IR 05000443/1990017
| ML20058D626 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 10/24/1990 |
| From: | Mccabe E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20058D610 | List: |
| References | |
| CON-#490-11001 50-443-90-17, OL, NUDOCS 9011060185 | |
| Download: ML20058D626 (27) | |
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O U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Docket: 50-443 Lleense: NPF56 Seabrook Station, Seabrook, New Ilampshire Inspection Report 50-443/9017 (9/5/90 - 10/14/94)
Inspectors:
Dudley, Senior Resident Inspector
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R. Puhrmeister, Resident inspector A. Cerne, Senior Resident inspector, Construction R. Nimitz, Senior Radiation Specialist Approved By:
b O k O.h 16l24 bo Ebe C. McCabe, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 3B Date OVERVIEW Operations: Events caused by equipment failures were well-controlled. Corrective actions on previous unresolved items and violations were adequate.
Radiological Controls: The investigation of the source of chlorides to the steam generators was detailed, timely, and comprehensive.
Maintenance / Surveillance:
Adequate corrective actions were implemented to address configuration control problems. Programmatic improvements were implemented to strengthen the maintenance department. The core thermal power calculation was determined to be accurate and well-controlled.
Emergency Preparedness:
The emergency drill was an effective training exercise which identified areas needing additional attention.
Security: Immediate corrective actions were taken on inspector observations. Security offic,r training documentation indicated that the program exceeded NRC requirements.
Engineering and Technical Support: Appropriate actions were taken to evaluate the loose parts monitor alarms.
Safety Assessment /Ouality Verification: The final self assessment report for power ascension j
testing corresponded with NRC observations and demonstrated the ability to be self-critical.
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9011060185 901024 l
PDR p, DOCK 05000443 o
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.O TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE 1.0 S u m mary or Activities.............................................................. 1 2.0 Ope rations (71707, 92 701, 93702)............................................... 2 2.1 Plant Tours
2.2 Plant Events
2.3 Facility Tour issues
2.4 (90-10-02) less of Two Offsite A.C. Electrical Power Sources
2.5 (9015-01) Actuation of a Feedwater Isolation Signal
2.6 (90-15-02) (LER 90-019) Shut Containment Distribution Panel Breakers
3.0 Radiological Controls (71707, 92701, 93702).................................. 6 3.1 Plant Tours
3.2 Steam Generator Chloride Contamination
4.0 Maintenance / Surveillance (61706, 61726, 62703, 92701).................... 6 4.1 Maintenance
4.2 Surveillance
4.3 Core Thermal Power Measurements
4.4 (90-10-01) Configuration Control
5.0 Emergency Prepared ness (82301 )................................................. 9 6.0 Secu rity (71707, 81501 )............................................................ 9 6.1 Pir.nt Tours
6.2 Security Training and Qualification Records
7.0 Engineering and Technical Supput (37828)................................... 10 8.0 Safety Assessment / Quality Verification (40500)............................... I1 l
9.0 M ecti ng s (3 0703).................................................................. 1 1 l
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DETAllS i
1.0 Summarv of Activities 1.1 NRC Activittes Two resident inspectors were assigned throughout the period. Through September 21,1990, a Senior Resident Inspector, Construction also was assigned. The 120 inspection hours included 24 backshift hours, of which 15 were deep backshift hours.
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On September 10-14, a region-based inspector inspected radiological controls. The results will be documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-443/90-19.
On September 17-21, a team inspected the Emergency Operating Procedures. The results will be documented in NRC Inspection Report 50 443/90-84.
On September 18, hearings on a petition to revoke Seabrook's full power operating license were held in the U.S. Court of Appeals in Washington, D.C. The appeal contends that the NRC did not follow its procedures in approving the emergency evacuation plan.
On September 18, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeals Board remanded teacher participation in emergency evacuation to the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board for further review.
On September 20, the NRC Indep:ndent Review Team was on site to discuss, with Congressional staff, conclusions reached during previous NRC inspections.
On September 24 28, region-based inspectors reviewed the implementation of Regulatory Guide 1.97, instrumentation for Light-Water Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant and Environs Conditions During and Following an Accident. The results will be documented in NRC l
Inspection Report 50-443/90-20.
On September 25, NRC Commissioner Rogers visited Seabrook Station, accompanied by Mr.
M. Knapp, Director, Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards, NRC Region 1.
The Commissioner met with plant and corporate management, toured the station, and inspected the training facilities. Representatives from the Boards of Selectmen of Amesbury and Salisbury, l
Massachusetts participated in the meetings and tours. Slides used during New Hampshire Yankee's presentation are provided as Attachment I to this report.
On October 9-12, a region-based inspector reviewed compliance with 10 CFR 50.62, L
" Requirements for Reduction of Risk from Anticipated Transients Without Scram Events." The results will be documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-443/90-21,
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1.2 Plant Activities The plant was at 100% power at the beginning of the period. On September 8, power was reduced to 80% to restore adequate seal water flow to Circulating Water Pump CWP-C. Power was returned to 100% the same day.
On September 16, approximately 75 persons demonstrated at the South Gate. Plastic barrels and trash bags were thrown over the owner-controlled area fence. Eleven persons climbed the fence and were arrested by local authorities.
On September 19, power was reduced to 30% due to chloride contamination in the steam generators. After chloride concentration and cation conductivity were reduced below program limits, power was increased to 90% on September 21. Power remained at 90% due to the failure of the CWP-B motor. On October 3, the CWP B motor was replaced and power was raised to 100 %.
2.0 Operations 2.1 Plant Tours Daily, the inspector toured the control room and reviewed operator log books, technical specification action statement tracking logs, tagout logs, and night orders. Assessments were made of technical specification action statements in effect, control room staffing, management oversight, operator awareness of plant conditions and alarms, and operator responses to abnormal events. No unacceptable conditions were noted, inspector tours also included the primary auxiliary building, fuel handling building, waste processing building, turbine building, switchgear rooms, diesel generator building, service water building, cooling towers, and intake structures. No equipment or structural problems were identified. Minor discrepancies were adequately resolved by the licensee.
2.2 Plant Events The inspector observed operator responses to routine and off-normal events. Those responses were conservative and in accordance with required procedures.
Ecolochem trailers have been used to cleanup and demineralize secondary system water throughout the low power and power ascension test programs. Four hours after flushing, sampling and aligning a new Ecolochem trailer for steam generator blowdown to the main condenser, chloride and cation conductivity levels in the steam genera, ors exceeded chemistry program Alert Level Il limits. After a confirmatory sample, the steam ganerator blowdown was aligned to the ocean and a power reduction was initiated in accerds. ace with licensee-established chemistry program requirement '
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Due to low secondary makeup water inventory, the steam generator blowdown was aligned through the trailer to the condenser after about nine hours of blowing down to the ocean. The source of chlorides had not been established, but the rate of reduction of chlorides and cation conductivity in the steam generators decreased after the trailer was placed in service. Blowdown was realigned to the ocean after about ten hours, as soon as secondary makeup water became available. (A 500,000 gallon demineralized storage tank is being installed to provide an additional source of makeup water.)
A new trailer was received, flushed, sampled using a more sophisticated test, and aligned to the main condenser. (This trailer was prepared in St. Louis, Missouri, whereas the contaminated trailer was prepared in Norfolk, Virginia.) Chloride and cation conductivity dropped below licensee-established Alert Level I chemistry limits, and power was increased.
At approximately 95% power, CWP B was stopped due to reports of increased noise. After inspection, an uncoupled run of the motor resulted in lower bearing and stator damage. Power was increased to 100% after a replacement motor was installed.
While preparing for a battery service test, the licensee realized that the Technical Specifications (TSs) require the test to be done while shutdown. The licensec decided to delay the test until a TS change could be obtained to allowing testing at power.
Power-Operated Relief Valve PORV A was declared inoperable due to dual position indication.
During repair, reactor coolant leakage increased. The leakage was from the PORV-A block valve packing. Block valve back seating stopped the leak. A requirement to back-seat the block valve after its quarterly surveillance was added to the procedure.
The inspector concluded that the operators responded well to the above events. TSs were properly followed.
Entries into and exits from Limiting Conditions for Operation were documented in accordance with procedures. Operator actions were timely and indicative of an appropriate safety perspective.
2.3 Facility Tour issues Observations made during a January 3,1990 tour were documented in Inspection Report 50-443/89-20.- Follow-up findings are provided below, item 2: 1-CBS LE-23851 has oil leaking from a conduit: CBS-LE-2384 and 2385 were filled with silicone oil to conform to the as ter'.ed condition for environmental qualification. To maintain the qualified condition, the conduit to the transmitters was also filled in order to provide a reservoir to makeup for leakage. Since scepage at the connections was a concern, the oil level was checked regularly. The check was conducted in accordance with Routine Task Sheet (RTS)
rdO2118 for train "A" (2384) and RTS rdO2119 for train "B" (2385), The check was originally
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performed weekly due to the concern for loss of environmental qualification if the oil fill were lost. As there was no detectable decrease in level, the interval was gradually extendal to quarterly.
It was reported in IR 50-443/90 12 that Request for Engineering Services RES 90-0014 had been generated to evaluate the condition. RES 90-0014 he >cen dispositioned to replace the level indicating system for the containment sumps. The details and schedule for the modification are in planning. Based upon routine verification of adequate oil fill to ensure the level detectors remain in their qualified condition, this item is closed.
Jtem 7: Control room manning requirements inside the ' sacred' area should be better defined:
Revision 25 to the Operations Management Manual (OPMM) was issued with an effective date of August 23,1990. OPMM Chapter 1, Section 5.3, *No Solo Operation" requires an additional licensed individual to be present whenever an operator is performing li:ensed activities. Chapter 3, Section 1.1.2 now requires a licensed operator to be in the 'at the controls' area at all times, it also requires the Senior Reactor Operator to remain in the ' Emergency' area and spend most of his time where he can see and supervise the operator 'at the controls.' Chapter 3, Section 1.7.3 provides guidance on the number of people in the "Horseshoc Area," formerly called the
' sacred' area. This item is closed.
2.4 (Closed) Unresolved item 90-10-02: less of Two Offsite A.C. Sources Two offsite lines to the 345 KV switchyard were deenergized when one line was grounded due to an inadequate switching order. A root cause analysis recommended revising Operations Department Instruction ODI.12, " Switching Orders," and Operations Department Procedure ON 1046.13, 345 KV Switchyard Bypass Key Request and Control. The changes required direct involvement by the issuing supervisor and an independent check of all switching orders. The inspector verified that acceptable changes were made to the procedures.
New Hampshire Yankee held discussions with the dispatchers to reinforce the Technical Specification requirements for notification of a loss of any offsite 345 KV power line to Seabrook. The inspector noted that the dispatchers have since notified the shift superintendent of any 345 KV switching on the grid. The inspector reviewed the Dispatcher's Seabrook Substation System Operating Procedures and verified the adequacy of the procedural requirement for prompt notifications. This item is closed.
i 2.5 (Closed) Unresolved Item 00-15-01: Feedwater Isolation Sicnal l
In response to actuations of P-14 feedwater isolation signals due to spurious steam generator high level signals after reactor trips, New Hampshire Yankee implemented short term procedural guidance changes and initiated a long term equipment modification. Information on the cause of the feedwater isolation signal and the procedure for resetting feedwater isolations were included in the licensed operator continuing training program.
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A Design Change Request (DCR) to add a lead / lag card with a time constant of 1.6 seconds to the steam generator channels that share the upper steam generator tap with the steam flow transmitters is planned. The DCR is scheduled to be reviewed by the Station Operations Review Committee on February 22, 1991. The inspector concluded that the licensec was acceptably
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addressing this item.
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A note was incorporated in Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP) ESO.1, ' Reactor Trip Response,' which identified the possibility of initiating a P-14 feedwater isolation signal. The inspector noted that step 7e of FR-H.1, " Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink," also requires resetting the feedwater isolation signal but does not include a note on the oossibility of initiating a P-14 signal. The inspector considered the procedural changes to be adequate based
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on the continuing training and the planned system modification. This item is closed.
2.6 (Closed) Violation 90-15-02 and Licensee Event Report (LER) 90-019: Closed Containment Distribution Panel Breakers Circuit breakers that feed electrical loads in the containment were closed in excess of the 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> allowed by Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.4.1. New Hampshire Yankee (NHY) issued a Licensee Event Report (LER) on August 17,1990 and a response to the violation on Septt iber 14,1990. These v cre based on a Root Cause Analysis and a Human Performance Enhancement System Evaluatian. The inspector reviewed the LER, the response to the violation, and the corrective actbns taken.
NHY determined that the primary cause of the event was failure to follow procedures. The
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breakers' positions were not recorded in the Action Statement Status (ASS) Log as required and steps for verifying the breakers open in Procedures ON 1090.04, Containment Entry," and OS 1058.01, * Operating the Containment Personnel Hatches," were not performed. As corrective action, Procedure ON 1090.04 was revised to require an entry in the ASS log every time the breakers were closed and to require that form ON 1090.04A, " Containment Closecut Form," be completed. This form is a checklist which includes verifying the breakers are open. Procedure ON1090.04 also requires exiting the TS 3.8.4.1 action statement for two hours before reclosing the electrical breakers.
The Operations Manager discussed the violation individually with each Shift Superintendent.
Additional discussions with operators detern.ined that they were aware that the purpose of locking the breakers open is to ensure the integrity of the associated containment penetrations.
Licensee evaluation of the feasibility of a design change to preclude recurrence of this type of
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event is in progress.
The inspector reviewed the procedure changes, held discussons with Feensed operators and verified proper entries were made in the ASS log. The inspector concluded that the corrective actions were adequate. This item is close.
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3.0 Radiological Controls 3.1 Plant Tours
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The inspector toured the radiological controlled area, reviewed posted survey maps, and obsen'ed radiological practices. Minor discrepancies were discussed with health physics personnel and adequately resolved.
3.2 Steam Generator Chloride Contamination The Chemistry Department determined that the chlorides in the steam generators came from an Ecolochem trailer used for steam generator blowdown water cleanup. The chlorides were identified by offsite analysis as 1-2 dichloral propane. This organic compound decomposes under high temperature and pressure. The Chemistry Department developed and initiated a more sophisticated test of Ecolochem trailer discharge water to measure both purgable and non-purgable organics.
In discussions with the supplier, NHY determined that the contamination was from a poor batch of resin used in the trailer. NHY is evaluating the issuance of a Part 21 report on the event.
The inspector concluded that appropriate actions were taken and that the investigation of and corrective actions for the source of chloride contamination was detailed, timely, and comprehensive.
4.0 Maintenance / Surveillance 4.1 Maintenance The inspector observed activities and reviewed documentation related to the replacement of NG-V 129, a nitrogen supply valve to the Ixtdown Degasifier. Work was performed in accordance with work order 89W004464, and consisted of removing and replacing the valve and reorie: ting the new one 90 degrees from the vertical so that it could be refurbished using standard tools.
The inspector reviewed the work request, welding procedure, procedure qualification report, issue tickets and ignition source permit. The inspector observed weld preparations, welding equipment setup, and the progress of the actual welding. The inspector noted that ASME welding procedures, materials and controls were used, even though the system was required to meet less restrictive B31.1 procedures.
The inspector observed activities related to the rescaling of the underground electrical cable i
vaults. The work involved recaulking the slab / wall joint of the vaults, recaulking the joints in the cover slabs, notation of the depth of any water present, noting the condition of cables and l
supports in the vaults, excavation of several vaults to allow placing an impermeable membrane over the slab /walljoint, and drilling holes in the manway plugs. This last item will allow future t
water checks to be performed by simply removing a 4" plug and inserting a dips *ick. The size l
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of the hole will also permit passage of a suction hose for dewatering using portable pumps. The inspector interviewed engineers and construction tradesmen involved and found them to be knowledgeable of the work requirements and controls. The inspector noted no discrepancies and
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concluded that the observed maintenance activities were conducted properly.
4.2 Surveillance The insocctor observed the conduct of surveillances OX1456.43, " Train B ESFAS Slave Relays K601, K622, K624 Quarterly Go Test," and OX1413.01, "RHR Quarterly Flow and Valve Stroke Test and 18-hionth Valve Stroke Observation,* which were conducted concurrently. A
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change to OX1456.43 replaced a trundle on the diesel generator breaker with an electrical jumper. The effect of the jumper was verified to be the same as the use of the trundle before
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the surveillance was conducted. No discrepancies were noted.
m 4.3 Core Thermal Power Measurements The inspector reviewed the procedures and requirements for calculating core thermal power to assure compliance with the licensed maximum thermal power level of 3411 megawatts thermal (hiWt). The inspector reviewed 72 consecutive hourly values for instantaneous, four-minute, one hour, and eight hour averages of computer calculated thermal power, as well as the corresponding power range nuclear instrumentation readings. The calibrations of all instruments used for the computer calculaticas and their default values in the computer program were verified. The inspector observed operator response to a loss of computer event and held discussions with plant personnel.
All eight-hour averages were below 3411 htWt. Some less frequent averages were above 3411 htWt, however, there was no indication that power was intentionally raised above 3411 htWt to boost the eight hour average.
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Core thermal power measurement is made more precise calculating the heat losses to the chemical and volume control system (CVCS). The instruments used are checked against a band width to identify unreliable channel readings. Default values are used for parameters determined
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to be questionat'e and an overall default value of 2.5 hiW may be substituted for the CVCS heat loss, in all cases, default values result in calculating a thermal power greater than the power calculated using nominal values for the parameters with an error of less than +0.3 hiW.
Based on power ascension testing, the Tc (cold leg temperature) on which the default value of 560F was based increased from 558F to 559F. This change, which is an input to the core thermal power calculation, did not change the evaluation of the default value and corresponding requirements. Also, as the resuk of testing, the steam generator moisture carryover value was reduced from the design value oi J.25% to the average measured value of 0.024% Due to its small effect, the vendor recommended not including carryover in the thermal power calculation.
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In responw to the inspector's questions, Procedure OS 1000.10 " Operations at Power," was modified to require the average of the operating power range nuclear instruments to be monitored and maintained at 100% or less when the main plant computer is unavailable to calculate core thermal power. Also, the power range nuclear instruments were adjusted daily to accumulate data on instrument drift.
The inspector concluded that the thermal power calculation gogram is accurate, precise, reliable, and well-controlled, and that the procedure for monitoring core thermal power when the computer is unavailable is adequate. Also, thermal power was maintained below required limits and that no attempt was made to intentionally operate above the thermal limit.
4.4 (Closed) Violation 40-10-01: Configuration Control New Hampshire Yankee (NHY) presented corrective action for a violation involving loss of configuration control in a letter dated June 25,1990. The immediate corrective actions were assessed in NRC Inspection Report 50-443/90-10 and determined to be acceptable.
Corrective actions for the failure to identify and control second instrument isolation valves included plans to lock-wire the valves open and to modify Repetitive Task Sheets (RTSs) and instrument calibration procedures. The inspector verified that the second isolation valves on instrument racks were lock-wired open, and that RYSs for technical specification protection instrument valve line-ups included a check of all associated valves in the instrument racks. Also, the inspector verified that the calibration procedures included steps for verifying position of the second isolation valve and the instrument rack vent and drain valves. The inspector concluded that these corrective actions were adequate.
The inspector reviewed the changes to procedure OS 1090.05, " Component Configuration Control," and MA 4.2, " Equipment Tagging and Isolation," which were incorporated to ensure proper positioning of Wide Range Gas Monitor purge air line valves. The inspector reviewed the changes made to the Operations Manual and the Station Management Manual to assure preper control of equipment troubleshooting. The Operations Manual requires permission from the Station Manager prior to restarting equipment for continued troubleshooting. The Station Management Manual requires documentation of work in progress at the time of turnover. The inspector found these procedure changes adequate.
The inspector reviewed the preliminary NHY report evaluating the plant's overall Work Control Program for configuration control. That report identified the need for: consolidation and simplification of the various configuration control documents; increased accountability for attention to detail; and improved training programs in configuration control. Recommendations were presentea in 17 specific topical areas. The report was reviewed for completeness by the Plant Manager prior to submittal to Group Managers for dispositioning and implementation. The inspector concluded that the licensee had effectively identified areas in the configuration control program which require assessment.
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Based on the completion of immediate corrective actions and ongoing long-term corrective i
actions, this violation is closed.
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5.0 Emergency Preoaredness An emergency drill on October 3,1990 involved participation by five New Hampshire towns and three Reception Centers. The drill scenario involved a bomb threat, loss of all electrical power, and a loss of coolant accident outside the containment. The inspector reviewed the scenario; observed portions of the drill in the simulator, the technical support center and the operations h
support center; held discussions with emergency planning personnel; and reviewed the critique of the drill.
The inspector determined that the scenario was well-developed, exercised decision making, and exercised the command and control functions without simulating detailed operational and
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engineering problems. This drill was used to train exercise drill controllers and players in new positions. The inspector noted that the implementation of the scenario appeared at times to be artificial, with controllers interacting with players to maintain the scenario on track. The critique
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of the drill identified several areas for improvement.
The inspector concluded that the drill was an effective training exercise that provided experience in responding to emergencies and identified areas which required additional attentica.
6.0 Secun,ty 6.1 Plant Tours The inspector observed routine security activities including personnel and vehicle searches, compensatory measures for work on the new protected area fence and a shift turnover in the Control Alarm Station. Also, the inspector reviewed the fitness-for-duty suspension of a contractor and the subsequent licensee check of the contractor's past work, No discrepancies were noted.
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In response to an inspector's observation, Procedure GS 1302.00, " Control of Vehicles," was changed to require a second security officer to remain with an unlocked or running vehicle if the security officer escorting the driver was out of the line-of-sight from the vehicle cab.
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In response to an observation of unprofessional communications between security officers, disciplinary action was taken and the requirements for professional communications were stressed
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to all security officers.
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6.2 Security Training and Oualification Records
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The inspector reviewed the training and qualification records for 15 persons (~ 10% of security force personnel). That documentation met the requirements of 10 CFR 73, Appendix B, Criterion I.F. The inspector verified that the records documented initial qualification and annual requalification of personnel required by 10 CFR 73.
The inspector noted that the minimum scores for firearms qualification were higher than those specified in the regulations. The security training supervisor indicated that this was due, in part, l
to the State of New Hampshire having stringent requirements for a private guard force. The
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State requirements also caused a change to the shotgun course of fire which is documented in Revision 5 to the Training and Qualification Plan.
The inspector noted that the records showed several instances where personnel did not accomplish the required annual requalification either due to having missed the requalification or due to inadequate performance, in those instances, the personnel were removed from associated duties until retraining and requalification were completed. An example was the failure of several persons to achieve adequate scores for firearms requalification. They were removed from armed guard / response force duties until they fired satisfactory scores. Another example was an individual who missed a scheduled retraining and requalification. Ha completed retraining and requalification after his return to work and before being assigned to security duties.
l Firearms qualifications were observed by NRC specialist inspectors during their inspection on June 18 22,1990. This included shotgun qualification and pistol qualification for six people
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selected at random by the training supervisor and NRC inspectors. No deficiencies were noted.
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7.0 Encineerine and Technical Suncort
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i Intermittent alarms on the Steam Generator SG B above tube sheet detector channel of the Loose
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Parts Monitor were verified audibly. Tapes were sent to the Technology For Energy Corporation j
for analysis. Preliminary results were provided in a report issued September 24,1990. The report determined that the noise was high frequency bursts which were not typical ofloose parts.
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Also, the tapes of the other two detector channels for SG B did not contain any corresponding
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noises.
The postulated noise causes were impacts on the hardline cable attached to the accelerometer, loose insulation tapping on the accelerometer, or loose detector support structures.
New Hampshire Yankee plans to investigate the postulated causes of the noise when the steam i
generator accelerometer is accessible. The inspector concluded the licensee took appropriate action in response to these loose Parts Monitor alarms.
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8.0 Safety Assessment /Ouality Verification New Hampshire Yankee (NHY) issued their Power Ascension Test Program Final Phase 2 Self-Assessment Report on September 11, 1990. The report assessed performance of the Power Ascension Test Program since the 50% plateau assessment, which was reviewed in NRC IR 50-443/90-15. New Hampshire Yankee presented the conclusions of the report at a public meeting at King of Prussia, Pennsylvania on September 18, 1990. A transcript of that meeting was issued.
Inspector review found that the report defined the methodology used to reach the final assessments and provided details for the basis of those assessments. Six recommendations were included in the report, raising the total number of recommendations made by the Self Assessment Team (SAT) during Phase 2 of the self assessment to 59. Seven of the recommendations have been closed and the remaining $2 are being tracked to completion in the NHY Integrated Commitment Tracking System. The inspector concluded that the report was self critical and provided sufficient detail to support the conclusions reached.
During the public meeting, NHY presented the finding of the report which included:
The Power Ascension Test Program (PATP) was conducted in a deliberate,
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cautious and conservative manner.
The PATP was effectively supported by engineering, technical support, maintenance,
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health physics and quality assurance groups.
Management was actively involved in the operation and testing of the plant.
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Several maintenance program areas warrant enhancement.
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The NRC staff asked questions on configuration control, development of a radioactive waste disposal program, initiatives in quality assurance programs, root cause analyses, and enhancements for the maintenance program.
The findings and assessments of the SAT report corresponded well with the observations made by the NRC staff during the PATP evaluation and routine inspections. The actions taken by NHY to implement the recommendations appear to be appropriate. Overall, the NRC staff concluded that the SAT report demonstrated the ability to be self-critical.
9.0 Meetings The scope and findings of the inspection were discussed periodically throughout the inspection period. An oral summary of the preliminary inspection findings were provided to the plant manager and his staff at the conclusion of the inspection.
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Region-based inspectors conducted the following exit meetings.-
DAls SnMact Renort No.
Inspector 9 14 Radiological Controls 90-19 R. Nimitz 9 21 EOP 90-84 P. Bissett 9 28 Reg Guide 1.97 90 20 N. DellaGreca 10-12 10 CFR 50.62, (ATWS)
90-22 A. Finkel
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ATTACHMENT
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IR 90-17
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O NHY/PSNH/YAEC/ Joint Owner Relationship Joirt PSNH Presidert Owners
& Chief Executive Offcor l
LE. MAGLATHUN, JR.
Exocutko Committoe of Joint Owners G.W. EDWARDS, CHAIRMAN D.G. PARDUS,VICE CHAIRMAN I
Poky, agget a reaxw Lterdng & Ucense<ewed mar: cts NHY Presidert
& Chief Executive Offcor E.A. BROWN i
l Senior Yankoe Atomic Vice Presidert Electric Co. - - - -
& Chief Oper;tirq Officer SUPPORT T.C. FElGENBAUM l
NHY OrJanization New Hampshire -
Yankee
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i New Hampshire Yankee ORGANIZATION
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& tbareg 0.aky Pnges Emergency Pregedness $m. -
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Power Ascension Test Program MAJOR TESTS PERFORMED ST 22 Natural circulation test ST 35 Large load reduction ST-38 Unit trip from 100% power
ST-39 Loss of offsite power ST 33 Shutdown from outside the control room ST34 Load swing test ST-48 Turbine-generator startup test k
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CORE VALUES AND WORK ETHIC The core values and work ethic address:
Professionalism Safety Excellence Integrity and Ethics Teamwork Quality Respect
Accountability Cost Effectiveness and Communication New Hampshire -
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Self AssessmentTeam AREAS 0: EVA_ A Oh 1. Power ascension 2. Operations 3. Maintenance and work control 4. Testing and surveillance 5. Radiation protection, chemistry and radioactive waste 6. Training 7. Quality programs 8. Engineering and technical support 9. Management effectiveness yg;
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SELF ASSESSMENTTEAM COMPOSITIOrJ Years NHY Experience Team Manager
Startup Manager
Shift Superintendent (SRO)
Quality Assurance Senior Engineer
Startup Test Director
YANKEE ATOMIC Radiation Protection Manager
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CONTRACTORS Startup Manager
Project Manager
Ex NRC Site Section Chief
Maintenance Manager
Maintenance Manager
Maintenance Supervisor
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MANAGEMENT OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE COMPOSITION Edward A. Brown President & Chief Executive Officer
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Ted C. Felgenbaum Senior Vice President & Chief Operating Officer
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Bruce L Drawbridge Executive Director Nuclear Production
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R. Jeb DeLoach Executive Director Engineering & Ucensing
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Neal A. Pillsbury Director of Quality Programs
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Donald E. Moody Station Manager
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e NRC FORM 6 OUTSTANDING ITEMS FILE SINGLE DOCKET ENTRY FOkM Docket Numbers: 50-443 Originator: Dudley, Noel Reviewing Supervisor: McCabe Report Hours 50-443 1 Operations
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6. Eng/ Tech Support 1 7. Safe Asst /QV
._4 120 OUTSTANDING ITEMS FILE SINGLE DOCKET ENTRY FORM Docket Numbers: 50-443 Originator: Dudley, Noel Reviewing Supervisor: McCabe The following items were addressed during this report period.
Open Closed NV4 9010-01 UNR 90-10-02 UNR B15-01 NV4 90-15 02 LER B019 i
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