IR 05000443/1998009
| ML20198C151 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 12/11/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20198C119 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-443-98-09-01, 50-443-98-9-1, NUDOCS 9812210314 | |
| Download: ML20198C151 (20) | |
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l U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION I
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Docket No.:
50-443 License No.:
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~ Report No.:
50-443/98-09
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Licensee:
North Atlantic Energy Service Corporation Facility:
Seabrook Generating Station, Unit 1 l-Location:
Post Office Box 300 Seabrook, New Hampshire 03874 Dates:
October 4,1998 - November 14,1998 Inspectors:
Ray K. Lorson, Senior Resident inspector Javier Brand, Resident inspector Lonny Eckert, Radiation Specialist Robert J. _ Summers, Project Engineer Antone Cerne, Millstone 3 Senior Resident inspector i
Approved by:
Curtis J. Cowgill, Chief, Projects Branch 5
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Division of Reactor Projects
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PDR ADOCK 05000443
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l EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Seabrook Generating Station, Unit 1 NRC Inspection Report 50-443/98 09 This integrated inspection included aspects of licensee operations, engineering, maintenance, and plant support. The report covers a 6 week period of resident and specialist inspection.
Ooerations:
Routine plant operations were performed well during the period (Section 01).
- The reactor shutdown was performed well. The operators responded well to a
steam seal pressure failure. Some minor performance weaknesses were observed involving diagnosis of a " sticking" source range nuclear instrument, and the communication of " expected" alarming conditions (Section 04.1).
The fuel handling personnel did not properly assess the impact of degraded
underwater viewing conditions on the fuel handling activities. Two fuel handling problems were not communicated to the fuel handling supervisor. The licensee has issued an adverse condition report to review the standards and expectations for fuel handling (Section 04.2).
Maintenance:
Repair activities for an emergency feedwater system check valve, and for the low
voltage bus to the generator step up transformer were performed well. Good foreign material exclusion, and procedural controls were noted (Sections M1.1, and M 1.2).
Work control process deficiencies, and personnel error resulted in multiple risk
significant systems being simultaneously removed from service without a risk assessment. The rink associated with these activities would have been avoided had the original forced outage schedule been implemented. Additionally, a violation was identified involving the proper identification and tracking of a technical specification action statement. The licensee's planned corrective actions for this event appeared adequate. (Section M1.3) (NOV 98-09-01).
Enaineerina:
The identification of and response to an elevated temperature condition on the low
voltage side of the generator step-up transformer was good (Section E2.1).
The licensee's operability assessment for back leakage past the emergency
feedwater system stop check valves was adequate. The licensee is investigating a long term plan to correct this repeat issue (Section E2.2).
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The inspector concluded that operators and engineering personnel performed the
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feed and bleod evolutions to raise the "D" loop safety injection accumulator boron concentration well. Adequate procedural adherence and pre-evolution briefs were observed. The licensee is investigating a long term resolution to this problem (Section E2.3).
Plant Suocort:
l The licensee established, implemented, and maintained a good radiation monitoring
system program with respect to electronic calibrations, radiological calibrations, system reliability, and tracking and trending. (Section R2.1)
The licensee established, implemented, and maintained an effective ventilation
system surveillance program with respect to charcoal adsorption surveillance tests, HEPA mechanical efficiency tests, and air flow rate tests. (Section R2.2)
The licensee implemented a good quality control program to validate measurement
results for radioactive effluent samples. The quality assurance audit of the radioactive effluent control program was also effective. (Section R7)
A security guard properly initiated a "for cause" fitness for duty (FFD) test on
October 20,1998, after identifying that a non-licensed operator may have consumed alcohol prior to entering the protected area. The licensee's initial response to the FFD test failure was appropriate. The inspector noted a weakness
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l in that other personnel had the potential to identify this problem before the security guard. The licensee initiated an ACR to review this event (Section S1).
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TABLE OF CONTENTS Paae EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.......
......................................il TA B L E O F C O N TE NTS.............................................. iv I. Operations
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Cond uct o f Operations.................................... 1 01.1 General Co m ments.................................. 1
Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment................... 1 O 2.1 Fa cility To urs...................................... 1
Operator Knowledge and Performance........................ 1 04.1 Plant Shutdown and Cooldown......................... 1 04.2 Spent Fuel Move m ent................................ 2
Miscellaneous Operations issues............................. 3 08.1 Eve nt Re ports..................................... 3 08.2 (Closed) IFl 5 0-44 3/9 7-08-01.......................... 3 11. M aint e na nce................................................... 3 M1 Conduct of M aintenance................................... 3 M1.1 Generator Start up Transformer (GSU) Repair Activities........ 3 M1.2 Emergency Feedwater (EFW) Check Valve Repair............ 4 M1.3 Control Of Maintenance Activities....................... 4 M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance issues............................ 6 M 8.1 (Closed) URl 97-08-05...
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i 111. Engineering
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E2 Engineering Support of Facilities and Equipment.................. 7 E2.1 Generator Step-Up Transformer Low Voltage Bus Elevated Temperatures
.....................................7 E2.2 Emergency Feedwater (EFW) Check Valve Leakage......,.... 7 E 2.3 Safety injection Accumulator Feed / Bleed Procedure / Evolution.... 8 E8-Miscellaneous Engineering issues............................. 9 E 8.1 (Closed) IFl 9 7 - 0 3 -0 4................................ 9 IV. Plant Support
.................................................9 R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls................... 9 R1.1 G eneral Co mme nts.................................. 9 R2 Status of RP&C Facilities and Equipment
......................10 R2.1 Calibration of Effluent / Process Radiation Monitoring Systems (RMS)
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R2.2 ' Air Cleaning Systems............................... 11 R7 Audits and Appraisals of the Effluents Program.................. 12 R8 Miscellaneous RP&C issues........................... 12 R8.1 Effluent As Low As is Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) Program. 12 iv
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. R8.2 - (Closed) VIO 5 0-44 3/9 8-01 0 3....................... 13 S1 Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities.................. 13 S1.1. G e ne ral Co m me nts................................. 13 V. M an ageme nt Mee ting s.......................................... 13 X1 Exit Meeting Su m m ary................................... 13
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PAR 7l AL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED............................... 14 l
INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED.....................................
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LIST O F AC RO NYM S U S E D.......................................... 15
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l Report Details Summarv of Plant Status The facility operated at approximately 100% of rated thermal power throughout most of the inspection period. The licensee commenced a power reduction on November,11, 1998,in response to elevated temperatures on the "A" phase of the generator step-up (GSU) transformer lower voltage (25KV) bus. On November 12,1998, the licensee shutdown the plant to effect repairs to the bus. The plant remained in cold shutdown (Mode 5) for the duration of the period.
I. Operations
Conduct of Operations 01.1 General Comments (71707)
Using Inspection Procedure 71707, the inspectors conducted frequent reviews of ongoing plant operations. In general, routine operations were performed in accordance with station proceduros and plant evolutions were completed in a deliberate manner with clear communications and effective oversight by shift supervision. Contro!ioom logs accurately reflected plant activities and observed shift turnovers were comprehensive and thoroughly addressed questions posed by the oncoming c.ew. Control room operators displayed good questioning perspectives prior to releasing work activities for field implementation, The inspectors found that operators were knowledgeable of plant and system status.
O2 Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment 02.1 Escilitv Tours (71707. 62707)
The inspectors routinely conducted independent plant tours and walkdowns of selected portions of safety-related systems during the inspection report period.
These activities consisted of the verification that system configurations, power supplies, process parameters, support system availability, and current system operational status were consistent with Technical Specification (TS) requirements and UFSAR descriptions. Additionally, system, component, and general area material conditions and housekeeping status were noted. The inspectors did not identify any deficiencies during a visualinspection of selected primary component cooling water system (PCCW) spring can pipe supports.
Operator Knowledge and Performance 04.1 Plant Shutdown and Cooldown a.
insoection Scooe The inspectors observed the reactor shutdown to hot standby on November 12, 1998. The shutdown was performed in accordance with operations procedure, OS1000.03," Plant Shutdown From Minimum Load To Hot Standby".
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Observations and Findinas Operators controlled plant conditions well during the shutdown. Potential reactor trip conditions were approached with caution. The shift manager (SM) and unit shift supervisor (USS) maintained good command and control of the evolution.
Br:sfings were conducted at appropriate times to heighten crew awareness to the changing plant conditions. Operations management and quality assurance personnel provided oversight coverage of the shutdown. The crew responded promptly to a failure of the steam seal pressure regulator.
Despite the generally good performance some minor operator performance weaknesses were identified. Specifically, a reactor operator (RO) did not properly diagnose that a source range nuclear instrument gage needle was " sticking", and
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" expected" alarms that actuated during the shutdown were not consistently
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announced as such by the operators.
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Conclusions The reactor shutdown was performed well. The operators responded well to a steam seal pressure failure. Some minor performance weaknesses were observed involving the diagnosis of a source range nuclear instrument indication problem, and the communication of " expected" alarming conditions.
04.2 Soent Fuel Movement a.
insoection Scone On October 6,1998, the inspectors observed the handling and movement of selected fuel assemblies within the spent fuel pool (SFP). Additionally, the inspectors interviewed the fuel handling supervisor following the evolution, b.
Observations and Findinas The initial fuel assembly movements were noted to be difficult due to poor underwater viewing clarity. Prior to commencing fuel handling, the supervisor questioned both the reactor engineer and the spent fuel pool bridge operator concerning their ability to properly view the spent fuel racks. The visibility was considered to be adequate and the fuel handling activities commenced.
The first fuel assembly was improperly landed on top of the spent fuel rack. The supervisor proceeded to investigate the reason for the SFP surface ripples. The fuel assemblies were then landed on top of the SFP storage racks two additional times (during the fourth and sixth moves). The supervisor was not informed regarding
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either of these discrepancies. Following the sixth mese, two heater fans were
secured and the SFP clarity improved. The final seven moves were performed
without any problems. The licensee initiated an adverse condition report (ACR) to
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review this event and to develop appropriate standards and expectations for fuel
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handling activities. The inspector considered the initiation of an ACR as appropriate for the problems encountered during fuel handling. No violations were identified, c.
Conclusions The fuel handling personnel did not properly assess the potentialimpact of the degraded underwater viewing conditions on the fuel handling activities. Two fuel handling problems were not communicated to the fuel handling supervisor. The licensee has issued an adverse condition report to review standards and expectations for fuel handling.
Miscellaneous Operations issues 08.1 Event Reoorts The licensee issued several non-emergency event notification reports per 10 CFR 50.72 during the period to report the discovery of dead seats in the plant intake structure. The licensee reported on October 21,1998, a fitness for duty test failure involving a non-licensed operator. On November 13,1998, the licensee reported the plant shutdown per TS 3.8.1.1 due to having an inoperable off-site power source. The inspector reviewed the event reports and concluded that they properly described the individual events.
08.2 (Closed) IFl 50-443/97 08 01,NRC Inspection Report 97-08 noted that adverse condition report (ACR) 97-2381 did not identify a cause for several loose bolts on a service water system flange. The inspector was concerned that the corrective actions would not be adequate to prevent recurrence of the deficiency. The licensee subsequently checked the bolts and verified them to be tight. This addressed the concern regarding the potential for these bolts to become loose again without being detected. Additionally, the inspector reviewed several root cause reports since issuing IFl 97-08-01, and noted that they were typically detailed and of high quality. The inspector did not identify any violations. This item is closed.
II. Maintenance M1 Conduct of Maintenarce M1.1 Generator Start un Transformer (GSU) Renoir Activities On November 14 through 17, the inspector observed portions of electrical and mechanical maintenance activities to repair damage to the "A" phase of the generator start up transformer (GSU). The damage occurred on the ductwork and flexible connections to the input of the transformer.
The inspector concluded that repair activities were performed well. Adequate management oversight and foreign material exclusion controls were observed.
Additionally, the maintenance department properly incorporated the vendor welding
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process into a Seabrook procedure. The repairs were on-going at the completion of the period.
M1.2 Emeraency Feedwater (EFW) Check Valve Reoair On November 14, the inspector observed portions of the mechanical maintenance activities to repair seat leakage through the "B" steam generator EFW stop check valve FW-V82. This valve had been repaired during the June 1998 forced shutdown seat leakage was found to be leaking again. (Section E2.2)
The inspector noted that the valve plug had indications of steam cutting and was replaced. The seating surfaces of this valve had been recently lapped during the last repair activities to remove similar steam cuts. The inspector concluded that maintenance activities were performed well and that adequate foreign material controls were implemented. The inspector noted that the licensee is developing a long term plan to address the cause for the repeated leakage past this valve. See Engineering Section E2.2 of this report for further details.
M1.3 Control Of Maintenance Activities a.
Insoection Scop _g The inspector reviewed the licensee's control of maintenance activities and their consideration of the risk associated with the removal of equipment from service during the forced outage. The inspector focused on the equipment configuration established by the licensee while the plant was in Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown). The plant was in this condition for about six hours (11:02 a.m. to 5:40 p.m.) on November 13,1998. The inspector noted that prior to the shutdown one of the two required off-site electrical sources had been decla.ed inoperable as a result of the generator step-up (GSU) transformer problem (discussed in Section E2.1).
b.
Observations and Findinas The operators removed service water (SW) valve (SW V4) from service at about 2 p.m. on November 13, to perform testing. Valve SW-V4 is a motor-operated valve designed to automatically isolate the safety frorn the non-safety related SW heat loads during an accident in order to protect the "A" SW Train. Removing this valve from service affected the operability of the "A" loop for both the cooling tower, and ocean service water systems.
The inspector noted, however, that the operators removed SW-V4 from service without identifying or entering a TS action statement. Specifically, TS 3.7.6.d required this condition to be corrected within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or the plant shutdown within the next six hours. The subsequent operating shift identified that a TS action statement had not been entered, but incorrectly entered TS action statement 3.7.4.b which allowed the condition to exist for up to seven days. While performing an operating log review, the inspector identified that the incorrect TS action statement had been entered and contacted the Shift Manager, the licensee
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subsequently corrected the TS log entry. The inspector noted that the SW-V4 maintenance was completed within the allotted TS limit.
Administrative Procedure, OP 10.6, " Action Statement Tracking," requires that TS action statement requirements be identified and tracked. Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to properly identify and track the entry into TS action statement 3.7.4.d during removal of SW-V4 from service as required. This is a violation of TS 6.7.1. (NOV 98-09-01)
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The inspector then reviewed the equipment configuration status at this same time, and noted that the motor driven emergency feedwater pump also had been removed from service. The licensee's forced outage plan was to begin the SW and EFW maintenance activities in the Mode 5 condition, however, personal errors, and work control process deficiencies resultad in these components being removed from service in Mode 4. The licensee reviewed this event and determined apparent causes for this event including:
The schedule was not adhered to by operations or maintenance.
- Operations personnel did not rocognize that an on-line maintenance
assessment was required for these activities.
Operations did not recognize that the scope of the SW-V4 work affected the
operability of the "A" SW Train.
The inspector questioned the risk ass aciated with this configuration. The licensee subsequently performed two plant ris < assessments for the above equipment configuration (i.e. an off-sito source, service water train, and motor driven EFW pump were removed from service simultaneously). The first assessment was performed using risk assessment software that had been developed from the licensee's at-power probabilistic risk analysis (PRA). This assessment was considered bounding for the Mode 4 condition, and identified an increase in risk based upon event sequences involving a loss of the switchyard combined with operator and equipment faults that would have precluded the successful establishment of secondary, or alternate reactor cooling. The inspector noted that the licensee's risk analysis and on-line maintenance assessment program would not have permitted this particular equipment configuration for planned maintenance during normal power operation.
The second analysis utilized the outage risk model(ORAM) developed for the cold shutdown (Mode 5) condition. This analysis determined that the equipment configuration was not risk significant due to the low decay heat and large steam generator inventory available as a heat sink. The risk assessment noted that the time to boil was long enough to allow operator action (about 17 hours1.967593e-4 days <br />0.00472 hours <br />2.810847e-5 weeks <br />6.4685e-6 months <br />) to establish an adequate means of decay heat removal using the steam generators and condensate and feedwater system ~
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The inspector noted that neither of these models had been specifically developed for the Mode 4 condition, but considered that the plant conditions at the time that this equipment configuration was used were more typical of cold shutdown than power operations. The inspector concluded that although the actual risk increase was not readily quantifiable it was avoidable.
The licensee's planned corrective actions for this event included training on the importance of following the plant maintenance schedule, equipment operability, and the requirements for performing risk assessments for planned maintenance activities. Additionally, the licensee planned to incorporate general risk assessment guidance into the work control procedure. The inspector concluded that the licensee apparent cause determination and planned corrective actions appeared adequate.
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Conclusions Work control process deficiencies, and personnel error resulted in multiple risk significant systems being simultaneously removed from service without a risk assessment. The risk associated with these activities would have been avoided had the original forced outage schedule been implemented. Additionally, a violation was
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identified involving the proper identification and tracking of a technical specification action statement. The licensee's planned corrective actions for this event appeared adequate.
M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance lasues M 8.1 (Closed) URI 97 08-05 Lubricatino Oil System Deficiencies: Inspection Report 97-08 identified several weaknesses in the implementation of Seabrook's lubricating oil analysis program. URI 97-08 05 was opened pending further review of the oil analysis program. The licensee subsequently performed a comprehensive self assessment of Seabrook's predictive maintenance program, which includes; lube oil analysis, vibration monitoring, and thermography. The licensee concluded that the complete predictive maintenance program needed to be upgraded to enhance program controls and ownership. Specifically, the oil analysis program was revised, to improve the sampling, analysis, recording, and evaluation of oil sample results.
Corrective actions included: development of a new Component Engineering department, development of new predictive maintenance procedures for oil sampling and analysis, and training of applicable personnel. Additionally, a new standard was developed for determination of proper component oillevels, type of oil and oil addition points, oil sampling tools and specific safety and radiological concerns. The inspector found the licensee's review to be appropriate. Good program enhancements were developed and implemented by the licensee. No violations were identified during the NRC inspection followup. This item is closed.
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lll. Enoineerina E2 Engineering Support of Facilities and Equipment E 2.1 Generator Steo-Uo Transformer low Voltaae Bus Elevated Temoeratures l
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Insnection Scone The inspector reviewed the technical support response after elevated temperatures were identified on the low voltage bus (25kV) at the inlet to the generator step-up transformer on November 10,1998.
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Observations and Findinas:
The technical support supervisor initially attributed the problem to circulating currents within the bus, and attempted to correct this condition by tightening a bus cover, and by grounding the cover bolts. During this process, the licensee identified that the bus temperature was higher than expected, and reduced the turbine load and removed the turbine from service. On November 12, the licensee identified that the bus repairs could not be completed within the allotted TS time limits. This condition affected the operability of one of the two TS required off-site electrical sources.
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Conclusions The licensee performed well to identify and respond to an elevated electrical bus temperature condition.
E2.2 Emeraency Feedwater (EFW) Check Valve Leakaoe a.
insoection Scoce The inspector reviewed the operability determination per'ormed by engineering to
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evaluate the increased temperature on the "B" and "C" steam generators (S/G)
branch headers from the EFW system. These increased temperatures had been detected on October 19, through thermocouples installed on the EFW piping to detect potential check valve leakage. The temperatures measured immediately upstream of the two check valves (EFW side of check valve), were elevated but below saturation temperature (i.e.196 F, FW V82, "B" S/G, and 167oF, FW-V88,
"C" S/G).
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Observations and Findinos The system engineer determined that the increased temperatures were due to back
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leakage past EFW stop check valve FW V82. This valve had been maintained during the forced shutdown in June 1998 to correct a similar leakage problem as discussed in NRC Inspection Report 98-04.
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An operability determination concluded that the EFW system remained operable,
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provided that the temperatures remained within the corresponding saturation temperature, or alternately, by demonstrating that the pipe was full of water. The l
inspector verified that the system engineer and operations personnel monitored applicable temperatures daily and had a pian of action should conditions degrade.
The inspector noted that the licensee is developing a long term plan to address the cause for the repeat leakage past these check valves. The system engineer stated that an engineering work request had been initiated to review the EFW check valve installation and the possible need for a design change. In the interim, the licensee has installed equipment to monitor this condition.
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Conclusion The licensee's operability assessment for back leakage past the emergency feedwater system stop check valves was adequate. The licensee is investigating a long term plan to correct this repeat issue.
E 2.3 Safety Iniection Accumulator Feed / Bleed Procedure / Evolution a.
Insoection Scooe On November 6, the inspector observed portions of the "D" loop safety injection (SI) accumulator feed and bleed process performed in accordance with operations procedure, OS1005.05," Safety injection System Operation".
b.
Observation and Findinos This evolution was performed, while the plant was at 100% power, to bring the accumulator boron concentration closer to the normal value of 2800 ppm (parts per million) from the current concentration of 2670 ppm. Technical Specifications require that the accumulator boron concentration be maintained between 2600 and 2900 ppm while the plant is in Operating Modes 1,2, or 3.
At the time, the "D" accumulator was being diluted at a rate of about 8 ppm (boron concentration) per week due to back leakage into the accumulator by RCS fluid through SI system check valves. The licensee's previous efforts to address or mitigate this leakage have been discussed in NRC Inspection Reports 97 04, and 97-08. The licensee is investigating a long term plan to resolve this problem.
The inspector attended the pre-evolution briefing and found it to be excellent. The coordinator properly discussed the precautions and risks associated with the evolution, as well as applicable operating experience. Proper communications and time restraints due to entry into an associated 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> TS action statement were addressed. The schedule was conservatively planned for completion within an administrative six hour limit.
The inspector noted that the operators exercised due caution while performing the activity and properly followed the procedure steps. The evolution was completed
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satisfactorily and the "D" accumulator boron concentration was increased to 2802 l
ppm. This evolution caused the Si check valves to become slightly unseated which I
increased the Si accumulator dilution rate. The operators were able to successfully
" seat" the applicable Si check valves to reduce the leakage to the pre-evolution leak rate of about 3gpd.
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Conclusion The inspector concluded that operators and engineering personnel performed the feed and bleed evolutions to raise the "D" loop safety injection accumulator boron
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concentration well. Adequate procedural adherence and pre-evolution briefs were l
observed. The licensee is investigating a long term resolution to this problem.
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E8 Miscellaneous Engineering Issues l
E 8.1 (Closed) IFl 97-03 04: Leak Rate Test Failure of Containment Isolation Check Valve CBS-V18. Inspection Report 97-03 evaluated Seabrook's actions to address the Localleak Rate Test (LLRT) failure of CBS-V18. At the time of this evaluation, the licensee's root cause evaluation had not been completed. This inspection follow-up item was initiated pending the inspector's review of the completed root cause. The root cause, performed by the engineering department and documented under (ACR 97-1448, dated 7/1/97), determined that the most probable cause for the excessive leakage of valve CBS-V18 was due to the installation of an incorrect valve disc hanger during a pre-startup design change. The evaluation also determined three other contributing factors, including: close tolerances inherent in the valve design, the sharpness of the disc edge, and the incorrect analysis of impact marks observed on the disc during prior valve inspections. The inspector reviewed the root cause and verified applicable corrective actions as completed or in progress. The inspector found the licensee's actions to be reasonable and complete and did not identify any violations. This item is closed.
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IV. Plant Support i
l R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls R 1.1 General Comments (71750)
During the period the inspectors frequently toured the radiologically controlled area l
(RCA) and observed radiological controls practices. The radiological controls technicians were observed to be attentive and provided high quality assistance to plant workers. Plant workers were observed to be following proper radiological work practices including use of dosimetry and protective equipment. Personal l
briefings conducted prior to containment entries were thorough and informative.
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l R2 Status of RP&C Facilities and Equipment i
R 2.1 Calibration of Effluent / Process Radiation Monitorina Systems (RMS)
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insoection Scone (84750-01)
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i The inspector held discussions primarily with the RMS system engineer and chemistry staff. RMS maintenance rule improvement plans, year 2000 issues related to RMS and adverse condition reports (ACR) pertaining to RMS alarms were also reviewed. Electronic alignment and radiological calibration results for the following effluent and process RMS were reviewed.
Waste Liquid Test Tanks Radiation Monitor (R-6509)
Steam Generator Blowdown Flash Tank Radiation Monitor (R-6519)
Turbine Building Sump Pump Radiation Monitor (R-6521)
Main Steam Line Radiation Monitors (R-64811&3, R-6482 2&4)
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Primary Component Cooling Water Radiation Monitors (R-6515 & 6516)
Containment Purge Radiation Monitors (R-6527 A & B)
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Plant Vent Wide Range Noble Gas Monitor (R-6528)
Condenser Air Evacuators Discharge Monitor (R-6505)
Waste Gas Compressor inlet Radiation Monitor (R-6503)
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Waste Gar Compressor Discharge Radiation Monitor (R-6504)
Flow Rate Indicators
Electronic alignment results for the following flow rate indicators were reviewed.
Waste Liquid Test Tanks Flow Rate
Containment Purge Line Flow Rate
Plant Vent Exhaust Flow Rate
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Observations and Findinos
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Electronic alignment results for the above RMS and flow rate indicators were found
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to be within the licensee's acceptance criteria. Radiological calibration methodology
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for the above monitors was acceptable. Linearity tests were appropriate.
Secondary calibrations validated primary calibrations.
l The licensee identified certain RMS as warranting additional attention in accordance with their maintenance rule program. Severalinitiatives had been completed to help improve system performance. These actions included replacement of power supplies.
The licensee has identified the existence of a year 2000 (Y2K) problem with RM-11, the RMS processing computer. A plan to address the Y2K issues was under e
development. Per Generic Letter 98-01, the licensee is required to submit a written response by July 1,1999, describing the status of the actions taken to address i
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Y2K issues along with a completion schedule for any remaining work to be done to confirm that the f acility will be Y2K ready by the year 2000.
The licensee lowered the ACR process reporting threshold to include RMS alarms to better facilitate RMS performance trending efforts. As a result, the number of ACRs pertaining to RMS alarms increased with RM-6505 condenser air evacuation, and RM-6519 waste gas outlet occurnng most frequently. Alarm setpoints on these two monitors were established slightly above background. Corrective actions such as the installation of a new power supply and planned line stabikzation efforts are expected to reduce spurious alarms from these instruments to reduce the number of alarms from RM-6505 in particular. The licensee also stated that they will benchmark other utilities to determine the appropriateness of raising the current alarm setpoints. No issues of regulatory significance were identified pertaining to
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this matter.
C.
Conclusions The licensee established, implemented, and maintained a good radiation monitoring system program with respect to electronic calibrations, radiological calibrations,
system reliability, and tracking and trending.
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R2.2 Air Cleanino Svstems a.
Insoection Scope (84750-01)
The licensee's most recent surveillance test results (visual inspection, in-place HEPA and charcoal filter leak tests, air capacity, pressure drop tests, and laboratory tests for thc iodine collection efficiencies) for the following systems were reviewed.
Containment Purge Exhaust System
Primary Auxiliary Building Exhaust System
Fuel Storage Building Exhaust System (Trains A & B)
i Special tests were conducted in early 1994 to evaluate new test manifolds. The special test on the fuel storage building exhaust system was also reviewed to gain t-i
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insight into the validity of current testing methodology.
b.
Observations and Findinos The special test on the fuel storage building exhaust system in 1994 demonstrated that system air flow was not significantly altered by the new test manifolds as air flow remained within 10% of the acceptance criteria. Deficiencies identified during surveillance testing for the above systems were correctad and as-left conditions met
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the licensee's acceptance criteria, i
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C_Onclusions The licensee established, implemented, and maintained an effective ventilation system surveillance program with respect to charcoal adsorption surveillance tests, HEPA mechanical efficiency tests, and air flow rate tests.
R7 Audits and Appraisals of the Effluents Program a.
Insoection Scooe (84750-01)
The inspection consisted of review of the: (1) imp lementation of inter-laboratory measurement comparisons; (2) implementation of the chemistry laboratory quality control program for radioactive liquid and gaseous effluent samples; (3) quality assurance audit no. 97-A11-01,"RETS/ REP /ODCM"; and (4) self-assessments, b.
Observations and Findinas Allinter-laboratory quality assurance measurement comparisons were within the licensee's acceptance criteria. No anomalous trends were noted during a review of quality control charts for gamma and tritium measurements.
The scope and technical depth of the quality assurance audit was sufficient to assess the quality of the radioactive liquid and gaseous effluent control programs.
Individuals with experience in radioactive effluents control and chemistry participated as audit team members. The quality assurance audit team members identified no discrepancies of regulatory significance.
c.
Conclusions The licensee implemented a good quality control program to validate measurement results for radioactive effluent samples. The quality assurance audit of the radioactive effluent control program was also effective.
R8 Miscellaneous RP&C lasues R8.1 Effluent As low As is Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) Prooram NRC Inspection Report 50-443/97-03,section R1.1, reviewed the licensee's efforts towards maintaining radioactive effluent releases ALARA. That inspection concluded that the licensee's efforts towards maintaining radioactive gaseous releases ALARA were commendable. The licensee continued in these efforts and made an improvement to the radioactive liquid waste control program to use both boron water storage tanks as liquid radioactive waste water storage tanks to facilitate longer decay times prior to discharge. In summary, the licensee's efforts i
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in maintaining radioactive gaseous and liquid releases ALARA continue to be effective.
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l R8.2 (Closed) VIO 50-443/98-01-03: failure to adhere to radiation work permit and
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l posted instructions, in IR 50-44/98-01, the inspector had identified four workers l
performing maintenance on the "B" containment spray pump who had not adhered to the radiation work permit and posted instructions. The licensee's completed
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l corrective actions to address this issue included: coaching and counseling all individuals involved, meetings were held by the radiation protection manager with individual groups throughout the plant including maintenance, operations, engineering, to review and reinforce health physics (HP) expectations, reviews were performed by HP of existing " Contaminated Areas" postings and changes were made as necessary to ensure better delineation of posted boundaries. The inspector found the licensee's actions to be reasonable and complete. This violation is closed.
S1 Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities S 1.1 General Comments (71707,71750)
The inspectors observed security force performance during inspection activities.
Protected area access controls were found to be properly implemented during i
random observations. Proper escort control of visitors was observed. Security officers were alert and attentive to their duties.
l A security guard properly initiated a "for cause" fitness for duty (FFD) test on
October 20,1998, after identifying that a non licensed operator may have
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consumed alcohol prior to entering the protected area. The individual subsequently failed the FFD test. The licensee's initial response to the FFD test f ailure was appropriate. The individual had been working inside the protected area for about one and one-half hours before the security guard questioned the FFD. The inspector asked about the length of time before the individual's fitness was questioned. The licensee initiated an ACR to review this event.
V. Manaaement Meetinas X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management, following the conclusion of the inspection period, on November 23, 1998. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented.
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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee i
W. Diprofio, Unit Director j
G. Boissy, Assistant Station Director J. Grillo, Technical Support Manager M. Harvey, Senior Auditor J. Hill, Operations Supervisor J. Kwasnik, Senior Radiation Scientist J. Linville, Chemistry and Health Physics Manager J. Peterson, Maintenance Manager G. StPierre, Operations Manager B. Seymour, Security Manager J. Savold, l&C Technician, Meteorological M. Toole, l&C Manager R. Thurlow, Health Physics Supervisor R. White, Design Engineering Manager lNSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 37551:
Onsite Engineering IP 61726:
Surveillance Observation IP 62707:
Maintenance Observation IP 71707:
Plant Operations IP 71750:
Plant Support Activities IP 83750:
Occupational Exposure IP 84750-02 Radioactive Waste Treatment, and Effluent and Environmental Monitoring ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Ooened:
50-443/98-09-01 VIO Failure To Properly Implement Procedure OP 10.6 Closed:
50-443/97-08-01 IFl Apparent Cause Determination For Loose Service Water Bolts 50-443/97-08-05 URI Lubricating Oil System Deficiencies 50-443/97 03-04 IFl Leak Rate Test Failure of Containment isolation Check Valve CBS V18 50-443/98-01 03 VIO Failure to Adhere to Radiation Work Permit and Posted Instructions
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LIST OF ACRONYMS USED ACR-Adverse Condition Report ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers ASTM American Society for Testing and Materials CAS Central Alarm Station CBS Containment Building Spray DESEL Duke Engineering and Sciences Environmental Laboratory DOE U.S. Department of Energy EDG Emergency Diesel Generator EFW Emergency Feedwater EML Environmental Measurements Laboratory EPA U.S. Environmental Protection Agency FME Foreign Material Exclusion gpd gallons per day gpm gallons per minute LCO Limiting Condition for Operation MMP Meteorological Monitoring Program MOV motor operated valve MPCS Main Plant Computer System NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology NSARC Nuclear Safety and Audit Review Committee NSARC OS NSARC Operations Subcommittee ODCM Offsite Dose Calculation Manual psig pounds per square inch gauge QA Quality Assurance QC Quality Control REMP Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program RESL Radiochemical and Environmental Sciences Laboratory RHR Residual Heat Removal
- SIR Station Information Report SORC Station Operations Review Committee SUFP Startup Feedwater Pump SW Service Water TDEFW Turbine Driven Emergency Feedwater Pump TLD Thermoluminescent Dosimeter TS Technical Specifications UFSAR Updated Final Safety Analysis Report WR work request YAEL Yankee Atomic Environmental Laboratory l
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