IR 05000443/1989080

Readiness Assessment Team Insp Rept 50-443/89-80 on 890527- 0601.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operations, Radiation Protection,Safety Assessment/Quality Verification & Startup Testing

ML20247B012
Person / Time
Site:	Seabrook
Issue date:	07/07/1989
From:	Haverkamp D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20247A983	List: IR 05000443/1989080 ML20247A980
References
50-443-89-80, NUDOCS 8907240017
Download: ML20247B012 (20)

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d.S.NUCLEARREGULATORfCOMMISSION Region I

' Report.No.:

50-443/89-80

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Docket No.:-

'50-443-License No.: NPF-67

. Licensee:

Public Service Company of New Hampshire.

1000 Elm Street

Manchester, New Hamp hire 03105

. Facility:

Seabrook Station, Unit.No. 1 Location:

.Se'abrook, New Hampshire Dates:

May 27 - June.I', 1989 Inspectors:

.N. Dindiey, Senior Resident Inspector R. Nimitz, Senior Radiation Specialist

.M. Kohl, Resident. Inspector M. Markley,. Resident Inspector D. Dempsey, Reactor Engineer-

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.K. Kolaczyk, Reactor Engineer

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J. Trapp;-Reactor Engineer Approved By:

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~1l'7 fD?

DonaldR.Haverkamp,Chieff'

Date Reactor Projects Section No. 3C Division of Reactor Projects

' Inspection Summary:

Areas Inspected: Programmatic assessments and direct observations were made in the areas of operations, radiation protection, safety assessment / quality verification and startup. testing. The licensee's readiness to - commence plant heatup. was evaluated by system lineup verifications, review of chemistry analyses, procedure reviews and discussions with cognizant licensee personnel.

The conduct.of the heatup was assessed over two days of 24-hour shift cb-servation.

Results: Preparations for and the conduct of plant heatup were approached in a professional manner and evolutions were controlled and deliberate. The areas of

' radiation protection, startup testing cnd management effectiveness and assur-ance of. quality were found to. be adequate. Based. on direct observation and reviews-.of the facility organizations, the licensee was found to be prepared for the-initial approach to criticality and low power testing.

One unresolved item was identified regarding the use of an operations step list for the transfer of chemical and volume control system demineralized resins (Section 5.3).

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TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE 1.

Licensee Activities..................................................

I 2.

NRC Staff Organization and Activities................................

3.

Persons Contacted....................................................

4.

Preparations for Heatup (IP 71707, 71710 and 61726)*.................

5.

Conduct of Heat'up (IP 71707, 71710 and 71715)........................

6.

Radi ation Protection (IP 83521 and 83750)...........................

7.

Startup Testing (IP 72700)...........................................

8.

Management Effectiveness / Assurance of Quality (IP 40500 and 92720)...

9.

'Overall Team Conclusion Regarding Preparation for Crit 1cality and Low Power Testing..................................................

10. Management Meetings (IP 30703).......................................

• The NRC Inspection Manual inspection procedures (IP) that were used as inspection guidance are listed for each applicable report section.

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DETAILS 1.

Licensee Activities On May 26, 1989, New Hampshire Yankee (NHY or the licensee) was granted low power license No. NPF-67 for Seabrook. Station Unit 1 (Seabrook, the plant or the facility) which superseded zero power license No. NPF-56.

Upon receipt of the low power license, New Hampshire Yankee transitioned from zero power operating procedures to normal operating procedures. The transition included removal of caution tags and locks from reactor coolant boundary valves, which were under specific zero power license condition controls.

Chemistry was established in the steam generators by using a temporary domineralizer truck and draining and refilling the steam gene-rators. Proper boron concentration was established in all tanks including the boric acid tanks, reactor water storage tank and the accumulators.

The resin was replaced in the chemical volume control system deminerali-zers. Preparations for reactor heatup were completed including close out of the containment and completion of the required mode change check lists.

Required testing was completed as the plant was heated to normal operating temperature and pressure. A detailed chonology of major plant operational milestones and activities is provided as Attachment A.

2.

NRC Staff Organization and Activities The Readiness As;essment Team (RAT) inspection evaluated the licensee's preparation for plant heatup, the conduct of plant heatup, and the licen-see's readiness for initial criticality and commencement of the low power test program.

Programmatic assessments and direct observations were made in the areas of operations, radiation protection, safety assess-ment / quality verification, and startup testing.

The team was led by the Region I, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP) Section Chief and was composed of three DRP inspectors, a startup inspector, a radiological control inspector, the NRR project manager and the senior resident in-spector.

A separate inspection was conducted during the week of May 22, 1989 which evaluated the maintenance and surveillance programs with respect to readiness for commencement of plant heatup.

The results of that inspec-tion are documented in NRC Inspection Report No. 50-443/89-05.

The licensee's completion of its programmatic requirements for commencing plant heatup were reviewed and independent verifications were conducted to assess the readiness of the licensee to commence plant heatup.

Continuous shift coverage of main control room and in plant activities was conducted to inspect and evaluate the operations department's conduct and control of the plant heatup to normal operating temperature from 6:00 a.m. May 29 through 6:00 p.m. May 31, 1989. Inspections were made of the radiological control program, startup test program and quality assurance program to assess those areas in terms of the licensee's readiness for criticality and low power testing.

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Persens Contacted Irterviews and discussions were conducted with members of the licensee l

staff and management during the period of preparation and conduct of plant

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heatup to obtain information pertinent to the areas inspected. A list of the individuals who attended the exit meeting is presented in Attachment B.

4.

Preparations for Heatup 4.1 General Inspections were conducted to assess licensee readiness to conduct plant heatup to hot shutdown (Mode 4). The assessment consisted of attendance at licensee management meetings, control room observa-tions,-system lineup verification.s, review of chemistry analyses and results, procedure reviews, and discussions with cognizant licensee

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personnel.

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4.2 Meetings Attended The inspector attended-a meeting of the licensee Independent Review Team (IRT) on May 26, 1989.

The licensee team reported that all Phase I report recommendations required to he implemented prior to initial criticality were completed.

The IRT had reviewed station information reports (SIRS) and noted a declining trend in the number i

of SIRS.

The IRT stated that the decrease appeared to be due to I

increased attention to detail by station personnel.

After detailed i

review of the nine most recent SIRS, the IRT did not identify any

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common root causes. The IRT concluded that there were no outstanding issues which would prevent the commencement of low power testing.

A department management meeting was held on May 27, 1989 to complete the mode change check lists for operational modes 3 and 4.

The status of surveillance, maintenance and other scheduled evolutions l

was discussed.

Each manager provided a list of outstanding items l

requiring completion and sign-off prior to entry into operational l

mode 4.

The inspector observed that the discussions were detailed and thorough.

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Meetings with station security management were attended on May 25, 27 and 28, 1989 regarding contingency planning for demonstrations with the potential for civil disobedience activities.

The licensee

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I conducted on going discussions with state and local law enforcement agencies concerning the numbers of demonstrators to be expected and types of activities planned. The plant security staff was augmented and the number of plant patrols in both vital and non-vital areas was

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Contingency plans were in place to assure access to the l

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o plant by site and NRC personnel in the event that main access gates.

.were blocked.. Licensee plans were well developed and-appeared adequate to maintain the security of the facility.

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4.3 Control Room Observations L

i The inspectors. reviewed control room logs and records including night

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orders, shif t journals, shift turnover sheets, temporary modifica-tions. log, 1.ocked valve log, and control board indications.

The inspectors evaluated the plant's alarm status and ~ adherence to technical specification limiting conditions for operation and action statements. Reactor coolant system and connected water supplies were-checked'for boron concentration and sampling frequencies.

Control: room operators were knowledgeable of log. contents and re-sponsive to NRC questions and concerns.

Shift turnover briefings were noted to be comprehensive and professionally conducted.

Opera-tor.respnnses to alarms were timely and correct.

4.4 procedure Reviews Operating and surveillance procedures, listed in Attachment C, were reviewed by the inspectors for technical adequacy a :d completeness.

Licensed and non-licensed operators were observed to properly utilize-procedures during all evolutions and in response to system alarms.

i Throughout the inspection, operators were noted to display a proper questioning attitude regarding evolutions in progress.

During observation of chemical and volume control system mixed bed demineralized resin changeout, the licensee's use. of temporary step list procedures was questioned by the inspector, A step list pro-cedure is intended for use when necessary to perform a task or system lineup in support of a non-routine evolution.

In accordance with licensee operating procedure DP 10.7, Revision 1, Operations Step list, these procedures are prepared by control room personnel, reviewed by a. licensed operator, and approved for implementation by the unit shift supervisor or shift superintendent.

No station operations review committee (50RC) review is required prior to utilizing the procedure. Inspector concerns regarding the use of step list procedures are detailed in paragraph 5.3 of this inspection report.

4.5 Facility Tours The inspectors toured the following areas of the plant noting general housekeeping conditions, system lineups and equipment condition:

reactor containment, containment enclosure, primary auxiliary build-ing, mechanical penetration area, circulating and service water

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L pumphouses', waste process building, emergency diesel generator. rooms,

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cturbine building, essential-and non-essential. switchgear rooms, battery rooms, and,the emergency feed pumphouse.

No discrepancies that would adversely impact on plant heatup were

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noted during these facility tours.

4.6 Conclusions Operations were conducted.by licensee' personnel in accordance with applicable station ~ procedures and technical specifications.

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licensee displayed a conservative approach to mode change prepara-tions and an appropriate level of management and quality assurance-L department oversight of station activities was evident. - No. regula-tory concerns were-identified to prec1. Je transition to hot standby l(Mode 4) operation.

5.

Conduct of Heatup 5.1 General Continuous' shif t inspection was conducted to assess the performance of licensee activities associated with the plant heatup and to confirm readiness for the low power test program.

Functional areas evaluated during the inspection were plant operations, mair.tenance, surveillance and engineering support.

Procedures reviewed. by the inspectors are listed in - Attachment C and specific plant areas toured, evolutions observed, and equipment performance. reviewed by inspectors are identified in Attachment D of this report.

5' 2 Control Room' Observations

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Inspector observation of control room activities indicated good licensee performance.

Control room personnel were cautious and deliberate in performing their dutics.

Personnel wer e knowledgeable of technical specifications, station procedures, and plant systems.

Operators continued to properly utilize procedures during 'all safety-s'gnificant evolutions and in response to system alarms.

Shift turnovers wet, noted to be thorough and well delivered.

.A positive questioning attitude was continuously observed.

Shift turnover documentation adequately detailed off-normal conditiens and plans for the oncoming shift.

Access to the control board area was well maintained.

No loitering of non-shift personnel was observed.

The inspectors noted few occasions where personnel entered without first securing unit shift supervisor permission.

Licensed personnel demonstrated positive control and observation of operator trainee board manipulations.

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The shift ' superintend'.t maintained good oversight of control room activities.

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shift superintendents occasionally - performed

- administrative activities inside the:" horseshoe" area of. the control:

room panels in the vicinity of the licensed operator stations, which-could have been conducted as effectively in another location,- thereby limiting potential. distractions of the operating shift.. This prac-

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' tice' did not result in any performance errors or' operational events

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during the conduct of heatup.

Nonetheless, the. inspectors brought this matter to the attention lof operations and ' plant management for their~ consideration in enhand ng the general conduct of future control room activities.

Control room commur.ications were generally good. Auxiliary operators cerforming system lineups were in continuous communication with the control. room.

Maintenance, surveillance, and QA/QC personnel' in-terfaced-well wits the operations staff. However,. one incident indicating 'a need to improve shift personnel communications was identified. On May 31, 1989 while aligning the residual heat removal'

(RHR) system valses for entry into operational mode 3, valve RH-V14=

failed to open when it was remotely operated from the control room panei. The shif t superintendent (SS) directed the cognizant system engineer to troubleshoot valve RH-V14 locally without fully informing the c:ntrol room staff. When the inspector observed the control room position indicatirn for valve RH-V14 change from the closed to mid 5osition, the unit shift supervisor (USS) was unable ' to correctly identify the type of troubleshooting that was being performed on the walve. Senior operations management characterized this as being an isolated incident and not indicative of normal control room prac-tices.

The operations manager assured the -inspector that steps would be taken to improve performance.in this area.. The specific licensee actions, which were not identified by the end of the team inspection, will be reviewed during a subsequent routine resident inspection.

Logkeeping documentation of plant activities and status-was good.

However, the inspector identified a naed to improve "real - time" documentation of off-normal conditions and emergency notification system (ENS) operability testing.

Additiona11y, the use of pre-

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liminary notes ' for logbook entries may contribute to documentation-traceability problems. On May 30, the licensee experienced a loss of plant computer availability and normal control room phone service.

The licensee adequately documented the time when the computer failed but did not document when the computer was returned to service. When normal control room phone service was lost, the licensee verified the-operability of the NRC ENS phone, phone service for offsite and state communications, and the availability for onsite gaitronics com-munications systems.

However, these communication verifications were not documented in tht shift logbook. Senior station manaocment acknowledged the inspector's concerns and reaffirmed the licensee's

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n 6-commitment to record log entries in accordance with uisting program:

. requirements. Continuing inspector review indicated satisfactory-shift document,. tion.

' 5.3 i System Verification ar.d Conduct of Operational Evolutions Licensee performance in properly aligning systems and. conducting operational evolutions was good. The physical condition of the plant was satisfactory in that materials and equipment were properly,.

stored. ' No unacceptable housekeeping conditions were observed which..

would constitute a system hazard for normal operations or a potential missile hazard.

Fire protection equipment was found to be properly stored and tested.

Inspector review of system lineups noted them to be correct for the

. applicable plant conditions and preparations for mode changes.

Personnel adequately addressed equipment problems that arose when preparing the plant for heatup'.

Planning was generally good. Work requests were issued as required. Inspector identified discrepancies were immediately addressed by the licensee. Equipment status changes-were documented and communicated to appropriate shift personnel..

Operational evolutions were planned, authorized and implemented in accordance with the " shift plan" and stat %n procedures.

However, during the transfer of chemical and ' volume ~ control system (CVCS)

demineralized resins, the inspector identifiers some problems re-garding the use of operations step lists pe; procedure OP 10.7.

Specifically, operations step lists89-005 and 89-006. for the CVCS resin transfer indicated evidence of poor planning. Initially, step list 89-005-lacked the necessary guidance t'o complete the evolution as issued and required: revision = during implementation, anti then the subsequent step list 89-006 was necessary to complete l the' evolution.

O her inspector concerns included the lack of quality < assurance r, view prior to implementation and the need for a higher level of independent verification authorization.

Also, operations step list guidance was inconsistent with the more stringent programmatic controls found in maintenance step lists.

Senior station management was responsive to the inspector concerns.

The licensee asserted that the evolution did not constitute a safety hazard since the demineralized resins had not been used to process radioactive liquids and that no resins were spilled.

The licensee acknowledged the programmatic weaknesses with the operations step list program. The licensee stated that the program would be upgraded to be consistent with the controls and guidance entailed in main-tenance step lists which require departuent manager review and authorization.

Specifically, in addition to requiring unit shift supervisor review and approval, OP 10.7 would be revised to also require shift superintendent (management) review and approval as well as independent quality control r9 view and signature prior to

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use. 'The inspector noted that OP 10.7" already' requires post-r

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p implementation, onsite review committee = review and prohibits. the

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.use 'of operations step lists for.certain activities,. e.g., surveil '

lance -tests, emergency safety features system alignment, and evolu-tions that' alter core reactivity.

The inspector'noted, however, that the use of step lists as complete L D

procedures effectively bypasses the' normal station review cycle. that

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is followed for developing ' station procedures.

This fact was also identified ~by licensee quality assurance (QA) personnel, who observed

'the resin exchange and documented in QASR. 89-0027 that. step list 89-005 merited implementation 'as a procedure rather than a step list.

L The' use of this step list as a procedure that bypassed the normal'

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review cycle is ' unresolved pending resolution of inspector and QA

identified-weaknesses (89-80-01).

During. the. May " 31 residual heat removal (RHR) system lineeos in

. preparation for entry.into operational modr. 3, the inspector obse*ved sa systems engineer testing valve RH-V14. The inspector was concern 9d'

that a systems engineer was operatirg equipment. which norma 11/

requires specific training and qualification as an auxiliary _ opera-tor. The licensee explained that the contractor systems engineer was the cognizant individual. responsible-for declaring the valve operable and that he had been previously qualified to tag equipment. During a subsequent discu.;sion, the operations manager assured the inspector that only. properly qualified individuals. were allowed to operate equipment.

The inspector determined that in this instance the systems engineer was knowledgeable and qualified for the limited a ctivities associated with testing valve RH-V14. The qualifications cf individuals operating plant equipment will continue'to.'be moni-tored during routine resident inspections.

5.4 Maintenance, Surveillance, and Engineering Support Inspr.* ~ review of plant maintenance, surveillance testing, and engineering support indicated good licensee performance.

! rveil-lances required for heatup and mode changes were adequately com-pleted.

Maintenance and test equipment (MTE) was observed to be properly calibrated. Plant heatup was stopped when equipment did not satisfy surveillance requirements.

Maintenance work requests were -

issued as required.

Engineering evaluations were initiated for equipment anomalies'which were identified during surveillance testing and normal maintenance.

Below is a list of equipment problems or discrepancies that occurred during the heatup.

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Demineralized temperature divert valve CS-TCV-129 failed to

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operate in the automatic mode of control.

Licensee investi-i gation revealed that an electrical lead on cable GP-7-LCO to an

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interlock contact was found lifted. The interlock was installed as a modification to the valve. The licensee promptly issued a

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work request to repair the valve. The licensee is evaluating the failure through a : station incident report (SIR).

No - immediate -

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safety concern exi st s.,

The resident inspector will review theilicensee SIR determination and corrective actions during routine inspection.

Loop ~ '1. resistance temperature detector (RTD) bypass flow in '

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dication was lower than ' expected.

An engineering evaluation has been issued.

Initial - licensee assessment was that the indication. system was accurate and that the bypass flow was low.

The loop bypass line had been modified previously.

l-RHR valve ~ problems. Crossover valve RH-V21 would not cycle and.

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l was opened manually. Cold leg isolation valve RH-V14 failed to cycle.on demand. The licensee was troubleshooting these valves at the end of the inspection.

-l Reactor coolant pump (RCP-8) vibration.

The initial licensee

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assessment was that it was an indication problem and-that RCP-B

was rot actually vibrating abnormally.

The licensee is addressing the above described equipment problems through appropriate programs and procedures. The resident inspector will verify the adequacy of equipment problem resolution.

5.5 Management 0,ersight Senior management personnel were observed to actively mon'itor heatup progress in the control room. The inspector attended plan of the day meetings-and noted them to be effective in prioritizing and address-ing plant challenges. Communication among participants was organized and orderly. The plant management staff was responsive'in addressing inspector concerns.

5.6 Summary of Observations of plant Heatup The licensee was conservative during plant heatup.

Staffing was adequate. Personnel were conscientious and responsive in performing their duties and addressing inspector concerns.

Operations, main-tenance and testing activities were, for the most put, conducted in a deliberate controlled manner and evolutions werc conducted pro-fessionally by the plant staff.

6.

Radiation Protection The readiness and capability of the licensee's radiological controls program to support initial criticality and low power testing was reviewed.

The inspector selectively examined the adequacy of the radiological controls organization and staffing, the training and qualification of

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appropriate radiological controls. personnel, the training and qualifi-cation. of radiation workers, the establishment of the Radiological Con-trolled Zone, the numbers and adequacy of radiation and airborne radio-activity' monitoring instruments, the implementation of the external and internal exposure control programs including the provisions of personnel dosimetry devices and radiation work permit program, the establishment and control of acces':to potential High Rad $atinn Areas, the implementation of s

the, shield survey program, the controls f;r radioactive and contaminated material and the implementation of the personnel contamination control program.

The inspector also reviewed the level of understanding of radiation protection department personnel of on going and planned' activities and the adequacy of inter and intra departmental communications. In addition, the inspector reviewed the level of management efforts.to independently verify-the adequacy of the radiological controls program to support initial criticality and Sw power testing.

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The inspector evaluated licensee performance in the above areas by means of independent. aservation during,)lant tours, discussions with appro-priate licensee personnel and review of documentation.

The inspector considered overall licensee efforts to establish and implement an adequate and effective radiological controls program to support initial criticality and' low power testing to be pro-active and commendable. With the excep-

. tion of the isolated weaknesses discussed below, the overall radiological controls program was found to be adequate to support initial criticality and low power testing. -The licensee implemented prompt corrective-actions for the identified weaknesses.

Although a radiological control personnel training program was

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implemented, the program did not effectively provide for reading of important procedure changes or new procedures in a timely fashion.

Some personnel had not read some important new procedures (e.g. High Radiation Area Access Contr,!).

The licensee immediately required all appropriate personnel to read the procedures and initiated changes to administrate procedures to provide for reading of important procedure chang 's or new proceduros in a timely fashion.

Licensee radiological cor.t re's procedures contained a number of

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statements in which a particular action (e.g. surveying of material)

was recommended rather than required.

The licensee immediately initiated action to require all "shoulds" in radiological controls procedures to be treated as "shalls" pending a thorough review of the l

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L procedures. This action was taken 'mmediately.

The licensee's high radiation area access control procedures did not

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contain well defined criteria for scheduling performance of radiation l.

surveys to support high radiation area work or for actions to take following loss of a high radiation area access key.

The licensee immediately initiated action to address these matters.

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The. licensee moved a shielded neutron source into the instrument-

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calibration room for use. in checking neutron survey meters... The shielded source,- however, was producing a neutron field of 1-2 mrem /hr.

Personnel stood in. the field when calibrating other in-struments. The licensee acted immediately to move the source.-

Tha overall radiological controls program was found to be adequate to support initial criticality and low power testing.

Several isolated weaknesses were corrected.

Radiological controls personnel were found to be conscientious with a good understanding of ongoing and planned ac-tivities.

An appropriate level of mane ~ ment and quality assurance department oversight of the program was evioent.

7.

Startup Testing The low power physics test program, procedures and personnel qualifi-cations have been reviewed previously and documented in inspection report 50-443/88-13. Observations made by the inspector during the inspection have been evaluated by the licensee and incorporated into the rtartup test program where applicable. The inspector concluded that th: personnel, equipment and procedures were ready to conduct the low power phisics test program.

After a review of changes made to the test program since the last inspection, the inspector's conclusion that the licensee is prepared to conduct the low power physics test program remains valid.

8.

Management Effectiveness / Assurance of Quality The Nuclear Quality Group (NQG) is responsible for carrying out the Operational Quality Assurance Program (0QAP), the licensee's program that the applicable regulatory requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix 8.

meets The NQG reports to the Vice president-Engineering, Licensing, and Quality Programs and currently has a staff of fifty-five pers, with five con-tractor positions approved.

The NQG consists of thi:. Quality Control, Audit and Evaluation, Quality Assurance Engineering and Quality Assurance Surveillance Sections. NQG management holds daily update meetings, attends the station plan of-day meetings and the daily station manager's meeting, With regard to the readiness for the commencement of initial criticality

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and the low power test program, the NQG prepared certain of its staff for these events.

The NQG assigned two quality control (QC) personnel shift (three per shifts per day), one quality assurance (QA) surveillance senior reactor operator qualif # person per shift (two twelve-hour shifts per day), and quality control engipring personnel on a " call-in" basis.

NQG staffing will provide shift coverage until the completion of low power testing and is considered by the inspector to be adequate.

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Preparation.s specific to low power testing for the assigned personnel ircluded special briefings, development of inspector guidelines for use during the low power testing program, and review of the startup test

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program test description and stretup test procedures..Also, the assigned

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l personnel were. required to rean and learn the appropriate sections of the l

~ technical specifications.

The two Phase I licensee Self-Assessment Team-(

recommendations that. required NQG action before initial criticality were.

completed acceptably.

These recommendations included NQG obtaining the requisite technical and operational expertise for the low power test program and additional training of the QA and QC personnel assigned to low

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power testing activities.

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The licensee continues to perform self-assessment of its activities in order to assess its operational readine's and effectiveness.

The Inde-s pendent Review Team (IRT) is performing a self-assessment of the pre-paration for low power testing. The self-assessment is being performed in two phases. Phase I was completed and a report issued in October 1988. As a result of the-IRT, elf-assessment, recommended Phase I NQG actions were developed that needed to be satisfactorily completed before initial criticality. The inspector determined that this has been done except for the NQG activities associated with the final acceptance te(ting of the emergency feedwater system which is scheduled to be com, eted before criticality.

As mentioned above, action on those recommendations per-taining to NQG were completed.

Phase II of the self-assessment will continue through low power testing; however, Phase II assessments ac-complished to date are in the process of being reviewed with the func-tional area managers.

The IRT determined that none of the currently identified Phase II recommended actions that may pertain to the NQG are required to be completed before initial criticality; therefore, none of these have any impact on low power testing. Based on a preliminary review of the identified Phase II recommended actions, the inspector agreed with that IRT determination..

9.

Overall Team Conclusion Regarding Preparations for Criticality and L Power Testing

Based on observation, inspection and review of the licensee's programs and operations, it was found that the licensee is adequately prepared for the approach to initial criticality and low power testing.

Operations conducted in preparation for plant heatup and the evolutions and testing performed during plant heatup were conducted by the licensee in accordance with applicable station procedures and technical specifica-tions.

The licensee displayed a conservative approach to operations and maintained discipline in the main control room. Control of access to the main control board area, communications, log keeping and performance of operational evo?ut kra were good. Potential performance improvements were identified by the inspectors in the areas of communications in the main control room, timely log entries, and use of operations step lists.

Plant maintenance, surveillance testing, engineering support and radiological controls were found to be good.

The overall plant material condition was good.

Sufficient management and NQG oversite was observed in all aspects of the facility operation. All recommendations for low power which were

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developed during the licensee self-assessment process, have been com-pleted. The startup test program personnel and procedures are adequate to conduct the low power test program.

Management Meetings At periodic intervals during this inspection, meetings were held with senior plant management to discuss the findings.

The inspectors met with licensee representatives (ienoted in Attachment B) at the conclusion of the inspection on June 1, 1989.

The inspectors summarized the scope and findings of the inspection. No proprietary information was identified as being involved within the scope of the inspection.

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' ATTACHMENT A

- MAJOR PLANT OPERATIONAL MILESTONES AND ACTIVITIES IN PREPARATION FOR LOW POWER TESTING AT SEABROOK STATION

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May 18 Formal radiological control area procedures initiated.

.May 18.

Commission voted to issue low power license.

9'00a.m.

Low power license issued.

May 26

9:30a.m.

Independent Review Team recommended commencement of

' low power test program.

5:30p.m.

-Began 6ransition from zero power to normal operating-procedures.

9:00p.m.

Removed boron boundary tags, valves unlocked and-repositioned.

May 27.

11:00a.m.

Managers met to complete signatures on the operational.-

mode Change Check lists.

May 28 6:00p.m.

Started a reactor coolant pump (RCP) and allowed tem-perature and pressure to drift up.

May.29 7:00a.m.

Closed out containment.

8:21a.m.

Shift superintendent authorized change to operational mode 4.

9:51a.m.

Completed shift Technical. Specification (TS) log for operational mode 5.

10:51a.m.

Completed shift TS log for operational mode 4.

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11:00a.m.

Entered operational mode 4.

3:15p.m.

Completed transition from zero power to normal operating procedures.

10:12p.m.

Began dilution of the reactor coolant system (RCS)

from 2100 ppm to 1550 ppm.

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May 30 4:30a.m.

Completed boration of resin beds.

p 8:22a.m.

Recommenced heatup with four RCP's.

8:30p.m.

Established boron concentration of 1530 ppm.

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Mayf31 L4:00a.m.

Opened main steam. isolation valves.

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' Secured residual heat removal' system, began removing.

W heat with steam dumps to the condenser.

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x 5:30a.m.

Established hydrogen. overpressure on_ volume control.

tank.

May 31'

7:40p.m.

Completed shift TS log for operational mode 3.

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10 : 24 p.m'.

Completed:over speed test of the turbine-driven emergency feedwater pump turbine with pump uncoupled.

June'I-5:54a.m.

. Completed emergency core cooling systems (ECCS) ch'eck-valve testing.

6:00a.m.

Completed ECCS lineup for operational mode 3_

operations.

8:40a.m.

Shift superintendent authorized change from operational mode 4:to operational mode.3.

L 9:09a.m.

Entered operational mode 3.

June'2

'5:00a.m.

Completed verification of ECCS valve line up.

June.3 12:34a.m.

Established normal operating temperature and pressure.

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ATTACHMENT B PERSONNEL ATTENDING EXIT INTERVIEW ON JUNE 1, 1989 NRC Personnel N. Dudley, Senior Resident D. Haverkamp, Chief,. Reactor Projects Section 3C M. Markley, Resident Inspector

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V. Nerses, Seabroak Project Manager R. Nimitz, Senior Radiation Specialist J. Trapp, Reactor Engineer

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New Hampshire Yankee Personnel S. Barraciough, Technical Project Engineer S. Buchwald, QA Supervisor J. Cady, Jr., ISEG Supervisor R. Connolly, Jr., Lead Technical QC Inspector R. Cooney, Maintenance Department Supervisor D. Covill, Surveillance Supervisor R. Cyr, Maintenance Manager Y. Feigenbaum, Vice President Engineering, Licensing and Quality J. Grillo, Operations Manager P. Gurney, Reactor Engineer Department Supervisor g. Kenney, System Support Managar () Kline, Technical Support Manager

'J. Kwasnik, Principal Health Physicist l

W. Leland, Chemistry and Health Physics Manager J. Malone, Operations Administrative Supervisor J. Marchi, Nuclear Quality Group R. Martel, Staff Engineer D. McLain, Production Service Manager D. Moody, Station Manager T. Murphy, I&C Department Supervisor V. Pascucci, QC Inspection Supervisor J. Peschel, Operational Programs Manager D. Perkins, Operational Programs

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N. Pillsbury, Independent Review Team Manager J. Rafalowski, Health Physics Department Supervisor L. Rau, Reliability and Safety Engineer Manager C. Roberts, Station Staff i

R. Sherwin, Plant Services and Outage Manager i

E. Sovetsky, Technical Project Supervisor

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W. Temple, NRC Coordinator G. Thomas, Vice President Nuclear Production C. Vincent, QC Department Supervisor L. Walsh, Operational Support J. Warnock, Nuclear Quality Manager

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PROCEDURES' REVIEWED Operating Procedures

.0P 9.5, Rev.2-

= Alarm Response Guidelines-

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'0P 10.7, Rev.'l-Operations Step List 0S 1000.01, Rev.6'

.Heatup From Cold Shutdown'to Hot Standby OS 1001.05 Rev.3

' Reactor' Coolant Pump Operation OS 1001.08 Rev.3'

Operation of the. Pressurizer Relief Tank OS 1002-07

.Rev.2

. Establishing a. Hydrogen Atmosphere on the Volume

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Control Tank'

051002.09 Rev.3

' Resin Fill of Mixed Bed Demineralizers 2A andL2B OS 1005.05'

.Rev.7 Safety Injection System Operation OS 1013.06 Rev.3 Residual Heat Removal Train B Shutdown 05'1015.19-Rev.3 Containment Closecut Procedure OS 1019.13-Rev.2 Steam Generator Wet Layup and Recirculation

-Change 2 OS 1030.01 Rev.8 Main Steam System Operation OS1036.01'

Rev.5 Aligning the Emergency Feedwater System for-Change 1 Automatic Initiation OS 88-1-13 Rev.0 Plant Transition from Zero Power to Normal Operating Procedures

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.o Attachment C 2-l-

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Test Procedures IX 1660.872 Rev.3 R-6516 PCCW Loop "A" Radiation Monitor Operational Test IX 1660.873 Rev.3'

R-6516 PCCW Loop "B" Radiation Monitor Operational Test OX 0901.17 Rev.3 Accumulator Boron Concentration OX 1401.02 Rev,3 RCS Steady State Leak Rate Calculation OX 1430.01 l'er 2 Main Steam Isolation Valve Closure Test Change 7 STP 101 Rev.3 Turbine Driven Emergency Feedwater Start. Verification Change 7 Test

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L ATTACHMENT D'

L CONDUCT OF HEATUP l

Areas Toured-

--Control Room

--Residual Heat Removal. Vaults

--Reactor Containment Building

--Waste Treatment Area l

--Primary' Auxiliary Building'.

--Hvdrocen Monitoring Area L

--Emergency Diesel Generator Rooms

--Chemical. cad Volume Control System Area

--Essential-Switchgear Room ~

--Service Water Building

--Turbine Building _

--Cooling Tower Area

--Containment Penetration Area Evolutions Observed

- primary system. heatup and pressurization to mode 3

--reactor coolant pump operations

--chemical and volume control system lineups

'- residcal heat removal operations

---boric acid mix tank recirculation and sampling

--demineralized resin. sluicing, filling, venting, and boration

- pressurization of safety injection accumulators

--reactor coolant system boron dilution

--main steam isolation valve closure tests

--steam dump operation

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--steam generator recirculation Equipment Performance Reviewed

--demineraliger temperature divert valve CS-TCV-129'

--feedwater isolation valve FW-V39

--residual heat removal crossover valves RH-V21, RH-V14

--loop 1 RTD bypass flow indication

--emergency feedwater overspeed test

--reactor coolant pump vibration indication

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