IR 05000443/1990022

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Insp Rept 50-443/90-22 on 901009-12.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Design Implementation Verification & Surveillance Test Procedures
ML20058D335
Person / Time
Site: Seabrook  
Issue date: 10/26/1990
From: Blumberg N, Finkel A
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20058D329 List:
References
50-443-90-22, OL, NUDOCS 9011060059
Download: ML20058D335 (7)


Text

-

-,

.

.

..

--

.

V.

S.. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Report No.

50-443/90-22 Docket No.

50-443 License No. NPF-56

!

Licensee:

Publ1c Service Company of New Hampshire P.O. Box 330 Seabrook, New Hampshire Facility Name: ' Seabrook Unit 1

,

Inspection At:

Seabrook, New Hampshire Inspection Conducted: October 9-12, 1990-Inspectors:

N8

A. Finkel, Knior Reactor Engineer 7 date

!

t%udd-

)

Norman Brumberg, Chief, Operat_ional

' A'l/'70 Approved by:

dafe F

Programs Section, Operations Branch, DRS

-

Areas Inspected:

Routine, announced inspection by one~ region-based inspector of compliance with'the Anticipated Transients Without Scram (ATWS) Rule (10 CFR 50.62) including design implementation verification, surveillance test procedure-and results review, quality verification. measures evaluation, and review of licensed operator training.

Results:

The 'ATWS mitigating ' system (AMS) inst. ied at Seabrcok Unit I was determined to be in accordance with the design described in the FSAR and reviewed in the NRC SER.

The quality assurance program applied to these

= systems complies with the requirements'of 10 CFR.50, Appendix B.

Operating procedures and licensed operator training have been appropriately revised to reflect the plant modifications made to comply with thel ATWS Rule. A surveillance program has been developed and.. implemented to assure that!the system will per L rm in a reliable manner.

No. violations or aeviations were

. identified during this inspection.

'

,

'

9011060059 901029 ADOCK0500g3 DR

.

-

.

.

.

Details t

1.0 Persons Contacted

,

New Hampshire Yankee l

.

.

e

  • A. Amoruso, Independent. Review Team Member
  • B. Benchel, Engineering Supervisor l
  • S. Buckwald, Quality Assurance Supervisor.

_

l

  • J. Cody, Jr., Engineering Supervisor
  • J. Descher, Regulatory Compliance Manager i
  • W. DiProfie, Assistant Station Manager
  • B. Drawbridge, Executive Director Nuclear Production

.

'

  • R. Krohn, NRC Coordinator
  • J. Malone, Operations Administrative Supervisor
  • J. O'Connor, Instrumentation and Controls Engineer

-

  • N. Pillsbury, Director of Quality Assurance
  • E. Sowetsny, Technical Projects Supervisor

<

  • R. White, Plant Engineering Manager

.

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

  • N Dudley, Senior Resident Inspector R. Fuhrmeister, Resident Inspector

,

The inspector also contacted other' members of the Licensee's Operations, Technical, Quality Assurance, and Training Staffs.

  • Denotes those present at the exit meeting on_0ctober 12, 1990.

2.0 Compliance with 10 CFR 50.62-Anticipated Transients Without Scram'

(ATWS) Rule-

,

2.1 Inspection Scope -

,

The objective-of the ; inspection was to determine if _the des' gn of the i

ATWS mitigation systems for ~the ~ Seabrook Unit 1, as described. in their Final Safety. Analysis Report (FSAR) and reviewed in thel NRC.0ffice

Nuclear Reactor Regulation Safety Evaluation (Letter, Victor.Nerst

~1.S.

i a

NRC) to Edward Brown (New Hampshire' Yankee), " Safety Evaluation rc o.ced to compliance wi'.n ATWS' Rule 10 CFR _50.62,": June.15,1989) has-been y

l implemented. The inspection sought to'dete'rmine-that theiquality i

verification function for design, installation, maintenance and testing

,

of the ATWS mitigoting systems' comply with Generic Letter 85-06, "QA

!

Guidance for ATWS Equipment.that' is.not Safety-Related," or with 10 CFR'50, Appendix B.

'In addition,,the' inspector reviewed the training provided on the ATWS mitigating systems fo' _ licensed personnel.

'

a, r

i t

S l

.

-<

.

.

.

'

2.2 Design _ Implementation Verification 2.2.1 ATWS Mitigation System (AMS)

The ATWS Mitigation System (AMS) for the Seabrook Unit consists of

,

one non-nuclear safety electronics cabinet (MM-CP-519) which receives six isolated inputs frnm the Process Protection System-

(four steam generator narrow-range levels and two turbine impulse pressures). The AMS acts as a backup to the Reactor Protection System for a loss of feedwater event. The AMS will trip.the turbine _

(both trip circuits) and start. emergency feedwater pumps (FW-P-37A and FW-P-378). any time turbine _ power.is above 40% and narrow-range level is below 5% in three_ steam gent.rators.

The ATWS rule does not require the AMS system to-be safety grade, however, at Seabrcok the AMS has been installed using the Class.1E:

~

system criteria for separation, termination and drawing controls.

The inspector determined that the.AMS system is electrically and physically separated and independent from the Reactor Protection System (RPS). The AMS contains.its own logic.and control' circuits.

which enable it to perform a function redundant to RPS aad independent of it.

In addition to being independent and redundant to JS, the AMS must i

also be diverse from it.

To accomplish this, the AMS is powered

'

from circuit 2 of 125 volt direct current from nonsafety related

Battery B-28 through switchgear SWG-128.

The AMS logic cabinet incorporates energized-to-actuate logic while~the'RPS.'deenergize-to-

_

actuate logic.

~

The AMS actuation signal is initiated in. low-low-low steam generator-level, on three-out-of-four steam' generators (one' sensor for each steam generator).

The.setpoint is lower than the low-low steam generator level reactor trip /EFW actuation setpoint, and a time delay is added to the actuation signal in order to permit the-Protection System to' actuate prior to AMS actuation. The inspector

-

verified that the testing results of _ procedure N0. :127,:'!ATWS Mitigation System Acceptance Test, ": verified that the AMS performed as designed.

The AMS. had an' operating. bypass.(C-20 permissive)' provided 'which

'

blocks an.AMS actuation.when either turbine. impulse pressure ~

._

-

transmitter indicates less than 40i power.

The AMS design provides for-the C-20 permissive-to be maintained following a' turbine trip from above the C-20 setpoint long enough. to allow the - AMS to perform its function, if necessary.

The inspector; verified'that-theitime-delay circuit was tested during the verification of. the AMS'

functional test.

.l

a

.-

=

.

,,

,

.4 The AMS is'not safety-related or seismically qualified as stated,.

however,' the equipment was installed using Class 1E installation requirements.

The system shares narrow-range steam generator level

'

and turbine impulse pressure sensors with the Protection System; however, the AMS inputs are isolated.from the protection system.

The AMS bistables and logic network are of a different design and.

manufacturer than the Protection System and are physically located in a separate cabinet.

The logic cabinet is powered from a

'

non-Class IE 125 volt de power source which will provide power during a loss of off-site power.

The outputs of the.AMS are electrically isolated from-the. safety-related EFW pump circuit by

,

relays in an isolation relay-cabinet.

The system-has been' designed

-

-so that a single failure will not result in an inadvertent actuation. The AMS can be bypassed to allow testing at' power,'which"

. i was demonstrated during the system verification testing.

.

During the review of the engineering design'of the AMS, the

,

inspector verified that Human-Factor considerations were identified in the Design Coordination Report-(DCR)87-331, i.e. the location of

,

the C-20 bypass indication in the control room is a Human Factor

consideration.

2.3 Surveillance Testing

.

2.3.1 ATWS Mitigation System (AMS)

The inspector reviewed the surveillance 1 procedures listed.in Attachment A to verify that they are technically adequate; that they minimize the possibility of inadvertent actuation, and that theyL verify all aspects of. system operation to ensure thatLthe AMS will l

perform in a reliable manner.

The inspector ~ determined that the

procedures were ' technically ' adequate anduthat' allLphases'of thel AMS '

~

l design was tested during the initial installation phase.- As an example, the inspector verified. that when three out of _ four steam'

generators are less than 5% narrow range level and the plant _is-

,

greater than 40% turbine power, an automatic actuation lof the EFW

!

L system'and a turbine trip would' occur. The inspector:also verified

!

that the AMS cabinet logic was-tested to ensure:that-an actuation would not occur when the ' logic is in the' test mode:and-during-t transition to and from.the-test mode.- Based on the testing program I

performed on the AMS design-and installation, the inspector.

-determined-that both the-system test and sur'veillance procedures

results indicate that the 'AMS is capable of perfo'rming its function -

E in a reliable ~ manner.

,

I

!

)

i

.

.

.

,

'I 2.4 Operation Procedures and Licensed Operator Training The inspector reviewed the operating and alarm response procedures listed'

in Appendix A to verify that they had been appropriately revised to -

reflect the plant modifications required to comply with the ATWS rule.

The inspector also reviewed the training provided to licensed operators j

to verify that they received appropriate training on the ATWS. mitigation systems.

The inspector determ',ed that the plant procedures had been appropriately I

revised to reflect the ATW5' modification. -The-licensed operator systems training incorporated appropriate information on the AMS.. The inspector

-

verified that the operators are required as part of their R0'and SR0 training programs to understand the AMS. system.

In addition, the inspector verified that their simulator has been updated with the AMS design as part of.the R0 and SRO training program.

The inspector also

,

varified that the-ATWS events has been incorporated,into the Emergency

~

-

Operating Procedures (E0Ps) and' that training has been given to the plant personnel.

2.5 Quality Verification for ATWS ;htigating 5,:+ ems While the AMS is not covered under' the technical specification for Seabrook, it has been installed using the Class IE: system criteria and -is-subject to the same quality assurance-program as safety'related equipment as described in their quality assurance program'NHY 14400 (Quality Assurance Requirements for ATWS Mitigation System Actuation Circuitry).-

l The inspector reviewed.the quality assurance program as described in NHY 14400 and determined that information;concerning' the quality classification of equipment and the. installationand testing-of the' AMS

,

was in conformance with tim quality documentation.. During.the'walkdown of

I the installed AMS, the inspector verified cable' installation, separation-

!

and termination compliance with the design criteria of DCR 87-331.

'

2.6 Conclusion

,

The inspector's review of the ATWS Mitigating Wystem.( AMS). installed at

'

Seabrook Unit I determined.that it-is-in acccedance with the design-

described in the FSAR and reviewed in-the NRC SER..The. quality' assurance L

program applied to this system complies..with the requirements of-10 CFR 50, Appendix B.

A surveillance' program has been developed and-

,

implemented to ensure that the system will3 perform in a; reliable manner.

Operating procedures and licensed operator training have been appropriately revised to reflect the plant modifications made to comply

.

with the ATWS Rule.

>

t i

.

--

.

..,

,

,

-

,

,

,

,

,

.?.

c

_

,

,

'

'

i s

.,-

'

'

...

..

,

ll

+

y..

-

y>

-

,

-

v;G

!

-3,0 Exit Meeting

.

. Licensee management was. informed;of.the scope.and' purpose;of the--
!

--inspection at-anLentrance meeti_ng conducted'on~ October 901990.-

J

,

!: l

-.

.

.

..

..

.

,.......

' The. find _ings;of the. inspector ~were periodically discussed (with~;11censeel

  • j representatives during.the course;of theLinspectionn;An. exit wasJ

-

l-conducted on October:12, 1990.(see paragraph 1)Lat which time'thec

-

'

findings of the inspector were; presented.

' '

'

>

,

~

b Atnotimeduringthe= inspection,di.d'the_ inspector:providewritten; material-to:the licensee nor did1the-1.icensee indicate.that areas 1 covered:

by.this inspection contained proprietary 11nformationt 3 -

(

to i

,

-

.

'

..

}- \\_;

.

f

,

,_:' '

i

'1

..;'

[

i f

i

>

i

,. ;

s

'

.]

'

~

-l

.

.

c

.

- -

m-

,

,

2)

<

s

,'

d

'

'

s s-: s

..

. R K.

g.,

og y

..

,

t j

,

,

ci i m.

. t --

'

i,

_

s

,

,

..

%

.

,

.

,

,

'

a s

.

<

,

,,

.

.

Attachment A ATWS DOCUMENTS REVIEWED t

General Documents Safety Evaluation Report Seabrook Nuclear Station, Unit 1 Compliance with ATWS

-,

Rule 10 CFR 50.62

'

DCR 87-331, Design Coordination Report AMSAC QAP 14400, Quality Assurance Requirements for ATWS Mitigattun Syste:n Actuation Circuitry

NRC Generic Letter 85-06, Quality Assurance Guidance for ATWS' Equipment that is not Safety-Related Specification S-X-1-E-0007, Specification for ATWS Mitigation System Field Change Request.88-078, Actuation Logic dwgs, Emergency Feedwater Pumps dwgs, Feedwater-Turbine Trip /Run Back logic dwgs, and Logic Timer dwgs AMS Electronic Cabinet Block / Logic Diagram L1010001 Station Operating Procedures 0S1235.03, SG Level Instrument Failures j

0S1235.05, Turbine Impulse Pursue PT105 or PT506_ Instrument Failure.

]

FR-S.1, Response'to Nuclear Power Generation /ATWS li l

Work Request

!

..

89 WOO 2334, ATWS Mitigation System Status Monitor

!

l 89W002335, ATWS. Mitigation System Status: Lights l

,

'

,

,

89W002337,' ATWS Mitigation Status : Lights Internal Wiring 89W002338,-ATWS Mitigation Control Panel-

89W002339,.ATWS Control Panel Associated Conduit 89W002340, New Electrical-Cables-Test Procedures k

!

STP-120, ATWS Mitigation System Acceptance Test

]

1l

.

i

$

o