IR 05000443/1987001
| ML20215K470 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 05/05/1987 |
| From: | Eselgroth P, Vankessel H NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20215K453 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-443-87-01, 50-443-87-1, IEB-80-12, IEB-84-03, IEB-84-3, NUDOCS 8705110211 | |
| Download: ML20215K470 (11) | |
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r U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report No.
50-443/87-01 Docket No.
___50-443 License No.
CPPR-135 Priority Category
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Licensee:
Public Service of New Hampshire
~E70T YoT 316 7 anchester, New Hampshire 03T66-Fact 11ty Name:
Seabrook Statt_on, Unit No. 1 Inspection At:
Seabrook, New Hampshire Inspection Conducted:
Ja_nuary 12-16; February 9-13j February _24-27,1987
.'g7f _ [. d, * TEngineer
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date'[~p[j #7 Inspector:
F.
nKessel, R
^"'*"" "')Wd8iMief 897 Test Program Section, OB, DRS Inspection Summary:
~ Inspection on January 12-16 Februar
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FebruTry12E1987, !nspection NE50;44W8F0,
~~y 9-13, and
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1, Areas Inspected:
Routine unannounced inspection of the Preoperational Test Program incl ^ddIng the review of preoperatici al test procedures, witnessing of t
preoperational retests, the review of test exceptions, the review of test results of rotests, and the review of actions by the applicant on unresolved items identified by the inspector in previous inspections.
Results: No violations were identified.
NOTE:
For acronyms not defined, rcfor to NUREG-0544, " Handbook of Acronyms and initialisms."
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1.
Persons Contacted Public Service of New Hampshire S. Barraciough, Lead QC Inspector, NHY S. Buchwald, QA Supervisor, NHY R. M. Cooney, Technical Project Manager, NHY S. H. Dunphy, Startup Tech. Support Supervisor, NHY - STD R. A. Gwinn, Test Engineer, NHY J. R. Hodsdon, Working Foreman Receiving Inspection, NHY
- G. A. Kann, Programs Support Manager, NtiY M. Kenny, Mechanical Systems Supervisor, NHY D. W. Perkins, Licensing, NHY L. Rau, Reactor Startup Supervisor, NHY K. Robson, Test Engineer, NHY M. Rubano, Maintenanct Supervisor, NHY J. G. Tefft, Reg. Services Project Engineer
- W. J. Temple, Licensing Coordinator, NHY C. J. Vincent, QC Supervisor, NHY L. A. Walsh, Operations Manager, NHY J. Warnock, Nuclear Quality Manager, NHY U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission A. C. Corne, Senior Resident Inspector
"O, G. Ruscitto, Resident Inspector P. Wen, Reactor Engineer
- Denotes those present at exit interview (by phone) on March 19, 1987.
2.
Licensee Actions orL revious Inspection Findings P
(Closed) Unresolved Item 443/86-37-01, " Final Preoperational Test Exception Review."
.Sepgg A number of remaining test exceptions with safety significance were identified during inspection 50-443/86-37.
They are listed in Attachment A.
Some of the listed items required a system rotest during the Post Core Load Hot Functional Test, others only required a functional retest.
Special test procedures were written for the first category of items.
The test exceptions of the second category were, with few exceptions, processed and cleared prior to this inspection.
The inspector reviewed the work done on both categories of test exceptions.
Discussion The adequacy of the corrective action taken for the test exceptions Itsted in Attachment A were reviewed.
The references used for this review are listed under " remarks" in Attachment A.
For all listed test exceptions,
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the corrective action was considered to be adequate.
For the test excep-tions requiring a system retest, the verification of these judgements will be necessary. Special test procedures have been written to accomplish these system retests, i.e.,
ST-51: " Emergency Feedwater Pump Turbine Stop Valve Trip Dynamic Response Test ST-53: " Turbine Driven Emergency Feedwater Pump Start Verification Test" ST-55:
" Steam Dump System Test."
The evaluation of the test results for the listed retest will be accom-plished separately.
Conclusion The inspector has no further questions on these test exceptions. This unresolved item is hereby closed.
3.
Preoperational Test program 3.1 Procedure Review Scope Reviewed special test procedures as follows:
ST-51, " Emergency Feedwater Pump Turbine Stop Valve Trip Dynamic Response Test"
ST-53, " Turbine Driven Emergency Feedwater Pump Start Verification Test
ST-55, " Steam Dump System Test" The above test procedures were reviewed for technical and admin-1strative adequacy and to verify that test planning satisfies regulatory guidance and licensee commitments.
Discussion The procedures were examined for the attributes listed in paragraph 3.1 of Inspection Report No. 50-443/86-19.
Findings No noncompliances were identified by the inspector within the scope of this inspectio,
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3.2 Test Witnessing Scope Witnessed two tests as follows:
Retest on Power Operated Relief. Valve (PORV) A to open valve
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within the required 2 seconds
Fourth cold start of the Emergency Feedwater Turbine under special test procedure ST-53 (see 3.1 above)
Discussion Test witnessing included observations of the attributes listed in Inspection Report 50-443/86-17.
The stroking of PORV-A was unsuccessful for the first stroking (2.07 seconds) but was within the 2 seconds for the successive 2 strokes witnessed.
The inspector independently verified readings of system parameters during the tests.
System cooldown between valve strokes was accomplished as required and as verified by hand held pyrometer applied to the piping in the vicinity of the PORV-A.
The fourth cold start on the Turbine Driven Emergency Feedwater Pump, performed in accordance with ST-53, was not successful in terms of coming up to 3350 rpm within 60 seconds. The vibration level of the steam inlet piping to the turbine, however, was low and no water hammer was heard.
It was noted also that the steam pressure at the turbine inlet valve during the first 60 seconds was ample. A fast recorder was used to record this steam pressure upstream of the steam inlet valve.
From these test results, it was concluded that there were no foreign materials in the steam line obstructing normal steam flow. The actual turbine shaft speed at 60 seconds was 2800 rpm.
Since steam pressure at the turbine inlet valve was ample, it was suspected that the required valve opening was not being achieved quickly enough.
Findings No noncompliances were identified by the inspector within the scope of this inspection.
It is noted, however, that both tests were unsuccessful and had to be repeated at a later date.
3.3 Test Results Evaluation Scope Reviewed the test results for the following:
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PT-19.2, "RPS Response Time Evaluations"
Partial test results of ST-51, ST-53 and ST-55, part 3 (for titles, see paragraph 3.1 above).
Discussion-S These test results were examined for the attributes listed in
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Inspection Report No. 50-443/86-17.
The test results for PT-19.2 included recorder traces for response
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of Reactor Trip Breakers (Step 6.40.17).
These recorder traces
(10) were not marked completely for recorder speed. Also, the 4 additional traces of Step 6.40.22 were not marked clearly. These identification problems were resolved satisfactorily after discussion with the responsible test engineer.
Partial test results were obtained for ST-51, 53 and 55. The vibration results for the steam piping to the AFWP turbine during
" cold" start (steam admitted to cold piping) were acceptable.
To measure pipe deflection, temporary lanyards (point 4001) had been installed at the piping location where the support was damaged on the first cold start with the old design. Measurement at this location was in two directions, in the horizontal plane, i.e., 4001 AX and AZ.
The measured deflections in this point during cold restart were.03 and +.024 inches respectively. This deflection was considered negligible by the piping engineer consulted.
It was also noted that 15e required turbine speed of the Terry Turbine (AFWP) at 60 seconds (3350 rpm) could not be obtained for the third cold start. The first two starts were satisfactory.
It was thought that there might be an obstruction in the steam line.
It was planned to remove internals for one or more valves to see if something is in the pipe or in the valve.
During the third week, another cold start was attempted (see paragraph 3.2 above). This
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attempt, too, was unsuccessful.
Section 6.2 of procedure ST-55, for the Atmospheric Stear Dump Valves (ASDVs) has been completed successfully. There were two design changes to correct two operational problems (field change No. 3). These changes were executed under DCR 87-0064. The steam
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dump valves (to Condenser) were not tested yet under ST-55 due to a shortage of demineralized water.
Findings No noncompliances were identified by the inspector.
The test results for PT-19.2 are acceptable as are the partial test results for ST-51 and 55. Acceptable results for ST-53 were obtained during NRC Inspection 50-443/87-11, March 16-20, 1987, (Paragraph 2.2.2)
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3.4 Test' Exceptions Scope Review the corrective actions and retest results for the test exceptions identified in Inspection Report 50-443/86-37 as safety significant.
Discussion See Section 2 above on unresolved item 443/86-37-01.
4.
Independent Inspection Effort 4.1 Power Operated Relief Valves (PORV) History and Status Scope Problems were experienced with the PORVs initial operation. These problems were caused by the marginal quality of the valves as delivered by the valve manufacturer. The inspector discussed this with NHY QA/QC and Receiving Inspection.
Discussion The discussions with the NHY QC Supervisor and Receiving Inspection yielded the following information:
(a) NHY/QC found parts outside the dimensional tolerance range in a dimensional check.
(b) Orifice size in valves was inadequate. The orifices in the valves were changed (DCR 87001).
NHY considered this problem
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to be a design error.
(c) Found linear indications on the stellited surface of a new plug.
This was the result of the liquid penetrant (LP) test performed by NHY QC. The manufacturer uses a different LP
process (water wash).
l (d) Some parts were found to be within the tolerance range during the dimensional check but only marginally so.
(e) Cages weresfound to be out of round and outside the tolerance range for same.
NHY is reviewing the manufacturer's QA/QC program for weak spots to determine whether these problems on the valves are isolated cases of poor quality control or are indicative of broader problems with the manufacturer's QA/QC program. There also was some question on the reportability of the experienced PORV problems under 10 CFR Part 21.
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This review by NHY has not been completed yet.
In any event, NHY/QC is-intensifying their inspection ~ efforts on other valves supplied by the same manufacturer.
I Conclusion
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The. experienced operational problems with the PORVs were caused by inadequate sizing of the valve orifices and by out-of-tolerance parts supplied by the valve manufacturer.
The adequacy of the manufacturer's QA/QC controls are being further pursued by the licensee.- The valves have been reconditioned and retested success-
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fully (after this-inspection period).
No unacceptable conditions.
were found in the work done by NHY on the PORVs.
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i 4.2 IE Bulletins E
Scope Determine the status of:
f-IEB 80-12, " Decay Heat Removal. System Operability" IEB 84-03, " Reactor Cavity Seal Leakage" Discussion It was determined that IEB 80-12 did not require a response from the-licensee as evidenced by an NRC letter on the subject, dated May 9, 1980.
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IEB 84-03 was closed _in Inspection Report 50-443/84-17.
Conclusion The inspector has no further questions on the bulletins listed.in the scope above.
5.
QA/QC Interface Scope The continued participation of the NHY Field QA group in the Preoper-
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ational Test-(POT) program was evaluated by the inspector.
Discussion In continuation of the assessment of QA/QC involvement with the POT program, the inspector reviewed the surveillance reports listed in Attachment B.
These surveillances cover the witnessing of phase-1
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tests and surveillance tests. The review of these surveillances indicates adequate coverage of these tests.
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i Findings No noncompliances were observed within the scope of this inspection.
6.
Exit Interview In a telephone conversation following the conclusion of the~ site inspection, on March 19,.1987, an exit interview was conducted with the licensee's senior site representatives (denoted in Section 1). The find-
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ings were identified and previous inspection items were discussed.
At no time during this inspection was written material provided to the licensee by the inspector.
Based on the NRC Region I review of this report and discussions held with licensee representatives during this
inspection, it was determined that this report does not contain informa-tion subject to 10 CFR 2.790 restrictions.
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P:gs 1 cf 2 ATTACHMENT A TO IR 443/87-01 TEST EXCEPTION FOR SAFETY SICNIFICANT ITEMS REVIEWED FOR CORRECTIVE ACTION
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Lsgend:
CA - Corrective Action F - Fuel Load l
Initial Crit.
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Proc. No.
Mi'lestones TE No.
Proc. Tit le Problem Description /Act ion CA OK7 Retest Sched.
Remarks PT-3.3 Power Conversion Data 4 AFWP Turbine Stop Yee F-1 Steam Supply Line and TE 2 and ECCS Dynamic Valves not Submitted Because Mod. Steam During ST-51 Dra in System Mods i
Test of Requi red System Mod.
Supply OK Reviewed in IR 443/86-19
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i PT-5.1 CVCS - Cha rging Alarm D7850 and 51 will not Yes F
Closuro Package ready on
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TE-2 System Function as Required /CS-1012.
6-12.
Suppress Ala rm to For SI Signals > 60 sec. False VAS.
JTG Approva l 6-20-86 Alarm to VAS PT-14.2 EFW (HFT)
EFW Pumps Cannot Supply Required Yes F-1 Re f.
IR 50-443/86-19, TE-4 Flow to S.C. and Reci rc. to During ST-53 Section 2, items 3c and d CST /FW-1223 NRC 82-994; ERC of Unr. I tem 85-30-01 or 19/113221; FW 1315 for Rework New No. 85-30-15 and 16
PT-14.2 EFW (HFT)
EFWP-Turbine (Steam Supply) Cold Y es F-l Ref. IR 50-443/86-12 TE-3 Sta rt Problems (Water Hammer During ST-53 New No. 85-30-13 and 14 Experience)/FW-1270 CPR SQC-35 AHL 361 issued for Redesign ECAs:
03/113712, 751, 190; 08/802575-
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and 615 PT-31 125 VDC Measured Voltage Drop Versus Yes F
Answer to RFI 99/116028A'
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TE-3 Distribution Required was 28% Versus < 12.04%
Scheduled for 6-14-86 for Step 6.7.2. F/ED2E-0161; RFI JTC Approva l 6-24-86 99/116028A Took 3rd Dip for 28%
Should Have Been 2nd Dip-for 108 VDC PT-38 ESF Integrated MS-V 127 and 128 not Tested N/A F
PT-14.4 to be Done w/s TE-11 Actuation due to Modifications / Verify 6-16-86 in PT-14.4 Was Done OK
PT-39.1 Loss of Offsite Unable to Synchronize Bus E-5 Yes F
Ready to Close on 6-13-86 TE-7 Powe r with Offsite Power. Also Retest was done after Mods.
Applicable to Bus E-6/DCC-358, closeout Approval on Retest Required (39.1 was Field 6-19-86, 6-20-86 by JTG Completed)
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Pega 2 of 2 Proc. No.
Milestones TE No.
Proc. Title Problem Description / Action
,CA OK7 Retest Sched.
Rema rks !
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PT-39.1 Loss of Offsite Unable to Close Switchyard Yes F
Modifications were made TE-8 Power Breakers after De-energizing to Connect Heaters and Plant Busses 1-6 (Loss of SF-6 Compressors to Emergency Heaters and Compressors)/
Power Bus.
JTG Closeout SY-0027.
RFI 99/115076 Approval 7-25-86.
PT-39.2 Loss of Offsite UPS EDE-J-1B P D AC Input Yes F
Accept as is.
AC. Input TE-07 Power w/ESF Breakers were in Open Position, Breaker Trip is Intentional While 1 A was Closed (Step to Protect Inverter f rom 6.6.56)/ED5E-0222; RFI 99/
Overvoltage in DC supply.
115917 Also, get a la rm to Restore -
AC Power manua lly PT-40.1 PRZR Pressure and PORVs Closing Times are Greater Yes F-1 Work in Progress. Valves TE-11 Level Cont rol than W Spec./RC 1726: Cro sby Retest Before Ready for Test on 1-15-87 to Modify Orifices PCV 456 A & B;
' Post-Core HFT RC 1796: De-terminate PCS 456 A & B to Allow Inspection of Valves; RC 1786.
See Ch rono-logical History, Received 1-13-87, Prepared by G. Kann.
Problems with Leakage Similar to Millstone 3 PT-40.7 Condenser Steam Steam Dump Interlock Selector Yes F
Response Package due TE-1 Dump Switch MS-CS-3057A did not for JTG Approva l on 6-13.
Operate per Design /MS-1140; Will do Functional Retest NRC 82/924; Return to Vendor, Only.
OK 85-30-11 Reinstall and Retest - Was Done + OK; JTG Approva l 6-26-86 PT-40.7 Condenser Steam Steam Dump Valves do not Open Yes F-8 Va lcor rectifiers TE-2 Dump Within Requi red 3 seconds /
ST-55 were Undersized for the MS-1320, NRC 82-973, Rework (Steam Dump C i rcu i t, so the Circuit done, Rectifier mod. to be Valve Test)
wa s Ove rhea ted,
made and retest ( Post Core HFT)
85-30-61 PT-19.2 RPS Response Unable to Perform Steps 5.1.8; Yes F-1 JTG Approva l. for PT-19.2 TE-1 Time Evaluation 6.6.5.B2; 6.8.8E due to EFW ST-53 on 7-19-86 with TE-1 open System mods.; FW-1738 on llL ( E FWP-Tu rb.
Sta rt Veri f. )
AT-22 Containment Pu rge Step 8.2 not completed, GT-M-03 N/A F
Have to Complete Final TE-4 for Fans CAP-FN-9, 10, 34 and Balance of System CAP-MM-726/ CAP-0092; Completed GT-M-03 for CAP Fans w/ Temp.
Closu res
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ATTACHMENT B TO IR 443/87-01 SR No.
Scope of Surveillance Report Date 87-00068 Witness Raychem In-line Single Conductor 1-27-87 Splice Per MS 0514.09
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87-00044 Reactor Vent Path Surveillance Test; 1-15-87 0X 1401.09, Revision 1 87-00107 Witness Replacement of Gasket on Solenoid 2-11-87 Section of PORV and Torquing of Cover Bolts to 30 Foot Pound.