IR 05000443/1998010
| ML20203A300 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 01/28/1999 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20203A286 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-443-98-10, NUDOCS 9902090331 | |
| Download: ML20203A300 (23) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l
REGION I
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Docket No.:
50 443 License No.:
NPF-86 Report No.:
50-443/98-10
Licensee:
North Atlantic Energy Service Corporation
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Facility:
Saabrook Generating Station, Unit 1 Location:
Post Office Box 300 Seabrook, New Hampshire 03874 Dates:
November 15,1998-December 27,1998 Inspectors:
Ray K. Lorson, Senior Resident inspector Javier Brand, Resident inspector Thomas Moslak, Radiation Specialist John McFadden, Radiation Specialist Approved by:
Clifford Anderson, Chief Projects Cranch 5 Division of Reactor Projects i
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Seabrook Generating Station, Unit 1 l
NRC Inspection Report 50-443/98-10 l
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This integrated inspection included aspects of licensee operations, engineering, maintenance, and plant support. The report covers a 6 week period of resident and l
specialist inspection.
Ooerations:
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Several operational errors, including a f ailure to follow a procedural requirement, e
l contributed to the feedwater isolation event. Additionally, several minor human l
performance deficiencies occurred during the forced outage. The licensee l
implemented adequate corrective actions to address these issues (Section 04.1).
The operators responded well to stabilize plant conditions following the reactor trip e
on December 22. The event team review of this event was thorough and the
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licensee completed appropriate corrective actions prior to the plant restart (Section 04.2).
J The operators performed two reactor start-ups well (Section 04.3).
e A minor violation was identified for the failure to properly report an event involving e
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the initiation of a shutdown required by Technical Specifications (Section 08.1).
Maintenance:
e The licensee repaired and retested a degraded emergency diesel generator air start solenoid valve satisf actorily. The inspector noted weaknesses involving the identification of a degrading valve performance trend, and the tirnetiness in initiating a root cause analysis for previous solenoid valve failures (Section M1.1).
e The licensee satisfactori!y repaired and retested the motor driven emergency feedwater pump outlet stop check valve (FW-V70). Adequate foreign material controls were 2bserved. The inspector noted a minor weakness in that the evaluation of an internal valve anomaly had not been documented well (Section M1.2),
e The licensee responded well to assure the proper operation of the main steam isolation valves following a test failure. The system engineer has developed a long term plan to ensure the proper operation of the fast closure solenoid valves. This test failure was properly characterized per the maintenance rule requirements (Section M1.3).
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Executive Summary (cont'd)
Enoineerina:
The new fuel assemblies were thoroughly inspected. Le licensee properly e
addressed a minor anomaly involving debris on one of the new fuel assemblies (Section E2.1).
The licensee evaluated and performed a temporary repair of a secondary leak e
from the "D" steam generator manway cover well. Minor corrective action program weaknesses were noted involving the timeliness of initiating an adverse condition report (ACR), and in documenting the intended disposition of this ACR (Section E2.2).
A reactor coolant system leak was of minor significance due to its magnitude, and
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e location. The identification of the leak during a plant walkdown indicated a good
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attention to detail. The licensee responded well to isolate and repair this leak (Section E2.3).
Plant Suonort:
The radioactive waste management and transportation programs were effectively e
implemented. Radioactive waste and other radioactive materials were properly characterized, classified, packaged and shipped. The" Green is Clean" program was aggressively managed and monitored to reduce the volume of radioactive waste generated from routine tasks (Section R1.1).
Radioactive waste processing and storage areas were properly maintained, posted,
and controlled. Drums and boxes containing contaminated waste were properly labeled, segregated by waste type, and in satisfactory material condition (Section R2).
- Personnel responsible for classifying radioactive waste and shipping radioactive materials met NRC and DOT training and retraining requirements (Section RS).
e Performance of the waste services department was effectively monitored and problem areas were appropriately elevated to the appropriate management level for resolution (Section R7).
Radiological controls were effectively implemented in preparation for transferring e
spent resin from the spent fuel pool demineralizer to the resin sluice tank.
l Operational, radiological, and access control issues were effectively coordinated.
l Pre-job briefings reinforced management expectations on work practices (Section i
R8.1 ).
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TABLE OF CONTENTS l
E 22 EXEC UTIV E S U M M A RY.............................................. ii TAB LE O F C O NTE NTS.........................................
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Summary of Plant Status
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1. Operations
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Conduct of Operations.................................... 1 01.1 General Comments (71707)
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Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment
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Operator Knowledge and Performance......................... 2 04.1 Main Feedwater Isolation Event and Human Performance Standdown
...............................................2 04.2 Automatic Reactor Trip Following a Load Reject............. 3 04.3 Reactor Start-Up Observations
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Miscellaneous Operations issues............................. 4 08.1 Eve nt Re p o rt s..................................... 4 11. M a int e n a n c e................................................... 5 M1 Conduct of M aintenance................................... 5 M 1.1
"A" Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Air Start Solenoid Valve Repair...........................................5 i
M1.2 Emergency Feedwater (EFW) Check Valve Back Leakage / Repair.. 6 M1.3 Main Steam isolation Valve (MS-V-92) Slow Closing Performance. 7 M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance issues............................ 8 M8.1 (Closed) Violation (VIO) 98-04-01, inoperable Steam Generator Pressure Protection Channels:.......................... 8 Ill. Engineering
...................................................8 E2 Engineering Support of Facilities and Equipment.................. 8 E2.1 New Fuel Receipt and Storage.......................... 8 E2.2 Steam Leak On The "D" Steam Generator Outboard Manway Cover
...............................................9 E2.3 Reactor Coolant System Leak
........................10 E8 Miscellaneous Engineering issues............................ 11 E8.1 (Closed) Violation 50-443/98-01-02, Failure to implement Adequate Design Controls
..................................11 IV. Plant Support
................................................11 R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls.................. 11 R1.1 Solid Radioactive Waste Processing, Handling, Storage, and Shipping
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l 4. Table of Contents (cont'd)
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. Status of'RP&C Facilities and Equipment
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- RS
Staff Training and Qualific'ation in RP&C,..,................... 13 t
- R7 Quality Assurance and Self-Assessment in RP&C Activities......... 14
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R8 Miscellaneous RP&C lssues................................ 15 J
l R8.1 Inspection of Preparations for Transferring Spent Resin.....-.15 l
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S1 Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities................... 15
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i S1.1' General Comment (71707, 71750)
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P7
- Quality Assurance in Security and Safeguards Activities............ 15 i
P7.1 - Improper Temporary Access.......................... 15
'.I V. Management Meetings
.........................................16-i X1 Exit M eeting Summary.................................... 16
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ATTACHMENTS
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l Attachment'1 - Partial List of Persons Contacted
- Inspection Procedures Used-Items Opened, Closed, and Discussed
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- List of Acronyms Used i
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Report Details Summarv of Plant Status The facility began the period in a forced outage to complete repair of the main generator step-up (GSU) transformer low voltage side buswork (Discussed in NRC Inspection Report 98-09). The operators started-up the reactor on November 23, and operated the plant at 100% power until a switchyard problem caused an automatic turbine and reactor trip on December 22 (Section 04.2). The licensee corrected the switchyard problem, and performed a reactor start-up on December 24, and completed the period with the unit operating at 100% power.
l. Operations
Conduct of Operations 01.1 General Comments (71707)
Using Inspection Procedure 71707, the inspectors conducted frequent reviews of ongoing plant operations. In general, routine operations were performed in accordance with station procedures and plant evolutions were completed in a deliberate manner with clear communications and effective oversight by shift supervision. Control room logs accurately reflected plant activities and observed shift turnovers were comprehensive and thoroughly addressed questions posed by the oncoming crew. Control room operators displayed good questioning perspectives prior to releasing work activities for field implementation. The inspectors found that operators were knowledgeable of plant and system status.
Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment a.
Insoection Scope (71707. 62707)
The inspectors routinely conducted independent plant tours and walkdowns of selected portions of safety-related systems during the inspection report period.
These activities consisted of the verification that system configurations, power supplies, process parameters, support system availability, and current system operational status were consistent with Technical Specification (TS) requirements and UFSAR descriptions. Additionally, system, component, and general area material conditions and housekeeping status were noted. The inspectors found that the plant conditions were acceptable, but identified some minor material deficiencies that were appropriately addressed by the licensee.
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04 Operator Knowledge and Performance 04.1 Main Feedwater Isolation Event and Human Performance Standdown a.
Inspection Scope The inspector reviewed operating logs, plant data, and the licensee's event team evaluation following an unexpected feedwater (FW) system isolation on November 20,1998. Additionally, the inspector reviewed the licensee's human performance standdown on November 18,1998, that was performed in response to several human performance deficiencies.
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Observations and Findinas j
Prior to the FW isolation event, the control room operators were conducting a plant
heat-up to Mode 3 using the reactor coolant pumps. The plant heat-up rate was controlled by transferring steam to the condenser through the main steam isolation valve (MSIV) bypass valves, and the steam dump valves.
The operators decided to open the MSIVs to stabilire plant conditions at about 340 F prior to entering Mode 3. The control room operator opened the "A" MSIV which increased the steam flow rate and caused the "A" steam generator water level to swell from approximately 55% to 90% which exceeded the steam generator water level high-high setpoint (P-14) and actuated the feedwater isolation. The plant responded properly to this protective signal. The operators promptly stabilized plant conditions, and made the required 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> non-emergency report per 10 CFR 50.72. Plant management initiated an event team to investigate this event, and to
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develop recommended actions to be completed prior to the plant re-start.
The event team report identified several operational deficiencies that led to this event including: poor evolution planning (i.e. the MSIVs should have been opened sooner in the plant heat-up), the steam loads were not secured prior to opening the MSIVs as required by operations procedure OS1030.01, " Main Steam System Operation," and inadequate shift management oversight. The corrective actions performed prior to the plant start-up included: briefing operators on the event, review of related operational experience, and the assignment of an additional shift manager to improve operations oversight.
The inspector determined that the completed corrective actions prior to restart were adequate. The event involved mis-operation of the secondary system while the i
reactor was shutdown, and did not challenge reactor safety. The f ailure to properly implement operating procedure OS 1030.01 is consider a violation of minor significance and not subject to formal enforcement action.
The licensee performed a standdown on November 18, to improve personnel focus and performance following a series of minor human performance deficiencies. The
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deficiencies included errors in configuration control, tagging, and the control of j
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evolutions. The inspector determined that the standdown was appropriate and a good initiative to improve performance.
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Conclusions l
l Several operational errors, including a minor violation for a failure to follow a procedural requirement, contributed to the feedwater isolation event. Additionally, several minor human performance deficiencies occurred during the forced outage.
The human performance standdown and event team review of the feedwater isolation event were considered good initiatives to improve performance.
04.2 Automatic Reactor Trio Followino a Load Reie_c_t a.
Insoection Scope
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The inspectors observed the operators respond to an automatic reactor trip on December 22. Additionally, the inspector reviewed the licensee's event team findings and corrective actions prior to restart.
b.
Observations and Findinas The reactor tripped automatically in response to a turbine trip that was initiated by a turbine load reject. The load reject occurred when a mechanical linkage pin failed
- to properly reposition during the opening of one of the main generator output breakers (breaker 163). The operator had manually opened breaker 163 to isolate the "Scobie" off-site power source in preparation for a planned maintenance outage.
l The breaker control circuitry interpreted the linkage pin problem as a breaker 163 operating problem and automatically opened all adjacent breakers; including the l
other main generator output breaker (breaker 11), which led to the load reject.
The reactor plant responded properly to the trip, control room operators promptly stabilized plant conditions in accordance with the reactor trip procedure, and the event was propcrly reported per 10 CFR 50.72. The loss of breakers 11, and 163 isolated the power source to the unit auxiliary transformer (UAT) which resulted in a automatic transfer of the 4KV busses to the reserve auxiliary transformer (RAT).
One of the non-safety related busses (Bus 4) failed to transfer.
The licensee formed an event team to investigate several issues related to this event including: the breaker 163 problem, the failure of bus 4 to automatically transfer, and the necessary actions to be completed prior to restart. Additionally, the licensee identified and evaluated four safety-related electrical loads that did not automatically restart following the plant trip.
l The team identified that the breaker 163 mechanical linkage pin retaining snap ring l
had fallen off. This caused the mechanical pin linkage operating problem which led
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to the load reject. The licensee replaced the snap ring, visually inspected all other l
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345KV breakers for this problem, and found no additional deficiencies. The licensee planned to develop longer term actions to prevent recurrence of this problern.
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The licensee performed extensive breaker and protective relay testing on Bus 4, but was unable to duplicate the f ailure to transfer. The inspector determined that the failure of the non-safety bus (Bus 4) to transfer was not safety significant, and noted that the safety-related busses had additional relay protection installed to ensure that they would remain energized following an electrical transient. The licensee determined that the four safety-related loads which did not restart following the electrical transient functioned as designed. The inspector noted that none of the affected loads were required to automatically restart during an accident, and that operator action could have been implemented to restore the loads as required.
c.
Conclusions The operators responded well to stabilize plant conditions following the reactor trip.
The event team investigation of this event was thorough and the licensee completed appropriate corrective actions prior to the plant restart.
04.3 Reactor Start-Un Observations The operators maintained good control of key plaat parameters during the reactor start-up on November 23, and on December 24,1998. Operations and station management implemented and enforced appropriate Mode change restrictions. The reactor start-up activities were generally performed well. The inspector observed good communications, procedural adherence, and control of trainees. Additionally, the inspector noted adequate control of an evolution to seat the safety injection system check valves.
Miscellaneous Operations issues 08.1 Event Reoorts The licensee properly issued several non-emergency event reports during the period per 10 CFR 50.72. The reports included: the feedwater isolation event on November 21 (discussed in Section 04.1); the discovery of dead seals in the plant l
intake structure on November 24, and on December 5; a temporary access control deficiency (Section P7.1); and the reactor trip on December 22 (Section 04.2). The
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inspector reviewed the event reports and determined that they adequately described each event.
l On December 9, the licensee retracted the event report that had been issued for the i
plant shutdown on November 12 (Inspection Report 98-09). The licensee indicated
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that this event was not reportable since the shutdown was performed as a conservative action, and completed prior to expiration of the TS allowed outage time (AOT). The inspector did not agree with this assessment, and noted that the licensee shutdown the plant after determining that the bus repairs could not be
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completed within the TS AOT. Additionally, the inspector noted that the original event report was submitted about 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> following the event, and not within the four hour notification period required by 10 CFR 50.72.
l The licensee reviewed the inspector's concern, concluded that the event retraction
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was inappropriate and subsequently re-issued the event repert. The inspector determined that the failure to properly report this event was a violation of minor
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significance.and not subject to formal enforcement action.
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II. Maintenance j
M1 Conduct of Maintenance M 1.1
"A" Emeraency Diesel Generator (EDG) Air Start Solenoid Valve Repair a.
Insoection Segpe (61726/62707)
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The inspector reviewed the licensee's response to a failure of the "A" EDG air start solenoid valve to stroke open within the required time limit during surveillance
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testing (OX 1426.14) on December 1.
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Observations and Findinos l
Two air start solenoid valves are located on each EDG These valves are required to open within 0.5 seconds to ensure that the EDGs are able to start within 10 seconds. The actual open stroke time measured during the testing was 0.58
seconds, and the licensee promptly declared the EDG inoperable to effect repairs.
l The repairs were successfully completed with the TS allowed outage time.
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Instrument and Controls (l&C) technicians perform the testing by monitoring the solenoid coil current output trace during the valve operation. The inspector reviewed several previous test results and noted that the valve met its acceptance test requirements, however, it had a history of abnormal current traces, and a
degrading stroke time trend. The inspector noted a minor weakness, based on l-discussions with engineering personnel, that this degrading stroke time trend had j
apparently not been recognized prior to the latest failure. The licensee initiated a i
graphical trending program to enhance evaluation of the test data, l
The root cause investigation for the repeat valve failures is on-going. The inspector j
reviewed the work history for this valve and noted that a previous attempt in 1997
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to initiate a root cause assessment for this valve problem had not been completed.
The ii spector considered this a corrective action program weakness.
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Conclusion The licensee repaired and retested a degraded EDG air start solenoid valve satisf actorily. TFs inspector noted weaknesses involving the identification of a degrading valve performance trend, and the timeliness in conducting the root cause analysis for the repeat valve failures.
M1.2 Emeraencv Feedwater (EFW) Check Valve Back Leakaae/Reoair a.
Inspection Scone j
On November 17, the inspec':or observed portions of the mechanical maintenance activities to repair seat leakage through the motor driven emergency feedwater (EFW) pump outlet stop check valve (FW-V70).
b.
Observations and Findinas Valve FW-V70, is a 6 inch swing check valve that is included in the Inservice Test Program for forward flow and reverse leakage testing, and in Seabrook's check valve performance monitoring program (procedure ES 1850.001). The current inspection periodicity for this valve is every 60 months. The last inspection was performed in November 1996, during the fourth refueling outage. The licensee initially suspected leakage post this valve seat, based on a slightly elevated EFW pump suction piping tempertture.
The inspector visually inspected the valve internals and questioned a surface anomaly (narrowing) on the valve disc seating surface. Additionally, the inspector learned from the mechanic tnat the two bolts that hold the valve disc and corresponding arm (hanger) to the valve body had increased play due to a narrow shoulder and also that one of two hanger block dowel pins was missing. The inspector questioned the agt;regate impact of these anomalies on the valve operability and whether they contributed to the leakage problem.
The system engineer provided data and history of previous inspections performed.
The inspector noted that the indication (narrowing) on the disc had been previously identified and evaluated as satisfactory, but noted that the basis for this determination was not documented well.
The licensee initiated an adverse condition report (ACR) to evaluate the missing dowel pin. The valve manufacturer indicated that the dowel pins aid in the initial alignment and can help maintain alignment during transients. Additiona!!y, the vendor indicated that misalignment is easily detected during disassembly and by back leakage during operation. The system engineer stated that the industry has received conflicting information from the manufacturer as to whether or not the dowel pins are required, however, the licensee has modified the check valve inspection program to verify the proper installation of the dowel pins. The missing dowel pin was f abricated on site and replace _
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The inspector questioned the component engineer regarding the bolt shoulder design issue discussed above, and learned the bolt shoulder design was correct. A minor communication weakness was noted in that the component engineer was not aware of this potential issue until questioned by the inspector. The licensee is in the process of forming a multi-disciplined check valve team to help improve communications.
The system engineer indicated that the back leakage was minor as evident by satisfactory results in several valve closure IST test performed. The licensee plans to replace this check valve during the 1999 refueling outage with a softer seat design to reduce the potential for back leakage, c.
Conclusion The licensee satisfactorily repaired and retested the motor driven emergency feedwater pump outlet stop check valve (FW-V70). Adequate foreign material controls were observed. The inspector noted a minor weakness in that the evaluation for an internal valve anomaly had not been documented well.
M1.3 Main Steam isolation Valve (MS-V-92) Slow Closina Performance a.
Insoection Scope (62707)
The inspector reviewed the licensee's response to a main steam isolation valve (MS-V-92) failure to close within the required 5 seconds during shutdown testing.
b.
Observations and Findinas The licensee performed troubleshooting and determined that MS-V-92 operated slowly due to an improper air gap setting on the fast closure solenoid valve. The air gap setting was found to be flush instead of the required 0.002 - 0.010 in, clearance. The l&C technician properly adjusted the gap setting and retested the valve satisf actory. The licensee also inspected, and adjusted the air gap setting as necessary for the remaining MSlVs.
The inspector discussed the issue with the system engineer (SE), and learned that the lower air gap setting can be difficult to achieve. The licensee plans to contact the solenoid valve vendor to expand the allowable air gap setting.
The inspector noted that this was the second f ailure associated with the MSIV isolation function within the past few months and questioned how this failure was being treated per the maintenance rule. The inspector learned that an ACR had been generated to recommend placing the MSIV isolation function into the A(1)
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Conclusions The licensee responded well to assure the proper operation of the main steam isolation valves following a test failure. The system engineer has develooed a long term plan to ensure the proper operation of the fast closure solenoid valves. The test failure was properly characterized per the maintenance rule requirements.
M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance issuer M8.1 1 Closed) Violation (VIO) 98-04-01. Inoperable Steam Generator Pre;.
a Protection Channels: Inspection Report 98-04 identified that the licensee was sivw to confirm the operability of the A and D steam generator pressure protection channels after three of the six pressure protection channels were found to be inoperable on the B and C steam generators. The licensee formed an event investigation team and performed a thorough review of the calibration methodology for these instruments.
Additionally, the licensee revised the calibration procedure to improve the guidance to the technicians, and coached applicable personnel regarding this event. The inspector concluded that the licensee's actions were reasonable and appropriate.
This violation is closed.
Ill. Enaineerina E2 Engineering Support of Facilities and Equipment E2.1 New Fuel Receiot and Storaae a.
Insoection Scooe On December 2, the inspector observed portions of new fuel receipt and inspection activities being performed by reactor engineering. The inspector also reviewed applicable procedures and work instructions, interviewed reactor engineering and maintenance personnel and independently inspected four assemblies and their shipping containers.
b.
Observations and Findinas The reactor engineers performed the receipt inspection activities meticulously well and in accordance with applicable procedures. Proper foreign material exclusion (FME) techniques were implemented.
During inspection of the first assembly, the reactor engineers identified a small piece of debris (material) on one of tha four assembly springs. The material was promptly removed for analysis. The prehminary evaluation determined that the material did not affect the integrity of the fuel assembly. The inspector considered the licensee's response to this issue to be appropriat.
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The inspector independently verified the integrity of several fuel assemblies and their shipping containers, including the security seal and shock indicators, and did not identify any deficiencies.
c.
Conclusion The new fuel assemblies were thoroughly inspected. The licensee properly addressed a minor anomaly involving debris on one of the new fuel assemblies.
E2.2. Steam Leak On The "D" Steam Generator Outboard Manway Cover a.
Insoection Scoce On December 3, while the Unit was at 100% power, the licensee identified a steam leak through the gasket of the "D" steam generator (S/G) secondary side outboard manway cover. The leak formed a plume that was approximately 20 inches long and 1.5 inches wide. The inspector reviewed the licensee's analysis and repair of this condition.
b.
Observations and Findinas The secondary side of each Steam Generator (S/G) is provided with two manway access covers (180 degrees apart); each cover is held in place by 20 carbon steel bolts. An asbestos flexitallic gasket is installed to prevent leakage.
Engineering and operations personnel promptly evaluated the leak and determined that it did not present an immediate concern. The licensee initiated periodic containment walkdowns and installed a video camera to monitor the leakage. The licensee formed a multi-disciplined team to develop a repair plan and decided to perform an interim repair of the leak using a leak sealant injection method.
The inspector reviewed several 10 CFR 50.59 evaluations performed by engineering to support the repair and found them to be acceptable. The reviews included:
evaluation of the gasket leak, evaluation of performing a hot torque to the maximum allowable value, evaluation of the consequences of leaving the scaffolding material in the containment for the duration of the operating cycle, and evaluation of the required seal injection repair.
The licensee planned and executed the work activities well. Several good practices were implemented to minimize the occupational exposure. The inspector noted that the repair was effective and significantly reduced the leakage.
The inspector noted corrective action program weaknesses involving the timeliness of initiating an ACR for this event, and the documentation of the ACR disposition.
Specifically, an ACR was not generated for about nine days following the event, and only after the inspector questioned whether an ACR had been generated. The ACR disposition was " corrective action only", however, the inspector noted that a similar
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leak had developed approximately four years ago and questioned whether the licensee planned to investigate the cause for the leak. Station management indicated that the management review team had decided to evaluate this leak using the work control process. The inspector was satisfied that the leak was going to be evaluated, and noted that the licensee subsequently revised the ACR to require
"further evaluation".
c.
Conclusions The licensee evaluated and performed a temporary repair of a secondary leak from the "D" steam generator manway cover well. Minor corrective action program weaknesses were noted involving the timeliness of initiating an adverse condition report (ACR), and in documenting its intended disposition.
E2.3 Reactor Coolant Svstem Leak a.
Insoection Scop _e The inspectors reviewed the licensee's activities to evaluate and repair a minor reactor coolant system leak. The leak was identified by a licensee technician during a shutdown plant walkdown on November 18, that was performed to inspect previously identified boron leak paths inside the containment.
b.
Observations and Findinas The technician identified boron residue external to a fitting downstream of a reactor coolant system flow transmitter isolation valve (RC-V-20). The leak indication was on small diameter piping. The licensee removed the boron residue, but did not observe any visible leakage. The licensee then performed a liqu;d dye penetrant test which also did not indicate any defects. Finally the licensee pressurized the affected section of piping to 2200 psig and a small leak was observed (approximately 1 drop of water per every 10 minutes) on the lower portion of the fillet weld that connected the fitting to the piping.
The licensee ground out the fillet and attributed the leak to inadequate fusion of a section of the root weld. The licensee repaired the weld and satisfactorily pressure tested the system. The inspector reviewed the completed repair documentation, and did not identify any discrepancies.
c.
Conclusions The leak was of minor significance due to its magnitude, and location. The identification of the leak indicated a good attention to detail during the walkdown.
The licensee responded well to isolate and repair this leak.
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E8 Miscellaneous Engineering issues E8.1 (Closed) Violation 50-443/98-01-02. Failure to implement Adeauate Desian Controls:
The inspector identified in NRC inspection Report 98-01 that the licensee installed canvas covers over the residual heat removal (RHR) pump room ventilation screens without evaluating their affect on the RHR room ventilation system. The licensee attributed this event to poor communications between the engineering, and health physics departments, and to an improper review of the covers based on use of the temporary equipment procedure in lieu of the temporary modification procedure.
The licensee coached personnel involved with the event, and issued a memorandum that reinforced the use of the temporary modification procedure for similar situations. The inspector determined that the licensee's corrective actions were reasonable. This violation is closed.
IV. Plant SuospIt R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls R1.1 Solid Radioactive Waste Processina. Handlina, Storaae and Shionina a.
Insoection Scone (86750)
The implementation of the solid radioactive waste program was reviewed relative to waste processing, waste characterization, the development / application of scaling factors, shipping activities, and volume reduction efforts. This review included examination of performance related to implementing the Process Control Program-(PCP) including associated procedures and records, interviews with cognizant personnel, and direct observation of work activities. Five shipping records were reviewed for shipments of radioactive waste and other radioactive materials made since the previous inspection.
The review was conducted using selected criteria contained in 10 CFR 20,10 CFR 61,10 CFR 71,49 CFR 100-179, the applicable certificate of compliance for an NRC licensed shipping cask, and applicable NRC Branch Technical Positions.
b.
Observation and Findinas The Process Control Plan was an accurate description of the facility's waste types generated and waste processing methods. Scaling factors for hard-to-detect radionuclides were developed from sample data per Part 61 requirements and appropriately used in classifying waste shipped.
The radioactive waste / material shipping program was appropriately implemented.
Shipping records and supporting documentation were reviewed to ensure that:
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manifests were properly prepared; radioactive materials and waste were properly characterized and classified; the appropriate shipping container, labels, and placards were used; and the relevant radiation and contamination limits were met.
Receipt inspections of radioactive material shipments were appropriately performed.
Direct observations were made of the RadWaste staff performing a receipt inspection of a shipment of now fuel on December 8,1998. Surveys were conscientiously performed, supporting documentation was accurately completed, and the relevant regulatory requirements were met.
The licensee continued to aggressively implement and evaluate methods to reduce the volume of dry activated waste generated from routine activities. Potentially contaminated materials / waste were properly segregated from uncontaminated materials through a " Green is Clean" program. Various performance indicators relative to waste minimization were routinely monitored and tracked by management, c.
Conclusion The radioactive waste management and transportation programs were effectively implemented as evidenced by an experienced staff carrying out clearly written, detailed procedures. Radioactive waste and other radioactive materials were properly characterized, classified, packaged and shipped. The" Green is Clean" program was aggressively managed and monitored to reduce the volume of radioactive waste generated from routine tasks through segregating radioactive waste from non-contaminated materials.
R2 Status of RP&C Facilities and Equipment a.
Insoection Scoce (86750)
Tours were made of various radwaste processing and radioactive material storage areas including the Waste Processing Building, the Unit-2 cooling tower, and the Asphalt Storage Building to assess the adequacy in controlling radioactive materials, including access controls, area posting, and material condition.
b.
Observations and Findinas The Waste Processing Building, the Unit-2 cooling tower, and the Asphalt Storage Building were satisfactorily maintained and properly posted with access appropriately controlled. Radioactive waste was properly segregated by waste type.
Drums and boxes containing contaminated waste were properly labeled and in satisfactory material condition. Independent measurements of radiation levels on waste packages and general room areas confirmed documented readings.
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Building was evident. Actions were taken to minimize the leakage by sealant l
injection into affected wall areas and to contain, and routinely remove, accumulated l
water. Contaminated areas in the WPB were minimized by implementation of various contamination control measures. Potentially contaminated areas such as the l
Box Compacter Area and Decontamination Room were well maintained and l
controlled with contamination levels well below the procedurallimits. Radioactive waste processed in the WPB was expeditiously moved to interim storage areas.
c.
Conclusion Radioactive waste processing and storage areas were properly maintained, posted, and controlled. Drums and boxes containing contaminated waste were properly
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R5 Staff Training and Qualification in RP&C l
a.
Jnspection Scope (867501 l
Training of personnel responsible for classifying radioactive waste and preparing radioactive waste / materials for shipment was reviewed to determine compliance l
with the requirements of 49 CFR 172, Subpart H and NRC Bulletin 79-19.
Qualification records of selected individuals were reviewed and discussed with i
training and Chemistry / Health Physics Department management.
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Observation and Findinas A hazardous materials training program appropriately provides the initial and continuing training to waste services department personnel to qualify personnel for
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performing their job functions. The training program adequately addrmsed the
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training required by 49 CFR 172, Subpart H and NRC Bulletin 79-19.
Review of relevant training records for the Waste Services Department Manager, the Radioactive Waste Shipping Manager, and the Senior RadWaste technician, indicated that these individuals completed the required training.
There were no significant changes in the personnel, staffing, and responsibilities of the waste services organization since the last inspection.
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Conclusion Personnel responsible for classifying radioactive waste and shipping radioactive materials met NRC and DOT training and retraining requirements.
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R7 Quality Assurance and Self-Assessment in RP&C Activities a.
inspection Scooe (86750)
Audits, internal assessments, and surveillances of the Process Control Program and of radioactive waste handling / processing / storage activities were reviewed and compared to the criteria contained in the Quality Assurance Program,10 CFR 20, and 10 CFR 71, Subpart H.
The effectiveness of these management controls in identifying problems, analyzing causes, and implementing corrective actions related to implementing the solid radioactive waste program was assessed.
b.
Observation and Findinas Audit No. 98-A07-01, "RadWaste/ Process Control Program" was a comprehensive evaluation of the programmatic controls and the implementation of procedures related to managing radioactive wastes. Areas audited included staff training / qualifications; waste characterization, handling, storage, and packaging; radwaste volume minimization; the applicability of Operational Quality Assurance Program requirements to radwaste activities; and the effectiveness of the corrective action and self-assessment programs. Findings were appropriately addressed through Adverse Condition Reports (ACRs) and elevated to the appropriate management level for resolution. No adverse trends were evident in the ACRs reviewed.
Internal self-assessments by the waste services department were generally focused on verifying that procedures were complied with and that management expectations were met. Management was expanding the scope of waste services self-assessments to better measure other performance areas; e.g., communications and i
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efficiency.
A formalized human performance monitoring program using key performance indicators was implemented in March 1998 to more comprehensively evaluate field activities, shift turnovers, and pre-job briefings by all management levels and selected staff. This monitoring method has been very frequently carried out in evaluating radioactive waste management activities and assuring that management expectations were being addressed. Trending of the data as it relates to the waste services department performance was being developed.
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Conclusion Performance of the waste services department was effectively monitored and problem areas were appropriately elevated to the appropriate management level for resolution through various management controls, including audits, self-assessments, and the human performance monitoring program.
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R8 Miscellaneous RP&C lssues R8.1 Inspection of Preoarations for Transferrina Scent Resin a.
Scope (86750)
On December 10,1998, the radiological controls were reviewed in preparation for transferring spent resin from the Spent Fuel Pool Demineralizer to the Resin Sluice Tank. Areas reviewed included work coordination, pre-job briefings, use of radiation work permits, and management oversite.
b.
Observations and Findinas The task was well coordinated between the operations and health physics departments to address the changing radiological conditions that would occur in various areas of the Primary Auxiliary Building (PAB) and the Waste Processing Building (WPB) as a result of transferring the highly contaminated resin. Affected areas in the PAB and WPB were appropriately posted, door guards stationed, and specific doors locked to limit access. Process radiation monitoring instrumentation was confirmed to be operational. A staff member from the Nuclear Oversight Department conducted a surveillance of the pre-job briefings and task preparations to monitor human performance issues.
c.
Conclusion Radiological controls were effectively implemented in preparation for transferring spent resin from the spent fuel pool demineralizer to the resin sluice tank.
Operational, radiological, and access control issues were effectively coordinated.
Pre-job briefings reinforced management expectations on work practices.
S1 Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities S1.1 General Comment (71707. 71750)
The inspectors observed security force performance during inspection activities.
Protected area access controls were found to be properly implemented during random observations. Proper escort control of visitors was observed. Security officers were alert and attentive to their duties.
P7 Quality Assurance in Security and Safeguards Activities P7.1 Imoroner Temocrarv Access The inspector reviewed the licensee's response on December 14, after the licensee identified that an individual had been improperly granted temporary access to the l
protected area. The licensee properly reported this event, and implemented
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appropriate compensatory measures. The inspector discussed this event with a l
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NRC Security Specialist'and determined that the licensee's access control program
. was consistent with' regulatory requirements, and noted th'at the individual had not been permitted vital area assess.
V. Manaaement Meetinos X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management, following the conclusion of the inspection period, on January 7,1998.
The licensee acknowledged the findings presented.
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ATTACHMENT 1 PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee l
G. Boissy, Assistant Station Director W. Diprofio, Unit Director J. Grillo, Technical Support Manager M. Harvey, Senior Auditor J. Hill, Operations Supervisor J. Kwasnik, Senior Radiation Scientist J. Linville, Chemistry and Health Physics Manager J. Peterson, Maintenance Manager G. StPierre, Operations Manager B. Seymour, Security Manager J. Savold, l&C Technician, Meteorological M. Toole, l&C Manager R. Thurlow, Health Physics Supervisor R. White, Design Engineering Manager INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 37551:
Onsite Engineering IP 61726:
Surveillance Observation IP 62707:
Maintenance Observation IP 71707:
Plant Operations lP 71750:
Plant Support Activities IP 83750:
Occupational Exposure IP 84750-02 Radioactive Waste Treatment, and Effluent and Environmental Monitoring i
IP 92700:
Onsite Followup of Written Reports of Nonroutine Events at Power Reactor j
Facilities IP 93702:
Prompt Onsite Response to Events at Operating Power Reactors
ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Closed:
Violation 98-01-02, improper Review of a Temporary Modification Violation 98-04-01, Inoperable Steam Generator Pressure Protection Channels Discussed Inspection Report 98-09 indicated that the licensee initiated an adverse condition report to investigate a fitness for duty event. The licensee actually documented the event in the fitness for duty log consistent with the Security Manual, and adverse condition report procedural requirements.
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LIST OF ACRONYMS USED ACR Adverse Condition Report ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers
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ASTM American Society for Testing and Materials CAS Central Alarm Station CBS Containment Building Spray
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DESEL Duke Engineering and Sciences Environmental Laboratory DOE U.S. Department of Energy EDG Emergency Diesel Generator EFW Emergency Feedwater-EML Environmental Measurements Laboratory j
EPA U.S. Environmental Protection Agency FME Foreign Material Exclusion gpd gallons per day gpm gallons per minute LCO Limiting Condition for Operation MMP Meteorological Monitoring Program MOV motor operated valve MPCS Main Plant Computer System NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology NSARC Nuclear Safety and Audit Review Committee NSARC OS NSARC Operations Subcommittee ODCM Offsite Dose Calculation Manual i
psig pounds per square incii gauge QA Quality Assurance QC Quality Control REMP Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program RESL Radiochemical and Environmental Sciences Laboratory RHR Residual Heat Removal SG steam generator
- SIR Station Information Report SORC
' Station Operations Review Committee SUFP Startup Feedwater Pump SW Service Water TDEFW Turbine Driven Emergency Feedwater Pump TLD Thermoluminescent Dosimeter TS Technical Specifications UFSAR Updated Final Safety Analysis Report WR work request YAEL Yankee Atomic Environmental Laboratory r