initial cooling tower basin conditions prior to shifting the plant heat loads. After resolution of this concern, technicians successfully performed the SW pump inspections.
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Conclusion Mechanical maintenance activities during inspection, removal and replacement of the "A" and "B" SW pumps were performed well. Adequate briefings, including the use of operating experience were performed. A minor maintenance planning l
weakness was observed which delayed completion of the service water pump
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M1.2 SSPS Testina (62707)
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Insoection Scoos On September 25, the inspector observed portions of the Train "B", solid state protection system (SSPS) actuation logic testing performed by instrument and controls (l&C) technicians in the control room. This test is performed every 62 days on each train in a staggered basis, b.
Observations and findinas The SSPS system forms part of the reactor protection system (RPS). The RPS automatically keeps the reactor operating within the safe region by shutting down the reactor when ever safety limits are approached. The SSPS system is designed to allow for semi-automatic testing of the associated logic circuits while the plant remains operational.
The inspector noted adequate controls and procedural adherence by the l&C and operations personnel. Adequate communications were also maintained between the control room and the field. Expected alarms were properly announced by the I&C technicians and properly acknowledged by the operators. The inspector observed and questioned the l&C technicians regarding spurious computer alarms received during the test. The technicians stated that the alarms were caused by electrical noise at the input to the master relay, and that they had occurred previously during this test. The inspector reviewed the licensee's corrective actions, and found that the licensee had performed troubleshooting, and recently initiated an engineering work request to further evaluate this condition.
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Conclusions The solid state protection system testing was performed well. The licensee is currently evaluating corrective actions for the spurious alarms observed during this
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M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance issues M 8.1 (Closed) URI 50-423/97-04-01 and IFl 50-423/97-05-01:Followuo of Deficiency Taaaina Issues a.
Insoection Scope (40500,92901)
l During a 1997 inspection-tour of the emergency diesel generator rooms, an
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inspector conducted a review of all observed deficiency tags and their related work requests. An unresolved item was opened to further review the implementation of corrective actions associated with the deficiency tagging process. Separately, during an inspection of the deficiency tagging program conducted in conjunction with NRC inspection procedure IP 40500 for corre;tive action effectiveness, the inspector identified a weakness in the definition of system engineer responsibilities
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for deficiency evaluations and in getting the sampled deficiencies corrected. This was documented as an inspector follow-up item for additional NRC staff review.
During the current inspection, the inspector reviewed the licensee actions taken to l
address both of these open items.
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Observations and Findinas l
The inspector reviewed the licensee's conclusions and corrective actions associated with adverse condition report, ACR 97-2129, which was written to document the l
evaluation of the deficiency tags affixed to components in the emergency diesel l
generator rooms. In some cases, deficiency tags were observed that were not l
associated with active work requests, or were invalidated by already completed or l
voided work requests. Conversely, some active work requests were observed that did not have an appropriate deficiency tag. These discrepancies were noted to be contrary to the licensee's programmatic requirements for work control practices (reference: administrative procedure MA 3.0). With regard to the timeliness of corrective actions for the identified diesel generator deficiencies, no significant l
problems or outstanding work impacting the operability of the emergency diesel generators were identified.
The inspector conducted a walkdown of both trains of diesel generator equipment, examining each deficiency tag and the associated component condition. The l
inspector assessed overall equipment and support conditions in the emergency diesel generator areas and conducted a walkdown of main control board status to further evaluate the number and safety impact of identified deficiencies. The inspector also reviewed the Seabrook Station administrative procedures governing work requests (MA 3.1) and repetitive task sheets (MA 3.2), along with the controlling work control procedure (MA 3.0) to examine the changes in the l
deficiency tagging program controls initiated since the subject NRC inspection items were opened in 1997.
l With respect to corrective action issues relating to the NRC IP 40500 inspection, l
the inspector reviewed ACRs 97-2032(Revision 1) and 97-2453, evaluating the measures implemented in eliminating the deficiency evaluation process, which had been determined to be a weak program by the NRC inspection team. The licensee initiated corrective actions consistent with the program changes, including effecting
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revisions to the affected MA 3.0 and 3.1 work control procedures. Changes in the 1997 program for system work week controls were also effected in the current work planning and scheduling process, governed by the MA procedures.
l As part of the corrective actions to the subject NRC open inspection items, the licensee committed to continue periodically scheduled Station Oversight
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assessments of the deficiency tag control process. The inspector reviewed three Quality Assurance inspection Reports covering the verification that the deficiency tagging program is being properly implemented. The inspector noted that another similar Oversight inspection was in progress and discussed the preliminary results of the current inspection with the cognizant Oversight supervisor. The Oversight l
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schedule for the planning of such inspections indicated their conduct on approximately a four-month frequency c.
Conclusions The licensee implemented corrective actions to address both programmatic and individual discrepancies in the implementation of the deficiency tagging program at Seabrook Station. The inspector concurred with the licensee position that the previously identified problems were of an administrative nature with no technical significance affecting component operability or safety system functionality. The license has also initiated program revisions that the inspector found to provide better control of deficiency tag program implementation. Among the additional controls is a commitment for periodic QA inspections by Station Oversight to verify proper program implementation, which the inspector confirmed have been and continue to be conducted. The inspector determined that the licensee corrective measures to addre.ss this identified problem area have been appropriate, and that no violations were identified. Unresolved item, URI 97-04-01, and inspector follow-up item, IFl 97 05-01, are hereby closed.
M8.2 (Closed) LER 50/443/98-009:On September 15,1998, the licensee identified that the digital channel operational tests for the control room and containment on-line purge radiation monitors were incomplete. The inspector conducted an in-office review of this event report. Specifically, the tests had not been properly revised to fully test the channels following the a 1992 modification that added a second
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radiation detector to each channel. The licensee's interim and planned corrective actions appeared appropriate. The significance of this event was minimal since the affected relays operated properly when tested. The inspector noted that the licensee identified this condition as part of a corrective action for previously identified surveillance test deficiencies. The failure to develop adequate surveillance test procedures for the control room and containment purge radiation monitors is considered a minor violation and not subject to formal enforcement action.
fil. Enaineerina E2 Engineering Support of Facilities and Equipment E 2.1 Investiaation of "B" Service Water Pumo Failure i
a.
InsDeCtion SCoDe The inspector reviewed the engineering actions in response to a failure of the "B" l
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service water (SW) pump, which occurred during a normal pump surveillance test (discussed in Section M1.1). The inspector performed field walkdowns and visual inspections of the failed pump components, and reviewed the root cause evaluation and planned corrective actions.
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Observations and Findinos The safety related SW pumps provide the necessary cooling to several safety related components during normal and accident conditions. The SW system consists of six pumps; four pumps take a suction from the ocean, while the other two pumps take a suction from the cooling tower. The system consists of two independent loops, each of which can operate with either a SW pump train or a cooling tower pump train. One of the two SW pumps is required to be operable for the train to remain operable.
The SW pumps are two-stage, vertically mounted pumps, consisting of seven column pipe sections flanged on each end with 20 bolts. Diving inspections performed on the "A" and "B" ocean SW pumps identified damage as described in Section M1.1.
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Additionally, on September 11, the licensee removed the "A" ocean SW pump for l
inspection and to obtain further information for the root cause investigation. This
pump also showed loss of chromium oxide coating at the first line shaft bearing
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journal, and a significant loss of the Thordon bearing. The licensee stated that all I
four ocean SW pumps and one cooling tower pump had been modified in 1994, by changing the original rubber bearings to "Thordon" bearings and by adding a chromium oxide protective coating to the pump shafts in the journal areas.
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The root cause analysis included a description of the 41B pump problem, the status and sequence of events for related SW and cooling tower (CT) pumps, the nuclear safety significance, the degradation cause factors, and the major proposed corrective actions. Two main factors in the degradation sequence of the 41B pump
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were the loss of chromium oxide hard surfacing material on the pump shaft and
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journals in the seawater environment and the loosening of bolting on the pump column flanges. The causal factors and proposed corrective actions were adequately considered in the root cause analysis. An interim corrective action to
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enhance the SW pump vibration monitoring was appropriate, until the final corrective actions can be completed.
A performance weakness was noted in that a previous modification to apply Belzona to the flange areas should have eliminated the need to apply grease to the i
flange surfaces prior to assembly. However, this requirement was not deleted from l
the installation procedure, and was a potential contributing cause to the loss of pre-l load on the column bolts. The licensee did not initiate an ACR to review and update l
this procedure until questioned by the NRC. The failure to promptly initiate an ACR l
is another example of the minor violation discussed in Section 04.2.
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Conclusion l,
- The root cause analysis'and proposed corrective actions for the degradation of the.
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- service water pump SW-P-41B were found to be adequate. The interim pump
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vibration monitoring will provide additionalinformation regarding the service water-
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pump condition. The licensee did'not promptly initiate an adverse condition report j
to ' review a procedural deficiency involving the application of grease to the service.
water flanges during assembly.
- E2.2 Primary Comoonent Coolina inventorv Loss
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Inspection Scone The inspectors reviewed the licensee's investigation into an unexpected increase in inventory loss from the PCCW "B" train surge tank.
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Observations and Findinas The system engineer performed a walkdown of accessible portions of the PCCW system located outside the containment and did not identify any leakage. The system engineer developed a plan, based on system operating experience, to locate
.the source of system leakage. The system engineer then determined, based on chemistry sample results, that the leakage was into the steam generator blowdown
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coolers. Work request 98 WOO 3098 was initiated to repair the leakage, and the licensee plans to perform this work in November 1998.
The inspector considered this a reasonable period of time to repair the system leak since the blowdown coolers were in the non safety-related portion of the system that would be automatically isolated by a safeguards actuation signal. Additionally, the inspector noted that the leak rate was well within the capability of the makeup system to maintain the required surge tank inventory.
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Conclusions-The licensee responded well to identify the source of leakage from the primary component cooling water system, and developed an adequate plan to correct this leakage.
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IV. Plant SuDDort R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls l
l R1,1 Imolementation of the Radioloaical Environmental Monitorina Proaram (REMP)
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Insoection Scooe (84750-2)
The following areas of the REMP were assessed and reviewed: (1) selected sampling and analysis procedures; (2) analytical data from 1998;(3) selected
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l sampling techniques; (4) operability and calibration of air samplers; (5) Land Use Census results; (6) the Annual Radiological Environmental Monitoring Reports for i
1997.
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Observations and Findinas
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The REMP procedures provided appropriate guidance to prepare, sample, and analyze the environmental sample media. Sampling techniques were appropriate to l
collect environmental sample media. The air sampling equipment were operable during 1997 and from January to August 1998, as evidenced by the analytical results. The air sampling equipment calibration results were within the established tolerances, and calibrations were performed within the frequency specified in the
procedure.
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Good performance was demonstrated regarding technical review of analytical data.
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For the past two years the licensee observed and trended an apparent increase in
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the background levels at the location of TLD 13. The licensee determined that a l
building had been removed from the location and the increase became evident
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because the building had piovided shielding of natural radioactivity, in addition, the licensee thoroughly surveyed the area to ensure that the building was the only explanation.
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The annual Land Use Census was performed in 1997, during the growing season,
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as required by the Technical Specifications (TS). The licensee conducts a thorough land use survey, including a resident, garden, and milk animal census.
The Annual Radiological Environmental Monitoring Reports included results of the
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environmental monitoring program, program changes, land use census, and interlaboratory comparison program, as required by TS.
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Conclusion
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l The licensee effectively maintained and implemented a radiological environmental monitoring program in accordance with regulatory requirements.
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R1.2 Imolementation of the Meteoroloaical Monitorina Proaram (MMP)
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Insoection Scone (84750)
The following areas of the MMP were assessed and reviewed: (1) calibration procedures and methodology, (2) calibration results, (3) site operations logs and action reports, (4) functional checks, and (5) daily channel checks, b.
Observations and Findinas I
instrument and Controls (l&C) is responsible for performing maintenance, and
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annual calibrations. Daily channel checks were performed by Operations.
Execution of functional checks, daily channel checks, maintenance, and calibrations was performed according to the procedures. The calibration procedures were well written and were used to implement the Technical Requirements. The calibration results were within the licensee's acceptance criteria. The meteorological instrumentation on the tower and the readout devices were operable.
The licensee submits the wind speed and wind direction sensors to a wind tunnel test facility for wind tunnel tests including a test to verify (1) the sensors respond accurately to a known speed and direction and (2) the starting threshold (wind speed). The output of the wind speed sensors were compared to a NIST traceable standard, (discussed in the ASTM D 5096-96," Standard Test Method for Determining the Performance of a Cup Anemometer or Propeller Anemometer" July 1996). During the quarterly calibration, the licensee exchanged certain sensors and verified the accuracy of the system for the wind speed, wind direction and temperaturo channels upon installation. (ASTM D 4480-93," Standard Test Method for Measuring Surface Wind by Means of Wind Vanes and Rotating Anemometers",
April 1993)
The inspector noted a discrepancy in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (USAR) regarding the location of the meteorological monitoring program requirements. The USAR Section 2.3.3 stated that the calibration requirements were located in the Technical Specifications. However, the licensee had moved the requirement from the Technical Specifications and placed them into the Technical Requirements. The licensee generated an Adverse Condition Report to review the USAR and submit a change request to change the wording from Technical Specifications to Technical Requirements.
c.
Conclusion The licensee effectively maintained and implemented a meteorological monitoring l
program in accordance with regulatory requirements. The licensee's performance
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regarding the calibration methodology was very good.
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'R6 RP&C Organization and Administration R 6.1 Oroanization and Resoonsibilities A review was conducted of the organization and the responsibilities relative to oversight of the REMP and MMP. As of February 1998, Health Physics has the responsibility to implement the Radiolog; cal Environmental Monitonng Program.
Instrument and Controls (l&C) continues to have responsibility for the calibration and maintenance of the meteorological monitoring equipment. There were no significant changes to the organization since the previous inspection conducted in August 1997.
R7 Quality Assurance in RP&C Activities i
R7.1 Quality Assurance Audit Proaram a.
Insoection Scope (84750-2)
The licensee's quality assurance of the REMP was evaluated through a review of the (1) Quality Assurance audit report (97-A11-01),(2) self-assessment audit report, and (3) Laboratory Quality Control and Audit Committee (LOCAC) audit report.
b.
Observations and Findinas The QA audit was detailed in scope and effectively assessed the performance of the REMP. The audit was performed by a member of the Quality Assurance group and a technical specialist. Performance of the audit was very good, in that specific REMP activities were directly observed and timely feedback regarding performance of the activity was provided. The audit was impartial and provided a good assessment of the program strengths and weakne.sses.
The licensee's vendor audit of the analytical contract laboratory, Duke Engineering and Services Environmental Laboratory (DESEL), formerly Yankee Atomic Environmental Laboratory (YAEL), dated February 13,1998, was conducted by the Laboratory Quality Control Audit Committee (LOCAC). No deficiencies of safety significance were identified. The audit was thorough and of excellent technical detail.
The licensee's self-assessment report for the REMP was conducted by the Health Physics Technical Supervisor. The self-assessment of the REMP was thorough and objective, c.
Conclusion l
The licensee met the QA audit requirements. The audits were of sufficient depth to
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R7.2 Quality Assurance of Analvtical Measurements
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a.
Insoection Scone (84750)
i The following aspects of the OA/OC program were reviewed:
l the OA program (internal audits)
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the results of QC program (split, duplicate, blind samples);
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the results of the Interlaboratory Comparison (cross-check) program; and
the semiannual QA reports.
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The OA/OC program for analyses of REMP samples _was conducted by the primary analytical contract laboratory, Duke Engineering & Services Environmental Laboratory (DESEL), formerly Y.nkee Atomic Environmental Laboratory (YAEL). A tour of the laboratory was conducted during an inspection of the Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Units 1,2,&3,in April 1998. (NRC Integrated inspection Report No(s) 50-245;336;423/98-207 pertains). The performance of the laboratory continued to be excellent.
The laboratory utilized interlaboratory and intralaboratory comparisons and published
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the results in the semiannual OA reports. The intralaboratory comparison consisted
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of measurements of blind duplicate, spike, and split samples. The results were within the acceptance criteria established in the laboratory's analysis procedures.
The laboratory continued to participate in the EPA Cross-Check Program (for drinking water) and the Interlaboratory Comparison Program provided by a vendor l
(Analytics, Inc.), and several other laboratories (for example, Department of Energy (DOE) RESL and DOE EML). The quality control of environmental radioanalyses at DESEL emulated the internal process control program of National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). DESEL's participation in these programs was excellent.
The OA officer at the laboratory conducted independent audits of laboratory operations. The audits were methodical and provided very good insight for improvement where needed. The laboratory published a Quality Assurance report semi-annually. The inspector reviewed the reports from 1996 and 1997, c.
Conclusion l
The contract laboratory continued to implement excellent QA/OC programs for the l
REMP, and continued to provide effective validation of analytical results and the
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programs were capable of ensuring independent checks on the precision and i
accuracy of the measurements of radioactive materialin environmental media.
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15 F8 Miscellaneous Fire Protection Issues F8.1 Use of Dammina Boards in Fire Seal Desian j
a.
Lnapection Scooe The NRC reviewed the licensee's evaluation of the installation and fire rating qualification of Brand Industrial Service Company (BISCO) fire seals used at the Seabrook Station, b.
Observations and Findinas The NRC conducted an in-office review of the licensee's evaluation related to the installation and qualification testing of BISCO penetration fire seals, determined that the Seabrook Station used either BISCO 7-1/2-inch, SE foam or BISCO 5-inch SF-60 foam seals. Others seals, such as the BISCO 9-inch silicone foam penetration seals had not been used. Sealinstallation was in accordance with the BISCO Design Detail index, Revision 4, which described, for each type of seal, the design and test characteristics.
The licensee's evaluation aise determined that each of the approximately 9000 silicone seals used at Seabrook had been assigned a unique number and a Penetration Seal Design Document (PSDD) that described the sealant material, minimum required depth, end the BISCO installation detail to be used for the installation of the seal, including damming board requirements. Most Seabrook fire seals did not require the installation of permanent damming board. Therefore, damming boards used during the seas installation had been removed. For all seals, including those installed without permanent damming board, the PSDD specified the applicable fire test report which substantiated the seal's fire rating. Fire test reports were part of the plant permanent records.
c.
Conclusions The NRC concluded that the scope of the licensee's evaluation was sufficient to support the adequacy of installation and qualification testing of the BISCO fire seals used at the Seabrook Station.
Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities S1.1 General Comment (71707,71750)
l The inspectors observed security force performance during inspection activities.
l Protected area access controls were found to be properly implemented during random observations. Proper escort control of visitors was observed. Security officers were alert and attentive to their duties.
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V. Manaaement Meetinas X1'
Exit Mheting Summary The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management, following the conclusion of the inspection period, on October.19, 1998. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented.
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. PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee G. Boissy, Assistant Station Director W. Diprofio, Unit Director J. Grillo, Technical Support Manager M. Harvey, Senior Auditor J. Hill,' Operations. Supervisor
'J. Kwasnik, Senior Radiation Scientist J. Linville, Chemistry and Health Physics Manager J. Peterson, Maintenance Manager G. StPierre, Operations Manager
- B. Seymour, Security Manager
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J. Savold, I&C Technician, Meteorological M. Toole, I&C Manager
- R. Thurlow, Health Physics Supervisor R. White, Design Engineering Manager INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IPI.1726:
Surveillance Observation IP 62707:
Maintenance Observation IP.71707:
Plant Operations IP 71750:
Plant Support Activities IP 84750:
- Radioactive Waste Treatment, and Effluent and Environmental Monitoring ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Closed:
50-443/97-04-03 VIO Failure to Properly implement a Temporary Procedure Change (this violation was actually closed in Inspection Report 98-05, but was incorrectly listed as 98-04 03 due to a typographical
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error).
50-443/97-04-01 URI Diesel Generator Room Deficiency Tags
- 50-443/97-05-01 IFl Deficiency Tagging 50-443/98-009 LER inadequate Surveillance Test Procedure
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LIST OF ACRONYMS USED-ACR Adverse Condition Report ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers ASTM-American Society for Testing and Materials CAS Central Alarm Station-CBS Containment Building Spray
.EDG Emergency Diesel Generator EFW Emergancy Feedwater EML Environmental Measurements Laboratory EPA U.S. Environmental Protection Agency FME Foreign Material Exclusion gpd gallons per day gpm gallons per minute LCO Limiting Condition for Operation MMP Meteorological Monitoring Program MOV motor operated valve MPCS Main Plant Computer System NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology NSARC Nuclear Safety and Audit Review Committee ODCM Offsite Dose Calculation Manual psig pounds per square inch gauge QA Quality Assurance QC Quality Control REMP Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program RESL Radiochemical and Environmental Sciences Laboratory RHR Residual Heat Removal SG steam generator SIR Station Information Report SORC Station Operations Review Committee SUFP Startup Feedwater Pump
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TDEFW Turbine Driven Emergency Feedwater Pump TLD Thermoluminescent Dosimeter TS Technical Specifications USAR Updated Final Safety Analysis Report WR work request YAEL Yankee Atomic Environmental Laboratory l
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