IR 05000443/1993021
| ML20059G359 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 01/06/1994 |
| From: | Kennedy J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20059G335 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-443-93-21, NUDOCS 9401240121 | |
| Download: ML20059G359 (14) | |
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U. S NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report Number: 93-21 l Docket No.: 50-443 License No.: NPF-86 ,
Licensee: North Atlantic Energy Service Corporation Post Office Box 300 Seabrook, New Hampshire 03874 Facility: Seabrook Station Dates: November 9 - December 6,1993 Inspectors: Noel Dudley, Senior Resident Inspector Richard Laura, Resident Inspector Approved By: ,
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Janet L. Kennedy, Acting Chief ( ^ Date Reactor Projects Section 4B, DRP Inspection Summary: This inspection report documents the safety inspections conducted during day shift and back shift hours. The inspections aussed station performance in the
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areas of operations, maintenance, engineering, plant support, and safety assessment / qualit verificatio Besults: North Atlantic operated the facility safely. One unresolved item was identifie See the executive summary for the assessment oflicensee performanc f-
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9401240121 940106 PDR ADOCK 05000443 O PDR
I EXECUTIVE SUMMARY SEABROOK STATION NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO. 50-443/93-21 Operations: The operators operated the facility safely and properly followed technical specification requirements. Plant staff demonstrated a proper safety perspective by promptly lowering power after both trains of the control building ventilation system became inoperable. Auxiliary operators performed well by identifying an increasing leak rate on the cooling water system to the turbine generator exciter. The operation support staff adequately addressed procedural weaknesses identified by an NRC tea Maintenance: Mechanics safely unloaded a new fuel shipment and placed the fuel assemblies in dry storage. The lack of timely and effective completion of a corrective action contributed to a supervisor becoming too involved in the unloading of new fuel assemblie Mechanics properly obtained work request scope changes and satisfactorily performed post maintenance test Eneineering: Technical support engineers provided excellent support for emerging equipment problems. The corrective actions taken in response to a main steam isolation valve 10% stroke test failure did not resolve the identified root cause nor prevent a similar plant transient. A loss of instrument air event resulted from an unidentified design flaw in temporary air compressors. An inconsistency appears to exist between the turbine buliding reciprocating air compressors design coordination report and the actual implementation of the design change. Operators received poor training on the use of temporary air compressor Plant SURPm1; Health physics technicians, chemists, security personnel, and the emergency preparedness staff correctly performed routine activities. General employee training provided an adequate introductory lesson on the new 10CFR20 requirement Safety Assessment /Ouality: North Atlantic demonstrated an excellent safety perspective by incorporating the leak repair lessons learned at Millstone 2 in a timely and thorough manne Plant management provided good procedural adherence training. Plant workers demonstrated an improved level of procedural adherenc ii
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TABLE OF CONTENTS P3EC-EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .......................................i1 TABLE OF CONTENTS .......................................iii PLANT OPERATIONS (71707, 92701) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I Plant Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I ' Routine Plant Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Procedural Weaknesses: Unresolved Item 92-80-05 (Closed) ........ 2 MAINTENANCE (61726, 62703, 92701) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Routine Maintenance Observations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Motor Operated Valve Testing: Unresolved Item 93-17-01 (Closed) . . . . 5 ENGINEERING (71707, 92701) .............................. 5 Main Steam Isolation Valve 10% Stroke Testing ................ 5 . Replacement of Turbine Building Service Air Compressors: Unresolved Item 93-21-01 (Open) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 PLANT SUPPORT (71707) ................................. 8 Radiological Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Sec uri ty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Emergency Preparedness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Fire Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Plant Housekeeping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 SAFETY ASSESSMENT / QUALITY VERIFICATION (40500,92702) _. . . . . . . 9 Millstone 2 leak Repair Lessons Learned .................... 9 Procedural Adherence: Violation 93-13-01 (Updated) ............10 MEETINGS (30702) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
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DETAII3 PLANT OPERATIONS (71707,92701)
1,1 Plant Activities As the beginning of the period reactor power was at 100%. On November 14, operators reduced power to 48% due to a condenser tube leak. After repairing the leak, operators began raising reactor power on November 22. On November 25, reactor power reached 100 %. Routine Plant Operations The inspector conducted daily control room tours, observed shift turnovers, attended the morning station manager's meeting, and monitored plan-of-the-day meetings. The inspector reviewed technical specification requirements. The inspector conducted tours in the primary auxiliary building, the emergency diesel generator rooms, the residual heat removal vaults, the turbine building, the condensate storage tank building, and the service water pump-hous During the tours and attendance at the various meetings, the inspector noted overall good performance by the operations staf Due to a small condenser tube leak, the operators lowered reactor power to 48%. The operators followed procedures OS1234.02, " Condenser Tube Or Tube Sheet Leak," and ON1038.08, " Draining And Filling Condenser Waterboxes During Power Operations."
Chemistry technicians identified a 10 milliliter per second leak in the 'C' condenser waterbox. The operators isolated the 'C' condenser waterbox. After plugging approximately eighty tubes, the operators returned the unit to full power. The inspector reviewed the chemistry data, performed a general visual inspection of the 'C' waterbox, and observed portions of the repair activities. The inspector assessed that the plant staff demonstrated a proper safety perspective by promptly lowering power and making the necessary repair Due to a xenon transient that occurred during the power reduction to 48%, the operators entered technical specification 3.2.1, " Axial Flux Difference," action C. The inspector determined that the operators properly tracked and computed penalty minutes for the amount of time that the axial flux difference (AFD) deviated from the target band. During the subsequent power increase to rated power, the inspector observed that the reactor engineering staff provided the operators with graphs to assist in tracking and controlling the AFD. The inspector assessed that the operators complied with the AFD technical specification requirement The operators commenced a plant shutdown pursuant to technical specification (TS) 3.0.3 -
" Limiting Condition For Operation," due to the unavailability of both trains of the control room emergency make-up air and filtration system. The 'A' train was inoperable due to a ground on the filter heater element. The 'B' train air conditioning unit developed low oil pressure causing the unit to be inoperable. The operators made a one hour NRC notification reporting the initiation of a shutdown required by technical specifications. The shift
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superintendent authorized maintenance workers to remove the heater from the 'B' train filter and to install the heater in the 'A' train filter. After performing a post maintenance test, the shift superintendent declared the 'A' train operable, exited TS 3.0.3, and stopped the shutdown. The shutdown started from 48% power and lasted less than an hour and a hal The inspector determined that the operators documented the events in the unit journal. The i inspector assessed that the operators properly followed the technical specincation ]
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An auxiliary operator (AO) identified that an existing leak rate of one drop per minute from -;
a generator exciter unit heat exchanger pipe union had increased and represented a trip !
hazard. The operators notified the mechanical maintenance department and a mechanic j tightened the pipe union to stop the leak. The inspector assessed that the AO performed well I by identifying the increased leak rate and notifying the control room staf .3 Procedural Weaknesses: Unresolved Item 92-80-05 (Closed)
An NRC team inspection conducted between July 20 and August 21,1992, identified several !
procedural weaknesses and denciencies after reviewing a small sample of operating and alarm response procedures. The team documented the weaknesses in NRC Inspection Report No. 50-443/92-80 as an unresolved item. Some aspects of the unresolved item were closed in NRC Inspection Report No. 50-443/93-1 I One aspect of the unresolved item involved NRC and licensee identified weaknesses in the system lineup log. The lineup log contains the latest valve position veri 6 cation check sheets and valve position exception sheets. Shift superintendents believed the log was unreliable, since operators did not update exception sheets when auxiliary operators repositioned valves after removing danger tags. The inspector reviewed the system lineup log following the last refueling outage and documented the findings in NRC Inspection Report No. 50-443/92-2 The lineup log was up to date and valves on exemption sheets were cross-referenced to open tagout sheets. Operators attached pink notes on the open tagout sheets to remind auxiliary operators to update the exemption sheets in the system lineup lo During this inspection period, the inspector again reviewed the system lineup log. Operators had cleared most of the exemption sheets from the log. The operators had annotated the remaining exemption sheets to indicate how valve exemptions had been cleared and the reason for remaining valve exemptions. The inspector concluded that the licensee had maintained the system lineup log in accordance with operational procedure OP 10.3, " System Lineups." This aspect of the unresolved item is close The inspector reviewed the revised operations abnormal procedures OS 1212.01, "PCCW System Malfut : tion," OS 1213.01, " Loss of RHR During Shutdown Cooling," and OS 1213.02, "Imss of RHR While at Reduced Inventory." The NRC team identified weaknesses
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directions for recovering from accident scenarios developed by the NRC team. The inspector verified that OS 1213.01 included the recommendations made by the Seabrook Station Probability Safety Study. This aspect of the unresolved item is close The inspector concluded that North Atlantic adequately addressed all aspects of identified procedural weaknesses and no violation was identified. This item is close .0 MAINTENANCE (61726, 62703,92701) Routine Maintenance Observations Fuel Handline Activities The inspector observed portions of the receipt inspection and storage of new reactor fuel assemblies. Using the fuel handling crane in the fuel storage building, maintenance workers transferred the fuel assemblies from shipping casks to the dry storage vault. The work crew consisted of two mechanical maintenance technicians and one supervisor. A quality assurance engineer monitored the activities. Reactor engineers visually inspected and tracked the new fuel using procedure RS0722, "New Fuel and Component Inspection." A radiation protection technician performed the required radiological surveys of the new fuel and shipping cask The inspector observed the maintenance supervisor perform about half of the work. The supervisor used a mechanical platform lift and a wrench to remove the fuel from the storage casks. The supervisor connected the fuel assembly lifting tool to each fuel assembly. The two technicians remained idle watching the supervisor. The technicians operated the crane to lift each fuel assembly to transfer the fuel assembly to the dry storage vault. During the fuel transfer, the supervisor remained with the shipping casks preparing the next cas The inspector expressed concern to the supervisor that he functioned as a worker rather than a supervisor. The supervisor indicated that management wanted supervisors to become more -
involved with work activities to improve performance. Based on the inspector's concern, the supervisor changed his role to an oversight capacity. The inspector determined that the supervisor had not received training on management's expectations for supervisory oversigh Operational information report (OIR) 93-73 identified the training as a corrective action for a similar event that occurred two months earlier. The inspector discussed the lack of timely and effective completion of the training with the maintenance department manager. The maintenance manager indicated that the supervisor had been on vacation and missed the lessons learned briefing. To prevent recurrence, the maintenance manager stated that the review of lessons learned will be ensured by the use of an internal mem .
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The inspector noted that although the supervisor performed excellent fuel handling work, the supervisor became too involved with the work, which limited the normal supervisory oversight practice. The inspector considered the lack of timely and effective completion of a corrective action to be a weaknes Charging Pumo Corrective Maintenance The inspector observed mechanical maintenance technicians replace the 'A' charging pump pre-start lube oil pump, reviewed the work package, and tagging order. The pump needed to be replaced due to a leaking pump seal. The inspector reviewed the tagging order and the work package that contained the necessary instructions for performing the work. The inspector observed that the system engineer closely followed the wor The mechanics drained the lube oil sump. During installation of the replacement pump, the mechanics noticed that the new pump did not properly align with the suction piping. The mechanics stopped work to obtain a work request scope change. The scope change allowed the removal of the suction piping. The mechanics fabricated a new section of suction piping and completed installing the pump. The operators performed a satisfactory post maintenance tes The inspector observed that the mechanics were experienced and followed the work instructions. The inspector assessed that the mechanics properly obtained a work request scope chang Seismic Monitor Sensor The inspector observed instrument and control (I&C) technicians perform corrective maintenance on the primary auxiliary building 25 foot elevation seismic monitor 6707 per work request 93 WOO 3939. The technicians performed the work in the T&C hot shop traile The technicians replaced motion sensor No.15 and verified that the replacement sensor issue ticket matched the store tag number. The inspector observed that the technicians followed the procedure. The inspector assessed that the I&C technicians performed well when replacing the seismic monitor motion senso Electrical Corrective Maintenance The inspector observed portions of electrical technicians replacing a failed heating element in the 'A' control room emergency ventilation filter train per work requests 93 WOO 3817 and 93 WOO 3819. The inspector verified the adequacy of the work package and the tagging order. The electricians verified the electrical output of the heater during a post maintenance test. The inspector assessed that the technicians successfully replaced the heater elemen .l
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. Motor Operated Valve Testing: Unresolved Item 93-17-01 (Closed)
Electricians used a partial release of danger tags while testing the train 'A' cooling tower service water pump discharge valve SW-V-54. Station Ma: eenance Manual procedure MA 4.2, " Equipment Tagging and Isolation," allowed the use of a partial release for testing of equipment. However, electricians opened and shut the breaker supplying power to SW-V-54 and adjusted test equipment connections under the partial release, which was not explicitly allowed by MA The maintenance department revised MA 4.2 to allow additional activities to be conducted under a partial release. Electricians revised procedure LS0569.16, " Testing of Rising Stem MOV's Using the NHY Method," to allow closing and opening breakers to motor operators under partial release The inspector reviewed change 6 to revision 4 of MA 4.2 and revision 7 of LS0569.16. The changes created a new partial release orange tag and allowed electricians to make torque and limit switch adjustments, to make packing adjustments, and to install and remove test equipment under a partial release. MA 4.2 required an orange tag to be hung during MOV testing. Procedure IJS0569.16 provided provisions and steps to assign a person to control breaker position for motor operated valves under partial releases. The station operations review committee reviewed and approved the procedural controls for breakers to motor operated valve The inspector noted that procedure changes formalized the method for controllmg breakers to motor operated valves during valve testing. The inspector concluded that the station operations review committee's approval of the procedures provided an adequate review of the method used to control breakers. No violations were identified, therefore, this item is close .0 ENGINEERING (71707,92701) Main Steam Isolation Valve 10% Stroke Testing During main steam isolation valve (MSIV) 10% closure testing on October 28,1993, the 'A'
MSIV (MS-V86) unexpectedly shut to about 70% closed. Further closure of the valve would have resulted in a plant trip. The inspector reviewed the system description of the MSIV actuator, held discussions with technical support engineers, and observed management meetings conceming safe completion of the required MSIV testin The MSIVs are opened by hydraulic oil pressure. The MSIVs are closed by nitrogen pressure in the actuator dome. When hydraulic oil is vented to the oil reservoir, the valve closes. During valve testing, two pilot solenoid operated hydraulic valves open. One pilot valve opens a hydraulic oil vent line isolation valve. The second pilot valve positions a slow close orifice in the hydraulic oil vent lin .
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During 10% valve testing, the hydraulic oil is vented to the oil reservoir through the slow closure orince. The vent line isolation valve and the slow close orifice reposition simultaneously when the MSIV reaches 10% closed. If the slow How orifice repositioned before the isolation valve shuts, hydraulic oil vents to the oil reservoir faster and the MSIV rapidly close The technical support engineers developed six options for meeting the technical specification testing requirements. The station manager evaluated the options in terms of plant safety, practicality, and risk. The station manager selected the option for installing a jumper in the test circuitry that prevented the slow close orifice from repositioning until after the vent line ,
isolation valve shut. The technical support engineers completed testing procedure revisions and a 10CFR50.59 review to support the use of jumpers. The operators completed the 10%
MSIV stroke tests within the required periodicit The inspector observed portions of the pretest brienng and the valve testing. Technical support engineers conducted the pretest briefing and provided support during the valve testing. The briefing included discussions of contingency actions for potential testing problems. For example, if an MSIV continued to close after reaching the 10% close position, an operator would close a manual isolation valve on the hydraulic oil vent line to stop valve closure. The inspector concluded that the testing was well planned and went smoothl The inspector reviewed the maintenance work history and valve testing data for MS-V86 since June 18,1992. The nrst reported perturbation of the valve occurred on December 10, 1992. Technical support engineers prepared a work package that adjusted the 10% closure limit switch. After four successful tests, the valve again exhibited perturbations on March 5, 1993, during a post maintenance test. The technical support engineers identified the cause of the perturbation as the repositioning of the slow flow solenoid before the vent line isolation valve shut. Corrective actions included adjustments of limit switches, initiation of a test circuit design change, and a procedure revision requiring a technical support engineer to be present during future valve testin The inspector noted that the corrective actions did not prevent recurrence of a similar plant transient, but probably prevented a reactor trip. Station management became directly involved in valve testing decisions after October 28,1993. The inspector observed conservative, safety conscious, and probing discussions during several management meeting The inspector concluded that the initial technical support engineer's corrective actions to prevent valve perturbations did not resolve the identified root cause. The inspector noted that the comprehensive short and long term corrective actions implemented after management became involved were well developed and addressed the identined root cause. The inspector believed that a more critical review of the initial corrective actions by management could have prevented the October 18 transien . _
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i Replacement of Turbine ' Building Service Air Compressors: Unresolved Item 93-21-01 (Open) l l .I i
The inspector reviewed the implementation of design coordination report (DCR) 93-16,
" Replacement of the Turbine Building Service Air Compressors." The inspector observed construction work, reviewed DCR 93-16, and held discussions with operators, technical support, and engineering personne The turbine building service air system consisted of three reciprocating and one centrifugal (Centac) air compressors. The new design replaced the three reciprocating service air
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, compressors. The two temporary compressors would satisfy the 10CFR50 Appendix R )
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commitments when the permanent plant instrument air system was not available. The Centac is not credited in the Appendix R analysis. During phase 2 of the design modification, only the Centac and one temporary air compressor were available. The inspector ident:fied that .j the available air compressors did not appear to meet the intent of DCR section 3.3, j
" Implementation Considerations." The inconsistency between the DCR and the actual l
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implementation of the modification is a potential violation of work control requirements and is an unresolved item (URI 93-21-01).
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! North Atlantic experienced several difficulties in the operation of the temporary automatic-start diesel engine driven air compressors. A loss of instrument air event occurred when the Centac tripped and the temporary compressor started but did not immediately load. Air header pressure decreased to approximately 75 psig. The operations manager initiated a station information report, since a complete loss of instrument air would result in a plant tri Short term corrective actions included the vendor replacing the micro-processor control unit l on the temporary compressor to correct a software design flaw, and North Atlantic obtaining ;
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a second automatic-start temporary air compressor. The pre-operational test and the eight hour surveillance tests of the temporary air compressors had not detected the design fla The inspector noted that operations management did not conduct adequate formal training for the use of the temporary air compressors. When learning how to use the compressor controls, an operator inadvertently made a logic change. As a result, the air compressor did not automatically stop. The inspector considered the lack of formalized training to be a weaknes In summary, the inspector assessed that the DCR implementation needed increased management attention.
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8 PLANT SUPPORT (71707)
' Radiological Controls The inspector observed health physics (HP) technicians perform a monthly survey of chemical volume and control system filters. The technicians used the survey data to calculate the filter curie content. The HP staff followed the ALARA program during work performed inside containment on the incore detector. The inspector noted that plant workers adhered to radiation work permit requirements. The inspector determined that HP technicians maintained good control of plant workers entering and exiting the radiologically controlled area (RCA). The inspector observed that the radiation level survey maps posted at the entrance to the RCA were maintained up-to-date. The inspector assessed that the HP staff performed wel The inspector attended a general employee training session that provided an introduction to :
the new 10CFR20 requirements. The training provided definitions of new radiological control terminology, the new occupational dose limits, and a limited discussion of the effect of the new requirement on work practices. The inspector determined that the training session provided a good introduction to the new 10CFR20 requirement, but noted that additional training for operators and maintenance workers would be needed for a more comprehensive understanding of the changes to work practices on radiological jobs. The chemistry and health physics manager indicated that the HP staff was considering additional trainin Chemistry technicians performed well in the early identification and quantification of a condenser tube leak. The inspector noted excellent chemistry department management oversigh .2 Security The inspector observed supervisory oversight in the central alarm and secondary alarm stations. The inspector observed security guards perform thorough searches of vehicles entering the vital area. The inspector determined that the security staff properly controlled primary auxiliary building access during repair to a vital area door, and performed routine activities in a meticulous manner. The security department manager rotated three security staff supervisors with three on-watch security supervisors. The staff rotation provided for a change of pace to prevent complacency. The inspector assessed the security supervisor rotation to be a proactive measur .3 Emergency Preparedness The inspector observed a medical drill that simulated an injured and contaminated lathe worker in the hot machine shop. On-shift fire protection personnel responded to the accident scene to provide emergency medical attention. Health physics (HP) personnel performed contamination surveys and removed the worker's clothes. The inspector assessed that the HP
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personnel efficiently prepared the injured worker for transportation to the hospital. The inspector observed that the event had a high degree of realism and that the turnover between the North Atlantic and ambulance staff went well. The Town of Seabrook fire department ambulance transported the worker to the Exeter hospital. The drill coordinators monitored the drill. The inspector assessed that the plant staff demonstrated excellent teamwor The inspector attended the drill critique where the drill controllers identified strengths and opportunities for improvement. The inspector determined that the emergency preparedness ,
staff performed in an excellent manne .4 Fire Protection .
The inspector reviewed the fire protection compensatory measures established during the installation of new primary auxiliary building fire detectors. The inspectoi observed that fire protection watches remained alert and understood their responsibilitie .5 Plant ilousekeeping The inspector observed overall good plant cleanliness. The inspector noted two housekeeping issues in the I&C hot shop trailer. An empty, uncapped nitrogen compressed gas bottle was in a horizontal position on the floor. A roll of plastic tubing used in a ,
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radioactive system was not properly stored. The inspector discussed these issues with maintenance department management and the deficiencies were corrected. The inspector considered the two housekeeping deficiencies in the I&C hot shop trailer to be a minor weaknes .0 SAFETY ASSESSMENT / QUALITY VERIFICATION (40500,92702)
- Millstone 2 Leak Repair Lessons learned l The inspector reviewed North Atlantic's use of the lessons learned from a Millstone Unit 2 event that involved an uncontrolled leak repair of a chemical and volume control system valve (2-CH-442). The inspector held several discussions with North Atlantic staff, attended a lessons learned meeting, and reviewed procedure The North Atlantic executive director of nuclear production participated as a member of the independent review team that reviewed and evaluated the Millstone 2 event. After returning to Seabrook Station, the executive director of nuclear production briefed site personnel on the ,
Millstone 2 event. The briefing focused on relating the lessons learned at Millstone 2 to l Seabrook. The inspector observed that the briefmg stressed the importance of maintaining a j proper safety perspective when coping with equipment problems. Site personnel participated by asking several question .. . - _
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Nonh Atlantic distributed a videotape that provided a summary of the Millstone 2 event. In the videotape, Northeast Utilities executive management described the event and the need to l
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maintain a proper safety focus at all times. The inspector observed that North Atlantic enhanced the procedural controls for the use ofleak repair methods. The inspector observed thorough discussion and evaluation of the use of leak repair methods at the station manager's j morning meetin l l
I The inspector determined that North Atlantic aggressively applied the lessons learned from the Millstone 2 event at Seabrook Station. The inspector assessed that North Atlantic demonstrated an excellent safety perspective by the timely and thorough incorporation of the Millstone 2 leak repair lessons learne .2 Procedural Adherence: Viobvion 93-13-01 (Updated)
The inspector reviewed the North Atlantic corrective actions taken to address two examples where plant workers did not adhere to procedural instructions. North Atlantic conducted procedural compliance training for all site workers. The inspector attended one of the training sessions. At the start of each training session, the station manager provided an overview and expressed his procedural compliance expectations. A training department instructor conducted the trainin The inspector reviewed the training material provided to the participants. The material contained the program requirements for procedural adherence and the various procedure change methods. Although the training material had examples of each type of procedure change, the inspector considered the lack of worker exercises to be a minor weaknes The inspector reviewed a sampling of the procedure compliance training feedback forms completed by the participants. The workers rated the procedure compliance training as highly effective. The workers identified a few areas that needed more clarification. The station manager resolved the comments in a weekly news-letter that receives site-wide distributio During routine inspections, the inspector noted an improvement in the level of procedural adherence. The inspector assessed the procedural adherence training to be goo In the response to the procedural adherence violation, North Atlantic is addressing worker errors. North Atlantic formed a personnel error response team (PERT) that evaluated and developed recommendations to reduce personnel errors. The adequacy of the PERT recommendations and the effectiveness of the corrective actions are under revie .
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I1 MEETINGS (30702)
Two resident inspectors were assigned to Seabrook Station throughout the period. The inspectors conducted back shift inspections on November 15, and deep back shift inspections on November 14, 27, and 28, and December Throughout the inspection, the inspector met with station management to discuss inspection findings. At the conclusion of the inspection, the inspector met with the station manager and his staff to discuss the inspection findings and observations. Licensee comments concerning the findings are documented in the applicable sections of this report. No proprietary information was covered within the scope of the inspection. No written material regarding the inspection findings was given to the license Region based inspectors conducted the following exit meetings during this inspection perio DATE SURIECT REPORT N INSPECTOR 12/2 PERT 93-22 C. Goodman ,
12/3 erosion / 93-23 R. McBrearty corrosion
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