IR 05000443/1988009

Insp Rept 50-443/88-09 on 880627-29.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Emergency Preparedness & Observation of Licensee Annual full-participation Emergency Exercise

ML20151C048
Person / Time
Site:	Seabrook
Issue date:	07/06/1988
From:	Fox E, Lazarus W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20151C046	List: IR 05000443/1988009 ML20151C043
References
50-443-88-09, 50-443-88-9, NUDOCS 8807210208
Download: ML20151C048 (6)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Report N /88-09 l Docket N License N CPPR-135 Priority Category C Licensee: Public Service Company of New Hampshire i P. O. Box 330 4

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Manchester, New Hampshire 03105 Facility Name: Seabrook Nuclear Power Station Inspection At: Seabrook, New Hampshire

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Inspection Conducted: Juny 27-29,1988

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Inspectors: , L j.d /fd? l

. , enio" mErgency V date e ne ecialist, DRSS C. Amato, FPS C. Gordon, EtS l EPS S. Peleschat,RI, Seabrook i D. Ruscitto, Perrotti,NRR l

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J. Jamison, PNL j Approved By: m W. J.JAzarus, Chief, EPK, b ~) f #2 date l FRSSB, DRSS Inspection Summary: Inspection on June 27-29, 1988 (Report No. 50-443/88-09)

Areas Inspected: Routine, announced emergency preparedness inspection and observation of the licensee's annual full-participation emergency exercise performed on June 28-29, 1988. The inspection was performed by a team of seven NRC Region I, headquarters and contractor personne Resul ts: No violations were identified. Emergency response actions were adeguate to provide protective measures for the health and safety of the publi $$[

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DETAILS 1.0 Persons Contacted The following licensee representatives attended the exit meeting held on June 29, 198 E. Brown, President and Chief Executive Officer Exercise Coordinator Bovino, Senior Emergency Planner-P. Casey, T. Feigenbaum, Vice President Engineering / Quality G. Gram, Executive Director, Emergency Preparedness and Community Affairs  ;

l T. Harpster, Director, Emergency Preparedness Licensing D. Moody, Station Manager P. Stroup, Director, Emer ency Implementation and Response ,

G. Thomas, Vice President Nuclear Production i J. MacDonald, Radiologica Assessment Manager .

The team observed and interviewed several licensee emergency response  ;

controllers and observers as they performed their assigned l personnel,during functions the exercis ,

2.0 Emergency Exercise The Seabrook Nuclear Power Station full-participation exercise was conducted on June 28, 1988 from 9:00 AM to 7:00 PM. The State of New Hampshire 11 local towns and the State of M&ine participated. The CommonwealthofMassachusettsand6localtownsinNewHampshiredidnot participate. The State of New Hampshire compensated for the local non-participante. The New Hampshire Yankee Offsite Response  ;

Organization (NHY OR0) compensated for the Commonwealth I non-participants. The licensee, New Hampshire, Maine and NHY OR0 conducted field monitoring activities, an ingestion )athway exercise and recovery and reentr 1988. T1e Federal Emergency Management Agency FEMA) observed all off-s 29,ite activitie (y activities on June 2.1 Pre-exercise Activities l NRC Region I and FEMA Prior to the emergency representatives exercise,d held meetings an had telephone discussions with scope and content licensee representatives of the exercise scenario.toAs discuss objectives,hanges a result, m' .or c were made in order to clarify certain objectives revius certain portions of the scenarioandensurethatthescenarloprovidedtheopportunityfor the licensee to demonstrate the stated object.ives as well as those areas previously identified by NRC and FEMA e in need of corrective actio I i

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NRC observers attended a licensee briefing on ' June 27, 1988, and participated in the discussion of emergency rasponse actions expected during the various phases of the scenario. The licensee stated that controllers would intercede in exercise activities to prevent scenario deviation or disruption of normal plant operation The exercise scenario included the following events:

- Fuel damaged by loose parts;

- Damage to a turbine driven emergency feedwater pump;

- Large break Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) due to a total weld failure;

- Venting of the containment into the containment enclosure building with a subsequent elevated, filtered release to the atmosphere;

- Declaration of Alert, Site Area Emergency and deneral Emergency Classifications;

- Calculation of offsite dose consequences; and

- Recomendation of protective actions to off-site official .2 Activities Observed During the conduct of the licensee's exercise, seven NRC team members made detailed observations of the activation and augment-ation of the emerg w y organization, activation of emergency response facilities, and actions of emergency response personnel during the operation of the emergency response facilities. The following activities were observed: Detection, classification, and assessment of scenario events; Direction and coordination of the emergency response; 1 Augmentation of the emergency organization and response i facility activation; l Notification of licensee Nrsonnel and offsite agenc.ies of pertinent plant status information: Communications /information flow, and record keeping;

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4 Assessment and projection of offsite radiological dose and l

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consideration of protective actions; Provisions for inplant radiation protection; Performance of offsite and inplant radiological surveys; Maintenance of site security and acces' control; 1 Performance of technical support, repair and corrective actions; 11. Assembly, accountability and evacuation of personnel; 1 Preparation of information for dissemination at the Emergency News Center; and 13. Management of recovery and reentry opuration .0 Exercise Observations Exercise Strengths The NRC team noted that the licensee's activation and augmentation activation of the emergency response of tha emergency facilities, and useorganization,ilities of the fac were generally consistent with their emergency response plan and implementing procedure The team also noted the following actions that provided strong positive indication of their ability to cope with abnormal plant conditions: Very good command and control of all emergency response facilities (ERF's) was demonstrated; ,

, Plant conditions were quickly recognize? classified;  ;

! Shift turnover was accomplished s:noothly and with no apparent loss of control of the situation; The ERF's were activated in a timely manner and Protective Action Recommendations (PAR's) were prompt and conservative. Evacuation time estimates were effectively utilized in determining the PAR' . . .

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l 3.1 Exercise Weaknesses l

The NRC identified the following exercise weaknesses which needs to l be evaluated and corrected by the licensee. The licensee conducted i an adequate self critique of the exercise that also identified these area . The Technical Support Center (TSC) and Emergency Operations Facility staff displayed questionable engineering

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judgement (E0Fand or did not recognize or address technical concerns (50-43/88-08-01). For example:

- Neither the EOF or TSC staff questioned a release of greater l than 7000 curies per second with only clad dnage and no core uncovery;

- Efforts continued to restore the Emergency Feedwatar Pump after a large break LOCA;

- A questionable fix for the Containment Building Spray system;

- A lack of effort to locate and isolate the release path; and

- No effort was noted to blowdown Steam Generators to lessen the heat load in containmen . The TSC and Operational Support Center (OSC) have multiple entrances and exits that are not controlled. As a result, contamination controls were ineffective at times as personnel entered without frisking and it couldn't be determined if continuous accountability was, or could be, maintained (50-443/88-09-02), No apparent consideration was given to the departing first shift to account for possible dose when leaving the plant during (50-443 /88-09-03).the release, as they were not given dosimetry The response to some questions in the Media Center were not ,

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adequate such as: the NRC's role in an emergency; and why a reactor trip wasn't perfomed earlier (50-443/S8-09-04).

4.0 Licensee Actions on Previously Identified Items The following items were identified during a previous inspection (Inspection Report No. 50-443 Based upon observations made by the NRC team during the exerc/87-25).ise the following opens item were acceptably demonstrated and are closed:

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(CLOSED) 87-25-01 IFI: The simulator Shift Supervisor did not use classification procedures and failed to recognize the loss of both Radiation Monitoring Systems trains as an Unusual Even (CLOSED) 87-25-02 IFI:

Lack of a Post Accident Containment air sample prevented dose assessment personnel from estimating the containment atmosphere iodine concentratio .0 Licensee Critique The NRC team attended the licensee's post-exercise critique on June 29, 1988, during which the key licensee controllers discussed observations of the exercise. The licensee indicated these observations would be evaluated and appropriate corrective actions take .0 Exit Meeting and NRC Critique The NRC team met with the licensee representatives listed in Section 1 of this report at the end of the inspection. The team leader summarized the observations made during the exercis The licensee was informed that previously identified items were adequately addressed and no violations were observed. Although there were areas identified for corrective action, the NRC team determined that within the scope and limitations of the scenario, the licensee's performance demonstrated that they could implement their Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures in a manner which would adeguately provide protective measures for the health and safety of the publi Licensee management acknowledged the findings and indicated that appro-priate action would be taken regarding the identified open item At no time during this inspection did the inspectors provide any written information to the license + - - - -.