IR 05000443/1997006
| ML20199L326 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 11/20/1997 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20199L315 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-443-97-06, 50-443-97-6, NUDOCS 9712010378 | |
| Download: ML20199L326 (29) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION .
REGION I
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- Docket No.;- 50-443 License No.: T NPF-86 ;
50-443/97-06-
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Report No.:--
' Licensee:- North Atlantic Energy Service Corporation ,
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. Facility: Seabrook Generating Station, Unit 1
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Lc : ..on: - Post Office Box 300 Seabrook, New Hampshire 03874 i Dates:: August _16,1997 - October 4,_1997 -
Inspectors: F. Paul Bonnett, Senior Resident inspector (Acting)
- William T. Olsen, Resident inspector Glen Dentel, Resident inspector ;
Javier Brand, Resident inspector intern
- Ram S. Bhatia, Electrical Engineer, DRS Christopher Welch, DRS 5
Approved by: Richard J. Conte, Chief, Projects Branch 8 Division of Reactor _ Projects s
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Seabrook Generating Station, Unit 1 NRC Inspection Report 50 443/97-06 This integrated ins 9ection included aspects of licensee operations, engineering, maintenance, and plant support. The report covers an 7-week period of resident and specialist inspectio Operations:
- Seabrook Stat!on's conduct of operations was professional and focused on safety principles (Section 01.1).
- Operators closely monitored and maintained control of key reactor plant parameters including: reactor power, axial flux differential, and steam generator levels throughout the "A" main feedwater pump (MFP) steam supply pipe oscillations event. Shift and operations management determined that the pipe oscillations did not warrant an immediate plant trip, and decided to reduce power to remove the
"A" MFP from service. The issue of whether the decision to reduce power using the emergency boration flowpath instead of initiating a plant trip was appropriate remains open pending NRC review of the licensee's review of this even * Operator awareness and usage of the process to identify and clean boric acid leakage from the "A" safety injection pump mechanical seal was ineffective since boric acid was not being cleaned from the purnp on a regular interval. Further, the failure to cleanup the seal area on a regular basis made trending of the leak rate difficult. The system engineer adequately assessed the pump's mechanical seal leakage, however, the inspector noted that the possible failure mode of increased leakage without drainage was not evaluated (Section O2.2).
Maintenance:
- The installation of the makeup totalizer modification was well coordinated. Good inter-departmental cooperation was demonstrated. Station and operations management demonstrated a conservative approach to conducting the on-line maintenance by establishing contingency plans for addressing a rapid power reduction scenario (Section M1.1).
- Several performance problems occurred during the troubleshooting and repair activities for the A MFP that collectivel/ resulted in the A MFP f ailing to trip during the post-maintenance trip test. A lack of self-check and questioning attitude on the part of supervision and technicians resulted in the use of an inadequate procedure, poor configuration control (failure to document lifting electrical leads) during corrective maintenance, and adherence to procedures (Section M1.2).
- The plant staff demonstrated good plant awareness in identifying the leak in the circulating water piping. Maintenance technicians responded well to stop the leak ii I
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Engineering's evaluation of the issue was very good, in that, it identified a non-conformance between the plant's configuration and the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR). Comprehensive corrective actions were implemented to address the issue (Section M1.3).
Epaineerina:
e Overall, Seabrook performed the fuelinspection activities well. The inspector observed adequate Reactor Engineering supervisory and vendor oversight on the job. Further, there was excellent HP coverage and radiation controls, good FME program implementation, adequate Operations support, and adequate self-assessment by the QA Department. The inspector concluded that several minor issues had no effect on the safe implementation of the fuelinspections, and that they were promptly and adequately evaluated and addressed. The station's procedure review was completed in accordance with Technical Specifications (Section E1.1).
- A weakness existed in the mali.tenance/ procurement engineering (PE) interface, such that a barrier to ensuring the use of the correct replacement conigonent broke down. Personnel performing the work identified the wrong component in the field, but that information was never related to PE contrary to the guidance in MA (Section E8.1).
Plant Support:
e Security personnel properly rer.ponded to alarms caused by card readers inaccurctely reading security a: cess cards. The security staff adequately demonstrated that the security system appropriately alarmed and identified errors in access control (Section S1.1).
- The fire suppression system configuration in the main control room meets the requirements of the station's fire protection program. With no automatic Halon system in the control room, the negative implications caused by an inadvertent initiation or release of Halon into the control room do not apply. Seabrook management adequately evaluated and implemented corrective actions to provide adequate guidance for operations personnel use of SCBAs (Section F1.1).
e Seabrook Station's fire suppression systems meet General Design Criterion 3 with respect to inadvertent operation of fire suppression systems (Section F2.1).
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LTABLE OF CONTENTS)
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1 . . :. '. . . . . . . . . . : . . . . . . . . . ._ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . '. . 11
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- TABLE OF CONTENTS T. _ . . . . . .' . . . . . . . . . . . .' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1. . . . . . . . . L iv -
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i i t. L Operations" . . . . ........_.................-.......:.................1 -i
- 01 - Cr . duct of Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 01.1 ' General Comments (71707) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . - 1
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0112' Main Feed Pump Oscillations - Reactor Power Reduction . . . -... . . 1- ,
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,02 Operational Status of Facilities'and Equipment ....,,............3, I
- 02.10 Routine Plant Tours . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .- . 3
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LO2.2 . . Safety injection Pump Mechanical Seal Leakage . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~
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07 Quality Assurance in Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
,07.1 Technical and Safety Reviews . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 a 08 Miscellaneous Operations issues .' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........... 5 1 08.1 (Closed) URI 50 443/97 02 02: Temporary Installation of Portable Heaters in the Cooling Tower Pump Room. . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4 08.2 thansee Event Report Review . . _. . . . L . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . ... 6 08.3 (Closed) LER 50-443/94-06-00:"Unanalyzed Tornado Loading on
- Ventilation Damper /Ductwork and Metal Partitions". . . . . . . . . . . 6 ,
08.4 '-(Closed) LER 50-443/94-13-00:"Non-compliance with Technical Specification 3.9.12 Action Renuirements" . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .:7 ,
08.5 5 (Closed) LER 50 443/94-015-00:" Missed Technical Specification 4.0.5 Surveillance". . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 11. M ai n t e n a n c e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 M1 Conduct of M aintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
- M 1.1 Makeup Totalizer Modification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 M1.2 Main Feed Pump Troubleshooting and Repair . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . 9
- M1.3 Circulating Water Leak Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
111. Eng i ne a r in g . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2
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El Conduct of Engineering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 E1.1 _ Follow-up inspection of Failed Fuel Rods and Fuel Assemblies , , . 12 E8 Miscellaneous Engineering issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 "
E8.1. (Closed) Unresolved item 5.0-443/97 04-04: Engineering Evaluation of Dissimilar Replacement Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 IV. : Plant Support ................................................15
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-R8 Miscellaneous RP&C lssues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 .
R8.1= (Closed) LER 50-443/94-04-00:" Missed Surveillance.- Technical Specification 3.3.3.10, Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Monitoring 4 Instrumentation". . . . -. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . . . . . . 15
R8.2 _ (Closed) LER 50-443/97-13-OO: Inoperable Turbine Gland Seal Condenser Exhaust Radioactive Gaseous Efficent Monitor. . . . . . 15
- S1 Conduct of Security'and Safeguards Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 c
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S1.1 Secur_ity 8adge Failures . . . . . . ._ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .-. .- . . . . . -16 F1 Control of Fire Protection Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . 17 F1.1- Control Room Fire Suppression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , .17
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F2 :Sta:us of Fire Protection Facilities and Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18-
- F Design of Fire Suppression Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
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V. M a nageme nt Meetings : . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
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X1 Exit Me eting Summ ary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 X3 Other NRC Activitie s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 PARTIAL LIST _ OF PERSONS CONTACTED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
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INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
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LIST O F ACRO NYMS U SED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 t
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Report Details Summarv of Plant Statu![
Seabrook Station bagan this inspection period operating at 100% powar. On September
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15, operators reduced reactor power to 49% due to sustained oscillations in the "A" main feed pump (MFP) governor valve servd unit. T he "A" MFP was removed from service and repaired. However, during power ascension on September 17, with reactor power at 90%,
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the MFP governor oscillations recurred and operators reduced reactor power to 50% e :d removed the "A" MFP from service. Operators restored the unit to 100% power on September 19 and operated essentially at full power for the remainder of the period, with minor power reductions to support instrument calibrations and turbine valve testin l. Operations 01 Conduct of Operations 01.1 General Comments (71707)
Using Inspection Procedure 71707,the inspectors conducted frequent reviews of ongoing plant operations. In general, Seabrook Station's conduct of operations was professional and focused on safety principle .2 Main Feed Pump Oscillations - Reactor Power Reduction Insoection Scone (71707)
Ca September 15, at 7:45 p.m., control room operators ;icted oscillation of the "A" mai feed pump (MFP) governor control valve position and the stcam flow indications to the e MFP. Operators were unable to immediately reduce reactor power to remove the MFP from service due to a rod control system failure. The inspector observed portions of the control room activities during the event and portions of the troubleshooting activities. The inspector discussed the event with various operations department personnel, Observations and Findinas The operators became aware of the MFP p?biem when the _"A" MFP Emergency Oil Pump Running alarm annunciated in the main control room. The operators observed that steam flow and governor control valve positiori indication were oscillating. The operators noted that the actual speed of the MFP was not changing significantly and that steam generator (SG) levels and feed regulating valve iFRV) positions remained stable. The operators dispatched a nuclear shift operator (NSO) to the MFP and contacted the system engineers to assist in troubleshooting the MFP governor. The NSO snd system engineers observed the governor control valve servo cycling from full open and to full closed, lifting the high pressure steam inlet poppet,.which caused the long length of 4 inch high pressure steam supply piping to vibrate. Shift management notified the security supervisor to restrict normal access to the turbine building in the event the pipe faile .. .
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With reactor power and SG levels essentially steady, shift management evaluated the high pressure steam pipe oscillations to determine if power could be reduced to remove the MFP from service or if a plant trip was necessary. They determined that the pipe oscillations were not at the point to justify placing a major transient (plant trip) on the plant and decided to perform a controlled power reduction to 55% power to iemove the MFP from service. The system engineers and l&C supervisor believed that foreign materialin the control oil system could be causing the servo to hunt. This problem had occurred previously on June 29, during the startup from the refueling outage, and was the subject of an adverse condition report (ACR)97-173 The shift manager directed the operators to reduce power per operating procedure OS1000.06, Power Decrease. The operators were to use control rods to start the down power evolution, maintaining axial flux differential (AFD) close to the target value, and to borate per the contingency plan through the emergency boration valve, CS-V426 using procedure OS1202.04, Rapid Boration. However, when the reactor operators attempted to insert control rods, the rods failed to move. The operators entered abnormal procedure OS1210.2, Failure of Cor: trol Rods to Move, which directed the operatnrs to stop any power increase / decrease evolution and allow l&C technicians to troubleshoot and repair the rod control proble The shift manager then directed that power should be reduced using the emergency boration flow path to reduce the high pressure steam piping oscillations ner a contingene ,
procedure developed for work in progress. The emergency boration path was used due u normal blended makeup path being out-of-service for the boric acid blender modification (see Suction M1.1). Prior to performing the boric acid blender modification the licensee had established contingency actions in the event that the plant experienced a transient that would require a power reduction. The decision to reduce reactor power using the emergency boration flowpath war .:onsistent with the contingency plan. The inspector noted that the decision to reduce power using the continency plan instead of maintaining power steady in accordance with the abnormal rod control procedure was not documente The shift manager directed that a plant trip be initiated at any time that the operators believed the plant to be in an unstable condition or excessively challenged. The inspector questioned whether the decision to reduce power using the emergency boration flowpath in lieu of initiating a plant trip was appropriate since this increased the amount of time required to mitigate the steam pipe oscillations. Operations management initiated ari ACR to review this event. The inspector will further inspect this issue pending completion of the licensee's review of the ACR findings. (URI 50643/97-06-01)
The cperators successfully decreased reactor power to 92% which reduced the high pressure steam piping oscillations. The lower steam demand also reduced the MFP servo oscillations which stopped the MFP high pressure poppet valve fr;m cycling ope Operators held power at 02% until the rod control system could be repaired and because AFD was trending toward the upper limit. Power could not be reduced further with boric acid alone without violating AFD limits and entering a 15 minute TS limiting condition for operation (LCO). Further, work vn the MFP could not be performed until it was removed from service. -To further reduce steam line oscillations and the effects of the "A" MFP
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governor oscillation, the operators placed the "B" MFP in manual and increased pump load which unloaded the "A" MF On September 16, following the repair to the control rod drive system, operators decreased reactor power to 50% and removed the "A" MFP from service. On Sepember 17,l&C technicians replaced a failed control circuit board and tested the MFP. Operators placad the MFP in service and began to increase reactor power. When power had reach 90%, the
"A" MFP began to oscillate as previously. Operators immediately commenced a rapM .
down pown to 50% per OS1000.06,and removed the MFP from service, l&C technicians troubleshooting the problem determined that the new circuit card had failed. I&C _
l tech 7l clans installed a new replacement card on September 18. The operators tested the MFP, placed it in service, then began to increase reactor power. Power reached 100%
power on September 1 i Conclusion Operators closely monitored and maintained control of key reactor plant parameters including: reactor power, axial flux differential, and steam generator levels throughout the event. Operations management determined that the steam plant oscillations did not warrant an immediate plant trip, and decided to reduce power to remove the "A" MFP from servic The issue of whether the decision to reduce power using the emergency boration flowpath r instead of initiating a plant trip was appropriate remains open pending NRC review of the licensee's review of this even !
02 Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment 02.1 Routine Plant Tours (71707)
The inspectors used Procedure 71707 to perform routine tours of the f acility and also to .
welkdown accessible portions of engineered safety feature (ESF) systems:
o Emergency C,lesel Generators e Safety injection Systems e Service Water System Equipment operability, material condition, and housekeeping were acceptable in all case Several minor discrepancies were brought to management's attention and were correcte The inspectors identified no subste.itive concerns as a result of these walkdown .2 Safety injection Pump M6chanicel Seal Leakage insoection Scopa (71707) ,
On August 25, during a surveillance test of the "A" safety injection (SI) pump, the inspector observed boric acid accumulation at the r 'mp's mechanical seal, in the seal ;
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basin, and the seal basin drain. In addition, the seal basin drain appeared to be completely
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blocked. The inspector discussed the deficiency with the operator and system engineer, reviewed the impact of the accumulated boric acid and the engineering processes for evaluating and correcting the deficienc Observations and Findinns Operator awareness and usage of the process to identify and clean boric acid leakage from the "A" safety injection pump mechanical seal was ineffective. The boric acid Nakage at the pump mechanical seal had been previously identified with a deficiency tag dated February 15,1996. The operator in the field stated that the boric acid leaks had been identified and referred to the Health Physics (HP) department for cleanup. HP personnel cleanup boric acid from plant components through a quarterly repetitive task sheet (RTS 97RH00033002). The inspector's review of the RTS indicateC that the last HP cleanup of the pump seal was October 11.1996, and that boric acid leakage at the "A" Si pump had not boon cleaned during the current RTS period. The inspector determined that the operators demonstrated a lack of a questioning attitude concerning the buildup of boric acid on the pump over an extended perio The inspector's concern focused cn the potential for leak off water from the seal to fill the basin with the seal bas!n drain blocked, come in contact with the pump shaft, and interact with the pump bearing causing a f ailure and subsequent pump damage. The SI pumps are safety related and are required to operate during a design basis accident. Further, the inspector observed during recent plant tours, boric acid accumulation on both Si pump The "A" SI pump mechanical seal was not replaced during the last refueling outage, but was postponed until the next refueling outage. Engineering personnel evaluated the "A" SI pump sealleakage as acceptable until the next refueling outege, based on the results of the "B" Si pump replacement and inspection. The "B" SI pump was experiencing the same type of boric acid accumulation as the " A" Si pump and the vendor replaced the mechanical seal during the outage in June 1997. The as found condition of the "B" mechanical seats were "as now" a: cording to vendor documentatio Currently, HPs cleaned the basin drain and both Si pumps. The system engineer determined that the existing sealleakage for both SI pumps was normal for this type of seal. Pump seals are not designed to be zero leakage and the leakage rate was very smal The "B" seal inspection previously performed confirmed that minor leakage was not an indication of seal degradation. No immediate safety issue exists at this time. In the mean time, the system engineer has taken corrective actions to ensure frequent cleanup of the seal, basin and drain piping after the corresponding quarterly surveillance run of each pump, Conclusion Operators did not ensure that boric acid leakage was removed from the "A" safety injection pump mechanical seal. Further, the f ailure to cleanup the seal area on a regular interval made trending of the leak rate, difficult.1he system engineer adequately assessed the pump's mechanical sealleakage, however, the inspector noted that the possible f ailure mode of increased leakage without drainage was not fully evaluate .-. .- -
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l 07 Quality Assurance in Operations i 07.1 Technical and Safety Reviews (71707)
During the inspection period, the inspectors reviewed or attended multiple self assessment !
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e various Station Operational Review Committee (SORC) meetings and meeting minutes; :
e various Management Review Team (MRT) meetings and adverse condition reports (ACRs). ,
The SORC reviewed several activities related to safe station operation. The members of SORC actively participated in the maeting with open discussions on the plant issues while 1
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maintaining a focus on safety principles. The inspectors concluded that the SORC and MRT members performed a detailed and critical review of the issue Miscellaneous Operations issues 08.1 (Clo4ad) URI 50 443/97 02 02: Temporary Instellation of Pone Heaters in the Cooling Tower Pump Roo i insoection Scooe On March 26, the inspector observed the use of temporary heaters in the cooling tower pump room and questioned whe'her the equipment was properly controlled. in the current ,
period, the inspector evaluated the control of these temporary heaters and the requirements for installa' ion of temporary equipment. The inspector interviewed the -
supervisor in charge of installing the temporary heaters and reviewed ACR 97106 Observation and Findinas t
The inspector determinod that personnel installing the temporary heaters followed maintenance administrative procedure MA 4.8, " Control of Temporary Equipment".
Provedure MA 4.8 provided guidance for evaluating and controlling the installation of temporary equipment. Persornel properly stored the ter.iporary heaters at a lateral distance away from safety related components by at least twice the height of the temporary components, and also secured to supports in the cooling tower pump roo The inspector concluded that the responsible supervisor had properly evaluated the temporary heater installation per MA 4.8, but noted that the procedure did not require this review to be documente The inspector noted a weakness in that control room personnel were not aware of the purpose for the temporary heaters, nor of the supervisor's review. Poor c:,mmunications and not documenting the supervisor's review were considered to be contributing f actors to -
this minor deficiency. Maintenance management indicated that MA 4.8 would be enhanced to require that the temporary equipment evaluation be documente . , -- -
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i 6 Conclusion-The temporary heaters were installed in accordanct with the applicable station procedur !
A weakness was noted in the process in that the evaluation was not required to be documented and the operators were not aware that this equipment had been installed. The licensee planned to enhance procedure MA 4.8 to address this weakness. This unresolved item is close .2 _ Licensee Event Report Review The following licensee events report (LER) events were reviewed in previously issued inspection reports, but the LERs were not documented as having been reviewed. The LERs ;
and supplements met the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73, and the inspector had no further i questions regarding each event, e (Closed) LER 50 443/94 010-00and Supplement 01: " Potential Fuel Damage Due ,
to RCP Turning Vane Capscrew Locking Nut Failure". The event was reviewed in inspection report 50 443/94 1 e (Closed) LER 50 443/94 01100and Supplement 01: "Non compliance with High Radiation Area Controls". The event was reviewed in inspection reports 50-443/94-13 and 941 e (Closed) LER 50 443/94 012 00:"Non-compliance with High Radiation Area Controls. The event was reviewed in inspection reports 50 443/9414and 94 2 e (Closed) LER 50 443/94-014 00:" Missed Technical Specification Surveillance on ,
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Containment Air Locks". The event was reviewed in inspection report 50 443/94-2 e (Closed) LER 50-443/94 016-00:"Non compliance with Technical Specification i 3.3.2 Action requirements". The event was reviewed in inspection report 50-443/94 2 e (Closed) LER 50-443/94 02 00and Supplement 01: " inadequate Slave Relay Testing". The event was reviewed in inspection reports 50-443/94 03,94 2 .3 (Closed) LER 50 443/94-06 00;"Unanalyzed Tornado Loading on Ventilation Damper /Ductwork and Metal Partitions".
Seabrook reported on April 15,1994, an event concerning discovery that documentation was not available to substantiate the analysis regarding the effects of differential pressure on vontilation dampers, associated ductwork and diesel generator building metal partition The licenaee determined that the components in question were capable of meeting the design basis tornado criteria as defined in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) and Regulatory Guide 1.76, The licensee has enhanced the design documentation requirements to prevent recurrence of this type of administrative weakness. The inspector
- determined that the licensee's corrective actions to resolve the issue were appropriat ;
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08.4 (Closed) LER 50 443/9413 00:"Non compliance with Technical Specification 3.9.12 Action Requirements". 1 l
- The licensee identified that rod control cluster ac emblies and thimble p!ugs wc e muc# .t '
in the spent fuel pool (SFP) prior to ensuring that the fuel storage building (FM wevacw air cleaning system could maintain the SFP area at the TS required negative (ogme following a modification to the FSB access door. The licensee promptly and s@rd(&
performed the required testing. The inspector noted that the event had no actus; spot on plant safety since the system performed properly during the test, however,it did indicate a work control proceos weekness. The station's corrective actions included:
revision of the work control process to enhance tracking of required retests prior to system restoration. This non repetitive licensee identified and corrected violation li, being treated as a Non Cited Violation, consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Polic (NCV 50-443/97 06 02)
08.5 (Closed) LER 50 443/94 015 00:" Missed Technical Specification 4. Surveillance".
The licensee discovered that two Main Steam Drain valves (MSD V44 and 47) were also containment isolation valves and had not been surveillance tested as required by Technical Specification surveillance requirement 4.0.5. This surveillance demonstrated the operability of these valves and requires them to be stroke tested every 92 days, or 11b days includinc the 25% extension allowed by Technical Specification 4.0.2. The licensee satisfactorily performed the required testing and revised the routine test sheet to improve the guidance regarding test frequency. This non-repetitive licensee identified and corrected violation is being treated as a Non Cited Violation, consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. (NCV 50 443/97 06 03)
11. Maintenance M1 Conduct of Maintenance M1.1 Makeup Totalizer Modification Inse etion Scopa On September 15, maintenance technicians installed a minor modification (MMOD) to the blended makeup totalizer in the chemical volume and control (CS) system. Design change (DCR) 95 030, Boric Acid / Dilution Blend Flow Transmitter Replacement, was the controiling document to replace flow element CS FE-111 and add flow straightener CS-MM 903, downstream of the boric acid blender. The inspector reviewed the DCR, attended engineering meetings, and observed portions of the work activities in the field, Observations and Findinos The boric acid counter was not accounting for the total amount of boric acid added to the reactor coolant system (RCS), Control room operators identified the issue when a minor l _
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reactor power increase transient occurred dunng a blended makeup to the RCS (see inspection Rt. port 50 443/97 04). The engineers determined that an insufficient distance existrad between the orifice flow element (CS FE 111) and the mixing tee (CS MM 1)in the CS system, which was causing flow instabilities. To resolve the inaccuracy, the engineering staff developed a Jesign change package (DCR 95-030)to reinstall CS FE 111 downstream of the originallocation and install a 10-inch flow straightener. The flow straightener consisted of two flat plates connect together which cross sectioned the two-inch pipe into four equal quadrants. The flow straightener functions to provide a stable flow profile to enable accurate flow detectio Plant management determined that the modification work could be perforrned at power and that the optirnum time to complete the work was during the fuel cycle high boron point (the window when core reactivity is such that no boric acid or dilution is needed to maintain reactor power) for a relatively long period of time. This window occurred between September 15 and 18. The modification would require that the normal makeup to the volume control tank (VCT) be unavailable for two operating shif ts and that the required TS boration flowpath be maintained for the duration of the evolution. Although the system would be functional af ter two shif ts, the makeup totalizer would not be fully operable until the completion of system calibration and post maintenance testin The licensee established contingency actions in the event the plant experienced a transient that would require a power reduction. The assistant operations manager issued Standing Operating Order (SOO 97 025) which listed existing abnormal procedures and applicable procedure steps to rapidly reduce power or shutdown the reactor. Further, operating crews developed a briefing sheet to ensure accurate turnover of the status of the work in-progress and applicable cor@gencies in place. The operators removed the boric acid blender from service on tt s morning of September 15 af ter completing a 250 gallon makeup to the RCS via the charging pump suction. The last 50 gallons of the makeup was reactor makeup water tu Dush boric acid from the pipin Maintenance technicians performed the modification work well. Much of the replacement piping was pre fabricated in the maintenance shop reducing the amount of work to be accomplished in the field The welders were qualified and well supervised. The work package (WR 97 WOO 2740)was in order and located at the work site. Fire watches were present and aware of the responsibilitie Following the instsilation, technicians flushed the system to the "B" boric water storage tank (BWST). I&C technicians calibrated the flow transmitter and collected data as operations personnel performed various blended makeup evolutions to the VCT. Post-maintenance testing was completed and the system declared operab!c on September 1 Crnclusions The installation of the makeup totalizer modification was well coordinated. Good inter-departmental cooperation was demonstrated. Station and operations management demonstrated a conservative approach to conducting the on-line maintenance by establishing contingency plans for add'essing a rapid power reduction scenari .
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M1.2 Main Feed Pump Troubleshooting and Repair insoection Scone The inspector observe i troubleshooting activities performed regarding the "A" MFP governor servo oscillations and rod control system failure (see Section 01.2). The inspector also discussed the activities with various l&C department personnel, Observations and Findinas Hod Control Failure l&C technicians, troubleshooting the rod control system, found and replaced a f ailed supervisory memory buffer card (A 112). Failure of this card causes the rod control system to block all control rod motion except for reactor protection system a:;tivatio This was the second failure of this nature to occur within a two week period. A similar card, A 111, f ailed on Sep; ember 2 during the monthly control rod operability surveillance test which prevented insertion of control rods. The licensee determined that the A 112 card had been replaced three years earlier with an older style circuit card. These older circuit cards were being systematically replaced because of repeated poor performance in the late 1980s. The f ailed card, however, had boon stored in the warehouse with the same stock code as that of the new style replacement circuit cards, and was inadvertently used. The licensee currently verified that all of the old circuit cards were removed from the warehous The inspector observed several examples of the wrong part with the correct part number being used in the plant. These included: the wrong size springs for safety-related check valves (Section E8.1) and several ACRs. The inspector was concerned that further examples remain unidentified by procurement engineering. Therefore, this issue will remain unresolved pending further inspection and review (URI 50-443/97 06 04).
Main Feedwater PumD l&C technicians performed the initial troubleshooting activities well for the MFP governor servo control circuit f ailure. They found a f ailed demodulator in the pilot valve feedback circuit on the redundant speed pickup card (POSS). The demodulator produces a DC feedback signal proportional to an AC signal produced by pilot valve stem motion through a linear variable differential transformer (LVDT). The technicians replaced the circuit card with a new circuit card from the warehouse. The technicians properly installed, calibrated, and tested the circuit card using proceduto IN1640.910, MDT-20 SG Feed Pump A Speed Control Calibratio During the second MFP oscillation event, l&C technicians found that the new circuit board (POSS) had catastrophically failed. The demodulator f ailed in the low pressure poppet stem feedback circuit (which was similar to the pilot valve feedback circuit). No other replacement circuit card existed in the warehouse and procuremem engineers had to obtain a replacement circuit card from a fossil station in Connecticut. The card, however, was not an exact one for one replacement, but would be identicalin form, fit, and function
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once modified. The circuit card from the fossil station had an extra capacitor and resisto l Design engineers prepared a minor modification package (MMOD 97-0622)to remove the
capacitor and resistor, and revise the vendor manual. The MMOD package was of high quality. The engineers discussed the circuit card changes with a vendor representative and performed a safety evaluation (10CFR50.59)to evaluate the modificatio ;
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Several performance problenis occurred during the troubleshooting and repair activities of the second MFP event, which collectively resulted in the A MFP f ailing to trip during the post maintenance trip test. The problems included: -
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e l&C supervision uid not provide an adequate pre job brief and oversight. Neither the l&C supervisor nor the technicians recognized that the clearance order to block the MFP had created an electrical turbine trip signal that required defeating the trip by lif ting lead (D4), t
e Procedure IN1640.910was inappropriately annotated to perform the specified activity. l&C supervis!on allowed the technicians to reuse the same copy of the procedure that had been used for troubleshooting activities during the initial MFP event. During that event, no electrical trip signals existed; therefore, the two procedure steps for lifting and terminating lead (D4) (to remove the electrical trips),
were deleted. During the second event, the electrical trip signals were present; however, the technicians did not lift lead (D4) since the procedure steps were annotated as deleted. The procedure did not work as expected and the technicians ;
determined that lead (D4) needed to be lifted and performed the actio e l&C technicians demonstrated a lack of self check and questioning attitude. The technicians did not stop work activities or bring the procedure discrepancy to the attention of their supervision. Further, the technicians reported to the job with the procedure, but had forgotten to bring the detached data record sheets. They did not take the time to retrieve the data record sheets from the shop when they realized that they had forgotten them, but continued with the procedure without the ;
data sheets presen ;
e l&C technicians lif ted electrical lead (D4) without documenting this action as required by procedure IN1640.910, step 8.9.1. The failure to document lifting lead (D4) resulted in the MFP being reassembled and tested unsatisfactorily without terminating lead (D4), defeating the electrical trip capability of the MFP. Technical Specification 6.7.1.a specifies that written procedures recommended in Appendix A of Regulatory Guioe 1.33, shall be implemented. This is a violation of this T (NOV 50 443/97 06 05)
Seabrook management implemented several corrective action to prevent recurrence of this event. Procedure IN1640.910was revised to incorporate the data record sheet with the body of the procedure. Further, l&C management coached the l&C technicians involved with lif ting the lead and reviewed the incident with the entire departmen _ _ _ , _ , _ _ __ -
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I 11 ; Conclusion Several performance problems occurred during the troubleshooting and repair activities for the A MFP that collectively resulted in the A MFP failing to trip during the post- ,
maintenance trip test. A lack of self check and questioning attitude on the part of
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supervision and technicians resulted in the use of an inadequate procedure, poor config Jration control (f ailure to document lif ting electrical leads) during corrective -
maintenance, and adherence to procedure M1.3 Circulating Water Leak Activities l insoection Scoce On August 19, a roving security guard notified the control room operators of a through- ';
wallleak in the outlet piping of the "C" main condenser waterbox. An NSO was sent to investigate and reported that a steady stream of water (like a garden hose) was flowing from the one inch diameter leak located downstream from the waterbox outlet isolation valve (CW V29). The inspector observed work and troubleshooting activities in the field and reviewed the Operability Determination (OE4.5) issued to address an non conforming condition with the UFSA Qbservations and Findinas Maintenance technicians stopped the leak by installing a temporary repair (nylon belt with rubber gasket material) under an emergency work order. Further investigation determined that the leak was unisolable. Ultrasonic testing performed indicated significant wall
+ thinning and two other weeping leaks. Further, on August 20, a system engineer identified a similar through wallleak on the "A" waterbox outlet piping downstream of the waterbox outlet isolation valve (CW V33). A steady stream developed from the "A" waterbox leak and maintenance banded the pipe to stop the lea The Assistant Operation Manager issued a Standing Operating Order (SOO 97 024) which outlined contingency actions for the operators to take in the event the leak became worst or if a catastrophic f ailure occurred. The u11t remained at 100% power throughout the entire event with no challenge toward reactor safet The circulating water (CW) piping is an 84 inch, carbon steel, concrete lined pipe. The CW system is a low pressure, high flow system with a system pressure of about 60 psig. The leaks developed in the transition piece weld area between the concrete lined pipe and the lower isolation valve flange. The pipe and transition piece are welded together then the weld area is grouted over to seal and prevent degradation of the pipe from seawate However, a flaw developed in the grout allowing seawater to come in contact with and ,
attack the carbon steel pipe wall. A similar problem occurred and was corrected in the service water (SW) system 10-years earlier. Seabrook established a program to routinely inspect the SW system piping to ensure it's integrit _ _- - -- -. .-- - - . - . . - - _ .
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Seabrook performed ultrasonic testing of all of the outlet and inlet waterbox piping and determined that the piping was intact to allow continued plant operation until the next outage, during which repairs could be properly made. The engineers noted during their evaluation, however, that the UFSAR took credit for scuppers in the turbine building wall to provide a drain path in the event of a design break in the CW piping. A walkdown of the turbine building confirmed that the scuppers were not present. Also, the engineers found that a high level alarm in the condenser pit that would alarm in the control room was deleted from the UFSAR in 198 Engineering performed an Operability Determination (OD No. 9714) to address the non-conforming condition. The OD concluded that the system was operable due to several f actors including, both turbine building doors remained open at least 18 inches and that management heighten the operator's awareness to respond to a turbine building sump high level alarm by dispatching an NSO to the condenser pit. The long term resolution to correct this issue required a design change to install an alarm in the condenser pit, and to initiate an UFSAR change to delete the requirement for scuppers and reinstate the requirement for the condenser pit alarm. The OD stated that the turbine building doors would remain open until the installation of the condenser pit high level alarm in October 199 The inspector determined that the OD fully addressed the circumstances concerning the UFSAR non conformance and that the consequences of the issue were small. This non-repetitive licensee identified and corrected violation is being treated as a Non Cited Violation, consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. (NCV 50-443/97 06 06) Conclusions The plant staff demonstrated good plant awareness in identifying the leak in the circulating
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water piping Maintenance technicians responded well to stop the leaks. Engineering's evaluation of the issue was very good, in that, it identified a non conformance between the plant's configuration and the UFSAR. Comprehensive corrective actions were implemented to addrecs the issu Ill. Enaineerina E1 Conduct of Engineering E Follow up Inspection of Failed Fuel Rods and Fuel Assemblies Inspection Scope (37551)
Between August 14 and August 28, Seabrook conducted a two week follow-up inspection of the four fuel assemblies thot failed during Cycle 5. Reactor Engineers lRE) and the fuel vendor collected data to assist in determining the root cause for the f ailures. The inspector observed portions these activities and the licensee's controls in applicable areas such as, radiological work practices, foreign material exclusion (FME) and industrial and personnel safety. The inspector also examined the licensee process for reviewing vendor procedure _ - _ __. __ _ - . . _ _ ___ _ _ _ __ . _
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13 Observations and Findinas Reactor Engineers inspected 10 intact fuel rods that were systematically removed from the f ailed fuel assemblies as part of a corrective action specified in the root cause analysis from ACR 971401, dated 6/6/97. Overall, the inspection activities were performed well and included:
- visual and boroscopic examinations;
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- eddy current testing before and after crud scraping;
- oxide measurements on 5 of the 10 fuel rods, before and after crud scraping;
- profilometry (external profile inspection) on 4 of the 10 intact fuel rods;
- crud sampling for laboratory analysis on 1 rod of each phase of the 4 failed assemHie Duting inspection activities, several non safety related problems occurred. These issues i had no impact on the safe performance of the inspections, were immediately addressed by i the licensee, and were subjects of ACRs. One noteworthy issue involved an atterr.pt to inspect a broken fuel rod. The evolution would require moving the broken rod a few feet to the inspection station. The inspector noted that no precautionary measures were being taken to prevent the possible dropping of fuel pellets out of the broken fuel rod into the spent fuel pool during transport. As a result, the licensee decided not to perform further fuel inspection af ter cont.idering the inspector's concem and due to having previously '
completed visual and beroscopic inspections on the broken rod The inspector reviewed Seabrook's safety evaluation (10CFR50.59) performed for the vendor procedures and processes. A station qualified reviewer (SOR) performed the review, which was in accordance with the site procedures and Technical Specifications (TS). The inspector noted a minor weakness in that the Quality Assurance Manual (NAQA)
did not address use of the SQR. Station management initiated an ACR to review Seabrook's vendor procedure review policy, to ensure consistency among station programs and manuals, and to determine why the SQR process was not defined in the NAQA manua Conclusion Overall, Seabrook performed the fuelinspection activities well. The inspector observed adequate Reactor Engineering supervisory and vendor oversight on the job. Further, there was excellent HP coverage and radiation controls, good FME program implementation, adequate Operations support, and adequate self assessment by the QA Department. The inspector concluded that several minor issues had no effect on the safe implementation of the fuelinspections, and that they were promptly and adequately evaluated and addresse The station's procedure review was completed in accordance with Technical Specifications. .
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E8 Miscelleneous Engineering lesues [
E (Closed) Unresolved item 50-443/97 04 04: Engineering Evnluation of Dissimilar ,
Replacement Components laspection Scope Durhg refueling outage (OR05), the nitrogen fillline check valves NG V22 and NG V24, to the "C" and "D" safety injection accumulator tanks, were disassembled and rebuilt. The springs in both valves were replaced with new springs supplied from the valve vendo The springs, however, were dimensionally longer than the original springs. The engineer considered the springs to be acceptable since they were supplied by the vendor, and had been stored in the warehouse since 1985, and these springs had been used in other applications without any problems noted. TP a inspector was concerned that the lack of an ;
engineering evaluation for dissimilar components created the potential for an unauthorized modification of the check valve. This item was lef t unresolved pending review of the ACR (ACR 971671) evaluation for root cause and corrective action Observation and FindiD9E The ACR concluded that the wrong springs had been supplied by the vendor in 1985. The receipt inspection did not identify the difference in spring size because no spring dimensions were provided with the stock number. Further, maintenance procedurc, MA
' 3.0, Work Practices, required the in field maintenance foreman to notify Procurement Engineering (PE) if the replacement part looked different than the original part installe Procurement Engineering would then write an engineering work request (EWR) and Design Engineering would evaluate whether the spring was a suitable replacement componen This activity did not occur due to the process being bypasse The inspector discussed the maintenance /PE Interface with the lead procurement engineer and with several maintenance supervisors. Piocurement has three major barriers to ensure that the correct component is used in the plant. Having approved vendors (to send the ,
correct part), receipt inspection (to verify that the right part was received), and foedback from technicians in the field identifyir'g dis similar components. All maintenance foremen and technicians are trained and acquainted with management's expectation to notify the pes as per the MA 3.0 procedural step. In this case, a system engineer was acting in the role of maintenance foreman during the refueling outage to oversee contractors performing valve work. The system engineer made the decision to use the wrong size spring, which bypassed th'., PE process. Technical Specification 6.7.1.a requires that procedures be implemented, and the f ailure to properly implement MA 3.0 is a violation of this TS (NOV 50 443/97 06-05)
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The ptoblem with the spring was self disclosing when NG V22 f ailed to operate during the nitrogen charging attempt to the "C" accumulator. As a result of the valve failure, both NG V22 and NG V24 were disassembled, the wrong size springs were discovered and replaced with the original springs. The valves were tested satisfactorily with no further problems note ,
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Following the repair of % check valves, Support Engineering measured the springs in the ;
warehouse and sent the dimensions to the vendor, who responded that the springs in i inventory were incorrect. A review of maintenance records identified that seven of these springs had been issued into the field, some were installed into check valves. The .
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inspector verified that the springs had been removed from all vital application j As corrective actions, Seabrook romoved the incorrect size springs from the warehouse, initiated an EWR for &lgn change documentation to evaluate the applications that have used the issued springs, revise the in field maintenance procedure to require additional measurements of the spring and valve body cavity, and add dimensions to the procurement :
documents, Conclusions i
A weakness existed in the maintenance / procurement engineering (PE) interf ace, such that a contorl measure in ensuring the use of the correct replacement component was not me The maintenance technician performing the work identified the wrong component in the field, but that information was never related to PE contrary to the guidance in MA l IV. Plant Suonott :
R8 Miscellaneous RP&C lesues R8.1 (Closed) LER 50-443/94 04 00:"Missoi Survelliance Technical Specification 3.3.3.10, Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation".
On March 25,1994, a required source check of the station wide range gas monitor had not been performed prior to placing the monitor in service as required. The station revised the station procedure for design change implementation and post modification testing to require verification that outstanding Technical Specification surveillance tests have been performed prior to returning the affected equipment to operable status. The inspector reviewed the licensee's corrective actions to prevent recurrence and determined that they were appropriate to prevent recurrenc R8.2 (Closed) LER 50-443/9713 00: Inoperable Turbine Gland Seal Condenser Exhaust Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Monito On August 12,1997, Seabrook determined that the Turbine Glen d Seal Condenser Exhaust ;
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radioactive gaseous effluent monitor particulate sampler was inoperable on two separate occasions. The particulate filter paper was found torn during the routine filter paper replacement on July 28 and August 4. This resulted in a minor effluent release via this pathway without the required collection of a representative particulate sample. The effluent pathway was required to be continuously monitored while sampler was inoperabl Technicians found no radioactive particulate present from a limited particulate sample taken from the a torn filter paper. Also a particulate analysis of the in line iodine charcoal cartridge, which is capable of capturing radioactive particulate, identified no radioactive -
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particulate. The radioactive gaseous samples (noble and iodine) for the period in question were found to be less than minimum detectable. A steam generator primary to secondary leak is necessary for the Turbine Gland Seal Condenser Exhaust radiation monitor to indicate radioactivity. No primary to secondary leakage has been identified during the current operating cycl The licensee determined that the root cause of the event was due to the station chemistry technicians being unaware that the sampler o rings had been recently replaced, thereby necessitating a different technique when installing the r. ampler due to tighter fitup tolerances. The station corrective actions includer.: training chemistry department personnel on he proper method of aligning ar,d installing the sampler to preclude tearing the particulate paper and the sampler outlet line was replaced with flexible tubing to f acilitate sampler alignment and installation. The inspector determined that the licensee promptly implemented adequate corrective actions to the event. This non repeti;ive licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a Non Cited Violation, consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. (NCV 50-443/97 06 07)
81 Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities 81.1 Security Badge Failures Ansoection Scope On August 25 and August 26, the inspector encountered dif ficulty in attempting to gain access to various vital areas in the plant. Specifically, the security computer failed to recognize and log in the inspector's security access card when ontering a vital area. The-inspectors interviewed security personnel, reviewed access and alarm records, visited th Primary and Secondary Alarm Stations (CAS and SAS), and consulted NRC regional inspectors, Observations and Findinas The security computer denied the inspector access to several vital areas due to the security card readers inaccurately reading the identity code on the security card. This resulted in the computer mis-reading the card and identifying the inspector as another individual who had been previously terminated from the site. The computer did not authorized the entry and initiated a security alarm in the CAS. A security officer promptly responded to each alarm and the inspector was requested to replace his badge as soon as possibl The inspector determined that the security force appropriately responded to each alar Due to the combination of age and wear of various card readers in high traffic areas and a weak magnetic ctrip on the security access card, errors in reading security access cards were determined to occur at a frequency of two to three times per week. The security supervisor stated that security officers responded to each elarm and confirmed them as nuisance alarms. The inspector reviewed security alarms over a seven day period and confirmed that each alarm was appropriately addressed. Further, no entries into vital oraas by unauthorized personnel occurred.
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l Seabrook's security management demonstrated to the inspector that the station !
contingency plans, surveillance tests, and periodic card reader maintenance * vere l adequate. In addition, security performed a test where 35 randomly selected spare j security cards with a lower access level, were tested to attempted to gain access to vital i
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areas. Out of a total of 105 attempts made, access was donied in all cases by the syste Further, Seabrook management initiated actions to heighten the awareness of station personnel of proper card reader operation via an advisory in the daily news lette .
! Concluslos Security personnel properly responded to alarms caused by card readers inaccurately reading security access cards. The security staff adequately demonstrated that the security system appropriately alarmed and identified errors in access contro i
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F1 Control of Fire Protection Activities
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F Control Room Fire Suppression : Insoection Scoce (71760)
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In response to a recent inadvertent actuation of an automatic Halon fire suppression system in the control room at another facility, the inspector reviewed the fire suppression-capability for the control room and the requirements for control room personnel use of self contained breathing apparatus (SCBA). The inspector compared the control room configuration with the UFSAR and Fire Protection Plan, and reviewed applicable procedures. Further, the inspector interviewed operators, the fire protection englnoer, and the health physics supervisor, Observations and Findinag The control room configuration meets the requirements described in the UFSAR and Fire Protection Program M6nual. An automatic fire suppression system does not exist in the ;
control room at Seabrook Station. Fire suppression in the control room is accomplished by portable hand held Halon fire extinguishers that are strategically located. With no automatic Halon system in the coatrol room, the negative implications caused by an inadvertent initiation or release of Halon into the control room do not appl ,
The nearest automatic Halon system to the control room is located in the adjacent main computer room. The main computer room is separated from the control room by a normally closed fire protection door. Ventilation units and dampers interlinking the two rooms are automati: ally isolated by a smoke detector alarm signal to prevent Halon from entering the control room. Additionally, administrative controls are provided, such as disabling the automatic Halon system when the door is opened for extended periods of time.
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The inspector verified that a sufficient number of SCBAs were provided in the control room l
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to properly support control room operations. The SCBAs were properly inspected and maintained.- The inspector, however, identified that very little guidance for SCBA use l
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existed in any normal, abnormal, or emergency procedures. The need to use SCBAs was being determined on a case by case basis by the applicable department (ie; Fire Protection, Heath Physics, etc). Seabrook management agreed with the inspectors findings and initiated an ACR to address the issu Seabrook management initiated corrective actions to review and revise applicable abnormal operating procedures and the procedure for safe and from the remote safe shutdown f acilities (OS 1200.02). Operations management performed a review to verify that all licensed operators were currently SCBA qualified, and revised the existing Licensed Operator Requalification Program to ensure that licensed operators maintain their SCBA qualification. Further enhancements included ensuring that ladividuals with restricted licenses for corrective lenses had the required eyeglasses kit. In the interim, management directed the operators to wear the SCBA during any hazardous condition inside the control
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roo fanglusions The fire suppression system configuration in the main control room meets the requirements of the station's fire protuction program. With no automatic Halon system in the control room, the negative implications caused by an inadvertent initiation or release of Halon into the control room do not apply. Seabrook management adequately evaluated and implemented corrective actions to provide adequate guidance for operations personnel use of SCBA F2 Status of Fire Protection Facilities and Equipment F Design of Fire Suppression Systems Lriggetion Scooe The inspector reviewed Seabrook Station's ability to meet General Design Criterion 3, Fire Protection, regarding inadvertent actuation of the fire suppression systems. The requirements of General Design Criterion 3, state, in part, that " fire fighting systems shall be designed to assure that their rupture or inadvertent operation does not significantly impair the safety capability of structures, systems, and components." The inspector visually inspected the fire suppression systems for the emergency diesel generators, emergency feedwater system, emergency air handling system, and the emergency switchgear. The inspector also interviewed design engineers and reviewed design basis documents, Observations and Findinas The inspector determined that the fire suppression system did not adversely impact the associated safety-related systems. For the diesel generators, an inadvertent fire system actuation through a scismic or other event would not result in actual deluge of the diescl generators. The diesel generator fire suppression system utilizes pre-action sprinklers. The fire piping is maintained dry with closed head sprinklers. The closed head sprinklers open l at dssignated temperatures controlled by fusib;e links in the sprinklers flooding the pipe.
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The emergency feedwater system, emergency air handling system, and emergency <
switchgear fire protection systems are detection only systems requiring manual fire fighter t actions in respond to a fire. The inspector evaluated additional fire suppression system j and the inadvertent actuation of these system and determined that no impact safety- !
related components existed. The inspector determined that the design engineer was -
knowledgeable regarding the fire suppression systems and the design basis documents 5 were of high queit Conclusion i
Seabrook Station'e fire suppression systems meet General Design Criterion 3 with respect to inadvertent operation of fire suppression system ,
I V. Mansaament Meetinas -
X1 Exit Meetlog Summary The regional Engineering Specialist presented the inspection results from the two week engineering inspection to members of the station's management, following the conclusion ,
of the inspection on October The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of the station's management, following the conclusion of the inspection period, on October 7,1997. The Station Director acknowledged the findings presente The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materints examined during the inspection-should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identifie X3 Other NRC Activities
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On August 20, Commissioner Greta Dicus visited Seabrook Station. During her four hour visit, the Commissioner met with senior plant management and toured the plant. General ,
observations of the plant and topics regarding current plant events and industry concerns were discussed at the meetin On August 20 and on October 7, Larry Nicholson, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Safety, visited the site. The visit was primarily to allow Mr. Nicholson the opportunity to interf ace with plant management and to tour the f acilit i
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I PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED - ;
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B. Bouchel, Engineering Performance Manager l R. Cooney, Assistant Station Director !
W. DiProfio, Station Director 1 B. Drawbridge, Director of Services !
G. Kline, Technical Support Manager _
i W. Leland, Chemistry / Health Physics Manager M. Makowicz, Corrective Action Manager l R. Messina, Security Supervisor !
G. Mcdonald, Nuclear Quality Manager i-J. Peschel, Regulatory Compliance Manager J. Peterson, Maintenance Manager _ _
T. Pucko. NRC Coordinator, Regulatory Compliance :i E. Soretsky, Technical Projects Supervisor' j
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G. StPierre, Operations Manager ,
- R. White, Mechanical Engineering Manager ' ;
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F. Paul Bonnett, Senior Resident inspector (acting)
Javier Brand, Resident intern _ !
William T. Olsen, Resident inspector ;
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INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED i i
IP 37551: Onsite Engineering [
IP 40500: Effectiveness of Licensee Controls in Identifying, Resolving, and Preventi !
Problems IP 61726: Surveillance Observation ;
i IP S2707: Maintenance Observation IP 71707: Plant Operations ;
lP 71750: Plant Support Activities !
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IP 82205: Shift Staffing and Augmentation IP 82701: Operational Status of the Emergency Preparedness Program )
. IP 92700: Onsite Followup of Written Reports of Nontoutine Events at Pown Reactor i Facilities !
IP 92902: Followup Engineering -i IP 92903: Followup Maintenance IP 93702: Prompt Onsite Response to Events at Operating Power Reactors t
ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED -!
Opened [
URI 50-443/97 06 01 Review ACR findings to evaluate performance during the "A" ,
MFP piping vibration event (Section 01.2). (
L NCV 50 443/97 06-02 Failure to perform the required testing prior to relocating components in the spent fuel pool (Section 08.4).
NCV 50 443/97 06 03 Failure to perform surveillance testing as required (Section 08.3).
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URI 50-443/97 06 04 Determine if further examples of the wrong part with the correct part number being used in the plant (Section M1.2)
NOV 50-443/97 06 05 Failure to document lifting electrical laeds (Section M1.2), and to comply with maintenance proce .re MA 3.0 (Section E8.1) . r NCV 50 443/97 06 06 - Non-conformance between piant configuration and UFSAR :
(Section M1.3)
NCV 50 443/97 06 07 Failure to properly monitor an effluent stream (Section R8.2).
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URI 50 443/97 02 62 Temporary Installation of Portable Heaters in the Cooling-Tower Pump Room (Section 08.1)
URI 50 443/97-04-04 Engineering Evaluation of Dissimilar Replacement Components (Section E8.1) (NCV 50-443/97 06 07)
NCV 50 443/97-06-02 Failure to perform the required testing prior to relocating
components in the spent fuel pool (Section 08.4).
NCV 50-443/97-06 03 Failure to perform surveillance testing as required (Section 08.3). _;
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NCV 50 443/97 06 06 Non conformance between plant configuration and UFSAR r (Section M1.3)
NCV 50 443/97 06-07 ilure to properly monitor an effluent stream (Section R8.2).
LER 50 443/94-02 00and Supplement 01: Inadequate Slave Relay Testing (Section 08.2) ;
LER 50 443/94 04-00 Missed Surveillance - Technical Specification 3.3.3.10, Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation (Section R8.1)
LEP. BO 443/94 06-00 Unanaly ed Tornado Loading on Ventilation Damper /Ductwork and Metal Partitions (Section 08.3) '
. LER 50-443/94-08 00and Supplement 01: Non Compliance with Technicsl Specification 3.8.4.2 Action Requirements (Section M8.4)
LER 50-443/9410-00and Supplernent 01: Potential Fuel Damage Due to RCP Turning Vane Capscrew Nut Failure (Section 08.2)
LER 50-443/941100and Supplement 01: Non-compliance with High Radiation Area Controls (Section 08.2)
LER 50 443/94-12 00 Non-compliance with High Radiation Area Controls (Section 08.2)
LER 50 443/9413 00 Non-compliance with Technical Specification 3.9.12 Action Requirements (Section 08.4)(NCV 50-443/97 06-03)
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LER 50-443/94-14-00 Missed Technical Specification Surveillance on Containment Air Locks (Section 08.2)
LER 50 443/9415 00 Missed Technical Specification 4.0.5 Surveillance (Section 08.5) (NCV 50-443/97 06 03)
- LER 50 443/9410-00 Non compliance with Technical Specification 3.3.2 Action requirements (Section 08.2)
LER 50-443/9713-00 Inoperable Turbine Gland Seal Condenser Exhaust Radioactive ,
Gaseous Effluent Monitor (Section R8.2) (NCV 50-443/97 06-
- 08)
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LIST OF ACRONYMS USED :
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ACR Adverse Condition Report AFD Axial Flux Differential ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers ,
BWST Borated Water Storage Tank i CAS C Alarm Station CFR Code of Federal Regulations .
CRS Control Room Supervisor :
CW Circulating Water DCR Design Change Record DT Deficiency Tag DG Diesel Generator -
EFW Emergency Feedwater ESF Engineered Safety System .
EWR Engineering Work Request FME Foreign Material Exclusion i FRV Feed Regulating Valve 3 FSB Fuel Storage Building 3 gpd Gallons per day gpm Gallons per minute HP Health Physics ;
IAC Instrument and Controls IFl inspector Followup Item LER Licensee Event Report LCO Limiting Condition for Operation i LP Low Pressure l LVDT Linear Voltage Differential Transformer !
MFP Main Feed Pump MMOD Minor Modification i MNPR Manual and Procedure Manual MRT Management Review Team NAPA North Atlantic Procedure Administration NAQA North Atlantic Quality Assurance NCV Non-Cited Violation NI Nuclear instrument NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission NSARC Nuclear Safety and Audit Review Committee NSO Nuclear Shift Operator
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NSSS Nuclear Steam Supply System
= OPMM Operations Management Manual ,
pprn . Parts-per million PAB Primary Access Building .[
PDT Primary Drain Tank psia Pounds per square inch absolute psig Poundt per square inch gauge RCS- -Reactc..' Coolant System RHR Residual Heat Removal
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t RTS Repetitive Task Sheet !
RWST Refueling Water Storage Tank ;
'SAS Secondary Alarm Station - j SC8A Self contained Breathing Apparatus - l Steam generator S SI Safety injection (
SFP Spent Fuel Pool j SOO Standing Operating Order i SORC Station Operations Review Committee :
ST- Surveillance Test l TDEFW ' Turbine Driven Emergency Feedwater Pump TS Technical Specifications !
UFSAR Updated Final Safety Analysis Report ;
URI ' Unresolved item l
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-VCT Volume Control Tank-VIO Violation ,
-WR Work Request !
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