IR 05000443/1993017
| ML20059B279 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 10/15/1993 |
| From: | Rogge J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20059B257 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-443-93-17, NUDOCS 9310280116 | |
| Download: ML20059B279 (15) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report No.: 93-17 Docket No.: 50-443 License No.: NPF-56 Licensee: North Atlantic Energy Service Corporation Post Office Box 300 Seabrook, New Hampshire 03874 Facility: Seabrook Station Dates: August 29 - October 4,1993 Inspectors: Noel Dudley, Senior Resident Inspector Richard Laura, Resident Inspector
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Approved By: .-rf b Mohn F. Rogge, Chief yV 'Dhte #
" Reactor Projects Section 4B, DRP Inspection Summary: This inspection report documents the safety inspections conducted during day shift and back shift hours. The inspections assessed station performance in the areas of operations, maintenance, engineering, plant support, and safety assessment and quality verificatio Results: North Atlantic operated the facility safely. No violations were identified. An unresolved item concerning controlling electrical breakers during motor operated valve testing was opened. See the executive summary for the assessment oflicensee performanc :
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9310280116 931020 $
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY SEABROOK STATION *
NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO. 50-443/93-17 Operations: The operations staff demonstrated good overall performance. While troubleshooting electrical grounds, the operators and electricians communicated and functioned effectively as a team. The shift superintendent properly evaluated continued ,
operations with a turbine electrical trip test anomaly. Operations management developed ,
adequate contingency plans for anticipated weather conditions. Operators properly followed procedures and stabilized plant conditions during natural circulation after a reactor trip.
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Management demonstrated a good safety perspective by making conservative decisions for inspecting, repairing, and replacing equipment. In one case, the operators shutdown the reactor and cooled the plant to mode 5, cold shutdown, to replace a containment isolation valv ,
bfaintenance: Electricians and mechanics generally performed well. Maintenance supervisors generally provided effective oversight _ A personnel error resulting in improper wiring of a test switch used for motor operated valve testing on a service water pump discharge valve indicated continued weakness in personnei performance. The error was preventable by either the electricians, supervisors, or quality inspectors involved in the valve testing. Control of electrical breakers was not performed in strict compliance with the tagging program while correcting the wiring erro Encineerine: Engineering personnel did not adequately evaluate the cause of past line failures on non safety related piping to high pressure heater relief valves. The latest modifications to the relief valves were substantial. The technical support engineer's evaluation of the exciter brush degradation was appropriat Plant Sunoort: A security program weakness resulted in the accidental discharge of a shotgun. Health physics technicians and plant workers properly followed the ALARA program when radiation levels increased in the residual heat removal vault and mechanical penetration area. North Atlantic was slow in correcting housekeeping deficiencies. The annual shift unannounced fire drill was well planned and tested the fire brigade on the performance elements needed to respond to a fir Safety Assessment /Ouality Verification: The joint utility management report accurately identified and defined North Atlantic's weaknesses in the line management's acceptance of the quality programs. Senior manager's actions in response to the report were adequate.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS i Pac EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...................................... ii 1.0 OPERATIONS (71707, 71710, 92701, 93702) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Plan t Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Routine Plant Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Automatic Reactor Trip ............................... 2 Engineered Safety Feature System Reviews ................... 3 2.0 MAINTENANCE (61726,62703,92701) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Maintenance ...................................... 3 Motor Operated Valve Testing: Unresolved Item 93-17-01 (OPEN) . . . . 5 Emergency Diesel Generator Testing ....................... 6 3.0 ENGINEERING (37828, 71707) .............................. 7 Feed Water Heater Relief Valve Piping Failures ................ 7 1 Generator Exciter Brush Wear Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 l l
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4.0 PLANT SUPPORT (71707) ................................. 9 l Radiological Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 S ecuri ty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Housekeeping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Fire Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 l
5.0 SAFETY ASSESSMENT / QUALITY VERIFICATION (40500) ..........11
6.0 M EETIN G S (30702) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 i
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DETAILS
. OPERATIONS (71707, 71710, 92701, 93702) Plant Activities At the beginning of the period the reactor was at 100% power. On September 22, the reactor automatically tripped due to an undervoltage/underfrequency reactor coolant pump (RCP) reactor trip signal. The RCP undervoltage condition resulted when the brush rigging on the main generator exciter failed causing a decrease in the offsite electrical grid voltag On September 29, the operators brought the reactor critical and increased reactor power to 2%. On October 1, operators shutdown the reactor and cooled down to mode 5, cold shutdown, to repair a packing leak on a containment isolation valve. On October 4, the -
operators heated up the plant and entered mode 3, hot standb .2 Routine Plant Operations The inspector conducted daily control room tours, observed shift turnovers, attended the !
morning station manager's meeting, and monitored plan-of-the-day meetings. The inspector reviewed plant staffing, safety system valve lineups, and compliance with technical specification requirements. The inspector conducted tours in the primary auxiliary building, the emergency diesel generator rooms, the residual heat removal vaults, the turbine building, the condensate storage tank building, and the service water pump house. During the tours and attendance at the various meetings, the inspector noted overall good performance by the operations staf The inspector observed an auxiliary operator (AO), an electrician, and a fire protection technician investigate and resolve a ground on 480 volt bus 1-ED-US-25. The technician identified that the ground originated at the residual heat removal vault air cooled liquid chiller. The AO opened the chiller breaker causing the ground to clear. The inspector observed that the plant workers communicated and functioned effectively as a tea When performing a monthly fuel oil analysis, chemists identified that the total particulate in the 'A' fuel oil storage tank exceeded the technical specification limit of 10 mg/1. Operators declared the 'A' emergency diesel generator (EDG) inoperable and entered a 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> shutdown action statement specified by technical specification (TS) 3.8.1.1. Plant management contracted the services of a vendor who provided a truck mounted oil filtering skid to clean the fuel oi The inspector observed chemistry department management oversight of the filtering rig installation, use, and removal. The oil particulate decreased below TS requirements and operators declared the 'A' EDG operable. The chemistry manager indicated that the fuel oil particulate level had increased, but had leveled off based on oil samples taken over the last several months. The manager indicated that the fuel oil storage tanks are scheduled to be emptied and cleaned during the next refueling outage. The inspector assessed that the plant
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staff reacted well by entering the appropriate TS requirements and filtering the fuel oi !
When the routine turbine electric trip test sequence lasted longer than normal, operators !
I entered a seven day vendor manual recommended allowable period for continued turbine operations. Technical support engineers consulted with the vendor and prepared an evaluation for continued operations beyond the seven day period. The station operations review committee reviewed and approved the evaluation. The inspector assessed that the -
plant staff properly evaluated continued operation with a turbine electrical trip test anomal On September 1, the operations and site utilities department began preparations for a possible hurricane. Operators toured the site identifying ob.iects that needed to be removed or tied down. On September 2, operators entered abnormal procedure OS1200.03, " Severe Weather Conditions," based on tornado warnings resulting from a severe weather front not associated with the hurricane. The inspector noted that operations management developed adequate contingency plans for anticipated weather condition In summary, the inspector assessed that operations personnel performed routine activities wel .3 Automatic Reactor Trip An automatic reactor trip occurred on September 22 due to a reactor coolant pump (RCP)
undervoltage reactor protection system signal that resulted when a generator exciter brush failure caused an electrical grid instability. All four reactor coolant pumps tripped. The operators used the emergency operating procedures to stabilize plant conditions and to verify that natural circulation conditions were established. The shift superintendent decided not to l restart the reactor coolant pumps because of the perturbation on the electrical grid. The l primary plant equipment responded as designed to the reactor trip. Operators made the )
appropriate NRC notificatio !
North Atlantic initiated a post trip review that included an event evaluation. The inspector )
interviewed operators; observed troubleshooting activities; attended several of the event ;
evaluation team meetings; and reviewed the event team evaluation report. The' maintenance I and technical support staff determined that the reactor trip resulted from arcing between the generator exciter collector ring and brushes. The event evaluation team identified six corrective actions required before plant restart and four long term corrective actions. The inspector determined that North Atlantic conspleted a thorough post trip revie Two non-safety related equipment failures occurred shortly after the trip. The welds on the ;
high pressure feed water heater relief valve piping failed. A second equipment failure i occurred when operators restarted the 'D' RCP. The RCP tripped due to a ground faul These two equipment failures are discussed in further detail in Sections 2.1 and 3.1 of this repor After implementing the required corrective actions, the operators brought the reactor critica . _ _ _ _ _ _
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Management directed the reactor be shutdown and cooled down to mode 5 to repair a packing leak on containment isolation valve MSD-V4 I The inspector determined that North Atlantic conducted a thorough post trip review and completed necessary corrective actions before restarting the reactor. The reactor trip occurred due to equipment failure. The inspector concluded operators properly followed procedures to place the plant in a safe condition following the trip and that North Atlantic demonstrated a proper safety perspective by entering an unplanned outage to repair MSD-V4 .4 Engineered Safety Feature System Reviews The inspector verified that valves, breakers, and switches in the containment building spray (CBS) system were lined up in accordance with the CBS system operating procedure and ,
piping and instrument drawing 1-CBS-B20233. The inspector identified the open and shut limit switches for valves CBS-V31 and 32 were incorrectly labelled. An instrument and control technician corrected the labeling deficiencie ,
The inspector conducted a walkdown of the primary component cooling water system using the checklist from EGG-EA-7194, Rev.1, " Probability Risk Assessment Applications Program for Inspection at Seabrook Station, Draft Report," and piping and instrument drawings. The inspector reviewed completed calibration procedures for selected temperature l and flow instruments. The inspector noted no equipment or component problem The inspector concluded that the systems were aligned for normal operations and that instruments calibration were curren .0 MAINTENANCE (61726,62703,92701) Maintenance i The inspector attended morning planning meetings held by different maintenance ,
departments, and the plan-of-the-day meetings. The inspector noted that the maintenance and planning departments managed and performed work well during the unplanned outages. The inspector observed the repair of the generator exciter and the modifications to the feed water heater relief valve piping. The inspector reviewed the following work packages or observed the maintenance activities:
MSD-V44 Corrective Maintenance The inspector observed mechanical maintenance technicians remove the packing from 1 containment isolation valve MSD-V44. MSD-V44 is a motor operated main steam line drain l valve, which is normally open to ensure no water collects in the main steam line. The j
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technicians used the generic valve packing maintenance procedure to perform the work. The l
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inspector noted quality control technical support and maintenance supervisory involvement
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at the work sit After removing the packing, the maintenance technicians identified steam cuts in the internal surface of the packing gland. Plant management decided to replace the valve. The maintenance workers formed a freeze seal upstream of MSD-V44 to prevent moisture from interfering with welding the new valve. The technicians used a grinder to grind out the old valve body. The technicians welded the new valve in place. The motor actuator was not replaced. Electrical maintenance and technical support personnel performed motor operated valve (INSTEAD) testin The inspector assessed that the mechanical and electrical technicians performed well. MSD-V44 is located in the lower level of the west pipe chase and is not easily assessable. The inspector observed effective supervisory oversigh 'A' Main Steam Isolation Valve The inspector observed instrument and control (I&C) technicians and technical support engineers evaluate why the 'A' main steam isolation valve would not open. The engineers identified that the actuator hydraulic oil pressure was lower than normal. The I&C ,
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technicians adjusted the hydraulic pump air regulators to increase the hydraulic fluid pressure. Operators successfully opened the valve. The inspector assessed that the technicians, engineers, and operators communicated effectively and opened the main steam isolation valv Troubleshootine the 'D' Reactor Coolant Pump Ground The inspector observed electrical technicians megger the reactor coolant pump (RCP) power cables per Procedure LS 0564.01, " Isolation Resistance / Dielectric Absorption Testing," and reviewed completed work requests. The electricians identified the cause of the ground as ;
improper installation of a stress relief adapter in an electrical boot for containment electrical l penetration connectors. The stress relief adapter was inserted too far into the boot allowing i arcing between the power cable and the inside of the boot exposed to the containment !
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atmosphere. The electricians inspected the boot assemblies for all RCP power cable connectors inside and outside containment and found several adapters improperly installe The electricians replaced the damaged boot and repositioned the adapters to provide proper seals. Electricians generated a corrective action document to determine the cause of the incorrect position of the adapter ,
The inspector concluded that the electricians and technical support engineers conducted systematic troubleshooting and evaluated the generic implications of the electrical groun I
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5 Motor Operated Valve Testing: Unresolved Item 93-17-01 (OPEN)
l The inspector observed motor operated valve testing of the train 'A' cooling tower service
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water pump discharge valve, SW-V54. The inspector attended the pre-job briefing held the l
day prior to the test; reviewed procedure MS 0514.13, " Butterfly MOV's - Limitswitch l Verincation Using Strain Gauge Measurements;" discussed the test with the responsible technical support engineer and electrical supervisor; reviewed the 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation for removing pump interlocks during valve testing; and verined the tagging orde Electricians, a quality control inspector, the operations work control coordinator, and the technical support engineer attended the pre-job briefing. The electrical supervisor prepared for the test by requesting construction of a seismically qualified scaffold, prestaging test equipment, and preparing a work request for repacking the valve if the valve failed the tes The electricians followed procedures while lifting and landing leads to install a local control switch. The electricians verified, and recorded the lifted and landed leads on a MA 4.5(a)
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" Configuration Modification" form. A quality control inspector, the electrical supervisor, l and the electrical maintenance department supervisor observed the test preparations. An
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electrician landed the power lead for the local control switch on the wrong terminal preventing SW-V54 from closing. The procedure provided sufficient detail for determining
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performance enhancement system (HPES) review of the personnel erro The inspector concluded that the personnel error of incorrectly landing an electrical power lead was preventable by either the electricians, supervisors, or quality control inspector who were participating in the valve test. The inspector noted the personnel error was not an i
isolated event and involved several levels of station management and quality control.
l This is considered to be a further exampic of the type of problems identined in Violation 93- i 13-01 which the licensee is currently developing corrective actions to resolve in the long ter The electricians used a partial release to test SW-V54. Maintenance procedure MA 4.2,
" Equipment Tagging and Isolation," allows a partial release for testing to verify maintenance activities prior to returning equipment to service. When SW-V54 failed to close, the electricians opened the breaker to SW-V54, corrected the wiring error, and closed the breaker under the partial release. MA 4.2, Section 4.2.7 requires a tagging order be restored to its original con 6guration or cleared when testing is completed and does not allow any other activities besides testing to be performed under a partial releas The inspector discussed the work performed under the partial release with the electrical l I maintenance department supervisor, the maintenance manager, the operations department - !
manager, and the nuclear quality manager. North Atlantic stated that making adjustments to l
motor operated valve actuators or changing test equipment configurations could be done
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under a partial release. The maintenance manager planned to formalize the acceptable practices for controlling electrical breakers during motor operated valve testing. The inspector considers the issue of tagging and control of breakers during valve testing to be unresolved pending review of procedural controls. (Unresolved Item 93-17-01)
If SW-V54 fails in the open or intermediate position, interlocks prevent starting the other two train 'A' service water pumps, resulting in all train 'A' service water pumps being inoperable. In this situation section 3.0.3 of the technical specifications requires the reactor to be shutdown within one hour. Operations personnel identified the concern six month ago, when SW-V54 failed in an intermediate position. The operations manager prepared a standing order that provided guidance for removing the service water pump interlocks during testing of cooling tower service water pump discharge valve Based on recommendations of a Yankee Atomic Energy Company service water design review team, the station operations review committee (SORC) reviewed and approved a 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation for disabling service water pump interlocks while testing SW-V5 However, since there was no procedure for removing the interlocks and the 50.59 evaluation provided no directions for conducting the valve testing, the operators were confused on how to meet the intent of the 50.59 evaluation and restore from valve testing. Operators controlled the removal of the interlocks by using the tagging procedure and guidance from a standing order. The operations and technical support managers plan to write a procedure for removing and restoring the pump interlock The inspector noted that the failure to write a procedure for removing a pump interlock described in a 50.59 evaluation resulted in confusion for the operators not involved in the SORC discussions. The inspector determined that the failure to formally review and control removal of pump interlocks was a program weaknes The inspector concluded that the licensee was not strictly adhering to the tagging procedure requirements for partial releases for testing, had not eliminated personnel errors, and did not write a procedure for controlling removal of a pump interloc .3 Emergency Diesel Generator Testing -
A North Atlantic quality control (QC) inspector identified a deficiency in the surveillance test procedure used to satisfy technical specification (TS) requirement 4.8.1.1.2.(a).5. The TS requirement specifies that within ten seconds after a start signal the diesel should reach a speed of at least 514 rpm and the generator frequency should stabilize at 60 plus or minus 1.2 Hz. The surveillance procedure verified that the generator frequency reached between 58.8 Hz and 61.2 Hz within 10 seconds after a start signal. No direct measurement of engine speed exists and no tolerance was allowed for the 514 rpm specificatio North Atlantic determined that since the generator and engine turn at the same speed, the generator voltage and frequency specification satisfies the engine speed specification. The
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inspector reviewed the technical specification and held several discussions with various North !
Atlantic personnel. The NRC agreed with North Atlantic's determination and issued a letter on September 23,1993, that requested North Atlantic propose an amendment to the operating license that resolves the inconsistenc The inspector assessed that the QC inspector possessed a questioning attitude and plant management properly resolved the discrepanc .0 ENGINEERING (37828,71707) . Feed Water Ileater Relief Valve Piping Failures
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Approximately thirty minutes after the reactor trip on Septem?ct 22, the nonsafety related high pressure feedwater (FW) heater relief valve piping failed at the socket welds. The inspector performed a visual inspection of the failure, reviewed and observed modifications made to the piping, and held several discussions with the engineering staff members. The inspector performed a review of the maintenance history ard engineering evaluation and resolution of the failure at the socket welds on the high pressure FW heater relief valve inlet ;
pipin The inspector reviewed the chronological history of FW system pressure excursions. The high pressure feed water heater relief valves opened following the July 29,1990 and August 22,1990 reactor trips. The engineering staff determined that the pressure transients resulted when the feed water regulating valves shut in response to a FW isolation signal generated by the P-4 interlock (reactor trip signal coincident with a low average reactor coolant system temperature). The FW pressure peaks resulted from the combined shut-off heads of the feed water, condensate, and heater drain pump .
During the first refueling outage, the' engineering staffimplemented design change modification 90-644. The modification replaced the type of FW heater relief valves so that the relief discharge stream was directed to the heater shell side drain piping vice discharged to atmosphere in the vicinity of the hesters. The intent of the changes was to improve personnel safety when the relief valves lifted. The modification changed the piping configuration and support scheme. One end of the FW heaters are supported on wheels while the other end is supported by a bolted support saddle structure affixed to the floo The relief valves are located on the end of the FW heater beyond where the fixed support saddle structure exists. The engineering analysis assumed (erroneously) that essentially no- ;
thermal movement of the FW heaters occurred where the relief valves are located. Thtis, the i new style rel;ef valves and piping configurations were rigidly supported to the floor. The f faulty engineering assumption and the resultant rigid support design led to the series of pipe ;
failures detailed below. Engineering also implemented Design Change 91-49 that added over-pressure protection features to the condensate and FW systems. The change added a ;
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Following the January 14, 1993 reactor trip, the first failure at the socket weld on the E-26B l FW heater relief valve inlet piping occurred. The engineering staff concluded that the ;
existing piping design was adequate and that the failure resulted from a defective weld. A .
new piping stress analysis con 6rmed the acceptability of the original engineering analysi i
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Following the July 21,1993 reactor trip, a second failure occurred at the same location. For corrective actions, the socket weld elbows were replaced with smooth pipe bends. North Atlantic had a laboratory analysis performed and identified that a lack of fusion occurred at the toe of the weld. Following the September 22,1993 reactor trip, failure occurred at the !
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socket welds on the E-26A and E-26B FW heaters in summary, a total of four failures occurred in the high pressure FW heater relief valve piping configuratio !
Engineering personnel performed an in-depth study to determine the failure mechanism. The y engineers postulated that the failures were only a symptom of the root cause. The '
engineering staffidentified that the relief valves were rigidly supported to a different support structure than the heater support structure. As the FW heaters expand or contract, the relief 1 valve piping socket welds experienced a high transient stress condition and failed. As stated ;
earlier, the engineering analysis of modification 90-664 had incorrectly assumed no thermal movement occurred at the support saddle end of the heaters. Engineering implemented design change modi 6 cation 93-549 that altered the relief valve piping support such that the :
relief valve piping is attached to the FW heater support saddle. The modi 6 cations also ,
included the installation of a piping expansion loop to allow for some movement of the relief valve piping. Engineering plans to add the piping expansion loops during the next refueling outage. The engineering review identified that the support saddle bolts were loos Maintenance workers tightened the bolts snug tight. The engineering manager indicated that an independent consultant review is planned to further model and review the piping configuratio When cutting the relief valve piping to install the expansion loop, maintenance workers found several nuts in the bottom of the heater. The engineering staffinstructed the maintenance workers to remove the heater diaphragm to facilitate an internal inspection. Several nuts from a divider plate that were improperly lock-wired, had loosened and fallen to the bottom of the heater. Maintenance workers replaced the nuts and properly lock-wired all the divider plate nuts. The maintenance manager indicated that the nuts were improperly lock-wired by contract workers during the last refueling outage. North Atlantic initiated a station information report to review and implement corrective actions for the root cause of the improper lock-wired nut The inspector assessed that modifications to FW relief valve piping, following the September 22,1993 reactor trip, were substantial. Increased engineering management involvement was noted. The inspector determined that a weak engineering analysis for modification 90-664 and a narrowly focused failure mode analyses for the January 14 and July 21,1993 relief valve piping failures caused rework. Incorrect lock-wiring of divider plate nuts inside of the high pressure FW heaters also caused maintenance rewor . - - - - .-. _
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9 Generator Exciter Brush Wear Maintenance The inspector reviewed the maintenance history of the generator exciter brush wear. The inspector performed a visual inspection of the damaged brushes, brush holder assenibly, and collector rings. The inspector discussed the brush failure mode and the brush wear management with the technical support staf The technical support staff identified and evaluated the increased generator exciter brush wear in February,1993. North Atlantic consulted the vendor to develop compensatory measures. The corrective actions included collector ring inspection with a strobe light, increased brush spring tension, and cleaning of the collector ring. During an unplanned shutdown in May,1993, electrical technicians moved the brush rigging axially on the collector ring to provide a new ring surface for brush contact. Operators and technical support engineers observed some minor brush sparking that was spurious in nature. North Atlantic had plans in place to resurface the collector rings during the next refueling outag .
The design of the replacement exciter rotor and brush assembly had several enhancements to ;
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improve the bmsh and collector ring performance. The design included increased rigidity of '
the brush holding assembly, constant tension spring loaded brushes, a new support between the floor and the exciter casing assembly, and increased brush and collector ring surface are The inspector assessed that the technical support staff evaluation of the brush degradation problems was appropriate. The inspector concluded that the new design of the brush assembly should improve the exciter brush performanc .0 PLANT SUPPORT (71707)
' Radiological Controls The inspector observed that the health physics (HP) staff properly implemented the ALARA principle by anticipating the increased radiation levels in the 'B' residual heat removal (RHR)
vault and mechanical penetration area due to a crud burst and operating the RHR syste HP technicians posted the areas as high radiatien areas and then later as locked high radiation areas. HP personnel at the radiological control area entrance cautioned workers verbally and ,
hung warning signs. Auxiliary operators temporarily minimized rounds in these areas. The ,
inspector assessed that HP and plant workers properly implemented the ALARA concep t Security On September 7, an accidental discharge of a shotgun occurred in the security building armory. At the end of a shift, a security officer placed a live round in a weapon vice a snap- l cap when relieving the shotgun firing pin spring tension. The error occurred at the shotgun storage cabinet where live ammunition was mixed with snap-caps. No personnel injuries I
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occurred. The shotgun blast damaged the weapons storage cabinet door and the armory ceiling. North Atlantic notified local law enforcement officials of the incident. The security department management performed an investigation and initiated a station information repor The results of the security officer's fitness-for duty tests were negativ The inspector toured the armory, imerviewed security management, reviewed security procedure GD1326.00, and observed a shift turnover where several guards unloaded and turned in their weapons. The security department made two clanges to the weapons issue procedure. Ammunition and snap-caps are now passed through the issue port, and ammunition is stored away from the shotgun storage cabinet. Loading and unloading oflive ammunition and snap-caps will be conducted at the weapons clearing barrel with a clearing officer present. The inspector assessed that the accidental discharge resulted from weak security program control .
The security department increased patrols in response to a peaceful planned demonstration held outside the south access gate to the owner controlled area. The demonstrators made no attempts to enter the owner controlled area and did not disrupt access to the plan The security department followed the requirements in the fitness-for-duty (FFD) program, when an individual failed a random FFD test. The individual did not work on safety-related equipment and had not entered the protected area on the day of the tes .3 Housekeeping During walkdowns of the primary component cooling system and containment building spray system, the inspector noted extraneous duct tape, unnecessary tags, missing pipe caps, and i missing or incorrect component labels. The inspector discussed the discrepancies with the work control coordinator. After two weeks some discrepancies had not been corrected. The inspector concluded that North Atlantic was slow in correcting housekeeping deficiencie .4 Fire Protection j On September 1, the inspector observed an unannounced shift annual fire drill and the subsequent critique. Third party auditors and site fire protection, quality assurance, security, and operations personnel evaluated the drill. The fire drill began with a report of a fire in the 'A' diesel generator building. The responders donned fire gear, laid out fire hoses, and used self-contained breathing apparatus to enter the diesel generator building. The need to I
card through security doors and the lack of actual smoke reduced the realism of the scenari The evaluators observed fire fighters dress out and monitored communication between the main control room and the fire brigade leader. The evaluators noted good teamwork, command and control, and communications. The inspector concluded that the fire drill was well planned and tested the fire brigade on the performance elements needed to respond to a fir . _ _
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. SAFETY ASSESSMENT / QUALITY VERIFICATION (40500)
The inspector reviewed the 1993 joint utility management audit (JUMA) report, and discussed the report with the quality programs director and the senior vice-president and chief nuclear officer. North Atlantic requested JUMA to evaluate the organizational culture associated with quality program The independent third party audit focused on quality programs contributions to good station operation. The report noted that the North Atlantic staff's perception was that quality programs have improved in the last three years. However, members of the line management felt that quality programs audits were compliance oriented and did not identify significant concerns or opportunities for improvement. The JUMA team noted that some members of line management did not appear to "own" the problems identified by quality programs or to evaluate programs for improvement opportunities. The JUMA team concluded that the effectiveness of quality programs in supporting the station was hampered by lack of effective sponsorship by all levels of management including the executive leve Senior managers discussed the JUMA results and concluded that a negative perception of quality programs existed and that the role of quality programs at Seabrook was not fully understood. North Atlantic plarmed offsite workshops / discussion groups with station managers to define the role of quality and to facilitate restructuring quality program The inspector concluded that the JUMA report accurately identified and defined North Atlantic's weaknesses in the line management's acceptance of quality programs. The inspector determined that senior management's responses to the report were adequat .0 MEETINGS (30702)
'iwo resident inspectors were assigned to Seabrook Station throughout the period. The inspectors conducted back shift inspections on September 1,9,15,21 and 22, and deep back shift inspections on August 29, September 6 and 19, and October Throughout the period, the inspectors held periodic meetings with station management to discuss inspection findings. At the conclusion of the inspection, the inspector held an exit meeting with the station manager and his staff to discuss the inspection findings and observations. The licensee provided better definition of senior management's plans for addressing the JUMA report findings. No proprietary information was covered within the -
scope of the inspection. No written material regarding the inspection findings was given to the licensee during the inspection perio ,
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On September 30, the Regional Administrator toured the plant, and met with the plant and executive management staffs to discuss the station performanc Region-based inspectors conducted the following exit meeting l DATE SUBJECT REPORT N INSPECTOR i 9-17 Pipe Supports 93-14 J. Carrasco 10-2 Fire Protection 93-18 A. Finkle j
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